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# **Débâcle: The 11th GTA Report on Protectionism**

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## Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Centre for Economic Policy Research  
77 Bastwick Street  
London  
EC1V 3PZ  
UK

Tel: +44 (0) 20 7183 8801

Fax: +44 (0)20 7183 8820

Email: [cepr@cepr.org](mailto:cepr@cepr.org)

Web: [www.cepr.org](http://www.cepr.org)

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# Débâcle: The 11th GTA Report on Protectionism

Edited by Simon J. Evenett



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ALERT

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## About Global Trade Alert (GTA)

Global Trade Alert provides information in real time on state measures taken during the current global economic downturn that are likely to discriminate against foreign commerce. Global Trade Alert is:

**Independent:** GTA is co-ordinated by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, an independent academic and policy research think-tank based in London, UK. GTA draws upon expertise and analysis from 7 independent research institutions around the world.

**Comprehensive:** GTA complements and goes beyond the WTO and World Bank's monitoring initiatives by identifying those trading partners likely to be harmed by state measures.

**Accessible:** The GTA website allows policy-makers, exporters, the media, and analysts to search the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading partners harmed, and by sector. Third parties will be able to report suspicious state measures and governments will be given the right to reply to any of their measures listed on the website.

**Transparent:** The GTA website allows policymakers, government officials, exporters, the media, and analysts to report discriminatory measures, but also will provide data for all stakeholders on the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading partners harmed, and by sector.

**Timely:** The up-to-date information and informed commentary provided by Global Trade Alert will help ensure that the G20 pledge not to "repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras" is met, by maintaining confidence in the world trading system, deterring beggar-thy-neighbour acts, and preserving the contribution that exports could play in the future recovery of the world economy.

For further information, visit [www.GlobalTradeAlert.org](http://www.GlobalTradeAlert.org)

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# Foreword

Global Trade Alert was launched in 2009 with a simple objective: to provide information – in real time – on state measures taken during the current global downturn that are likely to affect foreign commerce and to identify the trading partners likely to be harmed by these measures.

Compiling this information, though straightforward in principle, is challenging in practice. During the first half of 2012, the GTA team has taken a thorough update of the information compiled between 2009 and 2011. The results of the update are dramatic: GTA has identified 400 new measures introduced in the past six months, compared to the 300 identified in earlier periods. More important, though, are the revisions to the data collected since 2009. These revisions reveal that the amount of protectionism actually introduced in 2009 was almost double that previously estimated by GTA. GTA has been accused of exaggerating the extent of protectionism. The revised data show that, far from crying wolf, GTA seriously underestimated the number of wolves already gathering outside the door.

The broader lesson to be learned is that protectionism takes time to find and document. It requires energy and determination as well, of course, and Simon Evenett possesses both in abundance. We owe him a vote of thanks for his leadership of the GTA initiative. Thanks are also due once again to Simon's indefatigable team at the Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research in St. Gallen, who initially compiled and have now updated GTA's online database of protectionist measures. The team comprises Raphael Baumgartner, Johannes Fritz, Darya Gerasimenko, Bruno Hässig, Marco Kräuchi, and Estelle Tanner. CEPR's Publications Team – Anil Shamdasani and Charlie Anderson – provided invaluable support, as always.

We also owe thanks to GTA's supporters: the International Development Research Center (IDRC) in Canada, and the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK, for their continued financial support for the core GTA monitoring activities, which have been undertaken by teams around the world, and for the development of a number of analytical studies and workshops on protectionism that have helped deepen our understanding of the regional impact of protectionist measures, particularly in Africa and Latin America. This support has been generous and most welcome, but IDRC and DFID of course play no role in the operation of GTA, nor do they necessarily endorse the opinions expressed in this Report.

As Simon notes in his Executive Summary, "Since official international initiatives amount to a weak bulwark against protectionism, any restraint is likely to have domestic sources... The emphasis then must be on winning the argument for maintaining open borders in each major trading nation. Here business

associations, consumer groups, and the media – supported by information provided by international organisations – should be at the fore of making the case against protectionism.” We hope that the independent monitoring and analysis provided by Global Trade Alert will help provide the evidence needed to make this case.

Stephen Yeo  
Chief Executive Officer, CEPR  
13 June 2012



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# 1 Executive Summary

**Simon J. Evenett**

*University of St. Gallen and CEPR*

In recent weeks official bodies such as the World Trade Organization and the European Commission as well as leading private sector associations—the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the so-called B20 group of business leaders—have made strong statements concerning rising protectionism in the run up to the G20 summit in Los Cabos, Mexico. They were right to do so. Having undertaken the most extensive update to the Global Trade Alert to date an unedifying picture emerges. Chapter 2 of this report provides an extensive overview of the key features of crisis-era protectionism.

There has been a steady stream of protectionist measures introduced since the last G20 summit—at least 110 measures have been implemented, 89 of which were imposed by G20 members. This report demonstrates that the amount of protectionism in 2010 and 2011 was considerably higher than previously thought. An additional 226 protectionist measures were found in those two years, representing a 36% increase on the number of beggar-thy-neighbour policies implemented during 2010 and 2011.

Such protectionism translates into lost commercial opportunities, threatened jobs, and slower economic recoveries. In very tangible terms, if the information available now had been known just six months ago—in November 2011 when our last report was published—then the number of times China’s commercial interests have been hurt by foreign protectionism in the three years following the November 2008 summit would have been increased by 105. Over the same time frame United States’ commercial interests were harmed 107 more times than previously thought. The understatement in previous reports of the frequency of harm done to many G20 countries’ commercial interests is of the order of at least 20%. Ultimately, what this means is that the world trading system did not settle down to low levels of protectionism after the spike in beggar-thy-neighbour policies in 2009.

What is more, the evidence presented in this report casts doubts on the strength of international restraints on the resort to protectionism by governments, in particular by G20 governments. There are two pieces of compelling evidence here. First, the share of the worldwide totals of protectionism implemented by the G20 countries has risen year-in and year-out. In 2009 sixty per cent of protectionism was implemented by G20 governments—that percentage has risen in the year to date in 2012 to 79%. Findings such as these cast the repeated G20 commitments to eschew protectionism in a particularly bad light. Some

observers of the G20 have noted that these commitments have been demoted in the respective summit declarations and the GTA's evidence reveals just how little priority the G20 countries have actually given to maintaining an open world trading system.

Second, while there has been a sustained increase in the use of trade defence measures since the last G20 summit, resort to the traditional forms of protectionism that are relatively-speaking better regulated by the WTO account never exceeded 42% of measures implemented in any recent year. During the crisis era, then, governments have circumvented tougher WTO rules and used beggar-thy-neighbour policies subject to less demanding or no binding multilateral trade rules. Much of that discrimination is pretty non-transparent—that is, it is murky protectionism.

This finding does not imply that the WTO rules are useless, rather so long as they remain incomplete that circumvention is to be expected. If anything, the policy implication is that more far-reaching WTO rules are ultimately needed, even if there is little apparent appetite among governments for expanding the remit of multilateral trade rules at this time. It is probably safer to conclude that the WTO rules have altered the composition rather than the amount of protectionism in recent years.

Since official international initiatives amount to a weak bulwark against protectionism, any restraint is likely to have domestic sources. For sure, it would be desirable for G20 governments to start doing what they said they would do at their first summit in November 2008—that is, refrain from protectionism—and having failed to do so to date, to unwind the protectionism that has been put in place. Moreover, peer pressure could and should be employed to rein those G20 countries that have engaged in extensive discrimination against trading partners.

Short of a major change of heart, the G20 is unlikely to deliver on these recommendations—and expectations should be moderated accordingly. The emphasis then must be on winning the argument for maintaining open borders in each major trading nation. Here business associations, consumer groups, and the media—supported by information provided by international organisations—should be at the fore of making the case against protectionism. The hard work in fighting protectionism is at the national level and not in writing reports for international summits. Information has its role, but it is not enough to limit the damage done to the relatively liberal world trading system created in the post war era.


The remainder of this Executive Summary describes in more detail some of the key insights in this, the eleventh, GTA report.

## Not only is there no let up in the resort to protectionism—if anything 2010 and 2011 saw much more protectionism than previously thought

Figure 1.1 sheds light on the rate at which protectionist measures were imposed since the first crisis-era G20 summit in November 2008. By comparing the data from this report with the last one, there is a substantial upward revision in the totals for every quarter since Q4 2009. The immediate implication is that the levels of protectionism in 2010 and 2011 were higher than previously thought.

This finding helps make the point that evidence on protectionism takes time to assemble and instant assessments almost certainly underestimate the true amount of protectionism. Another implication is that the falling off of the total number of protectionist measures per quarter reported for 2011 and 2012 should not automatically be attributed to greater restraint on the part of governments. Similar initial findings of lower quarterly totals were found in earlier GTA reports. Those totals were revised substantially up over time.

**Figure 1.1** After reporting lags the total number of protectionist measures implemented during 2010 and 2011 converged to the 100-120 range per quarter. Q4 2008 seems more anomalous as time goes on—protectionism jumped up in 2009 and has not returned to 2008 levels




A sharp jump up in the number of protectionist measures was seen in Q1 2009, with over 170 measures imposed in that quarter alone. After that, the next four quarters saw more than 115 measures implemented. Each subsequent quarter from Q2 2010 to Q3 2011—with the exception of Q3 2010—has rapidly trended towards totals of 100-120 measures. Quarter-by-quarter governments have consistently added to the stock of crisis-era protectionist measures—Q1 2009 may have been exceptionally awful but it was hardly the only quarter when open borders came under threat.

Figure 1.1 also contains some good news. Quite a few—certainly not a majority—of protectionist measures implemented from Q1 2009 to Q1 2010 are no longer in force. Still, approximately 100 protectionist measures implemented in each of those quarters remain in force. For reference, this total is double the number of protectionist measures implemented in Q4 2008 that are still in force.

### The G20 is responsible for the bulk of crisis-era protectionism

Together the G20 countries have implemented 877 almost certainly discriminatory measures and 136 likely discriminatory measures since November 2008. Of the total (1013), 272 were trade defence measures. This implies that 73% of all protectionist measures implemented worldwide during the crisis era were not antidumping, countervailing duties, or safeguards actions.

**Figure 1.2** The share of worldwide protectionist measures implemented by the G20 has risen every year since 2009




Taken together the G20 countries are responsible for 66% of all protectionist measures taken since the first crisis-era G20 summit in November 2008. Of the protectionist measures still in force the G20 countries are responsible for 69% of the worldwide total. In 2009 approximately 60% of all protectionist measures were taken by G20 countries. By 2011 that percentage had risen to 75%. In the year to date, that percentage has risen further to 79%, see Figure 1.2.

Countries may differ in the rate at which they announce state measures, so a simple count of the total number of protectionist measures may be misleading. One alternative is to compute for each G20 country the proportion of the total number of implemented measures that are almost certainly discriminatory (coded red in the GTA database), likely to be discriminatory (coded amber), and liberalising or transparency-improving (coded green) measures. Having sorted the G20 countries in descending order of the number of discriminatory measures (red plus amber), the results are portrayed in Figure 1.3. Compared to a ranking based on the total number of discriminatory measures implemented, Japan, Turkey, India, and Saudi Arabia move up the list of offending G20 nations. Argentina, the EU 27, and France remain highly ranked. This figure gives one way to compare the resort to protectionism across the G20 countries.

In terms of both the number of discriminatory measures imposed and the proportion of discriminatory measures imposed, the G20 country that has refrained from protectionism the most is Mexico, the host of the forthcoming summit.

**Figure 1.3** The composition of state measures taken by each G20 country since November 2008, ranked by descending order in the proportion of protectionist measures implemented



## G20 countries frequently in the lists of the top 10 worst offenders

The GTA does not calculate the amount of commerce affected by each state measure, nor the associated welfare impact. To do so for 2430 state measures would be exceptionally resource intensive. Instead four intermediate metrics of harm done by a jurisdiction are reported: the number of almost certainly (coded red) discriminatory measures implemented, the number of tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures, the number of sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures, and the number of trading partners harmed by a jurisdiction's almost certainly discriminatory measures. All the trading jurisdictions in the GTA database are ranked in descending order on these

four metrics and the top 10 offenders on each category are reported in Table 1.1. Looking across the top 10 lists it is striking how often G20 members are mentioned.

In terms of discriminatory measures imposed the EU 27 is the worst offender, in terms of tariff lines affected Vietnam is worst (due to repeated, transparent competitive devaluations), in terms of sectors affected Argentina tops the list (a combination of many protectionist measures), and in terms of trading partners harmed China tops the list (in part due to its extensive export management policies through selective VAT rebates for exporters). China and Argentina are represented in the top 10 list of offenders in all four categories of harm. Germany, India, and Russia are listed in three of the four top 10 list of worst offenders.<sup>1</sup>

**Table 1.1** Which countries have inflicted the most harm since November 2008?

Metric, Country in specified rank, Number				
Rank	Ranked by number of (almost certainly) discriminatory measures imposed	Ranked by the number of tariff lines (product categories) affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of sectors affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of trading partners affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures
1	EU27 (302)	Viet Nam (931)	Argentina (63)	China (193)
2	Russian Federation (169)	Venezuela (786)	Algeria (62)	EU27 (187)
3	Argentina (141)	Kazakhstan (732)	EU27 (57)	Netherlands (163)
4	India (74)	China (701)	China (52)	Germany (155)
5	UK (67)	EU27 (656)	Nigeria (45)	Poland (155)
6	Germany (64)	Nigeria (599)	Russian Federation (45)	India (153)
7	France (61)	Algeria (476)	Germany (44)	Indonesia (153)
8	China (60)	Argentina (467)	Kazakhstan (43)	Belgium (152)
9	Italy (56)	Russian Federation (446)	USA (43)	Finland (152)
10	Brazil (54)	India (401)	Ghana (41)	Argentina (151)


*Note:* There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect different numbers of products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA reports four measures of harm.

<sup>1</sup> The results for Germany aggregate the (many) measures taken by the central government in Berlin and the (fewer) measures taken by the European Commission on behalf of all of the EU member states. This approach was applied consistently to each EU member state. At the request of some users, Table 1.1 reports information on both individual EU member states and the total amount of measures taken by all the member states plus the European Commission (listed as EU27).

## Governments have circumvented tougher WTO rules

The traditional forms of protectionism—tariff increases and trade defence instruments—account for less than 37% of the worldwide total of discriminatory measures implemented since November 2008. Only in 2010 did that percentage breach 40% and then not by much (see Figure 1.4). In terms of measures still in force the respective percentage is 38.9%. In short, non-traditional forms of protection still dominate crisis-era protectionism. The fact that so many of the top 10 most used protectionist instruments are subject to weak or no WTO rules confirms an earlier GTA finding—namely, that governments under pressure during the crisis era have circumvented the more constraining binding multilateral trade rules (see Table 2.7 in the next chapter).

**Figure 1.4** The circumvention of tougher WTO rules is a recurring feature of crisis-era protectionism



## The organisation of this report

This remainder of this report is organised as follows. The next chapter describes the lessons that have arisen from monitoring government policies during the crisis era, the key findings in the GTA database, and what they imply for the landscape of contemporary protectionism. The second section of the report contains four case studies, drawing upon recent government initiatives (in the case of Brazil, China, and the European Union) and a recent analysis of the trade coverage of protectionism (in this case on Swiss commercial interests.) The value of these case studies is that they bring to life the mass of numbers that the GTA database can generate, highlighting that underlying the latter are decisions by governments and firms.

The third section of the report provides an overview for each G20 country of the frequency of foreign protectionism harming their commercial interests and the resort to protectionism by each G20 member. With this data—plus the maps contained at the end of this Executive Summary—it is possible to make bilateral and cross-country assessments of the resort to protectionism. Such assessments

add to the level of transparency in the world trading system and may help hold governments to account for their behaviour during the crisis era.


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- Evenett, Simon J and Johannes Fritz (2012). *Die negativen Auswirkungen des krisenbezogenen Handelsprotektionismus auf die Schweizer Aussenwirtschaft*, February. This study, which as the title suggest is written in German, is summarised in the second section of this report.
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
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St. Gallen, Switzerland  
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
**Map 1.1** Number of discriminatory measures implemented since the first G20 crisis related summit, ignoring measures in the pipeline




**Map 1.2** Number of trading partners harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures




Map 1.3 Number of (4 digit) tariff lines harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures




**Map 1.4** Number of sectors harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures




Map 1.5 Number of trading partners affecting a jurisdiction's commercial interests




**Map 1.6** Number of times a jurisdiction's commercial interests are harmed by trading partners



Map 1.7 Number of harmful measures implemented by G20 countries affecting each jurisdiction



**Map 1.8** Number of pending discriminatory measures likely to harm a jurisdiction





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# **SECTION 1**

## **Analyses of Contemporary Protectionism**



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## 2 The Landscape of Crisis-Era Protectionism

**Simon J. Evenett**

*University of St. Gallen and CEPR*

### 2.1 Lessons from monitoring crisis-era protectionism

Given the pre-crisis trend towards opening borders to international commerce, it is important to establish the steps governments have taken during the crisis era<sup>1</sup> that reintroduce fragmentation of markets along national lines. Moreover, should governments begin to unwind protectionism once the crisis has passed, it will be useful to know which types of state measures are a priority. There are good reasons, then, to monitor the form and extent of crisis-era protectionism beyond evaluating compliance with the pledges of the G20.

That governments resort to discrimination against foreign commercial interests during global economic downturns is well known. History shows that the forms of protectionism tend to change during crises and that such protectionism prevails well after national economies have recovered (Irwin 2011). For these reasons it makes more sense for monitoring initiatives to look out for government measures that alter the relative treatment of foreign commercial interests vis-à-vis their domestic rivals.<sup>234</sup>

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1 It is important to note that the GTA database comprises of measures taken during the “crisis era,” taken for our purposes to start with the first crisis-related G20 summit in Washington DC in November 2008. The choice of phrase “crisis era” is deliberate for there is no implication that every measure reported in the GTA database is crisis-induced. As such the GTA database is best thought of as summarising different aspects of policy stance since November 2008.

2 Each state measure is colour coded in the GTA database according to its impact on the relative treatment of foreign commercial interests. See the explanation of the colour coding scheme used below Table 2.1 in this chapter.

3 Therefore, the GTA database includes reports on measures that reduce discrimination against foreign commercial interests. Here it is worth noting that the GTA database deliberately excludes regional trading agreements, technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Of course, all three can introduce discrimination against some foreign commercial interests—although the government intention may not be to benefit domestic commercial interests at the expense of foreign rivals. The sheer volume of the latter two make keeping track of them very difficult—still, the GTA database includes reports on changes in the legislation and implementing regulations concerning TBT and SPS (as opposed to specific interventions undertaken within the auspices of an existing regime.) To the extent that these three trade interventions were motivated by beggar-thy-neighbour factors then, of course, the GTA database will understate the true state of discrimination against foreign commercial interests.

4 A relative treatment standard was preferred to a standard based on consistency with WTO agreements. The latter standard was not adopted by the GTA because not every discriminatory state measure is covered by a WTO agreement and, even if it was, it is not immediately obvious what the benefit is to second guessing the outcome of the WTO dispute settlement process.

A leading alternative approach—only looking for protectionism that takes certain forms (tariffs, quotas, and antidumping actions being examples)—runs the risk of missing innovations in discrimination against foreign commercial interests, in particular resort to forms of discrimination less well regulated by multilateral trade rules. For these reasons, the Global Trade Alert team has preferred a general discrimination-based definition of protectionism over a form-based one.<sup>5</sup> As Table 2.7 below makes clear, much of the discrimination against foreign commercial interests during the crisis era would have been missed with a backward-looking definition of protectionism. This is the first important lesson from monitoring crisis-era protectionism.

Another consequence of the changing forms of discrimination is that, to the extent that governments shift towards using less transparent state measures, then sustained efforts are needed to document policy stance. Under these circumstances it is almost inevitable that the first reading on the resort to discrimination in any particular time period will understate the true state of affairs. Readers of G20 monitoring reports might want to bear this lesson in mind too.

For this report the Global Trade Alert team undertook a substantial search for measures implemented before the last report was issued in November 2011, updated the records of 700 out of the 2001 measures already in the GTA database in November 2011, as well as documented as many measures announced since the last G20 summit. The result is a database now comprising 2430 state measures announced since November 2008, the date of the first crisis-era G20 summit when government leaders publicly committed to eschew protectionism. In a typical six month cycle the GTA has added on average 334 measures to its database—whereas in the six months since November 2011 the GTA database increased by 429 measures, a 28 percent increase in the rate of reporting.

One consequence of the extensive update performed for this report is that the changes in the totals reported in the tables in this chapter are a consequence of measures taken since the publication of our last report in November 2011 as well as the due to new information on measures taken before November 2011. It would be incorrect, therefore, to interpret the relatively large jumps in some totals as being due solely to recent policy initiatives. Still, since the beginning of November 2011 a total of 110 state measures that discriminate against foreign commercial interests have been implemented.

The revisions to the pre-November 2011 record are substantial (see, in particular, the jump in the number of discriminatory measures implemented in many quarters that is portrayed in Figure 2.5). To get a sense of how this new information might alter assessments of crisis era protectionism consider the following. Concern in policymaking circles and in the press about protectionism was probably at its peak during the first three quarters of 2009, before the Pittsburgh G20 summit. Just before that summit the Global Trade Alert reported that 240 discriminatory measures had been implemented since

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<sup>5</sup> In recognition of the fact that trade policy analysts have differed over whether trade defence measures are protectionist, data on the resort to discriminatory measures is reported here with and without trade defence measures. This does not represent an endorsement of the position that trade defence measures are benign.

the November 2008 G20 summit in Washington DC. Some contended that our report exaggerated the true state of protectionism. With the information that is available in 2012, it turns out that nearly double (442) the number of protectionist measures were actually implemented from November 2008 to September 2009. Correspondingly, many countries' commercial interests were harmed more often than was initially supposed. For example, over that time period the number of times Chinese commercial interests were harmed was not 99 as the GTA initially reported but 198.

Another lesson, then, is that the resort to protectionism during 2009-2011 was greater than the prominent monitoring initiatives initially reported. The fact that protectionism during 2009-2011 did not reach 1930s levels does not make what has happened in recent years unimportant or irrelevant. Many governments around the world—in particular those in the G20—have stepped back from the “level playing field” as the operative principle guiding economic policymaking. The fact that they have often done so in non-transparent ways that have not come to light immediately in no way diminishes the economic effect of these protectionist measures.

Ultimately, hopefully, governments will withdraw their crisis-era discriminatory measures. Some government measures taken during the crisis were designed to have a finite life and have already elapsed. To facilitate monitoring the withdrawal of state measures—whether they diminish or increase discrimination against foreign commercial interests—in preparing this report the GTA team has tried to identify whether a measure remains in force.

For this reason some of the tables below deliberately differentiate between measures that have been implemented since November 2008, measures that are still in force in June 2012, and those are not. Table 2.1 provides a breakdown of the total number of measures worldwide according to whether they are still in force. Table 2.5 reports the total number of measures that are still in force as of June 2012 for both the world and for the G20 countries taken together.

Overall, then, the current report is based upon the most extensive update of the GTA database to date. No doubt further improvements are possible and comments and suggestions in this regard are welcome and should be sent to the author. It is hoped that the numerous steps taken in the preparation of this report shed more light on the landscape of crisis-era protectionism, the subject of the next subsection.

## **2.2 Principal features of the landscape of crisis-era protectionism**

1. Of the 2430 state measures taken since November 2008 that are included in the GTA database, 1340 almost certainly worsened the treatment of some foreign commercial interest. To this must be added the 202 implemented state measures that likely harmed foreign commercial interests. The number of liberalising or transparency-improving measures proposed since November 2008 was 553. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2.

2. The number of discriminatory measures implemented (1542) exceeded the number of liberalising and transparency improving measures implemented (437) by more than three-to-one. Restricting consideration to state measures other than trade defence does not alter this ratio much.
3. The total number of almost discriminatory and likely discriminatory measures that are no longer in force (299) exceeds the number of liberalising and transparency-improving measures (87), again by almost three to one. See Table 2.1.
4. The number of almost certainly discriminatory measures in the GTA database has expanded more than 30 percent since the last report was issued in November 2011. A total of 313 such measures have been found, a number that falls to 220 once trade defence instruments are excluded. See Table 2.1.
5. The update of the GTA database for this report has added nearly five times as many almost certainly discriminatory measures (313) than liberalising and transparency-improving measures (69).
6. Using the advanced search function of the GTA website reveals that, since the last G20 summit, a total of 110 discriminatory measures have been implemented by governments worldwide. Ninety of those measures are almost certainly discriminatory.
7. Together the G20 countries have implemented 877 almost certainly discriminatory measures and 136 likely discriminatory measures since November 2008. Of the total (1013), 272 were trade defence measures. This implies that 73 percent of all protectionist measures implemented worldwide during the crisis era were not antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards actions. See Table 2.3.
8. Since November 2003 the G20 countries have not just implemented discriminatory measures. Together these countries are responsible for 303 liberalising and transparency-improving measures. Still, for the G20 countries the number of discriminatory measures outnumbers the latter measures by more than three to one. See Table 2.3.
9. Taken together the G20 countries are responsible for 66% of all protectionist measures taken since the first crisis-era G20 summit in November 2008. Of the protectionist measures still in force the G20 countries are responsible for 69% of the worldwide total. See Tables 2.2-2.4.
10. While there is little difference in the proportion of discriminatory measures undertaken by G20 and non-G20 countries in total since November 2008 (see Figure 2.1), calculated year by year the share of protectionist measures

- implemented by the G20 countries has consistent increased (see Figure 2.2).
11. In 2009 approximately 60 percent of all protectionist measures were taken by G20 countries. By 2011 that percentage had risen to 75%. In the year to date, that percentage has risen to 79%. See Figure 2.2.
  12. There is a wide variation across G20 countries in the number of state measures taken since November 2008. The total number of measures implemented by the 27 member states of the European Union plus those measures undertaken by the European Commission exceeds 200. Argentina and Russia also stand out for implementing a large number of measures. In terms of the number of protectionist measures undertaken the totals for the EU 27 together, Russia, and Argentina are far larger than the rest of the G20. Having said that Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have implemented relatively more liberalising and transparency-improving measures than their G20 counterparts. See Figure 2.3.
  13. Countries may differ in the rate at which they announce state measures, so a simple count of the total amount of measures may be misleading. One alternative is to compute for each G20 country the proportion of the total number of measures that are almost certainly discriminatory (red), likely to be discriminatory (amber), and liberalising or transparency-improving (green) measures. Having sorted the G20 countries in descending order of the number of discriminatory measures (red plus amber), the results are portrayed in Figure 2.4. On this measure, Japan, Turkey, India, and Saudi Arabia move up the list of offending G20 nations. Argentina, the EU 27, and France remain highly ranked. This figure gives one way to compare the resort to protectionism across the G20 countries.
  14. In terms of both the number of discriminatory measures imposed and the proportion of discriminatory measures imposed the G20 country that has refrained from protectionism the most is Mexico, the host of the forthcoming summit. See Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
  15. Figure 2.5 sheds light on the rate at which protectionist measures were imposed since the November 2008 G20 summit. By comparing the data for this report with the last one, there is a substantial upward revision in the quarterly totals for every quarter since Q4 2009. This reinforces the point that evidence on protectionism takes time to assemble and instant assessments almost certainly underestimate the amount of protectionism. Another implication is that the falling off of the total number of protectionist measures per quarter reported for 2011 and 2012 should not automatically be attributed to greater restraint on the part of governments. Similar reports of lower quarterly totals were found

for more recent quarters in earlier GTA reports. Those totals were revised substantially up over time.

