

# The Unrelenting Pressure of Protectionism: The 3rd GTA Report

A Focus on the Asia-Pacific Region

Edited by Simon J. Evenett



GLOBAL  
TRADE  
ALERT



---

# **The Unrelenting Pressure of Protectionism: The 3rd GTA Report**

---

## **Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)**

Centre for Economic Policy Research  
2nd Floor  
53-56 Great Sutton Street  
London EC1V 0DG  
UK

Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801  
Fax: +44 (0)20 7183 8820  
Email: [cepr@cepr.org](mailto:cepr@cepr.org)  
Website: [www.cepr.org](http://www.cepr.org)

© Centre for Economic Policy Research 2009

---

# The Unrelenting Pressure of Protectionism: The 3rd GTA Report

Edited by Simon J. Evenett



GLOBAL  
TRADE  
▲ALERT

---

## About Global Trade Alert (GTA)

Global Trade Alert provides information in real time on state measures taken during the current global economic downturn that are likely to discriminate against foreign commerce. Global Trade Alert is:

**Independent:** GTA is co-ordinated by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, an independent academic and policy research think-tank based in London, UK. GTA draws upon expertise and analysis from 7 independent research institutions around the world.

**Comprehensive:** GTA complements and goes beyond the WTO and World Bank's monitoring initiatives by identifying those trading partners likely to be harmed by state measures.

**Accessible:** The GTA website allows policy-makers, exporters, the media, and analysts to search the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading partners harmed, and by sector. Third parties will be able to report suspicious state measures and governments will be given the right to reply to any of their measures listed on the website.

**Transparent:** The GTA website allows policymakers, government officials, exporters, the media, and analysts to report discriminatory measures, but also will provide data for all stakeholders on the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading partners harmed, and by sector.

**Timely:** The up-to-date information and informed commentary provided by Global Trade Alert will help ensure that the G20 pledge not to "repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras" is met, by maintaining confidence in the world trading system, deterring beggar-thy-neighbour acts, and preserving the contribution that exports could play in the future recovery of the world economy.

For further information, visit [www.GlobalTradeAlert.org](http://www.GlobalTradeAlert.org)

## About the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

The Centre for Economic Policy Research is a network of over 700 Research Fellows and Affiliates, based primarily in European universities. The Centre coordinates the research activities of its Fellows and Affiliates and communicates the results to the public and private sectors. CEPR is an entrepreneur, developing research initiatives with the producers, consumers and sponsors of research. Established in 1983, CEPR is a European economics research organization with uniquely wide-ranging scope and activities.

The Centre is pluralist and non-partisan, bringing economic research to bear on the analysis of medium- and long-run policy questions. CEPR research may include views on policy, but the Executive Committee of the Centre does not give prior review to its publications, and the Centre takes no institutional policy positions. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and not those of the Centre for Economic Policy Research.

CEPR is a registered charity (No. 287287) and a company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 1727026).

Chair of the Board	Guillermo de la Dehesa
President	Richard Portes
Chief Executive Officer	Stephen Yeo
Research Director	Mathias Dewatripont
Policy Director	Richard Baldwin

---

# Contents

<i>Foreword</i>	<i>ix</i>
<b>Executive Summary</b> Simon J. Evenett	<b>1</b>
<b>Section 1: Assessments of crisis-era protectionism</b>	
<b>The Landscape of Crisis-Era Protectionism One Year After the First G20 Crisis-Related Summit</b> Simon J. Evenett	<b>19</b>
<b>Crisis-Era State Measures and Asia-Pacific Economies</b> Mia Mikic	<b>33</b>
<b>Section 2: The impact of the crisis on policymaking and national commercial interests in the Asia-Pacific</b>	
<b>Russia: From Collapse to an Economic Modernization Programme</b> Darya Gerasimenko	<b>51</b>
<b>China's Protective State Measures in the Crisis Era: Motivation and Effect</b> Yunxia Yue	<b>79</b>
<b>The Impact of Cross-Border Discrimination on Japanese Exports: A Sectoral Analysis</b> Anirudh Shingal	<b>89</b>
<b>Does the Crisis Alter Indian Trade Priorities?</b> Nilanjan Banik	<b>101</b>
<b>Section 3: Worldwide assessments of selected aspects of crisis-era protectionism</b>	
<b>Is Full Recovery of Global Production Networks Inevitable?</b> Olivier Godart and Holger Görg	<b>115</b>
<b>Has the Crisis Changed the Use of Antidumping? A Comparative Analysis</b> Johannes Fritz and Martin Wermelinger	<b>123</b>

---

## Section 4: Country-by-country reports on the resort to discrimination and its consequences

Afghanistan	139
American Samoa	143
Armenia	145
Australia	149
Azerbaijan	155
Bangladesh	157
Bhutan	159
Brunei Darussalam	161
Cambodia	163
China	165
Cook Islands	175
People's Democratic Republic of Korea	177
Fiji	179
France	183
French Polynesia	191
Georgia	193
Guam	195
Hong Kong	197
India	201
Indonesia	209
Iran	217
Japan	219
Kazakhstan	227
Kiribati	233
Kyrgyzstan	235
Lao People's Democratic Republic	239
Macao	241
Malaysia	243
Maldives	251
Marshall Islands	253
Micronesia	255
Mongolia	257
Myanmar	261
Nauru	263
Nepal	265
Netherlands	267
New Caledonia	273
New Zealand	275
Niue	279
Northern Mariana Islands	281
Pakistan	283
Palau	287
Papua New Guinea	289



---

<b>Philippines</b>	<b>291</b>
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	<b>295</b>
<b>Russian Federation</b>	<b>301</b>
<b>Samoa</b>	<b>309</b>
<b>Singapore</b>	<b>311</b>
<b>Solomon Islands</b>	<b>315</b>
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	<b>317</b>
<b>Tajikstan</b>	<b>319</b>
<b>Thailand</b>	<b>321</b>
<b>Timor-Leste</b>	<b>327</b>
<b>Tonga</b>	<b>329</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>331</b>
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	<b>337</b>
<b>Tuvalu</b>	<b>339</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>341</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>349</b>
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	<b>357</b>
<b>Vanuatu</b>	<b>359</b>
<b>Viet Nam</b>	<b>361</b>



---

## Foreword

Just over a year has passed since the November Washington summit, where world leaders pledged to reject protectionism and "refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services...". As Simon Evenett points out in his Executive Summary, since that summit governments have together implemented 297 beggar-thy-neighbour policy measures - more than one for every working day of the year. Furthermore, since the last GTA report was published in September 2009, 105 additional measures have been identified, which is more than eight times the number of benign or liberalising measures implemented in the same period. We also learn that during the past 3 months the number of measures 'in the pipeline' that are likely to harm foreign commercial interests has grown from 134 to 188. These figures suggest that protectionist pressures have not abated, despite indications that the world's largest economies are gradually beginning to recover from the crisis.

This Report, the third from GTA, focuses on the Asia-Pacific Region, with several papers highlighting the impact of the crisis on the trade and commercial priorities of China, India, Japan and Russia. We are delighted that the report will be launched at two events in the region - one in Macau at a meeting of the UNESCAP Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT) on 15th November 2009, and the other at a dedicated launch event in New Delhi hosted by GTA's new partner in India, the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) on 18th December.

Simon Evenett has been central to the co-ordination and global outreach of GTA; this report would not have been possible without his energy and commitment. Johannes Fritz, Darya Gerasimenko, Malwina Nowakowska, and Martin Wermelinger, Simon's hard working team at the Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research in St. Gallen, prepared the summary tables and maps and provided general research support. Anil Shamdasani, Publications Manager at CEPR, has also provided first-rate support. The task of collecting and analyzing the data has been conducted very efficiently and professionally by GTA's regional network partners, notably, the African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET), the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), the Gulf Research Center (GRC) and the Latin American Trade Network (LATN). We also owe thanks to GTA's supporters: the Centre for International Governance Innovation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the International Development Research Center, the Trade Policy Unit of the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and Department for International Development, and the World Bank. Their support has been generous and welcome, but they of course play no role in the operation of GTA, nor do they

necessarily endorse the opinions expressed in this Report.

Since its inception in June 2009, the central assumption underlying Global Trade Alert's work has been that in the current circumstances the most practical approach to resisting protectionism is to combine peer pressure with high-quality, current information on state measures and their actual or potential effects on foreign commercial interests. The very impressive body of data that has been collected, analysed and made publicly available through the GTA database ([www.globaltradealert.org](http://www.globaltradealert.org)) in just six months is ample testimony to the fact that GTA already plays an important global role as an independent monitor and 'information-gatherer'. Information on its own will not be enough: governments, the media and civil society must now rise to the challenge and use this information to influence policy.

Stephen Yeo  
Chief Executive Officer, CEPR  
London, 10 December 2009

---

# Executive Summary

**Simon J. Evenett**

*University of St. Gallen and CEPR*

Towards the end of 2009 the very welcome news was received that many of the world's larger economies had begun to recover - and that others had bottomed out. Coming soon after the fast rates of descent in many indicators of economic activity (including international trade) witnessed in the first two quarters of the year, the gloomiest expectations - including fears of a re-run of a 1930s style Great Depression - appear in many quarters to have given way to various forms of cautious optimism. Should this optimism carry over into likely future protectionist dynamics?

In addition to reversing the general trend towards freer international commerce - a trend to which developing and industrialised countries have contributed to varying degrees over the past 25 years - protectionist measures taken during the global economic downturn of the past year can have the following three consequences:

- By closing markets, compromising the viability of internationally-active firms, revoking visas for migrant workers and the like, protectionism could have exacerbated the initial downturns in national economies, threatening jobs and living standards.<sup>1</sup>
- Protectionism can limit the contribution of exports to economic recovery.
- As economic historians have repeatedly warned us, once protectionist tendencies enter the body politic of nations they can take decades before the associated government interventions are reversed.<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, there are cyclical as well as longer-term reasons why continued monitoring and discussions makes sense. These considerations may be of particular relevance to the nations of the Asia-Pacific region, many of whose governments have actively pursued export-led and investment-led growth strategies and appear determined to continue doing so in the future.

Global Trade Alert (GTA) has always operated on the assumption that, under current circumstances, the most practical approach to resisting protectionism is to combine peer pressure with high-quality, current information about state measures and their actual or potential effects on foreign commercial interests. Governments, the media, and civil society are the key sources of the former; the job of Global Trade Alert and other monitoring exercises is to provide the latter.

---

1 In this regard experts have debated the impact of crisis-era protectionism on international trade flows. See Baldwin (2009) for a wide range of contributions on this matter.

2 See, for example, O'Rourke's observations about the durability of the protectionism imposed in the 1930s in the Republic of Ireland.

### **How GTA built its extensive database on contemporary protectionism**

Since GTA was launched on 8 June 2009 over 600 state initiatives have been investigated by our independent team of trade policy analysts located around the globe. These initiatives vary from packages of wide-ranging public measures, with many implications for trade and investment policy instruments, to temporary tariff increases on single product lines. GTA's goal is to provide the most comprehensive online database of state measures taken since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008 that might affect foreign commercial interests. The latter are broadly conceived by the GTA team to include not just trade flows and foreign investments but also intellectual property rights and migrant workers deployed abroad. It is through careful, multi-faceted investigations of these initiatives that a rich evidential base was built, from which the contours of contemporary protectionism can be discerned. Users can access this evidence at the website: [www.globaltradealert.org](http://www.globaltradealert.org)

One of the most important steps in a GTA investigation is to establish whether the implementation of a state initiative has, or is likely to, alter the relative treatment of domestic and foreign commercial interests in the markets where the initiative's effects will be felt. In common parlance, GTA checks whether a state initiative tilts the playing field against foreign firms. GTA, therefore, does not opine on the WTO legality of a measure or whether a measure is "appropriate," "fair," "reasonable" or "crisis-related" (there being no agreed definitions of these terms.)

State initiatives that almost certainly (or certainly) introduce or change asymmetries of treatment to the detriment of some foreign commercial interests are deemed by Global Trade Alert to be contrary to the no-protectionism pledges made at the November 2008 G20 summit in Washington, DC, and elsewhere. In this Executive Summary, the phrases discriminatory and protectionist are used synonymously.

Without attempts to carefully enumerate the different types of state measures used and their various effects, any assessment of contemporary protectionism is likely to overlook key trends and is of diminished value to policymakers. That is why GTA goes beyond providing an assessment of the discriminatory impact of state initiatives. Examination of the tariff lines, sectors, and trading partners that are likely to be affected by each state initiative are carefully conducted so as to provide some indication of a public initiative's impact in what is still a relatively interdependent global economy even though, strictly speaking, there may be some circumstances where some form of discrimination is needed to attain a non-protectionist government objective.

No doubt purists will argue that a complete understanding of the consequences of crisis-era protectionism requires a detailed economic analysis of each state initiative. Such analyses could indeed be very useful; indeed the GTA team would gladly cooperate with experts interested in conducting such studies. But, leaving aside the question of resources and the availability of all the necessary data, quite frankly it is utopian to believe that over 600 such analyses could be conducted in the timeframe necessary to influence policymaking. In short, we should not make the perfect the enemy of the very good. GTA's investigations go a long way towards indicating the scale of an initiative's effects by making extensive use of publicly available trade, investment, migration, and other data. Still, the GTA team welcomes suggestions that will result in further improvements in the coverage and assessment of state initiatives.

*Note:* See Evenett (2009a) for an overview of the GTA's methodology and Evenett (2009b) for a discussion of the concerns some have raised about the GTA's approach

This Report, GTA's third, is published in December 2009, six months after this independent monitoring initiative began to investigate state measures that might affect foreign commercial interests. State measures announced and implemented from November 2008 fall within the remit of GTA. Consequently, this Report sheds light on the extent, nature, and possible harm done by discriminatory state measures taken since global financial markets and subsequently the global economy went into free-fall. Particular attention is given in this Report to developments in the Asia-Pacific region, the most populous region on Earth.

This Report also provides an assessment of the extent and changes over time in protectionist dynamics, by considering not just the quarter-by-quarter changes in the numbers of protectionist measures implemented, but also the number of pending measures that have been announced and are expected to be implemented in the future. Information on the pending measures provides policymakers with an "early warning" of what is to come, a feature unique to GTA's monitoring initiative.

## Protectionism has not relented during the past 12 months

In the last GTA report, published in September 2009, it was argued that a **protectionist juggernaut** was underway (Evenett 2009c). The evidence received over the past three months has, if anything, reinforced this conclusion. Moreover, as reported recently in Evenett (2009b), the proportion of products affected by beggar-thy-neighbour policies exceeds pre-crisis trends for several leading industrialised countries (specifically, Japan, the UK, and the USA) and for many of the larger emerging markets (specifically, China, Mexico, India, Indonesia, and the Russian Federation). Characterising the protectionist impulse in many of the world's largest trade over the past twelve months as "business as usual" is wildly misleading. Still, few governments have introduced anything like across-the-board discrimination against foreign commercial interests; in this respect, the world economy is still far away from a 1930's-style protectionist outcome.

Since the first G20 crisis-related summit in November 2008, the governments of the world have together implemented 297 beggar-thy-neighbour policy measures; that is, more than one for every working day of the year. Add in another 56 implemented measures that are likely to have harmed some foreign commercial interests, and the total reaches 353. Moreover, since the GTA's last report was published in September 2009, the number of beggar-thy-neighbour measures discovered (105) was more than **eight times** the number of benign or liberalising measures (12). Looking back on all of the measures implemented since November 2008, the ratio of blatantly discriminatory measures to liberalising measures stands at nearly six to one.