16. A sharp jump up in the number of protectionist measures was seen in Q1 2009, with over 170 measures imposed in that quarter alone. After that, the next four quarters saw more than 115 measures implemented. Each subsequent quarter from Q2 2010 to Q3 2011—with the exception of Q3 2010—has rapidly trended towards totals of 100-120 measures. Quarter-by-quarter governments have consistently added to the stock of crisis-era protectionist measures—Q1 2009 may have been exceptionally awful but it was hardly a blip.
17. Figure 2.5 also contains some good news. Quite a few—certainly not a majority—of protectionist measures implemented from Q1 2009 to Q1 2010 are no longer in force. Still, approximately 100 protectionist measures implemented in each of those quarters remain in force. For reference, this total is double the number of protectionist measures implemented in Q4 2008 that are still in force.
18. China and the EU 27 taken together stand out in terms of the number of times that their commercial interests have been harmed by protectionism since November 2008. Foreign protectionism has harmed China's commercial interests 620 times, implying that 40 percent of all protectionist measures implemented since November 2008 have included China as one of the harmed trading parties. See Table 2.5.
19. The latest update of the GTA database has increased the number of times that commercial interests of China, the EU 27, and the USA have been hit by over 100. See Table 2.5.
20. Even when account is taken of the protectionist measures have lapsed, approximately 75-80 percent of the protectionist measures harming the major trading nations remain in place. See Table 2.5.
21. The GTA does not calculate the amount of commerce affected by each state measure, nor the associated welfare impact. To do so for 2430 state measures would be exceptionally resource intensive. Instead four intermediate metrics of harm done by a jurisdiction are reported: the number of almost certainly (red) discriminatory measures, the number of tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures, the number of sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures, and the number of trading partners harmed by a jurisdiction's almost certainly discriminatory measures. All the trading jurisdictions in the GTA database are ranked in descending order on these four metrics and the top 10 offenders on each category are reported in Table 2.6. Looking across the top 10 lists it is striking how often G20 members are mentioned.



22. In terms of discriminatory measures imposed the EU 27 is the worst offender, in terms of tariff lines affected Vietnam is worst (due to repeated, transparent competitive devaluations), in terms of sectors affected Argentina tops the list (a combination of many protectionist measures), and in terms of trading partners harmed China tops the list (in large part due to its extensive export management policies through selective VAT rebates for exporters). See Table 2.6.
23. China and Argentina are represented in the top 10 list of offenders in all four categories of harm. Germany, India, and Russia are listed in three of the four top 10 list of worst offenders. See Table 2.6.
24. With respect to the policy instruments that discriminate against foreign commercial instruments, an important change is that, in terms of measures still in force, trade defence measures now outnumber bailouts with discriminatory strings attached or beggar-thy-neighbour effects. In terms of the total number of discriminatory measures implemented since November 2008, however, resort to bailouts is still greater. Given that antidumping and countervailing duty actions target specific trading partners, the number of jurisdictions harmed by the effects of discriminatory bailouts is still double that of trade defence instruments. As a first approximation, bailouts remain where a lot of the action is in crisis-era protectionism. See Table 2.7.
25. The traditional forms of protectionism—tariff increases and trade defence instruments—account for less than 37 percent of the worldwide total of almost certainly discriminatory (red) measures implemented since November 2008. In terms of measures still in force the respective percentage is 38.9. In short, non-traditional forms of protection still dominate crisis-era protectionism. See Table 2.7 and Figure 2.6.
26. The fact that so many of the top 10 most used protectionist instruments are subject to weak or no WTO rules confirms an earlier GTA finding—namely, that governments under pressure during the crisis era have circumvented binding multilateral trade rules.
27. The increased resort to trade defence instruments—a feature common in previous business cycle downturns in many countries—merits a closer look and Table 2.8 was assembled with this in mind. A total of 285 trade defence measures restricting imports are currently in force. Another 215 investigations are under way, 80 of which have been launched since the last G20 summit.
28. As shown in Figure 2.7 on-going trade defence investigations account for over half of the policy measure that have been announced or initiated but

where, to date, no discrimination against foreign commercial interests has been undertaken.

29. For the first time in the GTA's reporting agricultural products—a development-sensitive sector—have been most hit by almost certainly (red) discriminatory measures since November 2008. In terms of measures still in force the sector most frequently hit is basic chemicals.
30. While discriminatory bailouts in the financial sector have received a lot of attention during the crisis, just over 8 percent of the total number of implemented protectionist measures in the GTA database affected this sector. Moreover, less than 30 percent of the total number of discriminatory bail outs and subsidies recorded in the GTA database relate to the financial sector. Both findings suggest that the GTA findings are not unduly skewed by the inclusion of the financial sector in the database.

## Reference

Irwin (2011). Douglas A. Irwin. *Trade Policy Disaster: Lessons from the 1930s*. MIT press.

## About the author

**Simon J. Evenett** is Professor of International Trade and Economic Development at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Co-Director of the CEPR Programme in International Trade and Regional Economics. Evenett taught previously at Oxford and Rutgers University, and served twice as a World Bank official. He was a non-resident Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution in Washington. He is Member of the High Level Group on Globalisation established by the French Trade Minister Christine LaGarde, Member of the Warwick Commission on the Future of the Multilateral Trading System After Doha, and was Member of the the Zedillo Committee on the Global Trade and Financial Architecture. In addition to his research into the determinants of international commercial flows, he is particularly interested in the relationships between international trade policy, national competition law and policy, and economic development. He obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University.

**Table 2.1** Total number of state measures reported in the GTA database

Statistic	This report (June 2012)		Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	2430	1793	429	309
Total number of measures coded green	553	449	69	52
of which currently in force	350	333	New entry in table:	
of which no longer in in force	87	85	Comparable data not available in last report	
Total number of measures coded amber	538	319	48	37
of which currently in force	161*	159	New entry in table:	
of which no longer in in force	41	39	Comparable data not available in last report	
Total number of measures coded red	1340	1025	313	220
of which currently in force	1082*	797	New entry in table:	
of which no longer in in force	258	228	Comparable data not available in last report	

*Note:*\* The sum of these two numbers represents the total number of protectionist measures currently in force.

## How does the GTA colour code measures?

Colour code	Criteria
Red	The measure has been implemented since November 2008 and almost certainly discriminates against foreign commercial interests.
Amber	(i) The measure has been implemented since November 2008 and likely involves discrimination against foreign commercial interests; OR (ii) The measure has been announced or is under consideration and would (if implemented) almost certainly involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests.
Green	(i) The measure has been announced and involves liberalization on a non-discriminatory (i.e., most favoured nation) basis; OR (ii) The measure has been implemented since November 2008 and is found not to be discriminatory; OR (iii) The measure has been implemented since November 2008, involves no further discrimination, and improves the transparency of a jurisdiction's trade-related policies.

*Notes:* 1. A measure that is red and still implemented as of 1 June 2012 is referred to in this report as "still in force." 2. A red measure that was implemented and has been repealed, withdrawn, or has lapsed is treated as "no longer in force." Likewise for amber measures that had previously been implemented. 3. In our previous reports once a red measure has been repealed, withdrawn or lapsed, it was classified as green (on the grounds that the measure no longer discriminated against foreign commercial interests.) This classification had the unfortunate side effect of mixing lapsed formerly red measures with liberalising measures (that were also classified as green.) In this report, the following convention was adopted: a red measure always retains its original colour but its implementation status can change from "in force" to "not in force." As a result in some of the tables that follow the number of green measures has fallen, reflecting the reclassification of withdrawn former red measures.

**Table 2.2** Measures implemented since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008, totals for all jurisdictions and change since last pre-summit report in November 2011

Statistic	This report (June 2012)		Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	1978	1640	385	331
Total number of measures coded green	437	418	31	63
Total number of measures coded amber	202	198	42	49
Total number of measures coded red	1340	1025	313	219
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	1212	1212	-1	-1
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	74	74	2	2
Total number of trading partners affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	219	219	-1	-1


**Table 2.3** Measures implemented by G20 countries since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008, totals for all G20 jurisdictions and change since last pre-summit report in November 2011

Statistic	This report (June 2012)		Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	1316	1029	270	224
Total number of measures coded green	303	288	38	59
Total number of measures coded amber	136	132	33	35
Total number of measures coded red	877	609	199	130
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	1088	1082	8	7
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	73	73	3	3
Total number of trading partners affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	214	210	-1	-4


**Table 2.4** Measures implemented since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008 that are still in force

Statistic	World		G20	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	1592	1289	1087	824
Total number of measures coded green	350	333	231	218
Total number of measures coded amber	161	159	105	103
Total number of measures coded red	1082	797	751	503


**Figure 2.1** The G20 members share of beggar-thy-neighbour policies is similar to that of other countries.



**Figure 2.2** But the share of worldwide protectionist measures implemented by the G20 has risen every year since 2009




**Figure 2.3** The total number of state measures implemented by each G20 country since November 2008, by type and ranked in descending order of number of state measures taken.






**Figure 2.4** The composition of state measures taken by each G20 country since November 2008, ranked by descending order in the proportion of protectionist measures implemented



**Figure 2.5** After reporting lags the total number of protectionist measures implemented during 2010 and 2011 converges to the 100-120 range per quarter. Q4 2008 seems more anomalous as time goes on—protectionism jumped up in 2009 and has not returned to 2008 levels



**Table 2.5** Top 10 biggest targets of protectionist measures taken since November 2008

State measure	Number of discriminatory measures imposed on target since November 2008		Number of discriminatory measures on target and still in force		Number of trading partners imposing discriminatory measures		Number of pending measures, which if implemented, would harm target too	
	This report (June 2012)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)	This report (June 2012)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)	This report (June 2012)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)	This report (June 2012)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)
China	620	133	525		83	1	157	2
EU27	581	113	466		94	5	105	-6
USA	482	109	394		79	4	63	-3
Germany	433	82	349		66	4	70	-5
France	387	80	313		67	3	60	-5
Italy	385	86	311		63	4	65	1
UK	355	58	288		80	7	56	-5
Japan	344	na	282		72	na	54	na
Netherlands	334	64	253		65	-9	43	-7
Spain	330	na	261		59	na	47	na

New entry in table: Comparable data not available in last report

**Table 2.6** Which countries have inflicted the most harm since November 2008?

Metric, Country in specified rank, Number				
Rank	Ranked by number of (almost certainly) discriminatory measures imposed	Ranked by the number of tariff lines (product categories) affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of sectors affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of trading partners affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures
1	EU27 (302)	Viet Nam (931)	Argentina (63)	China (193)
2	Russian Federation (169)	Venezuela (786)	Algeria (62)	EU27 (187)
3	Argentina (141)	Kazakhstan (732)	EU27 (57)	Netherlands (163)
4	India (74)	China (701)	China (52)	Germany (155)
5	UK (67)	EU27 (656)	Nigeria (45)	Poland (155)
6	Germany (64)	Nigeria (599)	Russian Federation (45)	India (153)
7	France (61)	Algeria (476)	Germany (44)	Indonesia (153)
8	China (60)	Argentina (467)	Kazakhstan (43)	Belgium (152)
9	Italy (56)	Russian Federation (446)	USA (43)	Finland (152)
10	Brazil (54)	India (401)	Ghana (41)	Argentina (151)

*Note:* There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect different numbers of products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA reports four measures of harm.

**Table 2.7** Ten most used state measures to discriminate against foreign commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting. (Ranked by number of discriminatory measures imposed).


State measure	Number of discriminatory (red) measures imposed since November 2008		Number of discriminatory (red) measures imposed and still in force		Number of jurisdictions that imposed these discriminatory measures since November 2008		Number of jurisdictions harmed by these discriminatory measures since November 2008	
	This report (June 2012)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)	This report (June 2012)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)	This report (June 2012)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)	This report (June 2012)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2011)
Bail out / state aid measure	361	88	247		48	-1	189	3
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	315	92	285		62	4	86	5
Tariff measure	178	46	135		70	7	153	-4
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	117	29	107		28	4	148	-5
Export taxes or restriction	90	20	59		57	3	178	-8
Investment measure	49	7	49		29	1	81	0
Migration measure	49	5	44		25	1	106	2
Export subsidy	41	4	40		42	0	198	-1
Public procurement	41	2	36		21	0	135	0
Import ban	32	na	29		24	na	98	na

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
**Table 2.8** Resort to trade defence measures since November 2008

Trade defence measures	Number
that have been initiated and are currently under investigation.	215
where a provisional or final duty has been imposed and is in force.	285
where a provisional or final duty has been imposed, but is no longer in force.	30
for which the investigation has ended without the implementation of any duties.	85
that were implemented before November 2008, but have been repealed early.	19

**Figure 2.3** Top 10 implemented protectionist measure types used to discriminate against foreign commercial interests



**Figure 2.4** Classification of pending measures that, if implemented, would almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests



**Table 2.9** Top 20 sectors most affected by discriminatory measures since November 2008.

CPC code, Affected Sector	Number of discriminatory (red) measures affecting commercial interests in this sector	Number of discriminatory (red) measures affecting commercial interests in this sector and still in force	Number of jurisdictions implementing measures affecting specified sector and classified as red	Number of pending measures affecting specified sector
01 ( Products of agriculture, horticulture and market gardening)	139	96	80	75
34 ( Basic chemicals)	128	108	103	57
49 ( Transport equipment)	122	101	64	61
81 ( Financial intermediation services and auxiliary services therefor)	121	84	43	37
41 ( Basic metals)	117	101	84	62
44 ( Special purpose machinery)	112	93	51	59
42 ( Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment)	97	87	63	54
21 ( Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats)	95	73	53	65
02 ( Live animals and animal products)	87	61	42	58
23 ( Grain mill products, starches and starch products; other food products)	85	58	58	62
43 ( General purpose machinery)	82	69	39	29
26 ( Yarn and thread; woven and tufted textile fabrics)	81	71	34	54
36 ( Rubber and plastics products)	73	68	34	53
37 ( Glass and glass products and other non-metallic products n.e.c.)	67	58	46	60
38 ( Furniture; other transportable goods n.e.c.)	67	58	30	31
28 ( Knitted or crocheted fabrics; wearing apparel)	65	57	23	33
35 ( Other chemical products; man-made fibres)	64	53	44	53
46 ( Electrical machinery and apparatus)	63	55	43	27
27 ( Textile articles other than apparel)	60	53	35	35
22 ( Dairy products)	56	38	38	53





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# 3 Brazil's Dutch Disease and the Auto Trade War with Mexico: Stylised Facts

**Herminio Blanco Mendoza, Jaime Zabludovsky Kuper, Adalberto García Rocha and Sergio Gómez Lora**  
*IQOM, Trade Intelligence<sup>1</sup>*

## Introduction

In recent years the Brazilian economy, and its industry in particular, has been experiencing difficulties caused by the country's export boom. What has been happening in Brazil has many, if not all, of the attributes of the 'Dutch disease', an economic ailment caused by an export boom of primary goods that overvalues the currency, erodes the capacity of the rest of the economy to compete abroad while increasing the presence of imported goods in the domestic market. In the case of Brazil, the overvaluation caused by the export boom was reinforced by high interest rates and capital inflows. Brazil's industrial production and exports have been the most affected.

To fight the malady, the Brazilian authorities proceeded to try an assortment of monetary, fiscal, and discriminatory policy decisions, including picking a motor vehicles trade dispute with Mexico. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the factors underlying this dispute and the policy choices that followed.

## 3.1 Brazil's export bonanza is based on exports of primary goods

Brazil's real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 was 46.5% higher than its 2000 level, an average annual growth rate of 3.7%. The growth path has not been steady, with lows around 3%, in addition to a 0.3% reduction by the global slump in 2009.

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<sup>1</sup> IQOM, Trade Intelligence is a leading consulting firm headed by economic experts with 20 years of experience in the design and implementation of international trade policy.

**Figure 3.1** Growth Rate of GDP




The associated accelerated expansion of trade has been an essential growth factor for the Brazilian economy. In dollar value terms, from 2000 to 2011 the average annual growth rate was 15.0% and 13.6% for exports and imports, respectively. From 2004 to 2008 imports increased at a higher rate than exports, and continued to do so after the downturn in 2009. The trade balance improved in 2006 but has been ever declining since, with a surplus of \$16 billion in 2010.

Relative to GDP, both exports and imports show a fall that started in 2006, parallel to a downward trend in Brazil's trade balance in the last five years to 0.9% of GDP in 2010 from 5.1% in 2005. The reduced trade surplus, through its effect on the current account, narrowed down policy options.

**Figure 3.2** Exports, Imports and Trade Balance, US\$ billion




**Figure 3.3** Exports, Imports and Trade Balance, % of GDP




Exports of raw and semi-processed primary goods accounted for the major share of total export growth. By 2011, they represented 63.0% of total exports. Between 2006 and 2011, exports of raw and semi-processed primary goods rose by 16.6 percentage points of total exports. Exports of manufactures, in contrast, lost 18 percentage points of their share in total exports registered in 2006.

**Figure 3.4** Composition of exports percent



In the period from 2000 to 2010, exports of commodities rose steadily, except for 2009. By 2010, the value of the exports of six commodities had reached 34% of the total value of exports.


**Figure 3.5** Selected commodities exports



The growth in exports of raw primary goods has been sustained by climbing international prices. Between 2000 and 2010, the prices of a number of commodities rose faster than the volume exported by Brazil.

The exports volume index increased on average 11.9% per year, whereas the corresponding price index increased 13%. Taking 2002 as the base year, the price index increased 17.4 per year to 2010. In 2008, commodity prices went through a large increase and a steep recovery in 2010.


**Figure 3.6** Overall volume and price indices



### 3.2 Brazilian exports of manufactures face severe challenges


Meanwhile, Brazil's industrial trade deficit has grown to \$66 billion as of 2011. Industrial inputs imports had a downward trend, most likely as a consequence of a fall in industrial production. On the other hand, the share of consumption goods imports has increased.

Figure 3.7 Imports by type of goods




Trade between Mexico and Brazil is relatively small and it represents less than 2% of Brazil's total trade. From 1998 to 2009, Brazil maintained a trade surplus with Mexico, but since 2005 the surplus has reduced steadily and became a deficit in 2010 and 2011. The falling surplus is due to, both, a decline of Brazilian exports to Mexico since 2008, and a sustained growth of Brazilian imports from Mexico since 2005.

Figure 3.8 Trade between Mexico and Brazil



In 2011, industrial trade between Mexico and Brazil recorded a deficit in seven areas, the most important of which is motor vehicles. The turn around in the trade balance led to the renegotiation of the auto trade agreement, as explained below.

**Figure 3.9** Foreign trade on industrial goods between Mexico and Brazil




### 3.3 The Brazilian export bonanza contributed to an appreciated real

The boom in primary exports caused the Brazilian currency, the real, to appreciate. The combined effect of high interest rates and the appreciation of the real attracted large foreign capital inflows, thus reinforcing the appreciating trend.


Productivity growth in the industrial sector could not keep up with the effect of the expensive real and was the hardest hit. Imports of industrial goods went up, and industrial production went down.

**Figure 3.10** Rates of growth of Brazilian industries first 4 months 2012- first 4 months 2011



The overall negative impact on industrial competitiveness was severe, leading to a trade deficit in manufactures of \$53 billion in 2010 and \$66 billion in 2011.

**Figure 3.11** Increasing deficit in the industrial sector, Brazil, US\$ billion




*Interest Rates.* Brazil devalued its currency in 1999 and raised interest rates, the result of years of high and persistent public deficits and difficulties financing its current account deficit. Interest rates have been declining since, but have remained high.

In January 2009, the US reduced the benchmark interest rate practically to zero; soon after the United Kingdom and the European Central Bank reduced their interest rates to very low levels. Later on, the US and the UK adopted large monetary expansions called Quantitative Easing (although the implementation of this policy in both jurisdictions differed.) Still, the end result was that Brazil's interest rates became the highest in the world. Although the monetary policies were aimed at preventing deflation, Brazilian authorities regarded them as a monetary 'tsunami' that was devastating trade and industrial activity.

In the second half of 2008, the global financial crisis led to a steep depreciation of the real that did not last long; from 2009 to 2011, the real recovered its previous level and appreciating trend. The high interest rates further attracted capital inflows that turned the real into one of the most overvalued currencies in the world. From 2005 to the present, the real has appreciated 55% in dollars, 46% in euros, and 83% in Mexican pesos.

**Figure 3.12** CPI annual growth rates



**Figure 3.13** Benchmark rate






Figure 3.14 Real exchange rates





Figure 3.15 Peso – Real exchange rate



Brazil is indeed an expensive country, not only compared with other Latin American countries, but also compared with the UK and the Eurozone. The *Economist's* Big Mac index for January 2012 showed that the real was overvalued 35% with respect to the dollar.

**Table 3.1** The Big Mac Index

Overvalued		Undervalued	
Country	Percentage	Country	Percentage
Brazil	35	Chile	-3
Argentina	10	UK	-9
Uruguay	10	Peru	-12
Colombia	8	Mexico	-36
Eurozone	6		

### 3.4 The Brazilian government reacted with industrial policy measures

To discourage capital inflows and other financial operations that kept the real rising, Brazil levied taxes and imposed controls on short-run portfolio investments; currency derivatives; foreign purchases of Brazilian bonds and dollar denominated foreign credits; as well as higher reserve requirements on short dollar positions of banks. Such financial measures not only had limited effects, but had to be postponed. In August 2011, the public debt crisis of peripheral European countries caused a depreciation of the real that has continued to the present. The various policies created initially to counter the effects of the appreciation of the real, however, were maintained and others were adopted as Brazil's industrial sector continued its decline.

The *Plano Brasil Maior*. To deal with the recession and loss of competitiveness of its industry, Brazilian policy makers devised the “Bigger Brazil Plan 2011-2014” (*Plano Brasil Maior* in Portuguese). The plan included a variety of policies to support industrial development and industrial exports including:

- Export supports, including a refund of 3% of the value of exported goods.
- Additional resources for export credit rebates.
- Creation of an export guarantee and finance fund.

The plan includes a number of additional trade measures, such as more rigorous anti-dumping enforcement; more frequent resort to safeguards and import taxation; cancelation of import permits with fraudulent statements of origin and under-invoicing; additional certification requirements for imports to curb counterfeiting and violations of industrial property rights; and suspension of tax exemptions to imports of pre-owned machinery and equipment.

The Brazilian government published 191 trade measures in its Official Journal between May 5, 2001 and May 31, 2012. At least 50 of those measures could be considered as protectionists. The Appendix to this document presents a detailed classification of those 191 trade measures.

More recently, Brazilian monetary authorities have put into effect measures to lower its benchmark rate (the SELIC), the spread between lending and savings rates, as well as the minimum savings rates paid by passbook accounts. The main goal behind these new policies is not to restrain capital inflows, but rather to put

in place a wider stimulus package to boost the sales of autos and other industrial goods produced in Brazil.

### 3.5 Brazil searched in the auto pact with Mexico an answer to its competitiveness loss

Brazil established, in September 2011, a tax on industrial products (IPI in Portuguese) that imposed a 30% charge on imported motor vehicles and parts. Mercosur members, as well as Mexico, were excluded from the new tax, the latter due to the Economic Complementation Agreement No. 55 (ACE in Spanish) signed in 2002 between Mexico and Mercosur. This agreement establishes free trade in the auto sector among the signatories.

In February 2012, however, the Brazilian government announced its intention to terminate the agreement to balance the unfavourable trade flows in the motor vehicle sector.

**Table 3.2** Brazil's motor vehicle trade

	2008			2001		
	Brazilian Imports	Brazilian Exports	Trade Balance	Brazilian Imports	Brazilian Exports	Trade Balance
w/Mexico	1115	1360	244	2252	881	-1371
w/world	12875	14672	1797	22621	13761	-8860
Mexico's share	9%	11%	-	17%	7%	-

Trade with Mexico is only 2% of Brazil's total trade; its trade deficit in motor vehicles is \$1.3 billion. Brazil's industrial trade deficit is over \$64 billion and its global deficit in the motor vehicle sector is over \$8 billion. Brazil's reaction to the deficit was not only out of proportion, considering the magnitude of trade flows with Mexico, but indicated the continuation of discretionary protectionist measures to counter negative trade balances with commercial partners (see Appendix).

After several weeks of negotiations, Brazil and Mexico agreed to implement export quotas for three years. The quotas are defined in value terms and are subject to rules of regional content of 35% in the first year and 40% within five years. Moreover, in the first year Mexico will limit motor vehicle exports to Brazil to \$1.45 billion. For the following two years, export limits will rise to \$1.56 billion and \$1.64 billion. After three years, free trade is supposed to resume.

### 3.6 Final comments

The appreciation of the real, resulting from the boom of commodity exports, capital inflows, and the monetary policies of the industrialised economies, exposed Brazilian industry's more fundamental competitiveness problems.

Brazilian export growth is explained by the rise in commodity prices, which Brazil profited from by supplying demand in a timely manner. Meanwhile, Brazil's industry has a growing trade deficit. Industrial costs of production are high and the currency is overvalued by the associated Dutch disease. Brazil's protectionist response, however, is not consistent with the objective of achieving industrial efficiency, not to mention that protectionism fosters inflation.

The trade dispute on motor vehicles with Mexico arose in this context. The motor vehicle trade deficit is the result of a loss of Brazilian industry competitiveness, whose source is entirely domestic (Dutch disease). Looking abroad for the cause misdiagnoses the underlying problem.

## Afterword

During 2012, Brazilian authorities have been taking a number of economic stimulus measures, apparently as a precaution to an imminent crisis in Europe and a slowdown of the Chinese economy.

Cuts in interest rates, announced initially to curb capital inflows, were later on presented with the purpose of stimulating demand. The current base interest rate is 9%, down from levels of almost 11% in December 2011. In addition to interest rate cuts, banks have been persuaded to lower the spread between lending and savings rates. The Banco do Brasil and the Caixa Economica, both controlled by Brazilian government, have abided with this request.

As the base interest rate goes down, inflation has risen to 7.3%, its highest in seven years and inflation is expected to increase. Government intervention has not just been macroeconomic, however. Recently, the authorities announced a reduction of \$6.5 billion in payroll taxes to firms most affected by imports. Another measure is to subsidise credits for over \$24 billion through the National Development Bank (BNDES).

Opinions differ as to the merits of this approach. As Gustavo Franco, Brazil's former Central Bank president, has declared:

*"The resort to protectionism is unfortunate. It is not only unjustified but it is also inconsistent. The solution to a foreign exchange bonanza is to spend the surplus dollars in the most useful manner. This is the worst possible time for policies like substituting imports by increasing domestic content, for example. That would make sense, albeit with restrictions, on currency board restrictions. The situation we have today is exactly the opposite. There is no war, no currency crisis, or anything. The authorities do not seem to be familiar with the real issues. "*

In contrast, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Brazil's former Minister of Finance lays the blame elsewhere.

*"Rich countries, which are in great difficulty, are right to print money and seek to devalue their currencies. We [Brazilians] are the wrong ones to respond to these measures in such a shy manner, with only a small IOF (tax on foreign capital). We*

need a greater IOF and to establish a variable tax on the commodities that Brazil exports, which are the source of the 'Dutch disease'."

## **About the authors**

**Herminio Blanco Mendoza** is IQOM President, former Mexican Minister of Trade and Industry (1994-2000) and NAFTA Chief negotiator (1990-1993). He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from University of Chicago.

**Jaime Zabludovsky Kuper** is IQOM Vice-president, former Mexican Ambassador to the EU (1998 to 2001), Under Secretary for International Trade Negotiations (1994-1998) and NAFTA Deputy Chief Negotiator (1990-1993). He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University.

**Adalberto García Rocha** is Special IQOM Collaborator and Former Commissioner for the Mexico's Federal Competition Commission (1997-2007). He holds a Ph.D in Economics from Stanford University.

**Sergio Gómez Lora** is IQOM CEO and former Mexican international trade negotiator (1993-2001).


## Appendix

### Foreign trade measures recently implemented by Brazil.

Between May 5, 2011 and May 31, 2012, the Brazilian government published in its Official Journal, 191 measures:

- 36 liberalising measures<sup>2</sup>.
- 50 protectionist measures<sup>3</sup>.
- 105 other<sup>4</sup>.

**Figure 3.16** Trade measures implemented by Brazilian Government, May 2011 – May 2012



The 191 identified trade measures are divided into the following areas:

- Antidumping procedures: 48
  - Initiation of antidumping investigation
  - Adoption of antidumping duties
  - Revocation of antidumping duties
  - Other
- Safeguards: 1
- Export promotion measures<sup>5</sup>: 9
- Import Quotas: 26

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2 We consider liberalising measures those that facilitate the importation of goods into the Brazilian market.


3 We consider protectionist measures those that impose restrictions to the importation of goods into the Brazilian market.

4 We include in this category the measures that require a detailed analysis to determine if they facilitate or restrict the importation of goods into the Brazilian market.

5 One of the measures classified under this category is related to government support for the importation of capital and technological goods, which are not solely intended for exports. They could also be used in the production for the domestic market.

- Tariff modifications: 25
- Tax modifications: 11
- Verification of origin procedures: 10
- Modifications of foreign trade and custom procedures: 36
- Sanitary and phytosanitary: 24
- Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA's): 1


**Figure 3.17** Type of trade measures implemented by the Brazilian Government between May 2011 and May 2012



36 liberalising measures are distributed as follow:

- Antidumping elimination: 10
- Tariff modifications: 19
- Tax modifications: 5
- Verification of origin procedures: 2


**Figure 3.18** Liberalising measures



The 50 protectionist measures identified are related to the following topics:

- Antidumping: 30
- Tariff modifications: 4
- Tax modifications: 6
- Verification of origin procedures: 8
- Safeguards: 1
- EPA's: 1

**Figure 3.19** Protectionist measures




The rest of trade measures published by Brazil in its official journal, between May 5, 2011 and May 31, 2012, are distributed in the following areas:

- Antidumping: 8
- Tariff modifications: 2
- Import Quotas: 26
- Sanitary and phytosanitary: 24
- Modifications in foreign trade operations and custom procedures: 36
- Export promotion measures: 9



Figure 3.20 Other measures





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# 4 A Blend of Encouragement, Discrimination, and Non-Transparency: An Analysis of China's New Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment

**YANG Chun Jing and MA Jia Ying**  
*Global Trade Alert*

## 4.1 Introduction and background

As the second-largest inward foreign investment destination in the world, the foreign investment policies adopted by Chinese government are necessarily a matter of considerable interest. Among China's foreign investment policies, the *Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (Foreign Investment Catalogue)* is the most important one, setting out whether a specific industrial sector or activity is "encouraged", "restricted", "permitted," or "prohibited" for foreign investors. The *Foreign Investment Catalogue* provides the framework for guiding foreign investment into China and plays a critical role in revealing government intentions at the sectoral level.

For the purpose of regulating foreign investments, the Chinese government started to draft catalogues in the 1990s and in 1995 the Chinese government issued the first version titled *Foreign Investment Catalogue (Version 1995)*. Since then, taking different economic environmental and domestic needs into consideration, the *Foreign Investment Catalogue* has been revised three times thereafter between 1995 and 2007, referred to as *Version 2002*, *Version 2004* and *Version 2007* respectively. With the purpose of amending *Version 2007*, in April 2011 the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) jointly released an Amended *Foreign Investment Catalogue (Draft Version)* to solicit opinions and comments from the public. Based in part on these comments, on December 24, 2011, the NDRC and the MOFCOM jointly issued the *Foreign Investment Catalogue (Version 2011)*, thereby replacing *Version 2007*, the former with the purpose of promoting foreign investments and creating a more friendly environment for foreign investors over the next four or five years. *Version 2011* came into effect on January 30, 2012.

Although the contents of the *Foreign Investment Catalogue* have been modified five times since its introduction in 1995, the main structure of this document remains unchanged. The *Foreign Investment Catalogue* sets out three different categories, namely, “Encouraged”, “Restricted” and “Prohibited” industries and activities for foreign investments. All industries and activities not falling into these three categories are deemed as falling into a “Permitted” category. In addition, the *Foreign Investment Catalogue* also specifies caps on foreign shareholdings by providing requirements on specific forms of foreign investment or by capping the percentage of foreign investment in some specified industries. Different categories may be subject to distinct regulatory approval procedures, taxation treatment, and other incentive measures.

## 4.2 Review of the amendments found in the 2011 version

With the goal of implementing China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development that was adopted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2011, and the *Opinions on Further Improving the Utilization of Foreign Investment* adopted by the State Council in 2010, *Version 2011* generally reflects the government’s priority of attracting foreign investments with significant development impact and that promote technological innovation and the upgrading of domestic industries. Changes in *Version 2011* generally are consistent with China’s “further opening-up” policy, and *Version 2011* seeks to encourage foreign investment to shift from some traditional industries with over-capacity to advanced manufacturing industry, high technology industry, modern service industry, and new energy and environment-friendly industries.

In accordance with official statement delivered by Chinese government, *Version 2011* lists 473 items (as compared to 468 items in *Version 2007*), including 354 Encouraged Items (351 Encouraged Items in *Version 2007*), 80 Restricted Items (87 Restricted items in *Version 2007*) and 39 Prohibited Items (40 items in *Version 2007*). In addition, some items with specific caps on foreign shareholding are removed in certain sectors, and the number of items with equity ratio restrictions was reduced by 11 compared to *Version 2007*.<sup>1</sup> At the end of this chapter we provide three detailed tables to show precisely the changes made in *Version 2011*, compared to *Version 2007*.

### 4.2.1 Major amendments to encouraged sectors and activities

Encouraged Items are categorised into 12 sectors, such as mining industry, manufacturing industry, education industry, wholesale and retail industry, education and so on. Moreover, each sector contains a number of specific items and each item can include a number of investment activities. For example, the sector “Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery” has ten Encouraged Items, and each item include several investment activities (for instance, the

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<sup>1</sup> See Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters about Catalogue Version 2011 by officials from the NDRC, [http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-12/31/content\\_2034603.htm](http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-12/31/content_2034603.htm)

Encouraged Item number five in this sector contains activities such as foreign investment in planting rubber trees, oil palms, sisal, and coffee).

In *Version 2011*, environmental-friendly, energy-saving, and high-end projects are added as Encouraged Items. *Version 2011* also seeks to encourage foreign investment to shift attention from some traditional industries with overcapacity—investment in wholly produced automobiles is removed from the list Encouraged Items—which in turn reflects a more selective attitude towards foreign investment in line with the government's current priorities and needs over the long run. These changes reflect a broader shift in the country's economic strategy, as leaders seek to shift away from dependence on heavy manufacturing and towards higher-tech and more environmentally-friendly industries.<sup>2</sup>

354 Encouraged Items are included in *Version 2011*, a slight increase in comparison to *Version 2007* with its 351 Encouraged Items. We have provided a detailed breakdown of the changes between the 2007 and 2011 catalogues (see Table 4.1). Analysis of the evidence in Table 4.1 reveals that 93 items and activities have been newly added and 91 items and activities removed from the list of Encouraged Items. However, according to official statistics, only three items were newly added. The reason for the difference between official statistics and Table 4.1 is that one item may include a number of activities, and in Table 4.1 we take both item changes and activity changes into consideration, so as to provide more detailed evidence. (Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 were also constructed according to the same approach.) Official statistics only count the item changes without considering amendments of activities contained with each item. Based on Table 4.1, the major amendments in *Version 2011* are as follows:

- **Manufacturing Industries:** foreign investment in the form of a joint venture (JV) in the exploration of unconventional natural gas resources and oil is newly added; waste textile recycle and treatment equipment, waste electrical products remanufacture facilities are encouraged as well. *Version 2011* adds the manufacture of specified key components for new energy automobiles, certain types of battery and battery components, motor management systems and certain types of electric-vehicle motors to the list of Encouraged Items.

A number of non-metal manufactured products, construction and operation of charging stations and battery-changing stations for automobiles, and equipment for internet systems based on internet protocol version 6 are also encouraged.

Notably, complete automobiles, polycrystalline silicon and coal chemicals, a number of chemical materials and chemical products, and some pharmaceutical products have been removed from the list of Encouraged Items. In addition, although some Encouraged Items have not been removed, their respective scope was narrowed or specific additional requirements introduced.

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<sup>2</sup> See Aaron Back, Andrew Galbraith, "China Shifts Foreign-Investment Focus", *The Wall Street Journal*, December 11, 2011.

- **Wholesale and Retail Industry:** the distribution of live and fresh agricultural products and other modern logistics, rural chain distribution, construction and operation of pallet and container unit sharing system have been added to the list of Encouraged Items.
- **Commercial Services:** the establishment and operation of venture capital enterprises, intellectual property rights services, home services and logistics consultation services are now welcomed according to *Version 2011*.

#### 4.2.2 Major amendments to the list of restricted items

Compared to the industries and activities under the list of Encouraged Items, industries and activities that fall within the list of Restricted Items are subject to stricter requirements and approval procedures, and may enjoy less favourable treatment as well. 80 Restricted items are provided for in *Version 2011*, a slight decrease compared to *Version 2007* of 87 Restricted Items. We have provided a detailed overview of the amendments to the list of Restricted Items (see Table 4.2). According to Table 4.2, 13 items were added but 21 were removed. The major amendments are as follows:

- **Mining:** *Version 2011* adds to the list of Restricted Items exploration and mining of high-aluminium fireclay, wollastonite, graphite and other important non-metallic metals; mining and mine selection of lithium mines and iron sulphur mines; and extraction of brine resources from salt lakes.
- **Manufacturing:** *Version 2011* included more activities on the list of Restricted Items in the manufacturing industries. It extended the scope of edible oils and grain-processing activities under the list of Restricted Items, such as processing of edible oils and fats from cotton seed, camellia seed, sunflower seed, palm processing of rice, flour. In addition, production of hydrogen fluoride and other low-end chlorofluorocarbons or chlorofluoro-compounds, butadiene rubber, viscose fibres, PVC through acetylene method, and production of ethane of limited output and post-processing products are now listed under Restricted Items.

*Version 2011* liberalises wholesale and retail sales of pharmaceutical products, carbonic acid beverage, and container products from Restricted Items, which means these activities now fall within the list of Permitted Items.

- **Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry:** For the purpose of further opening up the Chinese wholesale and retail market, activities such as the auction of commercial products, franchise business, commissioned agency business, and management service business, have all been removed from list of the Restricted Items. Wholesale and retail of drugs and automobiles are deleted from the Restricted Items list and now fall within the Permitted Items list as well.

Other notable changes to the list of Restricted Items include the removal of leasing and establishment of medical treatment institutions. In addition, the preferable treatment of villa construction and operation is cancelled and now falls within the list of Prohibited Items in *Version 2011*, which

is consistent with the strict rules for real estate development adopted by Chinese government during the past two years.

#### 4.2.3 Major amendments to the list of Prohibited Items.

For industries or activities that fall within the list of Prohibited Items, foreign investments are not permitted in China. 39 Prohibited Items are included in *Version 2011*, a slight decrease compared to *Version 2007* which had 40 Prohibited Items. Among all these Prohibited Items are industries or activities that endanger national security or military installations, or cause harm to the public interest. However, some activities neither endangering national security nor public interest are included in list of Prohibited Items because of other government policies.

We have provided a detailed breakdown of the changes to the list of Prohibited Items (see Table 4.3). Table 4.3 reveals that seven items have been added and six items deleted from the list of Prohibited Items. The major amendments are as follows:

- **Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery:** *Version 2011* adds two Prohibited Items, namely, research and development of China's rare and special varieties and production of relevant breeding materials; and research and development of transgenic organisms, and production of transgenic crop seeds, breeding livestock and poultry, and aquatic fingerlings.
- **Cultural, Sports, and Entertainment Industries:** In *Version 2007*, activities such as master issuing and importing books, newspaper and periodical, importing of audio and visual products and electronic publications, news website, network audiovisual service, online service location, internet art management (music) were categorised as Prohibited Items. The US had contended that these restrictions contravened China's commitments to the WTO. On January 19, 2010, a WTO Panel found that China's restrictions were indeed not consistent with its commitments. As a result, *Version 2011* deletes these restrictions so as to conform to the WTO's decision.
- **Gas and Water Production and Supply Industries:** In *Version 2007*, construction and management of conventional coal-fired power steam plants whose installed capacity is less than 300,000kW per unit within the small power grid as well as the coal-fired power of condensing-extraction steam plants with dual use unit cogeneration were only prohibited in Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan provinces. However *Version 2011* has extended this restriction's scope nationwide, thereby prohibiting foreign investment throughout.

As for foreign investment project in a specific industry that is subject to new restrictions the 'Grandfathering Principle' applies. That is, if a project has been approved or started its operation before *Version 2011* came into force, the project can continue to operate with rules and treatment that prevailed when the project was initially approved. Therefore, *Version 2011* does not have retroactive

application. However, *Version 2011* may be applied in the future to an existing foreign invested enterprise should it conduct a significant future corporate transaction requiring government approval, such as a capital increase, equity transfer, or overseas initial public offering (IPO).

### **4.3 Implications of *Version 2011* Catalogue**

#### **4.3.1 Discrimination against foreign investment remains.**

According to our statistics, there are 87 Items or activities still subject to requirements on investment form or shareholding caps of foreign investors. In *Version 2011*, 37 items (within the lists of Encouraged Items and Restricted Items) are subject to the rule that if a foreign investor intends on undertaking these activities then a Chinese party shall be the controlling shareholder. Moreover, six items have specific ceilings for the proportion of foreign investment.

In addition, as for the investment form, seven items require that any foreign investment shall be in the form of a Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture; and 37 items require that foreign investment shall be in the form of Sino-foreign equity or cooperative joint venture.

Although the Chinese government has claimed that it reduced the scope of Restricted and Prohibited Items lists--in line with its commitments to the WTO and the state's open market economic policies--as shown in our detailed tables, China is still try to protect its own domestic industries by adding some activities to the lists of Restricted and Prohibited Items and through providing new or strengthened requirements for caps of foreign equity ownership or investment form.

#### **4.3.2 Clear categorisation yet non-transparent treatment**

The *Foreign Investment Catalogue* only provides general guidance for foreign investment in China. It goes without saying that industries or activities falling within the list of Prohibited Items are not open to foreign investors. The *Foreign Investment Catalogue* only lists specific items as Encouraged or Restricted without specifying the detailed treatment that a specific item may enjoy, such as taxation and other incentives. Moreover, most of the detailed policies for foreign investments are adopted by local governments and these authorities may release detailed implementing measures in accordance with *Version 2011*. As a result, what kind of favourable treatment may be enjoyed by a specific Encouraged Item may vary across China.

In addition, with the purpose of promoting development of central and western regions, the Chinese government has adopted the *Catalogue of Priority Industries for Foreign Investment in Central and Western Region in China* (*Central and Western Region Catalogue*). This was first adopted in 2000 and the version currently in effect is *Version 2008* (adopted on December 13, 2008). The *Central*



and *Western Region Catalogue Version 2008* was based on the *Foreign Investment Catalogue Version 2007* and may well be amended in line with the new *Version 2011*.

In conclusion, *Version 2011* of the *Chinese Foreign Investment Catalogue* does not specify precisely the treatment that foreign investors in an activity will enjoy, instead using the general words of “Encouraged”, “Restricted” and “Permitted.” Again local governments have powers to adopt supplementary policies on foreign investment, so the Chinese investment environment is still relatively non-transparent and equal treatment far from assured. The prevailing rules, therefore, remain an obstacle to foreign investors who may need to devote considerable additional time and resources to prepare their entry and associated corporate strategies.

### **About the authors**

**YANG Chun Jing** is an independent researcher for the Global Trade Alert (GTA) and holds a MA in international law. He graduated from the Law School, Tsinghua University in Beijing PRC and his main academic interests are international law, international trade and dispute settlement, climate change, and carbon trading, etc.

**Ma Jia Ying** is a legal expert in clean energy business, FDI and M&A. She holds a MA in civil and commercial law. She graduated from the Law School, Minzu University of China in Beijing PRC and her main academic interests are commercial law, international investment law, clean energy development.

**Table 4.1** Detailed amendments of encouraged items in the 2011 version

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
Food Manufacturing	1. Production of natural food activities and food ingredients (not limited to Sino-foreign joint venture and Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture)	1. Processing of forest foods	
Tobacco Manufacturing	N/A	2. Processing of tobacco sheet by the method of paper making 3. Processing and production of filter tips 4. Bamboo fibre textile manufacturing	
Textile	2. Production of functional, ecological, or special purpose clothing	5. Mass production of ethane with an annual production capacity of over 800 thousand tons	
Manufacturing of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products	3. Development of new downstream products of sodium calcium hypochlorite, PVC and organ silicon	6. Processing and manufacturing of derivatives of ethylene downstream products and comprehensive utilization of ethylene fallout C4-C9 products	
Manufacturing Industries	4. Production of 1,3-propylene glycol	7. Production of corvic with an annual production capacity of over 200 thousand tons (ethylene method)	
	5. Production of at least 60,000 tons annually of non-phosgene PC, POM, polyamides (nylon 6, nylon 66, nylon 11 and nylon 12), EVA, polyphenyl thioether, poly (ether-ether-ketone)	8. Production of basic organic chemical raw materials as benzene, methylbenzene, dimethylbenzene and glycol and their derivatives	
	6. Development and production of special purpose intermediates or auxiliary agents, and development and application of relevant clean production process	9. Production of bisphenol-A	
	N/A	10. Production of precision terephthalic acid	
		11. Production of PPO, engineering plastic nylon 11 and nylon 12	

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
			<p>12. New products and technology for auxiliary and additives</p> <p>13. Production of low hysteresis HAF</p> <p>14. Production of large chemical products using coal as raw materials</p> <p>15. Production of ionic members caustic soda, inorganic membranes and functional dividing membranes</p> <p>16. Production of ship shell coating from silicone, multifunctional composite additives for plastic processing, citric acid esters of glycerol, fludioxonil and cyazofamid</p> <p>17. Amino acid: production of serine</p> <p>18. Production of new, effective and economical contraceptive medicines and devices</p> <p>19. Fluorine-containing high physiological active drugs such as heterocyclic fluoride and their intermediates</p> <p>20. Production of BCG and polio vaccine</p> <p>21. Production of biomedical materials and products (human body and its species excluding human organs and its species processing)</p> <p>22. Development of new products or new forms of antibacterial, anthelmintic, insecticide, anti-coccidiosis medicines used for animals</p> <p>21. Production of environmental protection-oriented chemical fibre such as new solvent fibre, etc.</p> <p>22. Production of PBT, and production of PDO from renewable resources and biomass engineering technology</p> <p>23. Production of polyamide with a single-line daily production capacity of 150 tons ore more</p>
	Pharmaceutical Manufacturing	N/A	
	Chemical Fibre Manufacturing	7. Production of PCT and PETG	
		8. Production of polyamide with a single-line daily production capacity of 150 tons ore more	

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
	Nonmetallic Mineral Manufacturing	<p>9. Production of conductive glass for thin film batteries and glass for solar illuminator</p> <p>10. Production of nami materials</p> <p>11. Production of organic inorganic composite cellular insulation materials</p> <p>12. Recycling of building wastes</p> <p>13. Comprehensive utilization of industrial by-products gypsum</p> <p>14. Development and application of new technologies for comprehensive utilization of non-metal mine tailings and ecological restoration of mines</p>	<p>24. Production of fiberglass continuous stand mat, fiberglass surface mat and fiberglass cloth &amp; felt use in microelectronics</p> <p>25. Production of sanitation porcelain with an annual production of 1 million pieces</p> <p>26. Production of fiberglass used in kilns and furnaces</p> <p>27. Production of ceramic carriers for use in the catalytic devices of vehicles</p> <p>28. Production of artificial crystals, heat insulating materials with thermal conductivity at 0.025 W/mK or below under room temperatures</p> <p>29. Production of glass-steel pipes with special performances (pressure &gt; 1.2 MPa) and braking plates</p>
	Nonferrous Metals Smelting and Rolling Industry	<p>N/A</p>	<p>30. Production of polycrystalline silicon which the diameter is 200mm or larger</p> <p>31. Production of high-tech non-ferrous metal materials: new &amp; high performances hydrogen storage materials, materials for the electrodes of lithium batteries</p>
	Metal Products Manufacturing	<p>15. Research, development and manufacture of new-weight and environment-friendly materials for aviation, aerospace</p> <p>16. Manufacture of nickel-saving stainless steel products</p>	<p>N/A</p>
	General Equipment Manufacturing	<p>17. Manufacture of equipment for post-processing and sorting of retired automobiles</p>	<p>32. Manufacture of precise casted and forged semi-finished products for cars and motorcycles</p>

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
		<p>18.Design and manufacture of high-pressure plunger pumps of working pressure≥ 35 MPa and engines, and low-speed large-torque engines of working pressure ≥ 35 MPa</p> <p>19. Manufacture of wheeled and crawler cranes of 400 tons or above</p> <p>20.Manufacture of high-density, high-precision, complex-shaped powder metallurgical parts and chains used for automobile, engineering machinery, etc.</p> <p>21.Manufacture of gear transmission used for wind power or high speed rail, gear transmission agent with adjustable blades used for vessels, and large-sized, heavy-load gear box</p> <p>22.Development and manufacture of accumulator bladders</p> <p>23.Manufacture of bearings of wind turbine generator set and aircraft bearings</p>	<p>33.Design and manufacture of high-pressure plunger pumps of working pressure≥ 35 MPa and engines, and low-speed large-torque engines of working pressure ≥ 35 MPa</p> <p>34.Manufacture of wheeled and crawler cranes of 300 tons or above</p> <p>35.Manufacture of high-precision, high-strength (at the level of 12.9), special-shaped, assembly fasteners</p>
	Special Purpose Equipment Manufacturing	<p>24.Manufacture of trackless equipment for mining, loading and transport in mines, including: mechanically-driven tippers for mining with a capacity of 200 tons or more; mobile crushers; bucket wheel excavators with a capacity of 3,000 cubic meters per hour or more; loaders for mining purposes with a capacity of 5,000 cubic meters per hour or more; and 2,500-kilowatt or above electrically-dragged coal mining machines</p>	<p>36.Manufacture of trackless equipment for mining, loading and transport in mines, including: mechanically-driven tippers for mining with a capacity of 100 tons or more; mobile crushers; bucket wheel excavators with a capacity of 3,000 cubic meters per hour or more; loaders for mining purposes with a capacity of 8 cubic meters or more; and 2,000-kilowatt or above electrically-dragged coal mining machines</p>

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
		<p>25. Manufacturing of oil exploration, drilling, gathering and transportation equipment: floating drilling systems and floating production systems which will work in more than 500 meters of water depth, working depth greater than 600 meters undersea oil production, gathering and transportation equipment, power of winch greater than 3,000 kilowatts, top driving force greater than 850 kilowatts, drilling pump more than 1,800 kilowatts of power by deep-sea oil rig, drilling depth of 9,000 meters above the desert land drilling rig and oil rig, 10 million tons / year oil refining installations with 80 tons and above Pistons edge reciprocating compressor, NC oil Sham Tseng logging, oil Drilling Mud Hole solid operating highway tunnel monitoring equipment, ventilation, disaster prevention and relief system equipment manufacturers</p>	<p>37. Manufacturing of equipment for oil exploration, drilling, collection and transportation: floating drilling systems and floating production systems with an operating water depth of more than 1500 meters and the supporting subsea oil extraction, collection and transportation equipment</p>
		<p>26. Design and manufacture of maintenance machinery and inspection and monitoring equipment for railway tracks, bridges and tunnels, and other key parts and components</p>	<p>38. Design and manufacturing of skeleton shield integrated system with diameter of 6 meters, TBM system integrating with diameter of five meters; manufacturing of consecutive wall underwater drilling machine, manufacturing of automatic vertical drilling system</p>
		<p>27. Manufacture of the key equipment of complete sets of ethylene equipment with an annual capacity of 1 million tons or more: mixing granulators with an annual processing capacity of 400,000 tons or more, helical-conveyor centrifuges with a diameter of 1,000 mm or more, low-flow high-head centrifugal pump</p>	<p>39. Design and manufacturing of large lifting machine of 100 tons or more 320hp</p>
		<p>28. Design and manufacture of punching dies for large-sized injection molds for dashboard, bumper, etc.</p>	<p>40. Design and manufacturing of pedrail soil shifter of ground pressure of 0.03MPa or less, power of 220 hp or more</p>

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
		<p>29.Design and manufacture of production equipment for power batteries for automobiles</p> <p>30.Manufacture of multi-colour and wide flexographic presses (printing width≥1,300 millimetres and printing speed ≥350 meters per second), inkjet digital printing presses (used for publication: printing speed≥150 meters per minute and resolution≥600dpi; used for packaging: printing speed≥30 meters per minute and resolution≥1,000dpi; used for variable data: printing speed≥100 meters per minute and resolution≥300dpi)</p> <p>31.Manufacture of electron-gun automatic coating machines</p> <p>32.Manufacture of rapeseed harvesters; cane harvesters; and beet harvesters</p> <p>33.Manufacture of equipment for collection, bundle and comprehensive utilization of straws and stalks of agricultural crops</p> <p>34.Manufacture of key components of medical imaging equipment (including high-field-strength superconducting magnetic resonance imaging equipment, X-ray computed tomography imaging equipment, digital colour diagnostic ultrasound equipment, etc.)</p> <p>35.Manufacture of image-guided intensity modulated radiation therapy systems</p>	<p>41.Design and manufacturing of large-scale road maintenance machinery and safety equipment</p> <p>42.Design and manufacturing of thin-slab continuous casting machine</p> <p>43.Manufacturing of devices of direct reverting iron and liquation reverting iron</p> <p>44.Manufacturing of high power DC electric arc furnace of 50 tons or more</p> <p>45.Manufacturing of colourful panting or plating board devices</p> <p>46.Manufacturing of key devices of 800000 tons/year or more of oxene complete devices: air compressor of pyrolysis gas, oxene and elemicin, complicated powder making machine of 1000000 tons/year, centrifuge with diameter of 800 millimeter, un-attachable pump and valve that can work under conditions of temperature250°C and pressure 15Mpa, valve that can work under conditions of temperature -55°C or less and so on(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures)</p> <p>47.Design and maintaining of mould standard elements.</p>

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
		<p>36. Manufacture of ozone generators with a capacity of more than 50kg/h, heavy metal wastewater treatment equipment</p> <p>37. Manufacture of solid waste treatment and disposal equipment: sewage plant sludge disposal and resource recycling equipment, complete sets of refuse incineration equipment with a daily treatment capacity of 500 tons or more, landfill leachate treatment technology equipment, anti-seepage geo-membranes in landfills, building waste treatment and resource recovery utilization equipment, devices for disposal of hazardous waste, devices for power generation with biogas in landfills, treatment equipment for ferrous wastes, and soil remediation equipment</p> <p>38. Manufacture of solid waste treatment and disposal equipment: sewage plant sludge disposal and resource recycling equipment, complete sets of refuse incineration equipment with a daily treatment capacity of 500 tons or more, landfill leachate treatment technology equipment, building waste treatment and resource recovery utilization equipment, treatment equipment for ferrous wastes, and soil remediation equipment</p> <p>39. Development and manufacture of equipment for comprehensive utilization of red mud from aluminum industry</p> <p>40. Manufacture of equipment for comprehensive utilization of mine tailings</p>	<p>48. Manufacturing of colourful soft printing machine with speed of 300meters/m or more and coverage of 1000 millimetres or more</p> <p>49. Special high-tech Industrial sewing machines manufacturing</p>
			<p>50. Packaging Materials for Aseptic packaging, DVS Bacteria Starter for Dairy Production</p>
			<p>51. Manufacturing of equipment for reusing in fields and comprehensive utilization of straws and stalks of crop. Manufacturing of equipment for comprehensive utilization of Rice Husk</p> <p>52. Manufacturing of medical imaging equipments' key components (high magnetic field intensity and superconductive MRI, CT, X-ray computed tomography, type-B ultrasonic )</p>



NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
41.	Manufacture of reclamation equipment for waste textiles	Manufacture of reclamation equipment for waste textiles	53. Manufacturing of X-ray Stereotactic Radiotherapy System
42.	Manufacture of equipment for remanufacturing of waste mechanical and electrical products	Manufacture of equipment for remanufacturing of waste mechanical and electrical products	54. Manufacture of ozone generators with a capacity of more than 10kg/h
43.	Manufacture of portable assembling water purification equipment	Manufacture of portable assembling water purification equipment	55. Manufacture of the equipment for comprehensively using the domestic animal and fowl waste in large scale
44.	Unconventional water treatment or recycling equipment and water quality monitoring instruments	Unconventional water treatment or recycling equipment and water quality monitoring instruments	
45.	Leak test equipment and instruments for industrial water pipeline networks and equipment (appliances)	Leak test equipment and instruments for industrial water pipeline networks and equipment (appliances)	
46.	Manufacture of devices for recovery of marine oil spilling	Manufacture of devices for recovery of marine oil spilling	
47.	Manufacture of equipment for utilization of low concentration of coal-mine gas and methane	Manufacture of equipment for utilization of low concentration of coal-mine gas and methane	