When examining quarter-by-quarter changes in protectionism, it is important to take into account the fact that some beggar-thy-neighbour acts only come to light with a lag. This fact alone has had an important impact on the number of discriminatory measures reported in the GTA database in the last quarter of 2008 and first two quarters of 2009. For example, in GTA's second report it was estimated that in the first half of this year approximately 70 measures likely to harm foreign commercial interests were imposed by governments. **This estimate is now revised upwards by 20-25 percent; governments tended to impose 85 protectionist measures per quarter dur-**

**ing the first half of 2009.** In the light of this finding, the reported number of discriminatory measures implemented in the third quarter of 2009 (78) is not far short of this quarterly average, especially when one bears in mind that this figure will almost certainly be revised upwards as more information about protectionist acts comes to light.

Particular caution is needed in interpreting the reported figure of 38 harmful measures imposed in the fourth quarter of 2009. First of all, this figure refers only to measures implemented in October and November 2009. Moreover, prior experience suggests that information on the most recent discriminatory measures taken by governments is not yet in the public domain. In short, **the very recent fall-off in the number of discriminatory measures is more apparent than real.**

Other key findings about contemporary protectionist dynamics found in this Report are:<sup>3</sup>

- During the past three months the number of state measures announced which - if implemented would likely harm foreign commercial interests - has expanded from 134 to 188. **The protectionism in the pipeline keeps growing - there is no respite here.**
- Since the last G20 Report was published in September 2009, every one of the top 10 countries targeted for protectionism has been hit by at least another 20 beggar-thy-neighbour policies. China has been hit by 47 more measures (the most), followed by the USA (32 more measures) and Germany (21 extra hits.) **Many nations retain a strong interest in monitoring and discouraging foreign protectionism, even if the economic recovery takes hold.**
- On GTA's four indicators of harm done by a nation's commercial policy, **the Russian Federation is always in the top 5 worst offending nations.** Meanwhile, **China and Indonesia** are always in the top 10 worst offenders. If the measures taken by each EU member state were aggregated, then the **EU27** would always appear in the list of top 10 worst offenders.
- Since the last GTA report was published, **bailouts and trade defence measures account for the overwhelming majority of new discriminatory state measures** that GTA has uncovered. Recently, it seems, the action is in these two policy instruments, with tariff increases running a poor third. Tariff increases account for only **one in seven** of the total number of discriminatory state measures imposed in the current global economic downturn. This calls into question how representative of contemporary protectionism the much-studied, easy-to-measure, and typically transparent tariff increase actually is.
- Looking ahead, the **basic metals and basic chemical sectors could be affected by over 30 pending measures.** Should this come to pass then over the next year or so, both sectors will eclipse the **financial sector** as the principal sectors most affected by contemporary era protectionism.

---

3 For further details see Evenett's Global Overview in the next section of this Report.



## Other insights from two empirical analyses in the GTA report

This report contains two distinct empirical analyses: one concerning the impact of domestic and foreign discrimination on Japanese sectoral export performance during the recent year; the other examining whether the types of anti-dumping cases brought during the first three quarters of 2009 (that is, during the crisis era) differed markedly from the pre-crisis era (as taken by the comparable three quarters of 2007). The main findings of these studies are summarised below.

With respect to Japanese sectoral economic performance, using monthly export data for 12 Japanese export sectors, from November 2008 until September 2008, and stripping out export variation due to changing demand levels at home and abroad, and relative export prices, Anirudh Shingal (University of Sussex) found:

- Other than subsidies, foreign beggar-thy-neighbour measures reduced Japanese sectoral exports during the crisis. A twenty percent increase in the amount of discrimination faced by a Japanese sector is estimated to have reduced exports by approximately six percent.
- Japanese protection in favour of a given sector reduced that sector's exports during the crisis; suggesting that resources are reallocated by Japanese firms towards supplying the more secure domestic market from the export market. This finding has an important policy implication, according to Shingal: "Japanese policymakers should be under no illusion that discriminating against foreign commercial interests can proceed without harm being done to Japanese export interests - not through subsequent foreign retaliation as is often supposed, but through shifting resources in Japan away from exporting."
- Discriminatory foreign subsidies have limited the contraction of Japanese exports during the crisis. Shingal offers the following explanation for this finding: "Suppose the foreign bailout or subsidy limits the output reductions of the beneficiaries of the foreign state's largess. If Japanese firms seek to preserve their share of the foreign market in question (perhaps because brand strength, which has intangible value, is associated with market presence or share), then Japanese firms may respond by limiting their export reductions more than would otherwise be the case."
- Shingal's study highlights the importance of not automatically conflating subsidies and bailouts with tariffs; estimates of the latter's effects provide a misleading overall assessment of the impact of contemporary protectionism.

Given the growing resort to antidumping investigations in the latter part of 2009, governments and firms probably want to assess the likelihood that their commercial interests will be targeted by foreign investigations. Rather than assume that pre-crisis targeting practices continue, Johannes Fritz and Martin Wermelinger (University of St. Gallen) checked whether there were any discernible differences between antidumping filing behaviour in the first three quarters of 2009 compared to two years previously in 2007, before the financial crisis had begun to affect trade flows. Fritz and Wermelinger's principal findings are:

- 
- Although the average number of countries targeted in each antidumping investigation remains unchanged<sup>4</sup>, during the crisis far more investigations target foreign firms whose combined market share is 21-40 percent rather than 41-60 percent. **A shift during the crisis to targeting larger shares of total imports - that one might expect if antidumping actions were being used as substitutes for across-the-board safeguards<sup>5</sup> - has not happened. Crisis-era antidumping actions seem to be more selective and less comprehensive than their pre-crisis predecessors.**
  - Three-quarters of crisis-era antidumping investigations targeted countries where imports had grown faster than the average from all sources; up from two-thirds before the crisis. **Selective targeting of foreign firms' expanding market share is consistent with this finding.**
  - There has been a large shift during the crisis to targeting products where import prices have risen over the previous two years. Only 16 percent of the antidumping investigations launched in the first three quarters of 2009 involved imports where their unit prices had fallen; the comparable percentage for the 2007 investigations was 52 percent. **Some defenders of antidumping actions argue that antidumping targets predatory pricing by foreign firms; the relevance of this argument is questionable during the current crisis as so few antidumping investigations target products whose prices are falling.**
  - Before and during the crisis antidumping investigations are overwhelmingly into imports of products where the gap between bound and applied tariff rates are low. However, the crisis has seen a large shift in investigations away from imported products where tariff rates have fallen on average more in the five preceding years. Only a quarter of crisis-related antidumping investigations are into products where tariffs have fallen faster than the national average; before the crisis this fraction was one-half. **Compared to earlier years, reversing prior tariff reform is a less likely motive for crisis-era antidumping actions.**

## Mapping crisis-era protectionism

Sometimes averages and totals obscure interesting variation across countries. To counter this several maps have been reproduced at the end of this Executive Summary. Map 1.1 shows how many almost certainly discriminatory measures have been implemented by each jurisdiction since November 2008. There is considerable variation across countries. While a number of Sub-Saharan African countries have implemented no such measures, Russia has implemented the most (37). Many countries have implemented 10 or more such measures in the past year.

Map 1.2 shows that the overwhelming majority of nations will find their country's commercial interests harmed if the discriminatory measures in the pipeline are actually implemented. This evidence suggests that many governments have a strong interest in discouraging this pending protectionism from retarding any economic recovery over the next year or so. The case for vigilance - and its mirror image, the case against complacency - is as strong as ever.

---

4 With a mean close to two in both the 2009 and 2007 filings.

5 It being recognised that the legal standard to be met in the injury test in an antidumping action is lower

Some government initiatives affect very few trading partners, others many. Map 1.3 reports the total number of trading partners that - on the basis of existing flows of goods, investments, and people across borders - are likely to have been harmed by the implementation of discriminatory measures. China, India, the Russian Federation, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, Argentina, Spain, and Poland have already taken measures that harm 100 or more of their trading partners. Maps 1.4 and 1.5 report the number of product categories (4 digit tariff lines) and economic sectors affected by the discriminatory measures that have been put in place since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008.