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
	Communication and Transportation Equipment Industries	<p>48. Manufacturing of key spare parts for automobiles as well as research and development of key technologies: complete disc brakes, complete driving rods, automatic gearboxes, fuel pumps of diesel engine, inhaled supercharger of engines, adhesive axial organ (used for four-wheel drive), hydraulic tappet, electronic cluster gauge, crankshaft and connecting bar (diesel motor above 8 litres), Anti-Lock Brake System (ABS, ECU, valve body, sensor), ESP, BBW, electronic braking distribution system (EBD), driving control system, gas generator for automobile airbags, electronic fuel injection system, sprays technology on fuel common rail technology (at most spray pressure above 1600 pa), VGT, VNT, discharge control equipment of motor meeting the pollutant discharge standard of the fourth phase of China, ITM and coupler assembly, Steer-by-Wire System, Diesel Particulate Filter (DPF), intelligent cylinder, special rubber automobile components</p>	<p>56. Manufacture of key automobile parts and components and research &amp; development of key technologies: dual-clutch transmission (DCT), automated mechanical transmission (AMT), gasoline engine turbocharger, viscous coupling (for four-wheel drive), actuator for automatic transmission (electromagnetic valve), hydraulic retarder, eddy current retarder, gas generators for automobile safety air-bags, electronic diesel injection systems, common rail fuel injection technology (with maximum injection pressure of more than 2,000 pa), variable geometry turbocharging (VGT) technology, variable nozzle turbocharging (VNT) technology, engine emission control devices meeting China's Phase V pollutant emission standards, intelligent torque management (ITM) systems and coupler assembly, steer-by-wire systems, diesel particulate trap devices, special-purpose axles for low-floor large buses, energy-absorbing steering system, variable frequency air-conditioning system for large and medium buses, special rubber automobile accessories, and key parts and components of the abovementioned parts and components</p>
		<p>49. Manufacturing of electronic combination instrument; ABS/TCS/ESP systems; Brake-By-Wire (BBW) system; gearbox transmission control unit (TCU); tire-pressure monitoring system (TPMS); on-board diagnostics (OBD); engine anti-theft system; automatic bump-shielded system;</p>	<p>57. Reused manufacture of engines</p>
		<p>50. Manufacture of key parts and components of new energy automobiles</p>	<p>58. Manufacturing of complete automobiles (foreign investments shall not exceed 50%) and construction of automobiles research and development organization</p>

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
		<p>51.Design of cruise ship and deepwater (3,000 meters or more) marine engineering equipment (limited to Sino-foreign equity joint venture and Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture )</p>	<p>59.Manufacturing of electronic throttle, power cell(NiH and Li-con) and control system(limited to equity joint ventures) integrated motor and control system(limited to equity joint ventures) wheelboss motor, multifunction controller(limited to equity joint ventures) fuel cell and spare parts thereof, hydrogen storing systems for automobiles</p> <p>60.Design and manufacturing of civil rocket launcher(Chinese part shall hold the majority of shares)</p> <p>60.Design of vessels with high and new technologies(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures)</p> <p>61.Maintaining, and manufacturing of vessels (including stages) and designing of equipment for ocean project(Chinese part shall hold the majority of shares)</p> <p>62.Design and manufacturing of diesel engine for vessel of high speed(limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures)</p> <p>64.Design and manufacturing of deck machine for vessels(Chinese parties shall hold the relative majority of shares)</p> <p>65.Design and manufacturing of overseas fishing vessels and cabin cruiser (limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures)</p> <p>66.Manufacture of the pivotal equipment of super-critical units of over 600,000 KW and over 1,000, 000KW of fire and electricity station (limited to Sino-foreign equity joint venture and Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture): boiler-feed water pump, circular water pump, valve of main steam loop high temperature and pressure which is over 400 work temperature and 20Mpa of work pressure</p>
	Electric Machinery and Equipment Industries	<p>52.Manufacture of key auxiliary equipment used for one million-kilowatt ultra-super-critical thermal power units (limited to Sino-foreign equity joint venture and Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture): safety valves, control valves</p>	

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
53.	Manufacture of large castings and forgings for coal fired power station and hydro power station equipment		67.Manufacture of the equipment of Over million kilowatt Nuclear-power plant (limited to Sino-foreign equity joint venture and Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture) Pump and valve of Nucleus, Nucleus
54.	Manufacture of key auxiliary equipment for hydro-power generating units		68.Design and manufacture of the equipment of nucleus-electricity airproof
55.	Manufacture of power transmission and transformation equipment (limited to Sino-foreign equity joint venture and Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture): amorphous alloy transformers, operating gears for high-voltage switches of 500 kilowatts or more, arc-control devices, large disc insulators (1,000 KV, 50 KA or more), outlet devices, sleeves used for 500 KV or more transformers (500, 750, 1,000 KV AC, all the specifications for DC), voltage regulating switches (on-load, no-load voltage regulating switches of ? Westlaw China Page 23500, 750, 1,000 KV AC), dry-type smoothing reactors for direct current transmission, and converter valves for ±800 KV direct current transmission (water coolers, DC field equipment)		69.Power transmitting and transforming equipment (limited to Sino-foreign equity joint venture and Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture): high voltage implement great bushing, high voltage on-off operation implement, and freedom integer arc contact, direct current transmit electricity dried reactor, 6 inch direct current convertor clique high-power grain-valve tube
56.	Manufacture of the equipment of New energy electricity-power: photovoltaic power , geothermal power generation, tidal power generation, wave power generation, rubbish power generation, methane power generation, wind power generation over 1.5M (not limited to Sino-foreign equity joint venture and Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture as required in Version 2007)		70.Manufacture of the equipment of nuclear-power of great model casting-forge

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
		<p>57. Manufacture of large pumped power storage units with rated power of 350MW or more (limited to Sino-foreign equity joint venture and Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture)</p> <p>58. Development and manufacture of linear motors and plane motors, and their drive systems</p> <p>59. Manufacture of high-tech green batteries: nickel-metal hydride (Ni-MH) batteries, nickel-zinc batteries, silver-zinc batteries, lithium-ion batteries, solar batteries, fuel batteries, etc. (excluding new energy vehicle power battery)</p> <p>60. Manufacture of refrigeration compressors for air conditioning with motor adopting DC speed control technology, refrigeration compressors for air conditioning adopting CO2 natural refrigerants, refrigeration equipment for air conditioning applying renewable energy (air source, water source, ground source)</p> <p>61. Manufacture of MEMS and compound semiconductor integrated circuits</p>	<p>71. Manufacture of intelligent molded case circuit (3800V, 1000A), large project intelligent cabinet or drawer type circuit breaker, belt-type intelligent electronic control distribution device</p>
	<p>Communication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment manufacturing</p>	<p>62. Manufacture of high molecular solid capacitors, super-capacitors, passive integrated components,</p> <p>63. Manufacture of touch control system (touch control screens, touch components, etc.)</p>	<p>72. Digital player equipment manufacturing</p> <p>73. Manufacture of flat panel FED display</p> <p>74. Manufacture of high-performance single-lens reflex with more than 6 million pixels</p>

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
		<p>64. Manufacture of high-brightness light-emitting diodes (LEDs) with luminous efficiency of more than 1001 m/W, LED epitaxial wafers (blue light) with luminous efficiency of more than 1001 m/W, and white luminous tubes with luminous efficiency of more than 1001 m/W and power of more than 200mW</p> <p>65. Manufacture of time division multiplex equipment (TDM) with rate of 40Gbps or more, Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing equipment (DWDM), broadband passive network equipment (including EPON, GPON, WDM-PON, etc.), next-generation DSL silicon and equipment,</p> <p>66. Manufacture of Coarse Wave Division Multiplexing(CWDM)</p>	<p>75. Manufacture of large-breath( more than 900mm) high-definition coloured printing equipment, high-definition coloured printer head with its precision more than 2400dbi, and large-breath( more than 900mm) high-definition coloured Xerox equipment</p> <p>76. High-tech green battery manufacture: dynamic zinc and nickel storage cell, zinc and silver storage cell, lithium-ion batteries, high-capability, air-proof and repair-free lead-acid battery, solar battery, fuel battery, column-shaped zinc-air battery and etc.</p>
		<p>67. Development and manufacture of next generation Internet system equipment, terminal equipment, testing equipment, software, and chips based on IPv6</p>	<p>77. High-brightness LBD with its luminous efficiency more than 501m/W, epitaxial slice LBD(blue) with its luminous efficiency more than 501m/W, white luminous tube with luminous efficiency more than 501m/W and its power more than 200mW</p> <p>78. Development and manufacture of RFID chip</p>
Machinery Industries for Meter, Culture and Office	<p>68. Manufacture of industrial process automatic control system and devices: field bus control systems, large-scale programmable logic controller (PLC), two-phase flow meters, solid flow meters, new-type sensors and field measuring meters</p>	<p>79. Manufacture of Asynchronous Transfer Mode(ATM) and IP digital communication system</p> <p>80. Manufacture of field-bus control system and its key components and parts</p>	

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
69.	Development and manufacture of 450KV industrial X-ray diagnostic machines, grating rulers and encoders		81. Development and manufacture of large-scale sophisticated instruments: laser with its power more than 2kw, industrial chromatograph, ultra-speed centrifuge with its rotating speed more than 100000r/min, large-scale metallurgical microscope, High-performance welding rare earth material with permanent magnetism, portable geological radar
70.	Manufacture of new-tech equipment of environmental-protection testing instrument: air quality testing, water quality testing, new-tech equipment of fume on-line detecting instrument, apparatus for emergency treatment and complete-set new differential coefficient analysis system, automatic calibration, composite, low-drift, on-line remote measurement and remote controlled apparatus and system and etc.		82. Manufacture of two-phase flow meter and solid flow meter
71.	Manufacture of flue gas & Pm2.5 dust samplers and sample cutters, heavy metal online monitoring equipment, on-line water quality early warning and monitoring equipment adopting biotoxicity method		83. Manufacture of automatic plating machine for electron gun
72.	Manufacture of 10 million pixels or more digital cameras		84. Manufacture of industrial NDT X-ray equipment governing the volt more than 800 kv
73.	Manufacture of office machinery: all-in-one multifunction office equipment (printer, copier, fax machine, scanner), colour printing devices, heads of high-resolution colour printers with precision of 2400dpi or more, OPC drums		85. Manufacture of new technical equipment for environmental protection
74.	Manufacture of film machinery: 2K, 4K digital cinema projectors, digital cinema cameras, digital video production, editing equipment		86. Manufacture of CO automatic monitor, automatic sampler and calcimeter for soot and dust, automatic sampler and calcimeter for soot

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
	Crafts and Other Manufacturing Industries	75. Recycling and treatment of waste electrical and electronic products, automobiles, mechanical & electrical equipment, rubbers, metals, batteries	87. Manufacture of ocean exploring apparatus and equipment: high-pressure pump used in filtration-proof seawater desalination with its efficiency more than 85%, filtration-proof seawater desalination membrane (desalination rate more than 99.7%), low-temperature multifunction distilled seawater desalination equipment with its daily production more than 20,000 tons N/A
2	Production and Supply of Power, Gas and Water	76. Construction and operation of water-supply plant (not limited to urban areas required in Version 2007) 77. Construction and operation of renewable water plants	88. Construction and management of new energy power plants (magnetic energy) 89. Using industrialization to recycle industrial sewage
3	Communication and Transportation, Storage, Post and Telecommunication Services	78. Construction and operation of vehicle charging stations, battery replacement stations 79. Construction and operation of elevated three-dimensional automatic storage facilities	N/A
4	Wholesale and Retail Industries	80. Distribution of live and fresh agricultural products and other modern logistics, as well as relevant technological services 81. Rural chain distribution 82. Construction and operation of pallet and container unit sharing system	N/A N/A N/A
5	Rent and business service	83. Logistics information consulting services 84. Venture capital companies 85. Intellectual property rights services 86. Home service	N/A



NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
6	Scientific research, technology service and geological exploration	87. Offshore oil pollution cleaning and ecology recovery technology and relevant product development, prevention and treatment technology of sea water eutrophication, prevention and treatment technology of marine life explosive growth disaster, and coastal zone ecological environment recovery technology 88. Energy-saving technology service 89. Technology for energy efficiency in printing and dyeing processing and for the disposal of exhaust gas, waste liquid and waste residue N/A	N/A
7	Water, environment and public facility management industry	N/A	N/A
8	Education	90. Occupational skills training	N/A
9	Public health, social security and social welfare	N/A	N/A
10	Culture, sports and entertainment	N/A	N/A
11	Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery	91. Planting of oil palm	90. Transformation of mid-low yield lands
12	Mining Industry	92. Development and application of new technologies for oil exploration and exploitation in areas such as geophysical prospecting, drilling, well logging, mud logging, and down-hole operation (the Sino-foreign joint venture is newly added) 93. Exploration and exploitation of unconventional oil resources, such as oil shale, oil sand, heavy crude oil, and extra-heavy crude oil (the form of Sino-foreign joint venture newly added)	91. Development of new varieties of genetically-modified (GM) trees N/A

**Table 4.2** Detailed Amendments of Restricted Items in the 2011 Version

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
1	Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery	N/A	N/A
2	Mining	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.Exploration and mining of high-aluminium fire-clay, wollastonite, graphite and other important non-metallic metals</li> <li>2. Mining and mine selection of lithium mines and iron sulphur mines, extraction of brine resources from salt</li> <li>3.Processing of edible oils and fats from peanut, cottonseed, camellia seed, sunflower seed, palm (with Chinese parties as the controlling shareholders), processing of rice, flour</li> </ol>	N/A
3	Manufacturing Industry	<p>Agricultural Products, By-products and Food Processing Industry</p> <p>Beverage Manufacturing Industry</p> <p>N/A</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4.Print of publication (packing and presentation)</li> <li>5.Atmospheric and vacuum refinery with the annual output below 10 million tons, the catalytic cracking with the annual output below 1.5 million tons, the continuous reforming (including aromatics extraction) with the annual output below 1 million tons, the hydrogen cracking production with the annual output below 1.5 million tons</li> <li>6.Production of hydrogen fluoride and other low-end chlorofluorocarbons or chlorofluorocompounds</li> <li>7.Production of butadiene rubber (excluding high cis-butadiene rubber)</li> </ol>	<p>1.Carbonic acid beverage manufacturing</p> <p>N/A</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.Construction and management of refineries which annual produce less than 800 ten thousand tons</li> <li>3.Production of fluorine-chlorocarbon, hydrogen-fluorine-chlorocarbon, tetrafluoroethylene, fluorination-aluminium and hydrofluoric acid</li> <li>4.Production of polybutadiene</li> </ol>

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
		8. Production of PVC through acetylene method, and production of ethane of limited output and post-processing products	5. Production of sulphate process titanium dioxide, open hearth process permanganate
	Medical and Pharmaceutical Products Industry	9. Production of inorganic salt which occupies large amount of resources, causes serious environment pollution, and adopts obsolete process N/A	6. Production of baron, magnesium, iron ores
	Chemical Fibre Manufacturing	10. Production of viscose fibres	8. Production of non-self-destructible expendable injectors, transfusion systems, blood transfusion systems, blood bags N/A
	Rubber Products	N/A	9. Old tire recondition (not including radial tire), and production of industrial rubber fittings of low-performance
	Metal Manufacturing	N/A	10. Manufacture of containers
	Common Purpose Equipment Manufacturing Industry	11. Manufacture of wheeled model, crawler crane less than 300 tons	11. Manufacture of wheeled model, crawler crane less than 300 tons
	Special Purpose Equipment Manufacturing Industry	12. Manufacture of hydro-mechanically driven off-highway dump trucks of 60 tons or less, asphalt concrete mixing and paving equipment and high-altitude operation machinery	12. Production of low or middle class type-B ultrasonic displays
			13. Manufacture of road surface milling rework machinery

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
	Manufacturing of transport and communication facilities	13. Repairing, design and manufacture of ship (including subsection) (Chinese partner shall hold the majority of shares)	N/A
	Manufacturing of Communication Apparatus, Computers and another Electric Installation	N/A	14. Manufacture of fiscal cash register
4	Production and Supply of Power, Gas and Water	14. Construction and management of conventional coal-fired power of condensing steam plants whose unit installed capacity is less than 300,000kW, within the small power grid (not limited to areas of Xizang, Xinjiang, Hainan province in Version 2007), and the coal-fired power of condensing-extraction steam plants with dual use unit cogeneration	N/A
5	Communication and Transportation, Storage, Post and Telecommunication Services	N/A	N/A
6	Wholesale and Retail Trade Industries	N/A	15. Commercial companies of franchising, commissioned operation, commercial management

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
		15. Purchase of grains	16. Medicines, automobiles retail trade and distribution (Chinese should hold the majority of shares of the multiple shops which have more than 30 branch stores and sale different kinds and brands of commodities from multi-suppliers)
		16. Construction and operation of large-scale agricultural products wholesale market	17. Commodity auctions
7	Banking and Insurance Industries	N/A	18. Distributing and selling of audio-visual products (excluding movies)( Chinese should hold the majority of shares)
8	Real Estate Industry	N/A	19. Financial leasing companies
9	Leasing and Commercial Service Industry	N/A	Note: Construction and operation of villas is cancelled, but classified into Prohibited items
10	Scientific Research and technical Services Industries, Geological Prospecting	N/A	N/A
11	Education	N/A	20. Common high school education mechanism (contractual joint ventures)
12	Public Health, Sports and Social Welfare Industries	N/A	21. Medical treatment (limited to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures)

**Table 4.3** Detailed amendments of Prohibited Items in *Version 2011*

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
1	Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery	<p>1. Research and development of China's rare and special varieties, and production of relevant breeding materials (including quality genes in planting industry, husbandry and aquaculture)</p> <p>2. Research and development of transgenic organism, and production of transgenic crop seeds, breeding livestock and poultry, and aquatic fingerlings</p>	1. Production and development of genetically modified plants' seeds
2	Mining	N/A	N/A
3	Manufacturing Industry	3. Production of mercury-contained silver oxide button batteries	N/A
4	Power, Gas and Water Production and Supply Industries	4. Construction and management of conventional coal-fired power of condensing steam plants whose unit installed capacity is less than 300,000kW, within the small power grid (not limited in areas of Xizang, Xinjiang, Hainan province in Version 2007), and the coal-fired power of condensing-extraction steam plants with dual use unit cogeneration	N/A
5	Transportation, Storage & Warehousing and Postal Services Industries	5. Domestic express delivery business of mails	N/A
6	Scientific Research, Technological Services and Geological Exploration Industries	6. Topographic map compilations and general map compilations, and compilations of electronic maps for navigation purpose	2. Relief map of map compilation and navigation electronic map compilation of common map compilation
7	Cultural, Sports and Entertainment Industries	7. Construction and operation of villas	3. Master issuing and importing books, newspaper and periodical

NO.	Industry Category	Newly Added Activities or Sectors	Cancelled Activities or Sectors
			<p>4.Importing of audio and visual products and electronic publications</p> <p>5.News website, network audio-visual service, on line service location, internet art management (music)</p> <p>6.Video screening companies</p>





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# 5 The Proposed ‘Buy European’ Procurement Regulation: An Analysis

**Kamala Dawar<sup>1</sup>**

*The Graduate Institute, Geneva*

## Introduction

The European Commission recently advanced a ‘Buy European’ proposal for a regulation on the access of third-country goods and services to the EU’s internal market in public procurement.<sup>2</sup> Reciprocity, or the practice of lowering barriers to trade in return for similar concessions from another country, is the core principle behind this proposed scheme. The key objective is to improve the conditions under which EU businesses can compete for public contracts in third countries.

The European Commission has pointed out that while about €352 billion of EU public procurement is open to bidders from member countries of the WTO agreement on government procurement (GPA), this market access is not matched by other countries. The estimated value of US procurement offered to foreign bidders is currently just €178 billion, €27 billion for Japan, and even less for China. As a result, only €10 billion of EU exports (0.08% of EU GDP) reach foreign procurement markets, leaving an estimated €12 billion of EU exports unrealised because of third-country restrictions. The European Commission’s proposal notes the stark contrast this is to the EU which has not exercised its power to regulate the access of foreign goods, services and companies to the EU’s public procurement market, except in certain utilities sectors.

The European Commission’s proposal therefore seeks to create an autonomous instrument that would both enhance the EU’s position in negotiations on market access, and preserve a competitive procurement regime in the EU.

This analysis sets out the main features of the proposed regulation as currently available. It then assesses the main implications of this proposed regulation, should it be adopted.

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1 Without implicating in any way, this paper gratefully acknowledges the input of Dr Edwin Vermulst and Dr Albert Sanchez Graells.

2 The official title is: “2012/060 (COD) Proposal for a Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council On The Access Of Third-Country Goods And Services To The Union’s Internal Market In Public Procurement And Procedures Supporting Negotiations On Access Of Union Goods And Services To The Public Procurement Markets Of Third Countries”. Adopted on March 21st 2012.

## The ‘Buy European’ two-track proposal:

The proposal advanced by the European Commission envisages two processes—or tracks—for encouraging greater reciprocity on the part of trading partners vis-à-vis access to the public procurement contracts.

### *Track 1: The contracting agency’s three-stage approach to reciprocity*

For a national contracting agency in an EU Member State, a 3-stage approach to obtaining reciprocity in procurement markets of third countries is envisaged as follows:

**Stage 1** of the regulatory process is triggered if and when a contracting authority explicitly decides that it will use the regulation to exclude any tender that does not conform to the criteria set out in the regulation under Article 6. A contracting authority must notify both firms tendering for a contract and the European Commission that it will be applying the regulation to the tender process.

Article 6 ultimately empowers the European Commission to exclude any tender if the value of ‘non-covered goods and services’ exceeds 50% of the total value of goods and services included, and the tender is valued at €5m or above.<sup>3</sup> These ‘non-covered goods and services’ are defined as goods and services that originate either in i) non-WTO Government Procurement Agreement signatory countries or in ii) WTO GPA signatory countries but which are not covered by the scope WTO GPA commitments because they are not included in the Annexes of the signatories to the agreement.

**Stage 2** involves an investigation by the European Commission of the specific tender notified by the domestic contracting agency. When assessing whether a lack of substantial reciprocity exists, the European Commission must examine the extent to which the public procurement laws of the country concerned ensure sufficient transparency in line with international standards in the field of public procurement as well as preclude any discrimination against EU operators.

**Stage 3**, which involves consultations with a view to remedial action, takes place if the European Commission concludes from its investigation that it has grounds to approve the intended exclusion because either:

- a. the goods and services concerned are subject to a market access reservation under the EU international agreements on public procurement; or
- b. an international procurement agreement does not exist, and the third country maintains restrictive procurement measures leading to a lack of substantial reciprocity in market opening between the Union and the third country concerned.

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
<sup>3</sup> Exclusive of value-added tax (VAT).

If the country concerned is unwilling to engage in consultations or provide satisfactory solutions to the restrictive procurement measures within 15 months, the EU may take the decision to:


1. disqualify certain tenders made up for more than 50% of goods or services originating in the country concerned; and/or
2. impose a mandatory price penalty on those goods or services tendered which originate in the country concerned.

**Figure 5.1** Track 1: The contracting agency


Stage 1: Notifications (Article 6)



Stage 2: Investigations under Article 6 criteria



Stage 3: Consultations/remedies




*Track 2: The European Commission’s 2-stage approach to obtaining reciprocity*

An investigation into a particular tender can also be undertaken on the initiative of the European Commission itself, if it believes it to be in the “interest of the Union” or there has been an application by a Member State or another *interested party*. Article 8 specifies that the European Commission must publish its decision to initiate an investigation in the *Official Journal of the Union* and the investigation should be based on the same criteria as when a contracting authority requests an investigation, and as set out under Article 6.

However, if the European Commission identifies restrictive procurement practices under Article 6 criteria, it does not have to undertake consultations with the country whose procurement practices are in question. The Commission may proceed directly to imposing remedies as set out under Article 10 in the form of price penalties or tender exclusions.

**Figure 5.2** Track 2: The Commission’s two-stage approach



**Analysis of the implications of the proposed regulation**

The adoption of this proposal is far from assured. Its successful legislative passage requires both the approval of the European Parliament and a qualified majority of EU governments. Crucially, even if it is approved, the regulation remains optional for both the European Commission and the contracting authorities. There is no obligation set out in the proposal to ensure reciprocity, rather it provides the discretion to pursue exclusion or price penalties lies at both the contracting agency level and with the European Commission.

The consequences of this ‘optional’ regulation are twofold. Firstly, its application may be uneven. This threatens to fragment the EU’s single market, which forms one building block of the proposal itself. The legality of this proposal is founded on Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which states, inter alia, that the EU’s common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles. This proposal has the potential to undermine this quest for uniformity and could also cause some non-transparent distortions to competition between EU companies. That is, those companies that place bids in markets where neither the contracting authorities nor the European Commission are seeking reciprocity will face more difficulties in competing for the contract

than in those markets where a tough line is taken towards excluding bids from non-reciprocating parties.

The decision to exclude a non-reciprocating bid may entail excluding the cheapest bid, or the principle of best 'value for money.' Presumably this is a real risk otherwise the bid would not win and there would be no need to exclude it. It could also entail excluding those goods and services from EU firms that may supply the remaining part (>50%) of the excluded bid. These costs, along with those resources required to pursue an investigation leading to an exclusion, are only likely to be borne where there is an important EU stakeholder lobbying for such an outcome. When the European Commission takes a decision to investigate a tender, it may be in response to an application from a member state or any "interested party". Thus, unlike the 'standing' requirement under EU laws such as anti-dumping, disappointed EU bidding firms have standing to initiate an investigation under this proposal.

The proposed regulation also addresses abnormally low bids. An instrument will be established to allow for information and evidence to be gathered not only for other procurement exclusions but also for possible use in WTO disputes under the Subsidies Agreement. Such cases are typically difficult to build because the associated assessments are complex and it is not straightforward to draw conclusions about the actual impact of a subsidy on export prices.

Some of the ambiguities of the proposal as it stands are potentially problematic. For example, in the case of non-reciprocity and unsuccessful consultations, the European Commission can temporarily disqualify the non-reciprocating country from the EU procurement market. However, the word 'temporarily' has not been defined, offering the European Commission ample room to manoeuvre in a non-transparent manner when seeking to exclude tenders for contracts. Price penalties are similarly ill-defined, providing the European Commission with more discretion in their application.

## The applicability of the GATT/WTO agreements

### a) The government procurement agreement

The EU is a Party to the WTO's plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). There are therefore potential legal ramifications should the EU take unilateral actions against contract bidders from other WTO GPA parties. First, the 'Buy national' regulation is contrary to the spirit as well as the explicit objectives of the GPA. The preamble of the Agreement *recognises* both the need for an effective multilateral framework of rights and obligations with respect to laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government procurement and also that laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government procurement should not be prepared, adopted or applied to foreign or domestic products and services and to foreign or domestic suppliers so as to afford protection to domestic products or services or domestic suppliers and should

not discriminate among foreign products or services or among foreign suppliers. At least as regards the bids covered by the GPA, this commitment appears to be directly opposed to the objective of the EU proposal.

Secondly, Article III.1 of the GPA states that each Party shall provide immediately and unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers of other Parties offering products or services of the Parties, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other Party. The voluntary nature of the proposed regulation would appear to work against the no-less-favourable treatment that must be immediately and unconditionally to all other parties to the Agreement. Again, at least as regards those non-reciprocating parts of procurement bids covered by the GPA in the Annexes of Appendix 1.

Thirdly, in an effort to remove the unilateral imposition of remedies potentially leading to trade wars, the GPA specifically provides for two types of disputes to be settled within its framework. Disputes between the parties over the application of the Agreement are to be settled under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism, including good offices, consultations and arbitration. It also provides for the resolution of disputes regarding the process of awarding a particular contracts using domestic bid challenge systems. This is required by Article XX of the GPA, which includes a requirement for both consultations and challenge procedures between the contracting agencies and the disappointed bidder. Consequently, unilateral remedies imposed by the European Commission on other Parties of the GPA may be challenged both domestically by disappointed bidders and in the WTO GPA by aggrieved signatory governments. Such unilaterally-imposed remedies may nullify the rights benefits accorded under that Agreement as regards access to the markets and entities set out in the schedules.