Maps were also generated for the number of times that each jurisdiction's commercial interests have been harmed by other country's discriminatory measures. Given the enduring interest in whether the G20 member states have lived up to their no-protectionism pledge, Map 1.6 may be of particular interest. This map demonstrates the almost global reach of the harm done when G20 governments thought it wise to violate their own no-protectionism pledge. No one can claim that the damage done by the G20 members was confined to themselves.

Maps 1.7 and 1.8 provide more evidence against the propositions that contemporary protectionism is confined to a small number of implementing jurisdictions, that the harm is confined to a small number of jurisdictions, and that essentially the problem is localised. In fact, the high degree of interdependence revealed by these maps strongly suggests that many nations have a very strong interest in putting the break on the protectionist juggernaut.

## How this Report is organised

The rest of this Report is organised as follows. The large number of state measures investigated by the GTA team provide the evidential base upon which the emerging trends in contemporary protectionism can be delineated. Accounts of the protectionist dynamics over the past 12 months are given next for the Asia-Pacific region and worldwide. Analyses of selected aspects of crisis-era commercial policymaking in four large Asia-Pacific trading powers (China, India, Japan, and Russia) follow. After that there are two chapters on the impact of the crisis on global supply chains and on the use of antidumping measures worldwide. Finally, for each nation in the Asia-Pacific region information is presented on the extent to which its commercial interests have been harmed by the actions of other countries. Symmetrically, information is presented on the extent to which each nation's state measures have affected other trading partners.

## References

- Baldwin (2009). Richard E. Baldwin (ed.). *The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences and Prospects*. VoxEU.org publication. December 2009.
- Evenett (2009a). Simon J. Evenett. "What can be learned from crisis-era protectionism? An Initial Assessment." *Business & Politics*. October.
- Evenett (2009b). Simon J. Evenett. "Crisis-era protectionism one year after the

Washington G20 meeting: A GTA update, some new analysis, and a few words of caution." In Richard E. Baldwin (ed.). *The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences and Prospects*. VoxEU.org publication. December 2009.


Evenett (2009c). Simon J. Evenett. *Broken Promises: The Second GTA Report*. CEPR. September.

O'Rourke (2009b). Kevin H. O'Rourke. "Government policies and the collapse in trade during the Great Depression." In Richard E. Baldwin (ed.). *The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences and Prospects*. VoxEU.org publication. December 2009.


**Simon J. Evenett** is Professor of International Trade and Economic Development, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland; Co-Director of the International Trade and Regional Economics Programme, CEPR; and Coordinator of Global Trade Alert.

9 December 2009


**Map 1.1** Number of discriminatory measures implemented since the first G20 crisis related summit, ignoring measures in the pipeline




Map 1.2 Number of pending discriminatory measures likely to harm a jurisdiction



Map 1.3 Number of trading partners harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures




Map 1.4 Number of (4 digit) tariff lines harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures







Map 1.5 Number of sectors harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures




Map 1.6 Number of harmful measures implemented by G20 countries affecting each jurisdiction



Map 1.7 Number of trading partners harming each jurisdiction's commercial interests



Map 1.8 Number of times a jurisdiction's commercial interests are harmed by trading partners



---

## **Section 1**

# **Assessments of crisis-era protectionism**



---

# The Landscape of Crisis-Era Protectionism One Year After the First G20 Crisis-Related Summit

**Simon J. Evenett**

*University of St. Gallen and CEPR*

The publication of the third GTA report falls just after the one-year anniversary of the first G20 crisis-related summit in Washington, DC. In their Declaration issued on 15 November 2008 the G20 Heads of State and Government affirmed:

"We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of financial uncertainty. In this regard, within the next 12 months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports."

Similar such commitments were made by governments in groupings outside of the G20.

Well, twelve months later, one might be tempted to ask how well have the governments of the G20 nations - and others - done? Did they keep to their pledge? Did the combination of (albeit non-binding) public commitment, transparency, and the promised "naming and shaming" deliver? While it might be tempting to focus on the actions of the G20 governments (after all, together they do account for a very large share of global output, population, and trade), in this chapter a broader, global assessment of contemporary protectionism is provided. (G20 watchers need not worry; information on the actions of these governments is reported below - see, in particular, table 2.3.)

This chapter will draw upon the 611 completed investigations of state measures that might have implications for foreign commercial interests which have been conducted by the GTA team.<sup>1</sup> Information about those investigations, including a description of a state measure and identification of the products, sectors, and trading partners likely to have been, or likely to be, affected by the implementation of a state measure, are reported on the [www.globaltradealert.org](http://www.globaltradealert.org) website. Interested readers are referred to the detailed account in Evenett (2009) of the methodology employed by the GTA team.<sup>2</sup>

To focus ideas, in what follows the main findings from the GTA database are summarised, followed by the tables and figures that contain the raw data to substantiate

---

1 The GTA database includes reports on state measures that might have implications for foreign commercial interests, the latter being defined broadly to include trade flows, foreign investments, migrant populations, and intellectual property rights deployed abroad. To be included in the database a key decision about a measure must have been taken after the first crisis-related G20 summit meeting in Washington DC in November 2008.

2 Section 2 of Evenett (2009) contains the description of the GTA's methodology.

each finding. Each finding described below is linked to at least one of those tables and figures. Readers are encouraged to augment the following account of contemporary protectionism with the comments made in and maps reproduced at the end of the Executive Summary of this Report.

The GTA's second Report was issued in September 2009 and covered state measures announced from November 2008 to the end of August 2008. In terms of coverage this Report shares the same starting point as its predecessor; however, it includes reports through to the end of November 2009. Where instructive, comparisons between this Report's findings and its predecessor are noted. Table 2.1 reveals that this third Report contains 183 more investigations than its predecessor - and, as will become clear, some of these investigations refer to state measures that were announced before the end of August 2008.

### **Protectionism has not stalled**

1. Since the first G20 crisis-related summit in November 2008, the governments of the world have together implemented 297 beggar-thy-neighbour policy measures; that is, more than one for every working day of the year. Add in another 56 implemented measures that are likely to have harmed some foreign commercial interests, and the total reaches 353. **See Tables 2.1. and 2.2.**
2. Since our last report was published in September 2009, the number of beggar-thy-neighbour measures discovered (105) was more than eight times the number of benign or liberalising measures (12). Looking back on all of the measures implemented since November 2008, the ratio of blatantly discriminatory measures to liberalising measures stands at nearly six to one. **See Table 2.2.**
3. Although there are a lot of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures in the pipeline, they account for only 61 of the 297 harmful measures implemented since November 2008. **See Table 2.1.**
4. Few products, economic sectors, and jurisdictions have emerged unscathed by crisis-era protectionism: few product categories and economic sectors, and a tiny number of trading jurisdictions have yet to be affected by any beggar-thy-neighbour state measures. In a highly-connected global economy, no country is an oasis from protectionism. Nor can fear of retaliation be said to have deterred foreign governments from engaging in beggar-thy-neighbour acts. **See Table 2.2.**
5. Despite taking their no-protectionist pledge the G20 members have imposed 184 beggar-thy-neighbour policies since November 2008. The G20 countries also implemented 37 of the 70 benign or liberalising measures recorded in the GTA database. **See Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1.**
6. Typically, since the first G20 summit in November 2008, every other day a G20 government has broken the no-protectionism pledge. In contrast, a benign or liberalising measure is implemented by a G20 government on average every 10 days. **See Table 2.3.**
7. While G20 governments have implemented many of the beggar-thy-neighbour policies since the Washington DC summit, a third (113) of protectionist measures have been implemented by other governments. **See Tables 2.2. and 2.3.**



### **The very recent fall-off in the number of discriminatory measures is more apparent than real**

8. In terms of raw numbers, there appears to be a reduction in the total number of 'almost certainly' and 'probably discriminatory' measures imposed in the second half of 2009 compared to the first half. **See Figure 2.2.**
9. Since our last report was compiled the GTA has found evidence of more harmful state measures that were imposed in the last quarter of 2008 or the first half of 2009. This evidence forces us to revise upward by between 20-25 percent the number of beggar-thy-neighbour measures imposed in the first six months of 2009. **See Figure 2.2.**
10. Previously the GTA reported that, on average, 70 discriminatory measures were imposed each quarter in 2009. For the first three quarters of 2009 the comparable rate is conservatively estimated to be 85. **See Figure 2.2.**
11. In the light of the above considerations, the reported number of harmful measures in the fourth quarter (38) is almost certainly an underestimate - and is unlikely to signal a significant slowdown in protectionism. First, the reported figure only applies to two of the three months in the final quarter of 2009. Second, as information on harmful state measures appears with a lag, like other quarterly totals the number is likely to be revised upwards significantly. **See Figure 2.2.**

### **The protectionist-in-the-pipeline keeps growing - no respite there**

12. Last time we reported that there were 134 suspicious protectionist measures in the pipeline<sup>3</sup>; now that total has risen to 188. If every one of these measures was eventually implemented it would be equivalent to just over half a year's more protectionism. **See Figure 2.2.**

### **China remains the most frequent target of crisis-era protectionism, but other nations are hit often too**

13. In the past 12 months China's commercial interests have been hit 146 times by protectionist measures. Only if the 27 members of the European Union are counted together, does any other jurisdiction come close to absorbing comparable harm (the EU27 group being hit 140 times). **See Table 2.4.**
14. Other than China, the top 10 target jurisdictions hit by the most number of harmful foreign measures are all industrialised countries.
15. Fifty-eight trading partners have imposed measures harmful to Chinese commercial interests. Only the USA and Japan come close in terms of suffering at the hands of so many trading partners. **See Table 2.4.**

---

<sup>3</sup> For the purposes of this report (and the last one) the protectionist pipeline is said to include all those state measures that (i) have been publicly announced, (ii) that have yet to be implemented and (iii) upon examination are likely to harm foreign commercial interests. Such measures are classified amber in the GTA database until implemented, whereupon their classification may change (depending on the details about the potential discriminatory impact available at the time of implementation.)

16. Since the last report was published in September 2009, every one of the top 10 targets has been hit by at least another 20 beggar-thy-neighbour policies. China has been hit by 47 more measures (the most again), followed by the USA (32 measures more) and Germany (21 more hits). **See Table 2.4.**
17. In addition, 109 of the measures in the protectionist pipeline are likely to harm Chinese commercial interests, should those measures be implemented. This represents more than a 40 percent increase over the total found in the last GTA report, indicating the intensification of discrimination against Chinese commercial interests that may unfold over the next year or so. **See Table 2.4.**

### **Which nations have inflicted the most harm?**

18. Because protectionist acts can affect different numbers of products, sectors, and trading partners, there is no single metric to identify the worst offending nations. The GTA reports four indicators of harm.<sup>4</sup> Still, whether it's the number of harmful measures implemented, tariff lines affected, sectors affected, or trading partners affected, the Russian Federation is always in the top 5 worst offending nations. (In the last report Indonesia held this dubious distinction; other countries have caught up.) **See Table 2.5.**
19. On all four metrics, China and Indonesia are always in the top 10 worst offending nations. If the EU member states are counted as one, they too always appear in the top 10. **See Table 2.5.**
20. For three of the four indicators of harm, Germany, India, and the United Kingdom are always in the top 10 worst offending nations. **See Table 2.5.**
21. The Russian Federation has the dubious distinction of raising trade barriers against the most tariff lines (40 percent of all product categories.) Still, Algeria takes the prize for measures that harm foreign commercial interests in the largest number of economic sectors; China for harming the most trading partners (164). **See Table 2.5.**
22. When nations are ranked by the number of trading partners their state measures have harmed, every one of the top 10 worst offenders has hurt the commercial interests of over 100 nations. Given the conservative methodology used to identify the harmed jurisdictions<sup>5</sup>, this finding indicates the scale of the adverse impact of many governments' crisis-era state measures. **See Table 2.5.**

### **A repeat of the 1930s protectionism has - to date - been avoided**

23. The fact that only 5 jurisdictions have taken measures that affect more than a quarter of all product categories demonstrates that the across-the-board measures seen in the 1930s has not been repeated in the past year. **See Table 2.5.**

---

<sup>4</sup> Comparisons of the rankings of countries on the basis of these four rankings shows a remarkably high degree of correlation. The Spearman rank correlations between the four rankings lie within the range 0.68-0.81. Details are available from the author upon request.

<sup>5</sup> In short, identification is on the basis of an existing non-trivial trade, investment, or other commercial flow, not indicators of potential harm.

## **Which types of beggar-thy-neighbour policies are used the most?**

24. In the year since the first G20 crisis-summit, bailouts and state aids are the most frequent source of discrimination against other nations' commercial interests. Thirty-two percent of all discriminatory measures were bailouts. Less than half of those bailouts relate to the financial sector; it is a mistake to associate the discriminatory bailouts of the past year solely with banks and insurance companies and the preservation of financial stability.<sup>6</sup> **See Table 2.6. and Figure 2.3.**
25. The implementation of discriminatory trade defence instruments is the second most common form of protectionism. Given that a large number of trade remedy investigations are ongoing, in the next 12 months it would not be surprising if the number of bailouts loses its number one slot. **See Table 2.6. and Figure 2.4.**
26. Since our last report was published, bailouts and trade defence measures account for the overwhelming majority of new discriminatory state measures that the GTA has uncovered. Recently, it seems, the action is in these two policy instruments, with tariff increases running a poor third. **See Table 2.6.**
27. Tariff increases account for only one in seven of the total number of discriminatory state measures imposed in the current global economic downturn. This calls into question how representative of contemporary protectionism the much-studied, easy-to-measure, and typically transparent tariff increase actually is. **See Table 2.6. and Figure 2.3.**
28. Export taxes or restrictions, bailouts, export subsidies, 'buy national' policies, tariff measures, trade defence measures, plus a rag-bag of non-tariff barriers imposed since November 2008 are each conservatively estimated to have harmed over 100 countries' commercial interests. **See Table 2.6.**

## **Which sectors are most affected by protectionism?**

29. Setting state measures that benefit the financial sector to one side, this Report confirms a finding in the second GTA report. Namely, despite all the talk about measures to bolster green industries, innovation, and future growth poles of the economy, the great majority of the discrimination is in favour of domestic firms in smokestack, declining industries and in agriculture. **See Table 2.7.**
30. Looking ahead, the basic metals and basic chemical sectors could be affected by over 30 pending measures. Should this come to pass, then over the next year or so both sectors will eclipse the financial sector as the principal sectors most affected by contemporary era protectionism. **See Table 2.7.**

---

<sup>6</sup> This latter finding can be confirmed by going on to the "Advanced Search" page of the GTA website and searching for the bailout measures that do not affect sector 81, namely, financial intermediation services and auxiliary services thereof.

**Table 2.1** Total number of state measures reported in the GTA database

Statistic	This report (December 2009)		Increase from previous report (September 2009)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	611	365	183	84
Total number of measures coded green	70	61	16	15
Total number of measures coded amber	244	88	62	18
Total number of measures	297	236	105	71

**How does the GTA colour code measures?**

Color code	Criteria
Red	(i) The measure has been implemented and almost certainly discriminates against foreign commercial interests.
Amber	(i) The measure has been implemented and may involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests; OR (ii) The measure has been announced or is under consideration and would (if implemented) almost certainly involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests.
Green	(i) The measure has been announced and involves liberalization on a non-discriminatory (i.e., most favored nation) basis; OR (ii) The measure has been implemented and is found (upon investigation) not to be discriminatory: OR (iii) The measure has been implemented, involves no further discrimination, and improves the transparency of a jurisdiction's trade-related policies.


**Table 2.2** Measures implemented since first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008, totals for all jurisdictions and change since last report.