In this respect, the US implementation of its 'Buy America' policy under of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) is instructive. Section 1605 of the ARRA states that none of the funds made available by the Act may be used for a project for the construction, alteration, maintenance or repair of a public building or public work unless all of the iron, steel and manufactured goods used in the project are produced in the United States. However, this provision does not apply in any case in which the head of the federal department or agency involved finds that, inter alia, it is inconsistent with United States obligations under international agreements. Such agreements include, for example, the EC and the US exchange of letters on government procurement (on 30 May 1995), by which the US granted no less favourable treatment than for out-of-state suppliers and for out-of-city suppliers for a number of states and cities. The US' amended Trade Agreements Act of 1979 also authorises waivers to federal-level discriminatory procurement provisions for parties to international agreements that provide reciprocal access for US goods, services, and suppliers in their procurement. These waivers have been issued when the GPA has been expanded to cover additional WTO Members and when the United States has entered an international agreement that covers government procurement.

The European Commission's 'Buy European' proposal, on the other hand, contains the possibility of identifying non-reciprocal procurement markets among other GPA Parties, and then imposing its own penalties on them if they do

not open this sector up to the EU. As a signatory Party to the GPA, the EU has set out the agreed coverage of the Agreement, as have all GPA Parties in the Annexes to Appendix 1 of the Agreement. These Annexes are the result of negotiations agreed to by all the Parties of the GPA. Coverage has also been subsequently expanded from within the framework of the Agreement. The EU proposal, however, seeks to re-negotiate or alter the GPA Parties' existing coverage outside of the forum of the WTO GPA, with the aim of getting the Parties to expand their schedules to 'match' EU coverage where their Schedules were negotiated otherwise or else it will 'contract' its own coverage even if it below what was agreed to in the Annexes to Appendix 1 of the GPA. Such a move to contract the coverage of the GPA by the EU seems prima facie to be open to challenge under the WTO GPA because it necessarily affects the existing rights and benefits accruing to the other parties.

This proposal sends warning signals to acceding- and observer-status GPA parties, most notably China, that if the EU does not like the results of its accession agreement in terms of market coverage, it could seek to remedy this situation outside of the Agreement. Such a challenge will take place on an ad hoc basis, on home ground and at the time when a large enough and important enough contract is being tendered. Implementation of this proposal, therefore, falls short of sustaining predictable, transparent, and non-discriminatory trading relationships.

### **b) GATT Article 1.1 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Principle.**

Another possible challenge lies in the relationship between this proposed regulation and the GATT. For while the GATS and the GATT Article III national treatment provisions<sup>4</sup> explicitly exclude government procurement measures from their obligations, the case is not unequivocal for GATT Article I MFN. Due to the lack of relevant case law, some controversy remains around the issue of whether procurement comes under the ambit of GATT Article 1 obligations on most favoured nation treatment – or the principle of not discriminating between one's trading partners.

While some scholars argue that procurement is implicitly excluded from the GATT MFN obligations,<sup>5</sup> others submit that the general MFN principle may apply to procurement because is not explicitly excluded from GATT Article I.<sup>6</sup> Procurement can be interpreted as a measure "in connection with importation" in which case it falls within the scope of the GATT I.1 obligation. Consequently, if the EU were to treat a Chinese company, for example, less favourably than a company from another WTO Member on the basis of this proposed regulation, it

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<sup>4</sup> National Treatment is the principle of giving others the same treatment as one's own nationals See The WTO Glossary.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Arrowsmith, *S Government Procurement in the WTO* (Kluwer Law International Ltd, 2002) at pp. 61-63.

<sup>6</sup> Most notably, in the WTO dispute *Argentina-Footwear*, the Appellate Body found that if the negotiators intended to exclude a particular aspect from the application of a rule, they would have done so expressly. Additionally, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that the text of the treaty provision takes precedence over context.

could be in breach of its MFN obligations under the GATT and open to challenge in the WTO DSB. This position is further supported by the decision taken by GATT signatories regarding plurilateral agreements on the conclusion of the Tokyo Round<sup>7</sup> that “existing rights and benefits under the GATT of contracting Parties not being parties to these Agreements, including those derived from Article I, are not affected by these agreements.” In effect, they saw fit to reaffirm the commitment not to discriminate between or among trading partners in connection with the importation of procurement goods.

## Conclusions

The political response to this proposal has been mixed both inside and outside the European Commission. While the proposal is the result of both the European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) for Internal Market and Services and DG Trade, some internal opponents have already identified themselves.<sup>8</sup> At the member-state level France has been the most vocal supporter, while Germany has been the most critical.<sup>9</sup> The UK government stated that while the principle of reciprocity might sound “superficially reasonable” it could result in protectionism.<sup>10</sup> As for the business community, the leading EU business forum, *BusinessEurope*, has also stated that: “Restricting market access undermines competition and does not help the country to build up a sustainable innovation capacity. Restricting public procurement limits access of the government to best quality and price available in the market.”<sup>11</sup>

Thus, whilst it is hard to disagree with the principle of reciprocity or the proposition that EU businesses need to become more competitive, this examination of the proposed regulation submits that it is equally difficult to see how unilateral measures to ensure ‘reciprocity’ in procurement markets through ‘matching’ market access opportunities are going overcome the challenges that the EU faces in maintaining competitiveness. Such a regulation could result in another ill-fated attempt to impose EU practices on the rest of the world. It could also serve to undermine multilateralism and the benefits of membership of the WTO’s plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement. This regulation could also provoke the creation of other ‘buy national’ policies, as well as unilateral retaliation by third countries who face exclusion from EU bids.

There is growing consensus that ensuring non-discriminatory, open and fair public procurement is the best way for citizens and tax payers obtain the best

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7 The Tokyo Round was when the plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement was negotiated.

8 These include Commissioner Catherine Ashton from the UK, Cecilia Malmström from Sweden, Olli Rehn from Finland, Czech Stefan Füle and Günther Öttinger from Germany.

9 ‘The Commission’s proposal would create a ‘fortress Europe’ at a time when the EU is depending on open markets to work our way out of the crisis. The major aim of public procurement is ‘best value for taxpayer’s money’. To achieve this aim, we need more competition on the procurement markets, not less.’ Source: Non-paper. German Comments on the European Commission’s Proposal for a regulation on the access of third country goods and services to the EU’s internal market in public procurement. Cited in: “Protect trade, or protect Sarkozy?” *The Economist*. Brussels. March 22nd 2012.

10 “Conundrum for Europe: Fair Versus Free Trade”. Reuters. April 2, 2012.

11 Rising to the China challenge. *BusinessEurope* 2011. p17.



goods and services available at the best price. Perhaps therefore it should be these rather than discriminatory 'Buy National' policies that are strengthened so they can boost EU competitiveness, along with its reputation within the international trading system?

## **About the author**

**Kamala Dawar** is a policy analyst and lecturer in international trade law and development policy. She holds advanced degrees with distinction from the London School of Economics and the University of Amsterdam School of Law in governance and in international and European trade law.

She conducts research and training on international trade and development related issues for inter-governmental institutions including the WTO, World Bank, ITC-ILO, UNCTAD, OSCE, the European Commission and public interest organisations such as Consumers International and GTZ.

She has published articles on issues including government procurement, competition, consumer policy, preferential trading arrangements and the EC's General System of Preferences. She also undertakes academic and legal editing.



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## 6 Bilateral Trade versus Sales to Third Markets: Swiss Trade Covered by Crisis-Era Protectionism?<sup>1</sup>

**Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz**  
*University of St. Gallen*

In devising policy responses to crisis-era protectionism, governments need to know how much trade into and out of their country has been affected by discrimination against their country's commercial interests. Should priority be given to unwinding one's own protectionism at the border given that it raises the costs to customers, including corporate buyers? Should priority be given to encouraging trade partners to remove their border measures? Or are the effects of foreign measures on export competition in third markets the priority? The answers to these questions could influence a government's views on the merits of proposals for international initiatives to "unwind" crisis-era protectionism, for example.

The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the findings of larger study (available upon request from the authors) on the Swiss trade facing crisis-era protectionism. Switzerland is a small open economy that is heavily reliant on sales in overseas markets and imported parts and components to sustain its high standards of living. Many other countries are heavily export dependent as well.

It turns out that where an analyst looks for the trade coverage of crisis-era protectionism depends on the set of policy instruments considered protectionist in the first place. As this report of the Global Trade Alert and others has shown, during the recent global economic downturn governments did not resort only to import-restricting border measures. Many subsidies likely to affect international commerce have been given to firms in recent years. A count of those subsidies reveals that a clear majority were given to producers of tradable goods (see Chapter 2), even though most of the headline-grabbing subsidies and bailouts were in the financial sector.

Per unit export subsidies are not the only subsidies to affect international trade. Subsidies to firms that postpone the day when painful capacity reductions are made essentially shift the burden of adjustment on to less subsidised or

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<sup>1</sup> This chapter is a summary of the findings of study the authors conducted for *Economie Suisse*, the leading association of major Swiss firms (Evenett and Fritz 2012). The authors thank Jan Atteslander for comments on an earlier draft of the original study.

unsubsidised commercial rivals. Slower capacity reductions and associated higher levels of production will depress prices in whichever markets the subsidised firms sell into, at home and abroad. Unsubsidised firms may have to lower their export prices to match subsidised rivals, the former experiencing reductions in revenues. Some subsidies may be linked directly to output or employment levels, often encouraging oversupply as well.

In other cases subsidies have been funnelled not through the government but through national banking systems. News reports in 2012 noted that two prominent European automobile producers had deliberately set up banks as subsidiaries so as to tap into the three year low interest rate loan facilities offered by the European Central Bank in December 2011 and in February 2012. It was also pointed out that such cheap financing gave these automobile firms a competitive advantage, as the loans could be used to offer customers more favourable financing deals than competitors. Moreover, these commercial advantages would be felt in foreign markets if the subsidies allowed firms to offer better terms to foreign customers as well and if there are economies of scale (whereby larger production runs in home markets enable incremental costs to fall and so lower prices that can be charged in foreign markets.) This chapter explores the empirical relevance of these considerations for Switzerland's imports and exports from 2008 on.

To address this matter the Global Trade Alert database was used to identify the discriminatory policy measures taken by Switzerland and the discriminatory<sup>2</sup> measures implemented by trading partners that are in products that Switzerland exports. Using detailed (6 digit<sup>3</sup>) trade data from the United Nations' COMTRADE database, the following three calculations were performed for each of the years 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011.

The first calculation involved summing up over the products that Switzerland buys abroad to obtain the total value of imports into Switzerland that faced a by discriminatory measure put in place by Switzerland from 2008 on.<sup>4</sup> This is referred to as the *direct* trade affected by Swiss protectionism on Swiss *imports*.

The second calculation involved identifying all the product-trading partner tuples where a product exported from Switzerland faced a discriminatory measure in a trading partner that was erected from 2008 on. The total sum of the trade associated with these tuples was calculated and is referred to here as the Swiss *exports directly* affected by foreign discriminatory measures.

As border barriers are included in the set of discriminatory measures used in the direct export and import coverage calculations, then the total value of direct Swiss exports and imports covered bound from above the total value of direct Swiss exports and imports respectively facing tariffs, import quotas, and

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<sup>2</sup> In the Global Trade Alert database a discriminatory measure is a state measure whose implementation is likely to or will almost certainly worsen the relative treatment of some foreign commercial interests vis-à-vis some comparable domestic rival. See Chapter 2 of this report for further information on this discrimination-based, as opposed to form-based, definition of protectionism and its contemporary relevance.

<sup>3</sup> The most disaggregated trade flow data available in that dataset.

<sup>4</sup> The requirement that the Swiss measure be taken during or after 2008 ensures that prior Swiss protectionism does not affect the trade coverage calculations.

trade defence measures. This helps gauge how important the traditional forms of protectionism were to Swiss commercial interests during the crisis era.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 1** Estimates of Swiss trade covered by different types of protectionism (in CHF and as percentage of relevant trade flow)

Type of trade flow	2008	2009	2010	2011
Imports, direct	0	41'840'275	73'693'270	160'813'770
Exports, direct	78'308'025	2'576'239'201	6'034'924'515	5'189'392'414
Exports, indirect	6'986'693'734	85'864'732'137	106'714'362'570	-
Percentage of total trade flow	2008	2009	2010	2011
Imports, direct	0,00%	0,03%	0,04%	0,12%
Exports, direct	0,04%	1,37%	2,97%	3,35%
Exports, indirect	3.24%	45.79%	52.43%	-

*Note:* These trade coverage numbers are computed summing up trade associated with individual 6-digit product categories using data obtained from the UN COMTRADE database.

To add a further dimension we calculated the amount of Swiss exports to third markets where Swiss firms compete with foreign competitors that are subsidised at home. For those tradable products where Switzerland's trading partners have given discriminatory subsidies, we identified every foreign market where Swiss firms compete with exports from countries whose governments offered such subsidies in the same product line.<sup>6</sup> For example, if the German government subsidises widgets and Germany and Switzerland both export widgets to a third market, say South Africa, then total value of Switzerland's exports of widgets to South Africa is part of the total value of Swiss exports indirectly affected by foreign subsidisation. The procedure used here involves a "bottom up" aggregation and only counts exports of Swiss products to those third markets where they compete with exports from a country known to have subsidised makers of those products at home.<sup>7</sup>

The three calculations are reported in Table 1 for the years 2008 to 2011. Bearing in mind that worldwide discrimination against foreign commercial

5 It being understood that the actual effect of protectionism on Swiss trade or the profitability of associated Swiss firms or employment levels associated with such trade need not be perfectly correlated with the estimate of trade covered by Swiss or foreign protectionism.

6 Therefore in this chapter a discriminatory subsidy regime must be implemented to count towards the reported indirect export coverage totals. This may understate the actual amount of indirect exports covered as it was established many years ago that the credible threat of subsidisation can affect commercial decisions—and therefore trade flows—as well.

7 Given international supply chains whereby country A exports parts to country B that assembles the finished product which, in turn, exports products to country C, then subsidies offered by country A could ultimately affect trade in this supply chain between countries B and C. However, our procedure for computing the Swiss exports covered by indirect subsidisation only considers cases where Swiss exporters compete with subsidised firms from country B in a third market such as country C. Our procedure does not include the trade covered by subsidies further up the supply chain (in country A in the above example.) This would bias down the estimates of trade covered in Tables 1 through 3. Working in the opposite direction the trade coverage numbers presented here would be overestimates if foreign subsidies targeted products at a finer level of disaggregation than 6 digit. Given 6-digit data is the finest level of disaggregation available to us we cannot go further in addressing the latter concern.

interests rose in frequency in 2009 (see chapter 2 of this Report), the data reported for 2008 can be thought of as a benchmark. In the top panel of Table 1 it is clear that 2009 marks a sharp increase in all three calculations of Swiss trade covered by protectionism. For example, the amount of direct Swiss exports in products facing discriminatory measures erected by foreign governments rose from 78 million Swiss Francs in 2008 to 2.5 billion Swiss francs in 2009 and then to over 5 billion Swiss Francs in 2011.

Comparing across the three trade coverage calculations, the amount of “indirect” Swiss exports facing discrimination stands out. In 2010 the total amount of Swiss trade that competed in third markets with subsidised foreign rivals is sixteen times as large as the sum of the two direct calculations of Swiss trade affected. Moreover, the total amount of Swiss exports “indirectly” covered by protectionism amounted to over half of total Swiss exports in 2010.<sup>8</sup> The comparable percentages for the direct trade covered are at least one order of magnitude smaller. Crisis era protectionism is likely to have had its greatest effects on Swiss commercial interests in third markets where Swiss exports face subsidised rivals.

**Table 2** Indirect export coverage associated with a given implementing foreign jurisdiction  
(in CHF, calculations based on 6-digit bilateral trade data)

Implementing jurisdiction or authority	2008	2009	2010
Argentina	0	0	2'486'676'915
Brazil	0	0	6'558'181'392
China	6'011'456'446	55'908'668'131	61'699'281'710
European Commission	0	145'396'873	171'091'311
India	1'034'976'120	10'850'558'372	32'264'273'309
United Kingdom	0	20'180'718'227	30'617'557'470
Total indirect exports covered	6'986'693'734	85'864'732'137	106'714'362'570
Percentage of total Swiss exports covered	3.24%	45.79%	52.43%

One can go a step further and calculate the relative contribution of Switzerland's trading partners to the indirect export coverage totals. Of course, only those countries that have engaged in discriminatory subsidisation of tradable goods need be considered here. The major culprits are reported in Table 2 for the years

<sup>8</sup> Sensitivity checks performed in the original study resulted in computations of this percentage from 40% to 60%. Even the lower end of this range represents a substantial amount of Swiss commerce affected by foreign protectionism. These sensitivity checks involved altering the de minimus level of bilateral trade in a product for a Switzerland to be deemed to be either importing or exporting a product to and from a particular trading partner. See Evenett and Fritz (2012) for details.

2008 to 2010. The products subsidised by China, India, and the United Kingdom account for much of Swiss sales to third markets that face subsidised rivals.<sup>9</sup>

The amount of indirect Swiss exports covered in leading export sectors is reported in Table 3. By 2010 every sector listed saw at least 60 percent of its exports to third markets competing with exports from firms in at least one jurisdiction offering discriminatory subsidies listed in the Global Trade Alert database. The effect of foreign subsidisation has likely been felt in many sectors of the Swiss economy.

**Table 3** Importance of indirect effects in total exports of given sector  
(calculations based on 6-digit bilateral trade data)

Sector	Share of total exports covered		
	2008	2009	2010
Precious stones	7%	87%	86%
General purpose machinery	5%	56%	82%
Rubber and plastics products	3%	83%	81%
Basic chemicals	6%	76%	79%
Office, accounting and computing machinery	8%	33%	79%
Electrical machinery and apparatus	7%	43%	77%
Products of agriculture, horticulture and market gardening	<1%	47%	75%
Knitted or crocheted fabrics; wearing apparel	6%	69%	72%
Pharmaceuticals; man-made fibres	2%	66%	70%
Yarn and thread; woven and tufted textile fabrics	4%	62%	64%

These findings have two policy implications, one for Switzerland and one more general. First, the unwinding of foreign subsidies—some of which may have already happened in response to austerity programmes implemented in 2011 and 2012—should be a priority for Swiss commercial policy. These subsidies have probably resulted in Swiss exporters losing orders and, at a minimum, lowering prices in overseas markets to retain customers.

Switzerland may want to sponsor discussions on the effects of different types of crisis-era subsidisation on international commerce in international fora, which may help develop a consensus concerning more far-reaching international trade rules on bailouts and other subventions. Given the extensive resort in recent years to beggar-thy-neighbour subsidisation it is unlikely that Switzerland is alone in seeing its exports to third markets harmed by foreign subsidisation of firms that sell into those third markets.

Second, the amount of Swiss exports in product lines facing foreign subsidisation in third markets is so much larger than the amount of trade covered by Swiss ad foreign border measures. Estimates of the total amount of trade

<sup>9</sup> Interestingly anecdotal evidence received after the original study was presented suggests that some Swiss exporters have had to lower their prices in third markets in response to subsidised competition from Indian rivals.

covered by border measures provide a misleading picture of the total amount of a country's commerce facing crisis-era protectionism. This implication has more general application and may be helpful in interpreting the trade coverage numbers reported in the press and elsewhere that are based on a limited set of policy instruments.

## Reference

Evenett and Fritz (2012). Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz. *Die negativen Auswirkungen des krisenbezogenen Handelsprotektionismus auf die Schweizer Aussenwirtschaft*. February.

## About the authors

**Simon J. Evenett** is Professor of International Trade and Economic Development at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Co-Director of the CEPR Programme in International Trade and Regional Economics. Evenett taught previously at Oxford and Rutgers University, and served twice as a World Bank official. He was a non-resident Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution in Washington. He is Member of the High Level Group on Globalisation established by the French Trade Minister Christine LaGarde, Member of the Warwick Commission on the Future of the Multilateral Trading System After Doha, and was Member of the the Zedillo Committee on the Global Trade and Financial Architecture. In addition to his research into the determinants of international commercial flows, he is particularly interested in the relationships between international trade policy, national competition law and policy, and economic development. He obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University.

**Johannes Fritz** is a Ph.D. candidate and a member of the Global Trade Alert team at the Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland.

He studied International Affairs in St.Gallen, Geneva and Barcelona, and is currently enrolled in the Ph.D. Program in Economics and Finance (PEF) at St.Gallen.



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## **SECTION 2**

### **Country-by-Country Reports**

**Table notes:**

[1] These measures are classified “green” in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified “amber” in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified “red” in the Global Trade Alert database.

# Argentina

**Table 7.1** Foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests.	278	259
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Argentina's commercial interests. [1]	66	62
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Argentina's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Argentina's interests [2]	73	66
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Argentina's interests [3]	139	131
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	184	177
Total number of implemented measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	138	132
Total number of implemented measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests that are harmful.	103	97
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	37	27
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Argentina's commercial interests.	30	23
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Argentina's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	57	55
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Argentina's commercial interests.	44	42
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Argentina's commercial interests	36	34
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	61	59

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Argentina" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.2** Argentina's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Argentina's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	184	124
Total number of Argentina's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	15	8
Total number of Argentina's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	28	13
Total number of Argentina's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	141	103
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Argentina's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	5	5
Total number of Argentina's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	8	8
Total number of Argentina's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	125	90
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests.	467	457
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests.	63	63
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests.	151	148

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Argentina" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.3** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	22
Kazakhstan	11
Belarus	10
China	10
India	9
France	8
Indonesia	8
Netherlands	5
Spain	5
Germany	4
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Brazil	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Finland	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Italy	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
South Africa	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Viet Nam	3
Bolivia	2
Chile	2
Ecuador	2
Ghana	2
Mexico	2
Nigeria	2
Paraguay	2
Ukraine	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
United States of America	2
Venezuela	2
Algeria	1
Australia	1
Canada	1
Colombia	1
Egypt	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Morocco	1
Republic of Korea	1
Sudan	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Tunisia	1

**Table 7.4.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Argentina's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	105
Brazil	66
United States of America	57
Italy	54
Germany	49
France	46
Spain	45
Thailand	45
Republic of Korea	43
Japan	42
India	41
Indonesia	40
Mexico	39
Belgium	35
Chile	34
Malaysia	33
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	33
Sweden	30
Canada	27
Netherlands	27
Uruguay	27
Viet Nam	27
Philippines	25
Singapore	25
Portugal	24
Hong Kong	23

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Poland	22
Switzerland	21
Austria	20
Colombia	20
Denmark	20
Paraguay	20
Turkey	20
Czech Republic	19
Peru	19
Pakistan	18
Israel	17
Norway	17
South Africa	17
Finland	16
Russian Federation	16
Venezuela	16
Hungary	15
Romania	15
Australia	14
Chinese Taipei	14
Ecuador	13
Egypt	12
Ireland	12
Bolivia	11
Greece	11
Slovakia	11
United Arab Emirates	10
Tunisia	9
Ukraine	9
Bangladesh	8
Saudi Arabia	8
Algeria	7
Bulgaria	7
Costa Rica	7
Croatia	7
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	7
Jordan	7
Slovenia	7
Sri Lanka	7
Dominican Republic	6
Lebanon	6
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	6
Luxembourg	6
New Zealand	6
Trinidad and Tobago	6
Angola	5
Belarus	5

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5
Cuba	5
Iceland	5
Lithuania	5
Malta	5
Morocco	5
Serbia	5
Albania	4
Aruba	4
Côte d'Ivoire	4
El Salvador	4
Estonia	4
Guatemala	4
Honduras	4
Jamaica	4
Kazakhstan	4
Macedonia	4
Netherlands Antilles	4
Nigeria	4
Syrian Arab Republic	4
Cambodia	3
Cameroon	3
Congo	3
Ghana	3
Latvia	3
Mauritius	3
Nicaragua	3
Niger	3
Panama	3
Qatar	3
Senegal	3
Afghanistan	2
Armenia	2
Haiti	2
Iran	2
Kuwait	2
Mauritania	2
Mozambique	2
Myanmar	2
Oman	2
Sudan	2
Suriname	2
Yemen	2
Andorra	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bahamas	1
Bahrain	1



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Barbados	1
Belize	1
Benin	1
Cape Verde	1
Chad	1
Cyprus	1
Dominica	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Ethiopia	1
Georgia	1
Grenada	1
Guyana	1
Iraq	1
Kenya	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Liberia	1
Mali	1
Palestinian	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Tajikistan	1
Uganda	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Zimbabwe	1


**Table 7.5** Implemented measures that harm Argentina's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	42	19.81%
Export subsidy	25	11.79%
Bail out / state aid measure	23	10.85%
Export taxes or restriction	15	7.08%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	11	5.19%
Public procurement	10	4.72%
Local content requirement	8	3.77%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	7	3.30%
Trade finance	7	3.30%
Import ban	6	2.83%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	2.83%
Competitive devaluation	4	1.89%
Investment measure	4	1.89%
Technical Barrier to Trade	4	1.89%
Import subsidy	3	1.42%
Other service sector measure	3	1.42%
Migration measure	2	0.94%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	0.94%
State-controlled company	2	0.94%
Consumption subsidy	1	0.47%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.47%
Total	212	100.00%

**Table 7.6** Argentina's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	75	56.39%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	35	26.32%
Bail out / state aid measure	5	3.76%
Export taxes or restriction	5	3.76%
Tariff measure	4	3.01%
Technical Barrier to Trade	3	2.26%
Import ban	2	1.50%
Export subsidy	1	0.75%
Investment measure	1	0.75%
Local content requirement	1	0.75%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	0.75%
State-controlled company	1	0.75%
Total	133	100.00%


**Map 6.1** Argentina: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



ARGENTINA

# ARGENTINA

Map 6.2 Argentina: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Australia

**Table 7.7** Foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Australia's commercial interests.	419	396
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Australia's commercial interests. [1]	131	126
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Australia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Australia's interests [2]	97	88
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Australia's interests [3]	191	182
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	290	284
Total number of implemented measures affecting Australia's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	202	197
Total number of implemented measures affecting Australia's commercial interests that are harmful.	149	144
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	45	32
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Australia's commercial interests.	32	23
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Australia's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	84	80
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Australia's commercial interests.	54	50
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Australia's commercial interests	42	38
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	60	57

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Australia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.8** Australia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Australia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	42	20
Total number of Australia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	11	4
Total number of Australia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	10	2
Total number of Australia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	21	14
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Australia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	4	3
Total number of Australia's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	2	1
Total number of Australia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	20	14
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests.	24	18
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests.	22	18
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests.	64	64

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Australia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.9** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Australia's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	20
Indonesia	16
China	15
India	15
Argentina	14
Belarus	10
Kazakhstan	10
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	10
Viet Nam	8
Brazil	6
France	6
South Africa	5
Republic of Korea	4
United States of America	4
Germany	3
Ireland	3
Italy	3
Japan	3
Malaysia	3
Netherlands	3
Nigeria	3
Poland	3
Spain	3
Algeria	2
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Bulgaria	2
Canada	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
European Communities	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Singapore	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Sweden	2
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Mexico	1
Paraguay	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Turkey	1
Uruguay	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 7.10** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Australia's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	8
United States of America	8
Germany	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
India	6
Indonesia	6
Malaysia	5
Netherlands	5
New Zealand	5
Singapore	5
Thailand	5
Belgium	4
Denmark	4
France	4
Ireland	4
Italy	4
Philippines	4
Poland	4
Republic of Korea	4
South Africa	4
Spain	4
Sweden	4
Brazil	3
Canada	3
Czech Republic	3
Japan	3
Portugal	3
Switzerland	3
Austria	2



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Chile	2
Cuba	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hong Kong	2
Hungary	2
Malawi	2
Mexico	2
Slovakia	2
Turkey	2
Viet Nam	2
Zimbabwe	2
Argentina	1
Belarus	1
Bulgaria	1
Cyprus	1
El Salvador	1
Estonia	1
Fiji	1
Jamaica	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Norway	1
Oman	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Qatar	1
Romania	1
Russian Federation	1
Slovenia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Timor-Leste	1
Uganda	1
United Arab Emirates	1


**Table 7.11** Implemented measures that harm Australia's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	55	19.10%
Bail out / state aid measure	29	10.07%
Export subsidy	29	10.07%
Export taxes or restriction	22	7.64%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	20	6.94%
Migration measure	19	6.60%
Local content requirement	12	4.17%
Public procurement	8	2.78%
Import ban	7	2.43%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	7	2.43%
Trade finance	6	2.08%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.74%
Investment measure	5	1.74%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	1.74%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	5	1.74%
Import subsidy	4	1.39%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	4	1.39%
State-controlled company	3	1.04%
Consumption subsidy	2	0.69%
Other service sector measure	2	0.69%
Sub-national government measure	2	0.69%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.35%
State trading enterprise	1	0.35%
Total	288	100.00%

**Table 7.12** Australia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	7	31.82%
Bail out / state aid measure	4	18.18%
Investment measure	4	18.18%
Public procurement	3	13.64%
Tariff measure	3	13.64%
Migration measure	2	9.09%
Local content requirement	1	4.55%
Total	22	100.00%


Map 6.3 Australia: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



AUSTRALIA

# AUSTRALIA

Map 6.4 Australia: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Brazil

**Table 7.13** Foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests.	490	448
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Brazil's commercial interests. [1]	110	97
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Brazil's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Brazil's interests [2]	98	89
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Brazil's interests [3]	282	262
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	331	310
Total number of implemented measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	266	247
Total number of implemented measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests that are harmful.	218	199
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	60	40
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Brazil's commercial interests.	39	30
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Brazil's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	99	98
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Brazil's commercial interests.	75	74
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Brazil's commercial interests	64	63
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	71	66

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Brazil" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.14** Brazil's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Brazil's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	156	103
Total number of Brazil's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	65	59
Total number of Brazil's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	37	9
Total number of Brazil's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	54	35
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Brazil's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	34	33
Total number of Brazil's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	5	5
Total number of Brazil's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	47	29
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests.	256	243
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests.	33	32
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests.	132	58

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Brazil" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.15** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	66
Russian Federation	24
India	14
Indonesia	11
China	10
Belarus	9
Kazakhstan	9
France	8
South Africa	7
Italy	5
Netherlands	5
Nigeria	5
Spain	5
Viet Nam	5
Belgium	4
Germany	4
Paraguay	4
Poland	4
Portugal	4
Turkey	4
Ukraine	4
Australia	3
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Ecuador	3
Egypt	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Finland	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Japan	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Republic of Korea	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	3
Bolivia	2
Canada	2
Ethiopia	2
Malaysia	2
Sri Lanka	2
Tunisia	2
Venezuela	2
Armenia	1
Colombia	1
Ghana	1
Iran	1
Mexico	1
Morocco	1
Pakistan	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Uzbekistan	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 7.16** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Brazil's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	27
United States of America	21
Germany	17
Italy	16
France	15
India	12
Japan	12
Mexico	12
Republic of Korea	12
Spain	12
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	11
Canada	10
Netherlands	10
Thailand	10
Finland	9
Sweden	9
Belgium	8
Indonesia	8
Hong Kong	7
Malaysia	7



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Australia	6
Austria	6
Czech Republic	6
Denmark	6
Norway	6
Singapore	6
Switzerland	6
South Africa	5
Turkey	5
Viet Nam	5
Chile	4
Hungary	4
Israel	4
Philippines	4
Portugal	4
Argentina	3
Colombia	3
Ireland	3
Luxembourg	3
Poland	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Ukraine	3
Bangladesh	2
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	2
Peru	2
Romania	2
Russian Federation	2
United Arab Emirates	2
Uruguay	2
Venezuela	2
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Macao	1
Morocco	1
New Zealand	1
Nigeria	1
Pakistan	1
Paraguay	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Bahrain	1
Barbados	1
Benin	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
Brazil	1
Cambodia	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Cameroon	1
Cape Verde	1
Cayman Islands	1
Chad	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Colombia	1
Costa Rica	1
Croatia	1
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Djibouti	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
El Salvador	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Estonia	1
Gabon	1
Gambia	1
Georgia	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Guatemala	1
Guinea	1
Guyana	1
Haiti	1
Honduras	1
Iceland	1
Iran	1
Iraq	1
Jamaica	1
Jordan	1
Kenya	1
Kuwait	1
Latvia	1
Lebanon	1
Liberia	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Madagascar	1
Malta	1
Mauritania	1
Mauritius	1
Mozambique	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Nicaragua	1
Nigeria	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Oman	1
Panama	1
Qatar	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Senegal	1
Slovakia	1
Sudan	1
Suriname	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
Tunisia	1
Turks and Caicos Islands	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Venezuela	1


**Table 7.17** Implemented measures that harm Brazil's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	66	17.37%
Tariff measure	61	16.05%
Bail out / state aid measure	34	8.95%
Export subsidy	26	6.84%
Export taxes or restriction	26	6.84%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	19	5.00%
Local content requirement	11	2.89%
Public procurement	10	2.63%
Import ban	9	2.37%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	9	2.37%
Investment measure	7	1.84%
Technical Barrier to Trade	7	1.84%
Trade finance	7	1.84%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.32%
Consumption subsidy	4	1.05%
Import subsidy	4	1.05%
Migration measure	4	1.05%
Other service sector measure	2	0.53%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	0.53%
State-controlled company	2	0.53%
Sub-national government measure	2	0.53%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.26%
Total	380	100.00%

**Table 7. 18** Brazil's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	21	40.38%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	18	34.62%
Export subsidy	4	7.69%
Public procurement	4	7.69%
Investment measure	2	3.85%
Local content requirement	2	3.85%
Trade finance	2	3.85%
Bail out / state aid measure	1	1.92%
Export taxes or restriction	1	1.92%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	1.92%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1.92%
Total	52	100.00%

Map 6.5 Brazil: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# BRAZIL

Map 6.6 Brazil: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others.



# Canada

**Table 7.19** Foreign state measures affecting Canada's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Canada's commercial interests.	496	475
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Canada's commercial interests. [1]	144	138
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Canada's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Canada's interests [2]	108	101
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Canada's interests [3]	244	236
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	349	341
Total number of implemented measures affecting Canada's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	251	244
Total number of implemented measures affecting Canada's commercial interests that are harmful.	196	189
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	53	41
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Canada's commercial interests.	40	33
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Canada's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	94	93
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Canada's commercial interests.	61	60
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Canada's commercial interests	48	47
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	69	67

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Canada" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.20** Canada's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Canada's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	62	44
Total number of Canada's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	13	12
Total number of Canada's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	23	16
Total number of Canada's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	26	16
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Canada's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	7	7
Total number of Canada's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	5	5
Total number of Canada's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	21	14
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Canada that harm foreign commercial interests.	29	12
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Canada that harm foreign commercial interests.	16	9
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Canada that harm foreign commercial interests.	50	43

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Canada" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".



**Table 7.21** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Canada's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	45
Argentina	27
Belarus	16
Kazakhstan	14
India	13
China	12
Indonesia	11
Brazil	10
France	10
Spain	8
Germany	7
Poland	7
Sweden	7
Belgium	6
Ireland	6
Italy	6
Portugal	6
United States of America	6
Austria	5
Bulgaria	5
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Estonia	5
European Communities	5
Finland	5
Greece	5
Hungary	5
Latvia	5
Lithuania	5
Luxembourg	5
Malta	5
Netherlands	5
Romania	5
Slovakia	5
Slovenia	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Republic of Korea	4
Viet Nam	4
Australia	3
Japan	3
South Africa	3
Ukraine	3
Ecuador	2
Ghana	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Malaysia	2
Paraguay	2
Singapore	2
Tunisia	2
Turkey	2
Uruguay	2
Algeria	1
Belize	1
Bolivia	1
Colombia	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Iran	1
Mexico	1
Nigeria	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Sudan	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
Venezuela	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 7.22** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Canada's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	14
United States of America	12
France	10
Mexico	8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	8
India	7
Republic of Korea	7
Colombia	6
Iran	6
Morocco	6
Pakistan	6
Philippines	6
Romania	6
Sri Lanka	6
United Arab Emirates	6
Germany	5
Japan	4
Spain	3
Australia	2
Brazil	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Czech Republic	2
Hungary	2
Indonesia	2
Italy	2
Netherlands	2
Sweden	2
Argentina	1
Austria	1
Azerbaijan	1
Chile	1
Croatia	1
Denmark	1
Finland	1
Israel	1
Lebanon	1
New Zealand	1
Peru	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Singapore	1
South Africa	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1


**Table 7.23** Implemented measures that harm Canada's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	65	18.47%
Bail out / state aid measure	50	14.20%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	34	9.66%
Export subsidy	30	8.52%
Export taxes or restriction	24	6.82%
Public procurement	14	3.98%
Local content requirement	12	3.41%
Migration measure	12	3.41%
Import ban	8	2.27%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	8	2.27%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	7	1.99%
Trade finance	7	1.99%
Investment measure	6	1.70%
State-controlled company	6	1.70%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.42%
Consumption subsidy	5	1.42%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	1.42%
Import subsidy	4	1.14%
Intellectual property protection	3	0.85%
Other service sector measure	3	0.85%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	0.85%
State trading enterprise	3	0.85%
Sub-national government measure	2	0.57%
Total	352	100.00%

**Table 7.24** Canada's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Migration measure	9	34.62%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	7	26.92%
Investment measure	3	11.54%
Local content requirement	3	11.54%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	3.85%
Public procurement	1	3.85%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	3.85%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	3.85%
Trade finance	1	3.85%
Total	26	100.00%

Map 6.7 Canada: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# CANADA

Map 6.8 Canada: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# China

**Table 7.24** Foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting China's commercial interests.	1144	789
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of China's commercial interests. [1]	268	218
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm China's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against China's interests [2]	256	142
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against China's interests [3]	620	429
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting China's commercial interests	770	589
Total number of implemented measures affecting China's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	606	428
Total number of implemented measures affecting China's commercial interests that are harmful.	525	348
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	214	56
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm China's commercial interests.	157	45
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected China's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	160	144
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to China's commercial interests.	113	98
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to China's commercial interests	95	81
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	83	75

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "China" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.25** China's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of China's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	137	94
Total number of China's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	35	30
Total number of China's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	42	32
Total number of China's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	60	32
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of China's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	34	30
Total number of China's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	26	26
Total number of China's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	56	29
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests.	701	695
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests.	52	52
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests.	193	191

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "China" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".



**Table 7.27** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting China's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	105
Russian Federation	65
India	44
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	33
France	31
Indonesia	31
Germany	29
Poland	28
Brazil	27
Greece	27
Italy	27
Netherlands	27
Spain	27
Sweden	27
Austria	26
Belarus	26
Ireland	26
Kazakhstan	26
Latvia	26
Portugal	26
Romania	26
Slovakia	26
Belgium	25
Bulgaria	25
Cyprus	25
Czech Republic	25
Denmark	25
Estonia	25
European Communities	25
Finland	25
Hungary	25
Lithuania	25
Luxembourg	25
Malta	25
Slovenia	25
South Africa	19
Turkey	17
Viet Nam	16
Canada	14
United States of America	13
Australia	8
Mexico	8
Egypt	7
Republic of Korea	7
Pakistan	6

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Paraguay	6
Japan	5
Nigeria	5
Thailand	5
Ukraine	4
Uruguay	4
Algeria	3
Iran	3
Philippines	3
Zimbabwe	3
Bolivia	2
Chinese Taipei	2
Colombia	2
Dominican Republic	2
Ecuador	2
Ghana	2
Malaysia	2
New Zealand	2
Saudi Arabia	2
Singapore	2
Sri Lanka	2
Tunisia	2
Venezuela	2
Bangladesh	1
Ethiopia	1
Iraq	1
Peru	1
Sierra Leone	1
Sudan	1
Switzerland	1
Togo	1
Uganda	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uzbekistan	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uzbekistan	1

**Table 7.28** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by China's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
United States of America	33
Germany	27
Japan	27
Netherlands	27
Italy	26
France	25
Belgium	24
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	23
Republic of Korea	22
Spain	22
Malaysia	18
Russian Federation	18
Sweden	18
Denmark	17
Indonesia	17
Thailand	17
Ireland	16
Poland	16
Australia	15
Austria	15
Czech Republic	15
Finland	15
India	15
Philippines	14
Viet Nam	14
Singapore	13
Canada	12
Hungary	12
New Zealand	12
Romania	12
South Africa	12
Switzerland	12
Greece	11
Hong Kong	11
Luxembourg	11
Mexico	11
Norway	11
Slovakia	11
Turkey	11
Argentina	10
Brazil	10
Bulgaria	10
Estonia	10
Israel	10
Malta	10

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Peru	10
Portugal	10
Saudi Arabia	10
Slovenia	10
United Arab Emirates	10
Chile	9
Croatia	9
Cyprus	9
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	9
Egypt	9
Iran	9
Kazakhstan	9
Latvia	9
Lithuania	9
Myanmar	9
Pakistan	9
Sri Lanka	9
Ukraine	9
Bangladesh	8
Belarus	8
Cambodia	8
Costa Rica	8
Dominican Republic	8
Kuwait	8
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	8
Madagascar	8
Mongolia	8
Panama	8
Papua New Guinea	8
Uzbekistan	8
Angola	7
Bahamas	7
Colombia	7
Cuba	7
El Salvador	7
Ethiopia	7
Georgia	7
Ghana	7
Iceland	7
Iraq	7
Jordan	7
Kenya	7
Kyrgyzstan	7
Lao People's Democratic Republic	7
Liberia	7
Morocco	7
Nigeria	7

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Qatar	7
Serbia	7
Tunisia	7
United Republic of Tanzania	7
Uruguay	7
Venezuela	7
Yemen	7
Zimbabwe	7
Afghanistan	6
Albania	6
Algeria	6
Azerbaijan	6
Bahrain	6
Belize	6
Benin	6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6
Brunei Darussalam	6
Cameroon	6
Côte d'Ivoire	6
Democratic Republic of the Congo	6
Djibouti	6
Dominica	6
Ecuador	6
Equatorial Guinea	6
Fiji	6
Gabon	6
Guatemala	6
Guinea	6
Guyana	6
Haiti	6
Honduras	6
Jamaica	6
Lebanon	6
Lesotho	6
Malawi	6
Mali	6
Mauritania	6
Mauritius	6
Mozambique	6
Namibia	6
Nepal	6
Nicaragua	6
Oman	6
Paraguay	6
Republic of Moldova	6
Senegal	6
Sierra Leone	6

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Sudan	6
Suriname	6
Syrian Arab Republic	6
Tajikistan	6
Togo	6
Trinidad and Tobago	6
Turkmenistan	6
Uganda	6
Zambia	6
Armenia	5
Barbados	5
Bolivia	5
Botswana	5
Chad	5
Chinese Taipei	5
Eritrea	5
Gambia	5
Montenegro	5
Niger	5
Palestinian	5
Rwanda	5
Antigua and Barbuda	4
Bermuda	4
Congo	4
French Polynesia	4
Macedonia	4
Marshall Islands	4
Netherlands Antilles	4
New Caledonia	4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	4
Somalia	4
Burkina Faso	3
Cayman Islands	3
Central African Republic	3
Tuvalu	3
Vanuatu	3
Aruba	2
British Virgin Islands	2
Burundi	2
Comoros	2
European Communities	2
Maldives	2
Samoa	2
Solomon Islands	2
Swaziland	2
Bhutan	1
Cape Verde	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Faeroe Islands	1
Guinea-Bissau	1
Kiribati	1
Micronesia	1
Puerto Rico	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
United States Virgin Islands	1
Seychelles	1
United States Virgin Islands	1

**Table 7.29** Implemented measures that harm China's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	178	20.32%
Tariff measure	127	14.50%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	93	10.62%
Bail out / state aid measure	63	7.19%
Export taxes or restriction	41	4.68%
Migration measure	34	3.88%
Export subsidy	29	3.31%
Import ban	22	2.51%
Local content requirement	18	2.05%
Public procurement	15	1.71%
Investment measure	10	1.14%
Trade finance	9	1.03%
Technical Barrier to Trade	6	0.68%
Competitive devaluation	5	0.57%
Consumption subsidy	5	0.57%
Import subsidy	5	0.57%
Other service sector measure	5	0.57%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	5	0.57%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	4	0.46%
State trading enterprise	3	0.34%
State-controlled company	2	0.23%
Sub-national government measure	2	0.23%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.11%
Total	876	100.00%

**Table 7.30** China's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	27	32.93%
Investment measure	12	14.63%
Export taxes or restriction	8	9.76%
Export subsidy	7	8.54%
Tariff measure	7	8.54%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	5	6.10%
Public procurement	5	6.10%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	5	6.10%
Local content requirement	4	4.88%
Sub-national government measure	2	2.44%
Technical Barrier to Trade	2	2.44%
Bail out / state aid measure	1	1.22%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.22%
Import ban	1	1.22%
Import subsidy	1	1.22%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.22%
Migration measure	1	1.22%
State-controlled company	1	1.22%
Trade finance	1	1.22%
Total	82	100.00%




Map 6.9 China: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# CHINA

Map 6.10 China: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# France

**Table 7.31** Foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting France's commercial interests.	701	629
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of France's commercial interests. [1]	179	169
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm France's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against France's interests [2]	135	110
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against France's interests [3]	387	350
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting France's commercial interests	497	461
Total number of implemented measures affecting France's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	372	338
Total number of implemented measures affecting France's commercial interests that are harmful.	313	279
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	76	43
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm France's commercial interests.	60	35
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected France's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	128	125
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to France's commercial interests.	90	87
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to France's commercial interests	74	71
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	67	63

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "France" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.32** France's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of France's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	111	49
Total number of France's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	24	9
Total number of France's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	26	10
Total number of France's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	61	30
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of France's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	7	5
Total number of France's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	5	5
Total number of France's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	53	23
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests.	118	83
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests.	30	24
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests.	150	146

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "France" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.33** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting France's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	62
Argentina	46
China	25
Kazakhstan	21
Belarus	20
India	18
Brazil	15
Indonesia	12
Turkey	12
Canada	10
Nigeria	7
South Africa	7
Viet Nam	7
Italy	5
Ukraine	5
Algeria	4
Australia	4
Germany	4
Republic of Korea	4
Saudi Arabia	4
Japan	3
Paraguay	3
Poland	3
Spain	3
United States of America	3
Ecuador	2
Egypt	2
Ghana	2
Greece	2
Iran	2
Malaysia	2
Netherlands	2
Singapore	2
Slovakia	2
Sweden	2
Tunisia	2
Uruguay	2
Venezuela	2
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Bolivia	1
Cameroon	1
Colombia	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Ethiopia	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Gambia	1
Hungary	1
Israel	1
Kenya	1
Latvia	1
Mauritania	1
Mexico	1
Morocco	1
Pakistan	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Sri Lanka	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 7.34** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by France's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	31
United States of America	11
Canada	10
India	10
Thailand	10
Turkey	10
Switzerland	9
Argentina	8
Brazil	8
Israel	8
Russian Federation	8
South Africa	8
Colombia	7
Japan	7
Mexico	7
New Zealand	7
Republic of Korea	7
Serbia	7
Algeria	6
Australia	6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6
Bulgaria	6
Chile	6

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Croatia	6
Malaysia	6
Morocco	6
Norway	6
Pakistan	6
Peru	6
Philippines	6
Romania	6
Singapore	6
Tunisia	6
United Arab Emirates	6
Belarus	5
Belgium	5
Costa Rica	5
Côte d'Ivoire	5
Denmark	5
Egypt	5
Greece	5
Indonesia	5
Italy	5
Kenya	5
Portugal	5
Senegal	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Albania	4
Armenia	4
Austria	4
Czech Republic	4
Dominican Republic	4
Germany	4
Ghana	4
Iran	4
Ireland	4
Lebanon	4
Lithuania	4
Madagascar	4
Netherlands	4
Nicaragua	4
Paraguay	4
Poland	4
Spain	4
Sweden	4
Ukraine	4
Viet Nam	4
Benin	3
Bolivia	3
Cameroon	3

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Cyprus	3
El Salvador	3
Estonia	3
Finland	3
Iceland	3
Kyrgyzstan	3
Luxembourg	3
Mali	3
Mauritius	3
Namibia	3
Oman	3
Republic of Moldova	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sri Lanka	3
Togo	3
Trinidad and Tobago	3
Uruguay	3
Zambia	3
Burkina Faso	2
Chinese Taipei	2
Congo	2
Cuba	2
Ecuador	2
Guatemala	2
Honduras	2
Hong Kong	2
Hungary	2
Jamaica	2
Jordan	2
Kazakhstan	2
Macedonia	2
Netherlands Antilles	2
Nigeria	2
Qatar	2
Saudi Arabia	2
Sudan	2
Venezuela	2
Yemen	2
Zimbabwe	2
Andorra	1
Angola	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Barbados	1
Belize	1
Botswana	1



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Cambodia	1
Comoros	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Ethiopia	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Fiji	1
Gabon	1
Georgia	1
Guinea	1
Guyana	1
Haiti	1
Kuwait	1
Latvia	1
Malawi	1
Mayotte	1
Mozambique	1
New Caledonia	1
Palestinian	1
Panama	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Sierra Leone	1
Suriname	1
Swaziland	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tajikistan	1
Uganda	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uzbekistan	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tajikistan	1
Uzbekistan	1


**Table 7.35** Implemented measures that harm France's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	94	18.01%
Bail out / state aid measure	74	14.18%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	59	11.30%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	34	6.51%
Export taxes or restriction	28	5.36%
Export subsidy	27	5.17%
Migration measure	19	3.64%
Local content requirement	15	2.87%
Public procurement	13	2.49%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	10	1.92%
Import ban	9	1.72%
Investment measure	8	1.53%
Trade finance	8	1.53%
Technical Barrier to Trade	7	1.34%
State-controlled company	6	1.15%
Competitive devaluation	5	0.96%
Import subsidy	5	0.96%
Consumption subsidy	4	0.77%
Other service sector measure	4	0.77%
State trading enterprise	4	0.77%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	0.57%
Intellectual property protection	2	0.38%
Sub-national government measure	2	0.38%
Total	522	100.00%

**Table 7.36** France's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	30	51.72%
Bail out / state aid measure	15	25.86%
Export subsidy	6	10.34%
Investment measure	2	3.45%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	3.45%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.72%
Local content requirement	1	1.72%
Migration measure	1	1.72%
Public procurement	1	1.72%
Tariff measure	1	1.72%
Total	58	100.00%

Map 6.11 France: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# FRANCE

Map 6.12 France: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others.



# Germany

**Table 7.37** Foreign state measures affecting Germany's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Germany's commercial interests.	819	719
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Germany's commercial interests. [1]	225	209
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Germany's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Germany's interests [2]	161	127
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Germany's interests [3]	433	383
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	580	535
Total number of implemented measures affecting Germany's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	422	379
Total number of implemented measures affecting Germany's commercial interests that are harmful.	349	306
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	90	42
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Germany's commercial interests.	70	36
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Germany's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	149	142
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Germany's commercial interests.	102	95
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Germany's commercial interests	84	83
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	66	60

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Germany" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.38** Germany's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Germany's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	113	51
Total number of Germany's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	27	12
Total number of Germany's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	22	6
Total number of Germany's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	64	33
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Germany's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	10	8
Total number of Germany's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of Germany's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	55	25
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Germany that harm foreign commercial interests.	61	26
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Germany that harm foreign commercial interests.	44	33
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Germany that harm foreign commercial interests.	155	146

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Germany" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.39** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Germany's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	66
Argentina	49
Belarus	29
Kazakhstan	28
China	27
India	22
Brazil	17
Indonesia	16
South Africa	12
Turkey	12
Viet Nam	8
Australia	7
Nigeria	7
Ukraine	6
Canada	5
Republic of Korea	5
Algeria	4
Austria	4
France	4
Italy	4
Poland	4
United States of America	4
Japan	3
Malaysia	3
Paraguay	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Spain	3
Sweden	3
Zimbabwe	3
Denmark	2
Ecuador	2
Egypt	2
Ghana	2
Greece	2
Netherlands	2
Pakistan	2
Slovakia	2
Tunisia	2
Uruguay	2
Uzbekistan	2
Belgium	1
Bolivia	1
Cameroon	1
Colombia	1
Ethiopia	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Gambia	1
Hungary	1
Iran	1
Israel	1
Kenya	1
Latvia	1
Mexico	1
Philippines	1
Portugal	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Romania	1
Sudan	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 7.40** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Germany's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	29
United States of America	9
India	8
Japan	8
Republic of Korea	8
Switzerland	8
Canada	7
Thailand	7
United Arab Emirates	6
Croatia	5
Norway	5
Russian Federation	5
Serbia	5
Singapore	5
Turkey	5
Algeria	4
Argentina	4
Belarus	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4
Brazil	4
Chile	4
Chinese Taipei	4
Colombia	4
Denmark	4
France	4



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Indonesia	4
Israel	4
Lebanon	4
Malaysia	4
New Zealand	4
Oman	4
Philippines	4
Saudi Arabia	4
South Africa	4
Armenia	3
Australia	3
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Costa Rica	3
Egypt	3
El Salvador	3
Finland	3
Guatemala	3
Hong Kong	3
Hungary	3
Iceland	3
Italy	3
Kazakhstan	3
Kyrgyzstan	3
Mexico	3
Netherlands	3
Nigeria	3
Pakistan	3
Paraguay	3
Peru	3
Poland	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Spain	3
Sudan	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Uruguay	3
Viet Nam	3
Zambia	3
Albania	2
Bangladesh	2
Benin	2
Bolivia	2
Bulgaria	2
Czech Republic	2
Ghana	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Greece	2
Iran	2
Ireland	2
Jamaica	2
Jordan	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Macedonia	2
Mauritius	2
Morocco	2
Netherlands Antilles	2
Nicaragua	2
Panama	2
Qatar	2
Republic of Moldova	2
Tajikistan	2
Trinidad and Tobago	2
Tunisia	2
Ukraine	2
Uzbekistan	2
Yemen	2
Zimbabwe	2
Andorra	1
Angola	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bahrain	1
Barbados	1
Belize	1
Cambodia	1
Cayman Islands	1
Comoros	1
Congo	1
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Ethiopia	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Fiji	1
Gabon	1
Guinea	1
Guyana	1
Honduras	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Kenya	1
Kuwait	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Liechtenstein	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Mali	1
Mayotte	1
Mongolia	1
Mozambique	1
Namibia	1
New Caledonia	1
Palestinian	1
Portugal	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Senegal	1
Sierra Leone	1
Slovenia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Swaziland	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Togo	1
Turkmenistan	1
Uganda	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Venezuela	1
Niger	1
Palestinian	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Portugal	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Senegal	1
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Somalia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Swaziland	1
Togo	1
Turkmenistan	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 7.41** Implemented measures that harm Germany's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	116	19.53%
Bail out / state aid measure	78	13.13%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	60	10.10%
Export taxes or restriction	46	7.74%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	43	7.24%
Export subsidy	29	4.88%
Local content requirement	19	3.20%
Public procurement	17	2.86%
Import ban	15	2.53%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	10	1.68%
Investment measure	9	1.52%
Migration measure	9	1.52%
Trade finance	9	1.52%
Technical Barrier to Trade	7	1.18%
Competitive devaluation	5	0.84%
Import subsidy	5	0.84%
Other service sector measure	5	0.84%
Consumption subsidy	4	0.67%
State-controlled company	3	0.51%
Intellectual property protection	2	0.34%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	0.34%
State trading enterprise	2	0.34%
Sub-national government measure	2	0.34%
Total	594	100.00%


**Table 7.42.** Germany's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	30	51.72%
Bail out / state aid measure	19	32.76%
Export subsidy	5	8.62%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	3.45%
Investment measure	1	1.72%
Other service sector measure	1	1.72%
Tariff measure	1	1.72%
Total	58	100.00%
Total	61	100%



# COUNTRY

**Map 6.14** Germany: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# India

**Table 7.42** Foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting India's commercial interests.	586	523
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of India's commercial interests. [1]	157	146
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm India's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against India's interests [2]	133	109
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against India's interests [3]	296	268
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting India's commercial interests	418	389
Total number of implemented measures affecting India's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	306	279
Total number of implemented measures affecting India's commercial interests that are harmful.	248	221
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	74	41
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm India's commercial interests.	60	36
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected India's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	94	93
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to India's commercial interests.	63	62
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to India's commercial interests	48	47
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	71	68

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "India" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.43** India's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of India's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	165	92
Total number of India's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	56	39
Total number of India's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	35	19
Total number of India's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	74	34
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of India's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	33	32
Total number of India's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	18	18
Total number of India's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	63	27
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests.	401	354
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests.	33	32
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests.	153	149

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "India" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".