Statistic	This report (December 2009)		Increase from previous report (September 2009)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	405	319	125	88
Total number of measures coded green	52	47	12	11
Total number of measures coded amber	56	36	8	6
Total number of measures coded red	297	236	105	71
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	1214	1214	57	73
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	79	79	16	16
Total number of trading partners affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	233	233	16	30


**Table 2.3** Measures implemented by G20 countries in the year since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008, totals for all G20 jurisdictions and change since last report.

Statistic	This report (December 2009)		Increase from previous report (September 2009)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	253	179	81	46
Total number of measures coded green	37	32	10	9
Total number of measures coded amber	32	16	8	5
Total number of measures coded red	184	130	63	32
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	977	967	51	46
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	58	58	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	209	196	3	3

**Figure 2.1** The G20 members implement a higher share of beggar-thy-neighbor policies than other countries.



**Figure 2.2** If the measures in the pipeline are implemented, the number of harmful measures will rise by more than half.



Notes: A harmful measure is taken to be one which has been implemented since November 2008 and is almost certainly discriminatory (coded red) or likely to be discriminatory (coded amber).

**Table 2.4.** Top 10 biggest targets of discriminatory measures.

Target	Number of discriminatory measures imposed on target		Number of trading partners imposing discriminatory measures		Number of pending measures, which if implemented, would harm target too	
	Increase This report (December 2009)	from last report (September 2009)	Increase This report (December 2009)	from last report (September 2009)	Increase This report (December 2009)	from last report (September 2009)
1. China	146	47	58	2	109	32
2. (EU27)	140	25	39	n.a.	55	n.a.
3. USA	118	32	49	0	30	11
4. Germany	115	31	34	4	41	11
5. France	106	28	34	5	33	9
6. Belgium	99	21	31	3	31	10
7. Japan	99	21	48	2	32	9
8. Netherlands	97	26	33	5	26	8
9. UK	94	22	31	2	28	8
10. Italy	93	23	30	5	36	13

Note: n.a. denotes statistic was not available.



**Table 2.5** Which countries have inflicted the most harm?


Rank	Metric, Country in specified rank, Number			
	Ranked by number of (almost certainly) discriminatory measures imposed	Ranked by the number of tariff lines (product categories) affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of sectors affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of trading partners affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures
1.	EU27 (90)	Russian Federation (486)	Algeria (54)	China (164)
2.	Russian Federation (37)	Ukraine (388)	EU27 (35)	EU27 (149)
3.	Argentina (21)	China (331)	Ecuador (30)	India (141)
4.	Germany (18)	Ecuador (316)	Indonesia (25)	Russian Federation (132)
5.	UK (13)	Indonesia (315)	Russian Federation (24)	Indonesia (124)
6.	China (11)	India (210)	Ukraine (23)	UK (122)
7.	India (11)	EU27 (209)	China (23)	USA (120)
8.	Indonesia (11)	Japan (134)	Belarus (23)	France (188)
9.	Italy (11)	UK (132)	Mexico (23)	Germany (116)
10.	Spain (11)	USA (124)	Germany (21)	Argentina (114)

*Note:* There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect different numbers of products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA reports four measures of harm.


**Table 2.6.** Ten most used state measures to discriminate against foreign commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting  
*Ranked by number of discriminatory measures imposed.*

State measure	Number of discriminatory (red) measures imposed.		Number of measures implemented (red, ), amber, or green		Number of jurisdictions that imposed these discriminatory measures		Number of jurisdictions harmed by these discriminatory measures	
	This report (December 2009)	Increase from last report (September 2009)	This report (December 2009)	Increase from last report (September 2009)	This report (December 2009)	Increase from last report (September 2009)	This report (December 2009)	Increase from report (September 2009)
1. Bail out / state aid measure	101	39	106	40	39	4	176	26
2. Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	62	34	87	37	47	7	109	8
3. Tariff measure	44	13	83	23	19	4	122	9
4. Public procurement	14	2	18	2	11	0	133	0
5. Export subsidy	14	5	16	5	33	2	145	1
6. Non tariff barrier (unspecified)	12	1	20	3	8	1	109	0
7. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	11	1	12	1	9	1	23	6
8. Export taxes or restriction	8	2	16	2	10	1	147	1
9. Migration measure	7	0	10	0	7	0	31	0
10. Import ban	7	1	8	2	6	1	42	8

**Figure 2.3** Top 10 implemented measures used to discriminate against foreign commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting.



**Figure 2.4** Top 10 pending measures that target foreign commercial interests.



**Table 2.7** Top 20 sectors most affected by discriminatory measures

CPC code, Affected Sector	Number of discriminatory (red) measures affecting commercial interests in this sector	Number of implemented measures affecting specified sector	Number of jurisdictions implementing measures affecting specified sector and classified as red	Number of pending measures affecting specified sector
81 (Financial intermediation services and auxiliary services thereof)	44	48	18	1
44 (Special purpose machinery)	34	54	19	14
41 (Basic metals)	31	50	39	31
21 (Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats)	30	44	19	7
23 (Grain mill products, starches and starch products; other food products)	28	40	42	12
42 (Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment)	28	43	16	18
49 (Transport equipment)	28	49	14	16
01 (Products of agriculture, horticulture and market gardening)	26	38	19	9
34 (Basic chemicals)	25	42	12	33
22 (Dairy products)	24	30	39	7
02 (Live animals and animal products)	22	30	43	5
38 (Furniture; other transportable goods n.e.c.)	22	30	15	6
27 (Textile articles other than apparel)	21	32	14	10
36 (Rubber and plastics products)	19	29	16	8
47 (Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus)	19	28	10	5
43 (General purpose machinery)	18	30	11	9
28 (Knitted or crocheted fabrics; wearing apparel)	17	27	12	3
29 (Leather and leather products; footwear)	16	25	12	2
46 (Electrical machinery and apparatus)	16	23	12	8
37 (Glass and glass products and other non-metallic products n.e.c.)	15	25	12	17

---

# Crisis-Era State Measures and Asia-Pacific Economies

Mia Mikic<sup>1</sup>

*United Nations ESCAP*

## 1. Introduction

There is ample evidence that in times of economic downturn and contraction in aggregate demand, governments react by imposing protectionist measures in the hope of "saving" the domestic market for local producers. The recent *World Trade Report* finds that the most likely reasons for more frequent use of contingency protection (antidumping tariffs, countervailing duties and safeguards) are associated with changes in the macroeconomic performance of the domestic economy (WTO, 2009a). In addition to contingent protection measures<sup>2</sup>, trade taxes (tariffs) are a traditional form of intervention. The scope for intervention by import tariffs is determined effectively by the difference between applied and bound tariff rates, and for many developing countries that difference is relatively large (ESCAP, 2009, p. 24, Figure 19). The reality is that governments in the Asia-Pacific region do have plenty of room to impose measures that discriminate against foreign commercial interests; one objective of this chapter is to establish whether they have done so during the recent global economic downturn.

The temptation to discriminate was substantial in late 2008. When the economic crisis started to unfold, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and it became obvious that the combined impact of the contraction of aggregate demand in the developed countries and the worldwide crunch in financial liquidity would strongly influence trade flows, commentators, policy analysts and trade-watchers were warning about the risk of a repeat of the 1930's style trade protectionism (Lamy, 2008; IMF, 2008; Baldwin and Evenett, 2009). The fears were not based only on the experience from the 1930s global recession. The crises in 1970s and 1980s also saw an increase in the use of various protectionist measures. The fact that today's global economy is guarded by the WTO and the system of multilateral rules to prevent nationalistic and protectionist moves from being taken unilaterally by governments did not eliminate nervousness about the impact of the crisis on the increased

---

1 Without implicating them in any way, helpful comments by Simon Evenett and excellent research assistance of Carl Wåghäll is gratefully acknowledged. Usual disclaimer applies. Author can be contacted at mikic@un.org.