**Table 7.45** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting India's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	41
Russian Federation	27
Indonesia	16
China	15
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	14
Brazil	12
France	10
Kazakhstan	10
South Africa	10
Viet Nam	9
Belarus	8
Germany	8
Netherlands	8
Poland	8
Portugal	8
Spain	8
Sweden	8
Austria	7
Belgium	7
Canada	7
Hungary	7
Ireland	7
Italy	7
Latvia	7
Romania	7
Slovakia	7
Australia	6
Bulgaria	6
Cyprus	6
Czech Republic	6
Denmark	6
Estonia	6
European Communities	6
Finland	6
Greece	6
Lithuania	6
Luxembourg	6
Malta	6
Slovenia	6
Turkey	6
Egypt	5
Nigeria	5
Republic of Korea	5
United States of America	5
Saudi Arabia	4

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Sri Lanka	4
Algeria	3
Malaysia	3
Ukraine	3
Ecuador	2
Ethiopia	2
Ghana	2
Japan	2
Paraguay	2
Singapore	2
Tunisia	2
United Arab Emirates	2
United Republic of Tanzania	2
Colombia	1
Mexico	1
Pakistan	1
Peru	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
Uruguay	1
Venezuela	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 7.46** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by India's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	44
Thailand	25
Japan	24
Italy	23
United States of America	23
Germany	22
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	22
Belgium	20
Republic of Korea	20
Spain	20
France	18
Malaysia	18
Netherlands	17
Singapore	17
Turkey	16
United Arab Emirates	16
Australia	15
Indonesia	15

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Russian Federation	15
Brazil	14
Denmark	14
Poland	14
South Africa	14
Sweden	14
Canada	13
Finland	13
Greece	13
Hong Kong	13
Israel	13
Portugal	13
Ukraine	13
Austria	12
Bangladesh	12
Czech Republic	12
Romania	12
Saudi Arabia	12
Sri Lanka	12
Ireland	11
Mexico	11
Slovenia	11
Switzerland	11
Viet Nam	11
Bulgaria	10
Egypt	10
Latvia	10
Lithuania	10
Norway	10
Pakistan	10
Philippines	10
Argentina	9
Hungary	9
Chile	8
Estonia	8
Iran	8
Mauritius	8
Nepal	8
Oman	8
Peru	8
Tunisia	8
Benin	7
Cambodia	7
Colombia	7
Croatia	7
Côte d'Ivoire	7
Dominican Republic	7

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Ecuador	7
Guatemala	7
Kazakhstan	7
Kenya	7
Lebanon	7
Luxembourg	7
Madagascar	7
Morocco	7
New Zealand	7
Nigeria	7
Qatar	7
Slovakia	7
Venezuela	7
Algeria	6
Azerbaijan	6
Honduras	6
Jordan	6
Myanmar	6
Senegal	6
Yemen	6
Zimbabwe	6
Afghanistan	5
Cyprus	5
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	5
Fiji	5
Ghana	5
Kuwait	5
Panama	5
Togo	5
Trinidad and Tobago	5
United Republic of Tanzania	5
Uruguay	5
Angola	4
Bhutan	4
Chinese Taipei	4
Congo	4
Djibouti	4
Ethiopia	4
Gambia	4
Guinea	4
Kyrgyzstan	4
Lesotho	4
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	4
Malawi	4
Mali	4
Malta	4
Mauritania	4

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Mozambique	4
Netherlands Antilles	4
Niger	4
Sudan	4
Swaziland	4
Syrian Arab Republic	4
Turkmenistan	4
Uganda	4
Zambia	4
Bahamas	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3
European Communities	3
Armenia	2
Bahrain	2
Belarus	2
Cameroon	2
Costa Rica	2
El Salvador	2
Gabon	2
Macedonia	2
Maldives	2
Nicaragua	2
Paraguay	2
Republic of Moldova	2
Albania	1
Brunei Darussalam	1
Burkina Faso	1
Cuba	1
Georgia	1
Iceland	1
Iraq	1
Jamaica	1
Namibia	1
New Caledonia	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Serbia	1
Seychelles	1
Somalia	1
Uzbekistan	1
Serbia	1
Seychelles	1
Somalia	1


**Table 7.47** Implemented measures that harm India's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	82	19.11%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	52	12.12%
Bail out / state aid measure	42	9.79%
Migration measure	35	8.16%
Export taxes or restriction	28	6.53%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	27	6.29%
Export subsidy	15	3.50%
Import ban	12	2.80%
Local content requirement	12	2.80%
Public procurement	9	2.10%
Investment measure	7	1.63%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	7	1.63%
Technical Barrier to Trade	6	1.40%
Trade finance	6	1.40%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.17%
Import subsidy	5	1.17%
Intellectual property protection	3	0.70%
Other service sector measure	3	0.70%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	0.47%
State-controlled company	2	0.47%
Consumption subsidy	1	0.23%
Sub-national government measure	1	0.23%
Total	429	100.00%

**Table 7.48** India's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	36	44.44%
Tariff measure	14	17.28%
Export subsidy	12	14.81%
Export taxes or restriction	8	9.88%
Investment measure	4	4.94%
Import ban	3	3.70%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	3	3.70%
Migration measure	2	2.47%
Trade finance	2	2.47%
Import subsidy	1	1.23%
Local content requirement	1	1.23%
Public procurement	1	1.23%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1.23%
Total	81	100.00%


Map 6.15 India: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



INDIA

INDIA

Map 6.16 India: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



INDIA



# Indonesia

**Table 7.49** Foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests.	447	392
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Indonesia's commercial interests. [1]	132	119
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Indonesia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Indonesia's interests [2]	99	88
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Indonesia's interests [3]	216	185
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	316	284
Total number of implemented measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	227	198
Total number of implemented measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests that are harmful.	172	143
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	50	29
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Indonesia's commercial interests.	32	21
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Indonesia's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	81	79
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Indonesia's commercial interests.	56	54
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Indonesia's commercial interests	44	42
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	62	59

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Indonesia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.50** Indonesia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Indonesia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	78	51
Total number of Indonesia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	10	9
Total number of Indonesia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	21	10
Total number of Indonesia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	47	32
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Indonesia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of Indonesia's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of Indonesia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	44	29
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests.	398	388
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests.	40	39
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests.	153	153

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Indonesia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.51** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	40
China	17
India	15
Russian Federation	9
Viet Nam	9
Brazil	8
Turkey	7
Australia	6
Egypt	5
France	5
Pakistan	5
Republic of Korea	5
South Africa	5
Germany	4
Italy	4
Latvia	4
Poland	4
Spain	4
United States of America	4
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Finland	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Japan	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Mexico	3
Netherlands	3
Paraguay	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
Ukraine	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Canada	2
Ghana	2
Kazakhstan	2
Malaysia	2
Nigeria	2
Philippines	2
Singapore	2
Tunisia	2
Uruguay	2
Belarus	1
Ethiopia	1
Jordan	1
Sri Lanka	1
Thailand	1
Uganda	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 7.52** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Indonesia's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	31
Malaysia	26
Singapore	23
Thailand	22
Japan	21
United States of America	21
Republic of Korea	18
Australia	16
Germany	16
India	16
Netherlands	16
Switzerland	13
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	13
Belgium	12
France	12
Hong Kong	12
Philippines	12
Brazil	11
Canada	11
Italy	11
Viet Nam	11
Denmark	10
New Zealand	10
Spain	10
Sweden	10

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Czech Republic	9
Finland	9
Mexico	9
Norway	9
South Africa	9
United Arab Emirates	9
Argentina	8
Austria	8
Ireland	8
Turkey	8
Chile	7
Israel	7
Egypt	6
Estonia	6
Greece	6
Morocco	6
Pakistan	6
Portugal	6
Russian Federation	6
Bulgaria	5
Croatia	5
Côte d'Ivoire	5
Hungary	5
Lithuania	5
Luxembourg	5
Poland	5
Slovakia	5
Sri Lanka	5
Tunisia	5
Ukraine	5
Belarus	4
Colombia	4
Ghana	4
Jordan	4
Kenya	4
Mauritius	4
Myanmar	4
Nigeria	4
Oman	4
Panama	4
Romania	4
Saudi Arabia	4
Senegal	4
Slovenia	4
United Republic of Tanzania	4
Yemen	4
Bangladesh	3

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Benin	3
Costa Rica	3
Ecuador	3
Guatemala	3
Iran	3
Lebanon	3
Mozambique	3
Papua New Guinea	3
Peru	3
Qatar	3
Syrian Arab Republic	3
Timor-Leste	3
Togo	3
Uruguay	3
Venezuela	3
Algeria	2
American Samoa	2
Angola	2
Bahrain	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2
Brunei Darussalam	2
Cambodia	2
Cameroon	2
Chinese Taipei	2
Cyprus	2
Djibouti	2
Dominican Republic	2
El Salvador	2
Iceland	2
Iraq	2
Kuwait	2
Latvia	2
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	2
Macedonia	2
Namibia	2
Serbia	2
Sudan	2
Afghanistan	1
Albania	1
Armenia	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bahamas	1
Barbados	1
Bolivia	1
Botswana	1
British Virgin Islands	1
Cape Verde	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Congo	1
Cuba	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Ethiopia	1
Fiji	1
Gabon	1
Gambia	1
Georgia	1
Guinea	1
Guinea-Bissau	1
Haiti	1
Kazakhstan	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Liberia	1
Macao	1
Madagascar	1
Mali	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mauritania	1
Nepal	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Niger	1
Palestinian	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Samoa	1
Sierra Leone	1
Solomon Islands	1
Swaziland	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Turkmenistan	1
Uganda	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 7.53** Implemented measures that harm Indonesia's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	57	18.10%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	43	13.65%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	29	9.21%
Export taxes or restriction	27	8.57%
Export subsidy	26	8.25%
Bail out / state aid measure	18	5.71%
Migration measure	12	3.81%
Local content requirement	9	2.86%
Public procurement	9	2.86%
Trade finance	9	2.86%
Import ban	8	2.54%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	6	1.90%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.59%
Investment measure	5	1.59%
Technical Barrier to Trade	4	1.27%
Import subsidy	3	0.95%
Other service sector measure	3	0.95%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	0.95%
Intellectual property protection	2	0.63%
State-controlled company	2	0.63%
Sub-national government measure	2	0.63%
Consumption subsidy	1	0.32%
Total	315	100.00%

**Table 7.54** Indonesia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	15	31.91%
Export taxes or restriction	6	12.77%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	5	10.64%
Tariff measure	4	8.51%
Bail out / state aid measure	3	6.38%
Investment measure	3	6.38%
Other service sector measure	3	6.38%
Public procurement	3	6.38%
Import ban	2	4.26%
Import subsidy	1	2.13%
Migration measure	1	2.13%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	2.13%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	2.13%
State-controlled company	1	2.13%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	2.13%
Total	47	100.00%




Map 6.17 Indonesia: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



INDONESIA

# INDONESIA

Map 6.18 Indonesia: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Italy

**Table 7.55** Foreign state measures affecting Italy's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Italy's commercial interests.	719	636
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Italy's commercial interests. [1]	191	182
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Italy's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Italy's interests [2]	143	112
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Italy's interests [3]	385	342
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	511	471
Total number of implemented measures affecting Italy's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	375	337
Total number of implemented measures affecting Italy's commercial interests that are harmful.	311	273
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	80	42
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Italy's commercial interests.	65	34
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Italy's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	128	123
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Italy's commercial interests.	88	83
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Italy's commercial interests	74	69
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	63	58

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Italy" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.56** Italy's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Italy's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	99	37
Total number of Italy's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	23	8
Total number of Italy's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	20	4
Total number of Italy's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	56	25
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Italy's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	7	5
Total number of Italy's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of Italy's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	47	17
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Italy that harm foreign commercial interests.	70	37
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Italy that harm foreign commercial interests.	27	18
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Italy that harm foreign commercial interests.	144	133

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Italy" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.57** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Italy's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	58
Argentina	54
China	26
Belarus	24
India	23
Kazakhstan	22
Brazil	16
Turkey	13
Indonesia	11
Egypt	6
France	5
Nigeria	5
South Africa	5
Ukraine	5
Viet Nam	5
Algeria	4
Australia	4
Poland	4
Republic of Korea	4
Saudi Arabia	4
Austria	3
Germany	3
Japan	3
Paraguay	3
Spain	3
United States of America	3
Uruguay	3
Venezuela	3
Canada	2
Ecuador	2
Greece	2
Israel	2
Malaysia	2
Mexico	2
Netherlands	2
Slovakia	2
Sweden	2
Tunisia	2
Armenia	1
Belgium	1
Bolivia	1
Cameroon	1
Colombia	1
Ethiopia	1
Ghana	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Hungary	1
Iran	1
Kenya	1
Latvia	1
Pakistan	1
Portugal	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Romania	1
Sudan	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1

**Table 7.58** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Italy's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	27
United States of America	9
Japan	8
Switzerland	8
India	7
Republic of Korea	7
Thailand	7
Canada	6
Brazil	5
Croatia	5
France	5
Israel	5
Turkey	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Algeria	4
Austria	4
Belgium	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4
Germany	4
Indonesia	4
Malaysia	4
Netherlands	4
New Zealand	4
Norway	4
Serbia	4
Spain	4
United Arab Emirates	4
Argentina	3

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Armenia	3
Australia	3
Bulgaria	3
Chile	3
Colombia	3
Costa Rica	3
El Salvador	3
Ghana	3
Hong Kong	3
Lebanon	3
Mexico	3
Oman	3
Paraguay	3
Philippines	3
Romania	3
Russian Federation	3
Singapore	3
South Africa	3
Tunisia	3
Ukraine	3
Zambia	3
Albania	2
Belarus	2
Benin	2
Bolivia	2
Chinese Taipei	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Egypt	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Guatemala	2
Iceland	2
Iran	2
Jamaica	2
Jordan	2
Kazakhstan	2
Kyrgyzstan	2
Macedonia	2
Mauritius	2
Morocco	2
Netherlands Antilles	2
Nicaragua	2
Nigeria	2
Pakistan	2
Peru	2
Republic of Moldova	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Saudi Arabia	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Sudan	2
Sweden	2
Trinidad and Tobago	2
Uruguay	2
Viet Nam	2
Yemen	2
Zimbabwe	2
Andorra	1
Angola	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Barbados	1
Belize	1
Cambodia	1
Comoros	1
Congo	1
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Fiji	1
Gabon	1
Guinea	1
Guyana	1
Honduras	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Kenya	1
Kuwait	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Mali	1
Mayotte	1
Mozambique	1
Namibia	1
New Caledonia	1
Palestinian	1
Panama	1
Portugal	1
Qatar	1



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Senegal	1
Sierra Leone	1
Sri Lanka	1
Swaziland	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
Uganda	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uzbekistan	1
Qatar	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Senegal	1
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Sri Lanka	1
Swaziland	1
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
Uzbekistan	1


**Table 7.59** Implemented measures that harm Italy's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	88	16.67%
Bail out / state aid measure	72	13.64%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	61	11.55%
Export taxes or restriction	45	8.52%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	38	7.20%
Export subsidy	29	5.49%
Local content requirement	15	2.84%
Public procurement	13	2.46%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	11	2.08%
Import ban	10	1.89%
Investment measure	7	1.33%
Migration measure	6	1.14%
Technical Barrier to Trade	6	1.14%
Trade finance	6	1.14%
Competitive devaluation	5	0.95%
Consumption subsidy	5	0.95%
Import subsidy	4	0.76%
State-controlled company	3	0.57%
Intellectual property protection	2	0.38%
Other service sector measure	2	0.38%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	0.38%
State trading enterprise	2	0.38%
Sub-national government measure	2	0.38%
Total	528	100.00%

**Table 7.60** Italy's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	30	60.00%
Bail out / state aid measure	11	22.00%
Export subsidy	5	10.00%
Investment measure	2	4.00%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	4.00%
Tariff measure	1	2.00%
Total	50	100.00%
Total	50	100%

Map 6.19 Italy: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# ITALY

Map 6.20 Italy: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Japan

**Table 7.61** Foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Japan's commercial interests.	682	602
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Japan's commercial interests. [1]	197	178
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Japan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Japan's interests [2]	141	118
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Japan's interests [3]	344	306
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	489	447
Total number of implemented measures affecting Japan's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	352	314
Total number of implemented measures affecting Japan's commercial interests that are harmful.	282	244
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	79	41
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Japan's commercial interests.	54	31
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Japan's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	114	114
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Japan's commercial interests.	79	79
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Japan's commercial interests	62	62
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	72	70

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Japan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.62** Japan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Japan's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	33	26
Total number of Japan's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	3	3
Total number of Japan's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	6	6
Total number of Japan's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	24	17
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Japan's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	0	0
Total number of Japan's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of Japan's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	18	15
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests.	141	137
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests.	15	15
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests.	116	115

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Japan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.63** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Japan's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	46
Argentina	42
China	27
India	24
Indonesia	21
Kazakhstan	16
Viet Nam	16
Belarus	15
Brazil	12
Germany	8
Italy	8
France	7
Poland	7
Republic of Korea	6
Spain	6
Sweden	6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	6
Hungary	5
Netherlands	5
Nigeria	5
Portugal	5
Romania	5
Slovakia	5
Austria	4
Belgium	4
Bulgaria	4
Canada	4
Cyprus	4
Czech Republic	4
Denmark	4
Estonia	4
European Communities	4
Finland	4
Greece	4
Ireland	4
Latvia	4
Lithuania	4
Luxembourg	4
Malta	4
Slovenia	4
Ukraine	4
United States of America	4
Australia	3
Philippines	3
South Africa	3

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Turkey	3
Zimbabwe	3
Ecuador	2
Malaysia	2
Pakistan	2
Paraguay	2
Singapore	2
Tunisia	2
Uganda	2
Uruguay	2
Venezuela	2
Algeria	1
Bangladesh	1
Bolivia	1
Colombia	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Gambia	1
Ghana	1
Iran	1
Mauritania	1
Mexico	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1

**Table 7.64** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Japan's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	5
Belgium	4
Netherlands	4
United States of America	4
Australia	3
Austria	3
Brazil	3
Canada	3
France	3
Germany	3
Indonesia	3
Italy	3
Malaysia	3
Philippines	3
Republic of Korea	3
Sweden	3



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Switzerland	3
Thailand	3
Viet Nam	3
Chile	2
Croatia	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Finland	2
India	2
Latvia	2
Mozambique	2
New Zealand	2
Norway	2
Papua New Guinea	2
Poland	2
Russian Federation	2
Singapore	2
Turkey	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
Argentina	1
Belarus	1
Belize	1
Bolivia	1
Bulgaria	1
Burkina Faso	1
Cameroon	1
Colombia	1
Cook Islands	1
Costa Rica	1
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Estonia	1
Ethiopia	1
Fiji	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Guam	1
Guatemala	1
Honduras	1
Hong Kong	1
Hungary	1
Iceland	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Iran	1
Ireland	1
Israel	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Kiribati	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Lithuania	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Maldives	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mauritius	1
Mexico	1
Morocco	1
Myanmar	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
New Caledonia	1
Nicaragua	1
Nigeria	1
Oman	1
Pakistan	1
Palau	1
Panama	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Saint Helena	1
Senegal	1
Serbia	1
Seychelles	1
Slovenia	1
Solomon Islands	1
South Africa	1
Spain	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Swaziland	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tonga	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Tunisia	1
Uganda	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Ukraine	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uruguay	1
Vanuatu	1
Venezuela	1
Vanuatu	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 7.65** Implemented measures that harm Japan's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	90	18.56%
Bail out / state aid measure	53	10.93%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	49	10.10%
Export taxes or restriction	40	8.25%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	38	7.84%
Export subsidy	31	6.39%
Import ban	16	3.30%
Local content requirement	15	3.09%
Public procurement	13	2.68%
Migration measure	11	2.27%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	9	1.86%
Investment measure	8	1.65%
Trade finance	8	1.65%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.03%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	1.03%
Consumption subsidy	4	0.82%
Import subsidy	4	0.82%
Other service sector measure	4	0.82%
Intellectual property protection	3	0.62%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	0.62%
State-controlled company	3	0.62%
State trading enterprise	1	0.21%
Total	485	100.00%


**Table 7.66** Japan's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade finance	7	35.00%
Bail out / state aid measure	4	20.00%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	3	15.00%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	3	15.00%
Sub-national government measure	2	10.00%
Consumption subsidy	1	5.00%
Export taxes or restriction	1	5.00%
Public procurement	1	5.00%
Total	20	100.00%



# JAPAN

Map 6.22 Japan: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Mexico

**Table 7.67** Foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests.	441	412
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Mexico's commercial interests. [1]	129	121
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Mexico's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mexico's interests [2]	101	89
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mexico's interests [3]	211	202
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	300	289
Total number of implemented measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	218	210
Total number of implemented measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests that are harmful.	173	165
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	56	40
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Mexico's commercial interests.	43	31
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Mexico's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	85	83
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Mexico's commercial interests.	51	50
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Mexico's commercial interests	38	37
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	62	59

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Mexico" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.68** Mexico's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Mexico's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	38	17
Total number of Mexico's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	14	8
Total number of Mexico's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	8	2
Total number of Mexico's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	16	7
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Mexico's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	11	8
Total number of Mexico's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of Mexico's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	14	5
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests.	89	81
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests.	26	22
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests.	37	36

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Mexico" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".



**Table 7.69** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	39
Russian Federation	29
Brazil	12
China	11
India	11
Indonesia	9
Canada	8
United States of America	8
France	7
Belarus	5
Kazakhstan	5
Netherlands	4
Poland	4
Sweden	4
Venezuela	4
Germany	3
Greece	3
Italy	3
Paraguay	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Uruguay	3
Viet Nam	3
Australia	2
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Bolivia	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Ecuador	2
Egypt	2
Estonia	2
European Communities	2
Finland	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Nigeria	2
Portugal	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Republic of Korea	2
Slovenia	2
Spain	2
Colombia	1
Ethiopia	1
Iran	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Peru	1
Saudi Arabia	1
South Africa	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Tunisia	1

**Table 7.70** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Mexico's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	8
United States of America	7
Indonesia	3
Malaysia	3
Philippines	3
Argentina	2
Colombia	2
Guatemala	2
Italy	2
Spain	2
Thailand	2
Viet Nam	2
Australia	1
Austria	1
Bolivia	1
Brazil	1
Canada	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Costa Rica	1
Cuba	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
France	1
Germany	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Honduras	1
Hungary	1
India	1
Israel	1
Japan	1
Nicaragua	1
Pakistan	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Slovenia	1
South Africa	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1


**Table 7.71** Implemented measures that harm Mexico's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	45	14.42%
Tariff measure	45	14.42%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	38	12.18%
Export subsidy	28	8.97%
Export taxes or restriction	17	5.45%
Local content requirement	12	3.85%
Migration measure	12	3.85%
Public procurement	10	3.21%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	8	2.56%
Trade finance	6	1.92%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.60%
Consumption subsidy	5	1.60%
Investment measure	5	1.60%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	5	1.60%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	1.60%
Import ban	4	1.28%
Import subsidy	4	1.28%
State-controlled company	4	1.28%
Other service sector measure	3	0.96%
Intellectual property protection	2	0.64%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	0.64%
State trading enterprise	1	0.32%
Sub-national government measure	1	0.32%
Total	312	100.00%

**Table 7.72** Mexico's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	9	60.00%
Tariff measure	3	20.00%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	6.67%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	6.67%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	6.67%
Total	15	100.00%

Map 6.23 Mexico: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# MEXICO

Map 6.24 Mexico: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Republic of Korea

**Table 7.73** Foreign state measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests.	654	558
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Rep. of Korea's commercial interests. [1]	187	169
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Rep. of Korea's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Rep. of Korea's interests [2]	141	105
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Rep. of Korea's interests [3]	326	284
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	464	419
Total number of implemented measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	330	289
Total number of implemented measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests that are harmful.	264	223
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	77	27
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Rep. of Korea's commercial interests.	59	23
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Rep. of Korea's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	113	112
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Rep. of Korea's commercial interests.	78	77
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	62	61
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	68	65

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Rep. of Korea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.74** Rep. of Korea's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Rep. of Korea's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	46	41
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	14	13
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	12	10
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	20	18
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	8	8
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of Rep. of Korea's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	18	16
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Rep. of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests.	195	195
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Rep. of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests.	34	34
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Rep. of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests.	122	115

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Rep. of Korea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".



**Table 7.75** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	47
Argentina	43
China	22
India	20
Indonesia	18
Belarus	14
Kazakhstan	14
Viet Nam	13
Brazil	12
Germany	8
Poland	8
Canada	7
France	7
Italy	7
Spain	7
Sweden	7
Austria	6
Hungary	6
Latvia	6
Netherlands	6
Romania	6
Slovakia	6
Turkey	6
Belgium	5
Bulgaria	5
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Estonia	5
European Communities	5
Finland	5
Greece	5
Ireland	5
Lithuania	5
Luxembourg	5
Malta	5
Nigeria	5
Pakistan	5
Portugal	5
Slovenia	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Australia	4
Ukraine	4
Japan	3
South Africa	3

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Uzbekistan	3
Ecuador	2
Egypt	2
Malaysia	2
Paraguay	2
Philippines	2
Singapore	2
Tunisia	2
United States of America	2
Uruguay	2
Venezuela	2
Algeria	1
Colombia	1
Ethiopia	1
Ghana	1
Iran	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Sierra Leone	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 7.76** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Republic of Korea's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	7
Japan	6
Germany	5
India	5
Indonesia	5
Malaysia	5
Norway	5
United States of America	5
Australia	4
Canada	4
Croatia	4
Denmark	4
Finland	4
France	4
Italy	4
Philippines	4
Poland	4
Romania	4
Russian Federation	4
Singapore	4
Thailand	4

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
Algeria	3
Belgium	3
Brazil	3
Bulgaria	3
Costa Rica	3
Estonia	3
Hong Kong	3
Ireland	3
Israel	3
Kuwait	3
Morocco	3
New Zealand	3
Saudi Arabia	3
South Africa	3
Spain	3
Sweden	3
Switzerland	3
Turkey	3
Viet Nam	3
Aruba	2
Austria	2
Cameroon	2
Chile	2
Czech Republic	2
Egypt	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Iceland	2
Iran	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Mexico	2
Netherlands	2
Nigeria	2
Pakistan	2
Panama	2
Qatar	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Sri Lanka	2
Swaziland	2
Tunisia	2
United Arab Emirates	2
Uruguay	2
Afghanistan	1
Angola	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Argentina	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bahamas	1
Belarus	1
British Virgin Islands	1
Brunei Darussalam	1
Cambodia	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Colombia	1
Congo	1
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
El Salvador	1
Ethiopia	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Georgia	1
Ghana	1
Guatemala	1
Honduras	1
Iraq	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Latvia	1
Liberia	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mongolia	1
Myanmar	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Nicaragua	1
Oman	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Portugal	1
Samoa	1
Sudan	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Ukraine	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uzbekistan	1
Venezuela	1
Yemen	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Ukraine	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Venezuela	1
Yemen	1

**Table 7.77** Implemented measures that harm Republic of Korea's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	84	17.99%
Bail out / state aid measure	49	10.49%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	48	10.28%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	41	8.78%
Export taxes or restriction	34	7.28%
Export subsidy	28	6.00%
Migration measure	16	3.43%
Import ban	13	2.78%
Local content requirement	12	2.57%
Public procurement	11	2.36%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	6	1.28%
Trade finance	6	1.28%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.07%
Investment measure	5	1.07%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	1.07%
Consumption subsidy	4	0.86%
Import subsidy	4	0.86%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	0.64%
State-controlled company	3	0.64%
Intellectual property protection	2	0.43%
Other service sector measure	2	0.43%
Sub-national government measure	2	0.43%
State trading enterprise	1	0.21%
Total	467	100.00%

**Table 7.78** Republic of Korea's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade finance	9	40.91%
Bail out / state aid measure	5	22.73%
Tariff measure	4	18.18%
Investment measure	3	13.64%
Migration measure	2	9.09%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	2	9.09%
Intellectual property protection	1	4.55%
Total	22	100.00%

# REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Map 6.25 Republic of Korea: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory



Map 6.26 Republic of Korea: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by



# REPUBLIC OF KOREA

# Russian Federation

**Table 7.79** Foreign state measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests.	348	305
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Russian Fed.'s commercial interests. [1]	92	78
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Russian Fed.'s commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Russian Fed.'s interests [2]	84	65
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Russian Fed.'s interests [3]	172	162
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	223	212
Total number of implemented measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	169	160
Total number of implemented measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests that are harmful.	133	124
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	57	26
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Russian Fed.'s commercial interests.	38	19
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Russian Fed.'s commercial interests but are no longer in force.	68	67
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Russian Fed.'s commercial interests.	49	48
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	39	38
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	61	55

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Russian Fed." in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".