2 These measures are described as those that can be used to respond to a change in economic circumstances that cannot be anticipated at the time of trade agreement. They therefore allow governments to offer wider and deeper trade concessions. However, too much flexibility can water-down the commitments of a trade agreement (WTO, 2009a, Part II.A).

use of protectionist instruments. Various international fora, bodies and agencies able to influence governments' behaviour (e.g. G20, IMF, World Bank, APEC, WTO, ASEAN, etc) hurriedly issued declarations and expressions of members' commitments to free trade.

Moreover, from January 2009 the WTO Secretariat used its surveillance mandate, as provided for by the Trade Policy Review Mechanisms (TPRM)<sup>3</sup>, to expand its monitoring of trade flows and the use of certain trade-related measures by member governments. So far, several reports have been issued and a short-term trade statistics facility was made available on-line for about 70 members of the WTO. In June 2009, an independent monitoring initiative under the name of Global Trade Alert (GTA) was established by CEPR and a number of research institutes around the globe. So far, two comprehensive reports have been issued by the GTA team. The interactive website provides free and easy access for the download of statistics on interventionist practices, reports of measures and analysis.

The WTO and GTA reports both found that the worst concerns about the protectionist threat have not yet materialised. In his letter to the Ministers on the occasion of the 7th Ministerial Conference, Lamy stated that "[T]he global economy has not suffered an outbreak of protectionism." (2009, p.1). Likewise, the GTA analysis does not show an "out of control" increase in protectionism. These findings have been met with two replies. One response claims that there was no real threat of protectionism and that discussion on these issues served as a smoke screen for not doing some other actions and moving on with the development round (Rodrik, 2009). Others argue that putting monitoring institutions in place served (at least to some degree) as a deterrent, as it made very clear to the countries that their actions will be in the public domain and under scrutiny of the whole membership. Thus this policy of "shaming" was effective in making countries consider undertaking other options to protectionism. While these monitoring mechanisms should not be credited fully for restraining the protectionist actions by governments, they did play a useful role in the overall "better safe than sorry" stance towards a risk of trade wars.

With the first signs that the contractions in the GDP rates and trade flows of most countries are bottoming out and that some have started to record improvements over previous months, this third GTA report provides an opportunity to look into the reasons for the reaction of the governments as they were - and to start identifying common factors in different economies that motivated governments to refrain from using blunt protectionist measures. There is also some evidence that the reason why we fail to detect an open run to protectionism lay in the fact that many countries were able to act protectionist "behind-the-border" (Evenett, 2009a). There are many reasons why "murky protectionism" is poor public policy (Baldwin and Evenett, 2009). Because murky protectionism does not involve "typical" trade measures, it is difficult to understand all the consequences of such measures (they may be more or less harm-

---

3 This mechanism is often overlooked when discussing the successes of the Uruguay Round. Trade Policies Review Mechanism introduced in 1988 was made a permanent feature of the new WTO establishment in 1995, and the mandate of the TPRM was broadened to cover services trade and intellectual property. Reviews are conducted by the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) and a report prepared by economists in the Secretariat's Trade Policy Review Division. The reports are prepared with great deal of care for factual correctness and detailed analysis and are often undervalued source of qualitative information on trade regimes of the WTO members.

ful than border trade measures), it might also be more difficult to get recourse from such policies in dispute settlement processes, and it may be harder to get rid of these measures when they are no longer needed.

The overall objective of this chapter in the Third GTA report is to provide an up-to-date (that is, as of December 2009) regional perspective from Asia and the Pacific on state measures that are harmful to international commerce. The chapter thus summarises the various measures affecting trade flows and the commercial interests of trading partners used by governments of Asia-Pacific economies, and such measures used against the economies (producers /traders) in Asia and the Pacific. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In the second section the landscape of protectionism undertaken by and against Asia-Pacific economies is provided and the uneven use of protectionist policies is pointed out. An account of who were the "enemies" of Asian producers (i.e. the countries that used the most harmful measures) and what policies were most frequently used by them is provided in section three. A special focus on the least developed countries from the region is given in section four where it is found that, despite all the declaratory statements in favour of granting special flexibilities and preferences to the least developed countries, the ones in Asia and the Pacific are yet to enjoy such privileges. Section five offers some conclusions.


## **2. The landscape of protection for Asia and the Pacific in December 2009.**

The unprecedented contraction of global and regional trade, at rates of between 20 and 30 per cent decline of monthly trade values compared with the 2008 values (ESCAP 2009; WTO 2009b, 2009c), was bound to attract reactions by both government and private sectors within and outside the Asia-Pacific economies. Figure 1 shows percent changes of exports from the Asian region<sup>4</sup> to the world (from October 2008 until October 2009) and the number of (amber and red) measures enacted by the same countries in each of those months. While the initial drop of exports was met with a very sharp increase of use of measures harmful to commerce, the continuing fall of exports was accompanied by a relatively stable protectionist activity in the first half of 2009, followed by a decline in the number of announced measures. It seems that this withdrawal from protectionism was triggered by improvements of exports flows from the region (and signs of GDP growth recovery, not shown in the figure). The statements of 'no outbreak of protectionism' are then substantiated with this declining trend observed in Figure 1.

---


4 While the Asia-Pacific region in this paper refers to the regional membership of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific comprising total of 58 economies (49 members and 9 associate members), this Figure covers fewer number of countries for which the short-term trade statistics is collected by the WTO. See details at [http://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/statis\\_e/daily\\_update\\_e/monthly\\_trade\\_e.xls#'Export data'!A1](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update_e/monthly_trade_e.xls#'Export data'!A1)

**Figure 1** Export per cent changes October 2008 - October 2009 (y-o-y, monthly flows) and number of "amber" and "red" implemented state measures reported in the GTA database



Sources: Export flow data taken from the *WTO Short Term Trade Statistics* for Asia, Turkey, Russian Federation, and Kazakhstan and the number of measures from the Global Trade Alert.

**Figure 2** No surprises - larger exporters face more protectionist measures.



Sources: Based on data from Table 1

**a) Protection measures faced by Asia-Pacific**

Details of the measures enacted against the commercial interests of the Asia-Pacific economies, grouped into sub-regions, are given in Table 1. It is clear that not all (countries) sub-regions attracted the same amount of protectionist measures from other countries (in and outside Asia-Pacific). As is obvious from Figure 2, the larger the country's share in world exports, the higher the number of harmful measures enacted by other countries against that partner. It is of course not surprising that countries that are involved in implementing these measures are also (in general) large traders. This is consistent with the accepted knowledge that trade wars typically happen among larger trading nations who have to be the policy setter and cannot free-ride on some other country's policy moves (as smaller countries could should they choose to).



**Table 1** Discrimination against the commercial interests of the Asia and the Pacific

Affected Trading Partner	Measures in database	(Green) measures in database	(Amber) measures in database	(Red) measures in database	Number of implemented measures affecting specified partner	Share in world exports in 2008
<b>East and North-East Asia</b>						
China	306	26	139	141	194	9.23
Hong Kong	56	7	15	34	49	2.39
DPR of Korea	15	4	3	8	14	0.01
Japan	164	22	48	94	130	5.05
Macao	6	4	1	1	6	0.01
Mongolia	21	3	8	10	17	0.01
Republic of Korea	146	21	48	77	114	2.73
<b>South-East Asia</b>						
Brunei Darussalam	12	3	5	4	8	
Cambodia	17	4	8	5	12	
Indonesia	100	13	40	47	68	0.89
Lao People's Dem. Republic	11	3	4	4	9	0.01
Malaysia	110	18	35	57	82	1.29
Myanmar	17	4	5	8	15	
Philippines	72	9	20	43	58	0.32
Singapore	108	15	32	61	89	2.19
Thailand	132	18	42	72	103	1.14
Viet Nam	70	8	21	41	53	0.31
Timor-Leste	3	2	1	0	3	0.00
<b>South and South-West Asia</b>						
Afghanistan	12	2	5	5	10	0.00
Bangladesh	28	6	8	14	25	0.08
Bhutan	5	2	2	1	4	0.00
India	113	16	39	58	86	1.18
Maldives	9	3	2	4	8	0.00
Nepal	11	4	2	5	10	
Pakistan	62	10	20	32	51	0.13
Iran	54	7	17	30	41	1.18
Sri Lanka	29	4	9	16	23	0.05
<b>Central Asia</b>						
Armenia	26	3	6	17	24	0.01
Azerbaijan	33	4	9	20	28	0.31
Georgia	26	3	9	14	20	0.01
Kazakhstan	50	6	14	30	40	0.46
Kyrgyzstan	26	4	5	17	24	0.01
Russian Federation	98	8	35	55	74	3.02
Tajikistan	11	2	4	5	9	
Turkmenistan	19	2	4	13	17	
Uzbekistan	29	5	6	18	25	0.04
Turkey	118	12	34	72	95	0.85
<b>Pacific</b>						
American Samoa	3	2	1	0	3	0.00
Australia	106	13	31	62	85	1.21
Cook Islands	4	2	1	1	4	
Fiji	15	5	4	6	14	
French Polynesia	5	2	3	0	4	0.00