**Table 7.80** Russian Fed.'s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Russian Fed.'s commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	263	234
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	70	70
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	24	17
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	169	147
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	52	52
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	13	13
Total number of Russian Fed.'s measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	136	116
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Russian Fed. that harm foreign commercial interests.	446	441
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Russian Fed. that harm foreign commercial interests.	45	44
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Russian Fed. that harm foreign commercial interests.	144	131

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Russian Fed." in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.81** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
China	18
Argentina	16
India	15
France	8
Kazakhstan	7
Indonesia	6
Ukraine	6
Belarus	5
Germany	5
Greece	5
Poland	5
Slovakia	5
Spain	5
Viet Nam	5
Ireland	4
Latvia	4
Netherlands	4
Portugal	4
Republic of Korea	4
Romania	4
Turkey	4
Uzbekistan	4
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Finland	3
Hungary	3
Italy	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Nigeria	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Brazil	2
Egypt	2
Japan	2
Tunisia	2
United States of America	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Armenia	1
Australia	1
Cameroon	1
Ethiopia	1
Iran	1
Malaysia	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Sierra Leone	1
Thailand	1
Venezuela	1
South Africa	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Venezuela	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 7.82** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Russian Federation's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Germany	66
China	65
Ukraine	65
United States of America	63
France	62
Poland	61
Italy	58
Finland	55
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	53
Netherlands	50
Spain	48
Sweden	48
Republic of Korea	47
Czech Republic	46
Japan	46
Canada	45
Turkey	45
Belgium	44
Lithuania	41
Austria	40
Hungary	37
Denmark	33
Slovakia	32
Switzerland	32
Latvia	31
Thailand	31

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Mexico	29
India	27
Portugal	26
Slovenia	25
Uzbekistan	25
Brazil	24
Iran	24
Estonia	23
Romania	23
Argentina	22
Norway	22
Australia	20
Singapore	18
Malaysia	16
Bulgaria	14
Kazakhstan	14
Republic of Moldova	14
Serbia	14
Azerbaijan	13
Greece	13
Hong Kong	13
Ireland	12
Israel	12
South Africa	11
Kyrgyzstan	10
Indonesia	9
Viet Nam	9
Croatia	8
Luxembourg	8
United Arab Emirates	8
Uruguay	7
Armenia	6
Iceland	6
New Zealand	6
Chinese Taipei	5
Colombia	5
Cyprus	5
Egypt	5
Georgia	5
Turkmenistan	5
Chile	4
Cuba	4
Macao	4
Mongolia	4
Philippines	4
Albania	3
Algeria	3

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
British Virgin Islands	3
Guatemala	3
Mauritius	3
Pakistan	3
Peru	3
Sri Lanka	3
Tajikistan	3
Tunisia	3
Belarus	2
Bolivia	2
Costa Rica	2
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	2
El Salvador	2
Kenya	2
Malta	2
Morocco	2
Panama	2
Paraguay	2
Saudi Arabia	2
Uganda	2
Venezuela	2
Afghanistan	1
Bahamas	1
Bangladesh	1
Barbados	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Falkland Islands Malvinas	1
Ghana	1
Guinea	1
Honduras	1
Jamaica	1
Lebanon	1
Liberia	1
Malawi	1
Mauritania	1
Montenegro	1
Mozambique	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Nicaragua	1
Niger	1
Nigeria	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Oman	1
Qatar	1
Rwanda	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Samoa	1
San Marino	1
Sudan	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Togo	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Yemen	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1
Liberia	1
Macao	1
Montenegro	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Nicaragua	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Samoa	1
Togo	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1

**Table 7.83** Implemented measures that harm Russian Federation's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	40	15.63%
Export taxes or restriction	30	11.72%
Export subsidy	29	11.33%
Bail out / state aid measure	24	9.38%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	15	5.86%
Public procurement	9	3.52%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	9	3.52%
Local content requirement	7	2.73%
Migration measure	6	2.34%
Trade finance	6	2.34%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.95%
Import ban	4	1.56%
Investment measure	3	1.17%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	3	1.17%
Technical Barrier to Trade	3	1.17%
Import subsidy	2	0.78%
Other service sector measure	1	0.39%
Sub-national government measure	1	0.39%
Total	256	100.00%

**Table 7.84** Russian Federation's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	73	48.99%
Tariff measure	29	19.46%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	20	13.42%
Export taxes or restriction	14	9.40%
State-controlled company	14	9.40%
Other service sector measure	5	3.36%
State trading enterprise	5	3.36%
Consumption subsidy	3	2.01%
Export subsidy	3	2.01%
Local content requirement	3	2.01%
Public procurement	3	2.01%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	3	2.01%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	2.01%
Investment measure	2	1.34%
Import ban	1	0.67%
Import subsidy	1	0.67%
Migration measure	1	0.67%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	0.67%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.67%
Total	149	100.00%

# RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Map 6.27 Russian Federation: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures







# Saudi Arabia

**Table 7.85** Foreign state measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests.	191	172
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Saudi Arabia's commercial interests. [1]	48	39
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Saudi Arabia's interests [2]	49	46
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Saudi Arabia's interests [3]	94	87
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	130	122
Total number of implemented measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	99	92
Total number of implemented measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests that are harmful.	71	64
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	24	13
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests.	14	11
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Saudi Arabia's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	37	37
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Saudi Arabia's commercial interests.	30	30
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	23	23
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests.	54	50

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Saudi Arabia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.86** Saudi Arabia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	12	12
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	10	10
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	0	0
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	10	10
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Saudi Arabia that harm foreign commercial interests.	22	22
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Saudi Arabia that harm foreign commercial interests.	6	6
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Saudi Arabia that harm foreign commercial interests.	37	37

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Saudi Arabia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.87** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
India	12
China	10
Argentina	8
Germany	4
Indonesia	4
Egypt	3
Netherlands	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Republic of Korea	3
Turkey	3
Ukraine	3
Viet Nam	3
Algeria	2
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Ethiopia	2
European Communities	2
Finland	2
France	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Italy	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Romania	2
Russian Federation	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Spain	2
Sweden	2
Tunisia	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
Kazakhstan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Nigeria	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
South Africa	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
United Arab Emirates	1

**Table 7.88** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Saudi Arabia's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
France	4
India	4
Italy	4
Germany	3
Spain	3
Turkey	3
United Arab Emirates	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	3
Yemen	3
Bangladesh	2
China	2
Egypt	2
Kuwait	2
Pakistan	2
Philippines	2
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Brazil	1
Canada	1
Czech Republic	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Netherlands	1
Norway	1
Qatar	1
Republic of Korea	1
Russian Federation	1
Singapore	1
South Africa	1
Sweden	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1


**Table 7.89** Implemented measures that harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	26	18.18%
Export subsidy	22	15.38%
Export taxes or restriction	19	13.29%
Bail out / state aid measure	9	6.29%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	9	6.29%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	7	4.90%
Competitive devaluation	4	2.80%
Trade finance	4	2.80%
Investment measure	3	2.10%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	3	2.10%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	2.10%
Import subsidy	2	1.40%
Migration measure	2	1.40%
Other service sector measure	2	1.40%
Public procurement	2	1.40%
Import ban	1	0.70%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.70%
Total	143	100.00%

**Table 7.90** Saudi Arabia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Import ban	3	30.00%
Migration measure	3	30.00%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	20.00%
Tariff measure	2	20.00%
Investment measure	1	10.00%
Total	10	100.00%


Map 6.29 Saudi Arabia: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# SAUDI ARABIA

# SAUDI ARABIA

Map 6.30 Saudi Arabia: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by





# South Africa

**Table 7.91** Foreign state measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests.	384	366
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of South Africa's commercial interests. [1]	111	105
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm South Africa's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against South Africa's interests [2]	96	91
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against South Africa's interests [3]	177	170
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	268	261
Total number of implemented measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	196	190
Total number of implemented measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests that are harmful.	141	135
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	44	34
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm South Africa's commercial interests.	31	26
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected South Africa's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	72	71
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to South Africa's commercial interests.	46	45
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to South Africa's commercial interests	36	35
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	64	62

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "South Africa" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.92** South Africa's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of South Africa's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	64	46
Total number of South Africa's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	24	21
Total number of South Africa's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	14	7
Total number of South Africa's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	26	18
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of South Africa's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	21	20
Total number of South Africa's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of South Africa's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	25	17
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by South Africa that harm foreign commercial interests.	61	54
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by South Africa that harm foreign commercial interests.	18	15
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by South Africa that harm foreign commercial interests.	133	60

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "South Africa" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.93** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	17
India	14
China	12
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	12
Russian Federation	11
Indonesia	9
France	8
Nigeria	6
Brazil	5
Spain	5
Sweden	5
Australia	4
Belarus	4
Germany	4
Ireland	4
Kazakhstan	4
Poland	4
Romania	4
Slovakia	4
United States of America	4
Viet Nam	4
Zimbabwe	4
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Finland	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Italy	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Netherlands	3
Portugal	3
Republic of Korea	3
Slovenia	3
United Republic of Tanzania	3
Iran	2
Malaysia	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Uganda	2
Canada	1
Colombia	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Japan	1
Kenya	1
Mexico	1
Pakistan	1
Paraguay	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Turkey	1
Ukraine	1
Uruguay	1
Venezuela	1
Zambia	1

**Table 7.94** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by South Africa's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	19
Germany	12
United States of America	12
India	10
Malaysia	8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	8
Brazil	7
France	7
Netherlands	7
Belgium	6
Thailand	6
Australia	5
Indonesia	5
Italy	5
Spain	4
Sweden	4
Switzerland	4
Argentina	3
Canada	3
Finland	3
Hong Kong	3
Japan	3
Poland	3
Republic of Korea	3

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Austria	2
Czech Republic	2
Norway	2
Pakistan	2
Singapore	2
Slovakia	2
Turkey	2
Viet Nam	2
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Bulgaria	1
Cambodia	1
Central African Republic	1
Denmark	1
Egypt	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Israel	1
Kuwait	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Mauritius	1
Mexico	1
Mozambique	1
Myanmar	1
Namibia	1
New Zealand	1
Philippines	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Slovenia	1
Tunisia	1
Ukraine	1
United Arab Emirates	1
Zimbabwe	1
Bahamas	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Barbados	1
Benin	1
Bermuda	1
British Virgin Islands	1
Burundi	1
Cameroon	1
Chad	1
Colombia	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Congo	1
Croatia	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Djibouti	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Eritrea	1
Estonia	1
Ethiopia	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Gabon	1
Georgia	1
Ghana	1
Guinea	1
Iran	1
Iraq	1
Ireland	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Kuwait	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Lebanon	1
Liberia	1
Luxembourg	1
Mali	1
Mauritania	1
Mongolia	1
Morocco	1
Mozambique	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
New Caledonia	1
New Zealand	1
Nicaragua	1
Nigeria	1
Oman	1
Panama	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Philippines	1
Qatar	1
Russian Federation	1
Rwanda	1
Saint Helena	1
Senegal	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Slovenia	1
Solomon Islands	1
Somalia	1
Sudan	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tonga	1
Turks and Caicos Islands	1
Uganda	1
Ukraine	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uruguay	1
Yemen	1
Zambia	1

**Table 7.95** Implemented measures that harm South Africa's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	52	19.05%
Bail out / state aid measure	31	11.36%
Export subsidy	28	10.26%
Export taxes or restriction	26	9.52%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	22	8.06%
Migration measure	14	5.13%
Public procurement	10	3.66%
Import ban	9	3.30%
Local content requirement	9	3.30%
Investment measure	6	2.20%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	6	2.20%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	2.20%
Trade finance	6	2.20%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.83%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	1.83%
Import subsidy	3	1.10%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	1.10%
Consumption subsidy	2	0.73%
Other service sector measure	2	0.73%
State-controlled company	2	0.73%
Sub-national government measure	1	0.37%
Total	273	100.00%

**Table 7.96** South Africa's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	16	55.17%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	8	27.59%
Bail out / state aid measure	2	6.90%
Import ban	1	3.45%
Investment measure	1	3.45%
Local content requirement	1	3.45%
Public procurement	1	3.45%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	1	3.45%
Total	29	100.00%




Map 6.31 South Africa: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# SOUTH AFRICA

Map 6.32 South Africa: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Turkey

**Table 7.97** Foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests.	508	474
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Turkey's commercial interests. [1]	139	130
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Turkey's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Turkey's interests [2]	110	95
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Turkey's interests [3]	259	249
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	348	338
Total number of implemented measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	253	244
Total number of implemented measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests that are harmful.	197	188
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	53	30
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Turkey's commercial interests.	40	25
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Turkey's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	107	106
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Turkey's commercial interests.	76	75
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to Turkey's commercial interests	62	61
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	70	66

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Turkey" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.98** Turkey's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of Turkey's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	38	12
Total number of Turkey's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	2	2
Total number of Turkey's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	7	1
Total number of Turkey's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	29	9
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of Turkey's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of Turkey's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of Turkey's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	29	9
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests.	41	15
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests.	18	7
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests.	60	52

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Turkey" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.99** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	45
Argentina	20
Belarus	18
Kazakhstan	18
India	16
China	11
France	10
Indonesia	8
Poland	7
Spain	7
Greece	6
Sweden	6
Austria	5
Brazil	5
Egypt	5
Germany	5
Hungary	5
Italy	5
Latvia	5
Netherlands	5
Romania	5
Slovakia	5
Ukraine	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Belgium	4
Bulgaria	4
Cyprus	4
Czech Republic	4
Denmark	4
Estonia	4
European Communities	4
Finland	4
Ireland	4
Lithuania	4
Luxembourg	4
Malta	4
Nigeria	4
Portugal	4
Slovenia	4
Viet Nam	4
Pakistan	3
Republic of Korea	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Australia	2
Ethiopia	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Iran	2
Israel	2
Japan	2
South Africa	2
Tunisia	2
Uzbekistan	2
Algeria	1
Ecuador	1
Ghana	1
Iraq	1
Malaysia	1
Morocco	1
Paraguay	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Sierra Leone	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
United States of America	1
Uruguay	1
Venezuela	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 7.100** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Turkey's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	17
Italy	13
France	12
Germany	12
Spain	11
United States of America	10
Greece	9
Romania	8
Indonesia	7
Poland	7
Austria	6
Czech Republic	6
India	6
Republic of Korea	6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	6
Belgium	5
Hungary	5
Thailand	5
Brazil	4
Hong Kong	4
Malaysia	4

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Netherlands	4
Russian Federation	4
Slovenia	4
Viet Nam	4
Bulgaria	3
Japan	3
Lithuania	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Singapore	3
Ukraine	3
Canada	2
Denmark	2
Egypt	2
Kazakhstan	2
Morocco	2
Pakistan	2
Portugal	2
Slovakia	2
Sweden	2
Switzerland	2
Algeria	1
Australia	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
Croatia	1
Finland	1
Iran	1
Ireland	1
Kuwait	1
Latvia	1
Luxembourg	1
Macedonia	1
Oman	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Serbia	1
South Africa	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tunisia	1
United Arab Emirates	1

**Table 7.101** Implemented measures that harm Turkey's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	73	23%
Bail out / state aid measure	65	20%
Export taxes or restriction	40	12%
Tariff measure	68	18.43%
Bail out / state aid measure	51	13.82%
Export taxes or restriction	35	9.49%
Export subsidy	31	8.40%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	30	8.13%
Public procurement	12	3.25%
Local content requirement	9	2.44%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	9	2.44%
Import ban	8	2.17%
Investment measure	6	1.63%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	6	1.63%
Trade finance	6	1.63%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.36%
Consumption subsidy	5	1.36%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	1.36%
Import subsidy	4	1.08%
Migration measure	4	1.08%
Other service sector measure	4	1.08%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	0.54%
State trading enterprise	2	0.54%
State-controlled company	2	0.54%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.27%
Sub-national government measure	1	0.27%
Total	369	100.00%

**Table 7.102** Turkey's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	20	66.67%
Tariff measure	8	26.67%
Export taxes or restriction	1	3.33%
Public procurement	1	3.33%
Total	30	100.00%





# TURKEY

Map 6.34 Turkey: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# United Kingdom

**Table 7.103** Foreign state measures affecting the UK's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting the UK's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting the UK's commercial interests.	680	620
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of the UK's commercial interests. [1]	186	175
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm the UK's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against the UK's interests [2]	139	121
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against the UK's interests [3]	355	324
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting the UK's commercial interests	486	454
Total number of implemented measures affecting the UK's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	356	326
Total number of implemented measures affecting the UK's commercial interests that are harmful.	287	257
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	73	46
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm the UK's commercial interests.	56	38
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected the UK's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	121	120
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to the UK's commercial interests.	82	81
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to the UK's commercial interests	68	67
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	69	65

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "the UK" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.104** The UK's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting the UK's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of the UK's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	116	54
Total number of the UK's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	25	10
Total number of the UK's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	23	7
Total number of the UK's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	68	37
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of the UK's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	9	7
Total number of the UK's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	5	5
Total number of the UK's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	55	25
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by the UK that harm foreign commercial interests.	161	135
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by the UK that harm foreign commercial interests.	27	19
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by the UK that harm foreign commercial interests.	151	130

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "the UK" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.105** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting the UK's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	53
Argentina	33
China	23
India	22
Belarus	21
Kazakhstan	20
Indonesia	13
Brazil	11
Canada	8
South Africa	8
Australia	7
Turkey	6
Viet Nam	6
France	5
Italy	5
Nigeria	5
Poland	5
Ukraine	5
Algeria	4
Netherlands	4
Republic of Korea	4
Germany	3
Malaysia	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Spain	3
Sweden	3
United States of America	3
Zimbabwe	3
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Denmark	2
Ecuador	2
Egypt	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Israel	2
Japan	2
Latvia	2
Pakistan	2
Paraguay	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Singapore	2
Slovakia	2
Tunisia	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Uganda	2
Uruguay	2
Bolivia	1
Bulgaria	1
Colombia	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Estonia	1
Ethiopia	1
European Communities	1
Finland	1
Gambia	1
Ghana	1
Iran	1
Ireland	1
Kenya	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Mexico	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Sierra Leone	1
Slovenia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Venezuela	1
Zambia	1

**Table 7.106** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by United Kingdom's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	33
India	14
United States of America	13
South Africa	12
New Zealand	11
Philippines	11
Australia	10
Pakistan	10
Thailand	7

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Japan	6
Canada	5
Republic of Korea	5
Turkey	5
Algeria	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4
Croatia	4
Israel	4
Malaysia	4
Serbia	4
Switzerland	4
United Arab Emirates	4
Argentina	3
Armenia	3
Brazil	3
Chile	3
Colombia	3
Costa Rica	3
El Salvador	3
Indonesia	3
Lebanon	3
Mexico	3
Norway	3
Oman	3
Paraguay	3
Romania	3
Russian Federation	3
Singapore	3
Zambia	3
Albania	2
Bangladesh	2
Belarus	2
Benin	2
Bolivia	2
Bulgaria	2
Chinese Taipei	2
Egypt	2
Ghana	2
Guatemala	2
Hong Kong	2
Iceland	2
Iran	2
Jamaica	2
Jordan	2
Kazakhstan	2
Kyrgyzstan	2
Macedonia	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Mauritius	2
Morocco	2
Netherlands Antilles	2
Nicaragua	2
Nigeria	2
Peru	2
Republic of Moldova	2
Saudi Arabia	2
Sudan	2
Trinidad and Tobago	2
Tunisia	2
Ukraine	2
Uruguay	2
Viet Nam	2
Yemen	2
Zimbabwe	2
Andorra	1
Angola	1
Austria	1
Bahrain	1
Barbados	1
Belgium	1
Belize	1
Cambodia	1
Comoros	1
Congo	1
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Denmark	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Fiji	1
Finland	1
France	1
Gabon	1
Germany	1
Guinea	1
Guyana	1
Honduras	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Kenya	1



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Kuwait	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Mali	1
Mayotte	1
Mozambique	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands	1
New Caledonia	1
Palestinian	1
Panama	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Qatar	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Senegal	1
Sierra Leone	1
Spain	1
Sri Lanka	1
Swaziland	1
Sweden	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
Uganda	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uzbekistan	1
Mali	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mayotte	1
Mozambique	1
New Caledonia	1
Niger	1
Palestinian	1
Poland	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
San Marino	1
Senegal	1
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Slovakia	1
Swaziland	1
Tajikistan	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Togo	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Uzbekistan	1
Venezuela	1


**Table 7.107** Implemented measures that harm the UK's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	91	18.42%
Bail out / state aid measure	67	13.56%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	43	8.70%
Export taxes or restriction	41	8.30%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	30	6.07%
Export subsidy	26	5.26%
Migration measure	23	4.66%
Local content requirement	14	2.83%
Public procurement	14	2.83%
Import ban	13	2.63%
Investment measure	11	2.23%
Trade finance	8	1.62%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	7	1.42%
Technical Barrier to Trade	6	1.21%
Competitive devaluation	5	1.01%
Import subsidy	5	1.01%
Consumption subsidy	4	0.81%
Other service sector measure	3	0.61%
State-controlled company	3	0.61%
Intellectual property protection	2	0.40%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	0.40%
State trading enterprise	2	0.40%
Sub-national government measure	1	0.20%
Total	494	100.00%

**Table 7.108** The UK's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	30	50.00%
Migration measure	12	20.00%
Bail out / state aid measure	11	18.33%
Export subsidy	5	8.33%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	3.33%
Tariff measure	1	1.67%
Total	60	100.00%
Total	62	100%

Map 6.35 United Kingdom: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# UNITED KINGDOM

Map 6.36 United Kingdom: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# United States

**Table 7.109** Foreign state measures affecting the US' commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting the US's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting the US's commercial interests.	900	768
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of the US's commercial interests. [1]	255	228
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm the US's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against the US's interests [2]	163	116
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against the US's interests [3]	482	424
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures affecting the US's commercial interests	650	592
Total number of implemented measures affecting the US's commercial interests that are harmful or almost certainly harmful.	477	423
Total number of implemented measures affecting the US's commercial interests that are harmful.	394	340
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	92	23
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm the US's commercial interests.	63	17
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected the US's commercial interests but are no longer in force.	158	153
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to the US's commercial interests.	105	100
Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that were harmful to the US's commercial interests	88	84
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Argentina's commercial interests.	79	73

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "the US" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.110** The US' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting the US's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of the US's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	143	100
Total number of the US's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	21	17
Total number of the US's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	94	67
Total number of the US's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	28	16
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of the US's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of the US's measures that have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests.	6	5
Total number of the US's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.	25	13
<b>COMMERCE AFFECTED</b>		
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by the US that harm foreign commercial interests.	155	139
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by the US that harm foreign commercial interests.	43	41
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by the US that harm foreign commercial interests.	124	109

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "the US" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

**Table 7.111** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting the US' commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	63
Argentina	57
China	33
India	23
Belarus	22
Brazil	21
Indonesia	21
Kazakhstan	21
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	13
Canada	12
South Africa	12
France	11
Viet Nam	11
Turkey	10
Germany	9
Italy	9
Australia	8
Netherlands	8
Poland	8
Spain	8
Greece	7
Mexico	7
Sweden	7
Austria	6
Belgium	6
Hungary	6
Ireland	6
Latvia	6
Nigeria	6
Portugal	6
Romania	6
Slovakia	6
Bulgaria	5
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Estonia	5
European Communities	5
Finland	5
Lithuania	5
Luxembourg	5
Malta	5
Republic of Korea	5
Slovenia	5
Japan	4

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Paraguay	4
Venezuela	4
Malaysia	3
Pakistan	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Ukraine	3
Uruguay	3
Algeria	2
Ecuador	2
Egypt	2
Ethiopia	2
Ghana	2
Philippines	2
Singapore	2
Thailand	2
Tunisia	2
Uzbekistan	2
Zimbabwe	2
Bolivia	1
Colombia	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Dominican Republic	1
Gambia	1
Morocco	1
Peru	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Sierra Leone	1
Switzerland	1
Togo	1
Uganda	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1

**Table 7.112** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by the US' state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	13
Mexico	8
Canada	6
India	5
Australia	4
Germany	4
Indonesia	4
Japan	4
South Africa	4
Sweden	4



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Brazil	3
Chinese Taipei	3
Finland	3
France	3
Hong Kong	3
Hungary	3
Italy	3
Philippines	3
Slovakia	3
Switzerland	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Viet Nam	3
Argentina	2
Barbados	2
Bulgaria	2
Costa Rica	2
Croatia	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Ireland	2
Israel	2
Jamaica	2
Luxembourg	2
Malaysia	2
Morocco	2
Netherlands	2
Norway	2
Pakistan	2
Poland	2
Portugal	2
Republic of Korea	2
Romania	2
Russian Federation	2
Singapore	2
Spain	2
Swaziland	2
Thailand	2
Trinidad and Tobago	2
Albania	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Belarus	1
Bolivia	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Botswana	1
Brunei Darussalam	1
Cambodia	1
Cameroon	1
Chile	1
Colombia	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
El Salvador	1
Ethiopia	1
Georgia	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Guatemala	1
Guyana	1
Haiti	1
Honduras	1
Jordan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Latvia	1
Lesotho	1
Lithuania	1
Macedonia	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Mali	1
Mauritius	1
Mongolia	1
Namibia	1
Nepal	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
New Zealand	1
Nicaragua	1
Oman	1
Peru	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
Slovenia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tokelau	1
Tunisia	1
Turkey	1
Turkmenistan	1
Ukraine	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
United Arab Emirates	1
Uruguay	1
Uzbekistan	1
Venezuela	1
Zimbabwe	1
Nepal	1
Nigeria	1
Oman	1
Panama	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Slovenia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Tokelau	1
Turkmenistan	1
Ukraine	1
Uzbekistan	1
Yemen	1
Zimbabwe	1


**Table 7.113** Implemented measures that harm United States' commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	119	18.45%
Bail out / state aid measure	73	11.32%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	70	10.85%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	54	8.37%
Export taxes or restriction	42	6.51%
Export subsidy	34	5.27%
Migration measure	33	5.12%
Import ban	18	2.79%
Local content requirement	17	2.64%
Public procurement	13	2.02%
Investment measure	12	1.86%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	11	1.71%
Trade finance	8	1.24%
Technical Barrier to Trade	7	1.09%
Consumption subsidy	6	0.93%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	6	0.93%
State-controlled company	6	0.93%
Competitive devaluation	5	0.78%
Import subsidy	5	0.78%
Other service sector measure	5	0.78%
State trading enterprise	4	0.62%
Intellectual property protection	3	0.47%
Sub-national government measure	2	0.31%
Total	645	100.00%

**Table 7.114** United States' implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	13	41.94%
Bail out / state aid measure	6	19.35%
Local content requirement	4	12.90%
Tariff measure	4	12.90%
Public procurement	3	9.68%
Export subsidy	1	3.23%
Import ban	1	3.23%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	3.23%
Other service sector measure	1	3.23%
Trade finance	1	3.23%
Total	31	100.00%

Map 6.37 United States of America: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



UNITED STATES

# UNITED STATES

Map 6.38 United States of America: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others