**Table 1** Discrimination against the commercial interests of the Asia and the Pacific (contd.)

Affected Trading Partner	Measures in database	(Green) measures in database	(Amber) measures in database	(Red) measures in database	Number of implemented measures affecting specified partner	Share in world exports in 2008
Guam	4	2	1	1	4	0.00
Kiribati	5	2	1	2	5	
Marshall Islands	9	3	2	4	8	0.01
Micronesia	5	3	1	1	5	0.00
Nauru	4	2	1	1	4	0.00
New Caledonia	8	2	5	1	5	0.01
New Zealand	74	6	21	47	60	0.20
Niue	4	2	1	1	4	0.00
Northern Mariana Islands	4	2	1	1	4	0.00
Palau	6	3	1	2	6	0.00
Papua New Guinea	11	4	2	5	10	
Samoa	8	3	2	3	7	0.00
Solomon Islands	4	3	1	0	4	0.00
Tonga	6	3	2	1	5	0.00
Tuvalu	3	2	1	0	3	0.00
Vanuatu	4	2	1	1	4	0.00

Source: GTA, downloaded 24 November 2009

## b) Protection measures enacted by Asia-Pacific countries

In contrast to measures directed against commercial interests of producers in the Asia-Pacific region, these countries have enacted significantly fewer measures themselves. Table A1 in the annex shows details per each country. Only a few countries have moved offensively and introduced measures against other jurisdictions, most notably: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian federation, Viet Nam, and with only 4 red measures each, Australia and Turkey.

Table 2 lists countries in the Asia-Pacific region that have used protectionist measures and compares the number of own measures with those enacted against those countries. The commercial interests of many industrialised economies (taken here to be members of the OECD) are disproportionately hurt - in return for the one measure that New Zealand imposed, it was on the receiving end of 47 measures; for Turkey this ratio was 18, Republic of Korea almost 15.5, Australia 15, and Japan almost 12. However, China also faced comparable aggressiveness from other countries, with a ratio of faced to own measure almost equal to 13. For each measure that the Republic of Korea raised against other countries, it faced almost 15.5 measures against its own economy. The Russian Federation imposed a measure on its own for each 1.5 measures faced, while Indonesia and Kazakhstan managed to keep the proportion of own and faced measures at a ratio lower than 5. Obviously, it is necessary to also explore what type of protection was enacted on both sides, and that will be done in the next section of the paper.

**Table 2** Selected Asia-Pacific countries and comparison of own and faced measures

Implementing Jurisdiction	(Red) Measures in database (own)	(Red) Measures in database (faced)	Ratio of faced to own measures
China	11	141	12.8
India	11	58	5.3
Indonesia	11	47	4.3
Kazakhstan	8	30	3.8
Pakistan	0	32	-
Republic of Korea	5	77	15.4
Russian Federation	37	55	1.5
Turkey	4	72	18.0
Viet Nam	5	41	8.2
Memo:			
Australia	4	62	15.5
Japan	8	94	11.8
New Zealand	1	47	47.0

Source: GTA, downloaded 24 November 2009

### 3. Which countries are doing the most harm? How?

Let us first explore which governments impose the largest numbers of red measures on traders from the Asia-Pacific region (Table 3 reports our findings). It is to be expected that these would be the countries with large trading interests (overall) or in specific sectors. Since China is becoming the large trading partner of many countries, it is to be expected that many countries will have it on their target list. The countries that impose the largest number of barriers against China are Germany and Indonesia with 9 measures, India with 8 and Brazil, France, Spain and USA with 7 measures. On the other hand, China imposes the largest number of barriers against 12 countries, including in Republic of Korea (8 measures) and the Russian Federation (5 measures), but also many Pacific island states (where the number of measures is small, often only one). The Russian Federation appears as the imposer of the largest number of measures in 12 Asian countries (mostly those in central Asia, but also Mongolia and Viet Nam). Similarly, India appears on top of list in nine countries, mostly in South Asia. In sum, for many countries the largest number of measures comes from other Asia-Pacific countries.

What one does not expect is that countries that belong to the same bilateral or regional preferential agreements impose (trade-restricting) measures on each other. However, Table 3 indicates that there is a high incidence of countries which belong to regional trade agreements (e.g. Asia-Pacific trade Agreement, ASEAN, ECOTA, SAFTA, etc) and even those that have bilateral FTAs, do impose measures against each other. Before jumping to further conclusions one needs to investigate what type of measures these countries impose on each other.

**Table 3** Countries imposing the largest number of measures on Asia-Pacific traders

Affected country	Countries imposing largest number of discriminatory (red) measures			
	No 1	No 2	No 3	No 4
China	Germany, Indonesia 9	India 8	Brazil , France, Spain, USA 7	
India	Argentina, Indonesia 6	Germany, Spain 5	France 4	
Indonesia	Russian Fed. 8	Argentina, India 5	ROK 4	China, France, Spain, Ukraine 3
Kazakhstan	Russian Fed. 12	India 3	Ukraine, Spain, Indonesia, Germany, France, China 2	
Malaysia	Indonesia 7	Russian Fed. 6	India 5	China, France, Spain 4
Pakistan	France, Germany 4	India, UK, US 3		
Republic of Korea	China, 8	Germany, India, Indonesia 7	Spain 6	
Russian Federation	China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Spain 5	Belarus, France, Germany, India, Ukraine 4		
Singapore	Indonesia 9	India 7	France 5	Germany, Viet Nam 4
Thailand	Indonesia 8	Spain 7	France 6	Argentina, India 5
Turkey	France, Spain 6	Germany 5	India, Indonesia, Ukraine 4	
Viet Nam	Russian Fed. 7	Indonesia 6	Spain 4	Argentina, China, France, India 3
<i>Memo:</i>				
Australia	Indonesia, 8	France, Germany, India 5	Japan, Poland, Spain, UK 4	
Japan	Germany, India, Indonesia 8	China 7	Italy, Spain 6	
New Zealand	Indonesia, RF, 6	France, Germany 5	China, UK 4	

Source: GTA downloaded 24 November 2009.

For 31 countries in the Asia-Pacific region the most prevalent measure harming their commercial interests were bailouts and other forms of state aids. Table 4 provides selective information on a smaller number of countries from the region. In all of them, except China, first and second position in terms of number of measures enacted against those country traders belong to bail-out/ state aid or tariff measures. Only Chinese traders are dealt with most frequently through trade defence measures, but the second place is still given to tariff measures. Export subsidy appears in the fifth place in almost half of the selected countries. It is interesting that trade finance does not feature very highly placed in many countries in the region.

**Table 4** What measures are used most frequently? (Number of measures classified red or amber harming specified trading partner, by type of measure)

Australia	Bail out / state aid measure, 22	Tariff measure, 16	Export subsidy, 12	Non tariff barrier (nes)	Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard), 4
China	Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard), 47	Tariff measure, 41	Bail out / state aid measure, 31	Non tariff barrier (nes)	Export subsidy 12
India	Bail out / state aid measure, 21	Tariff measure, 20	Non tariff barrier (nes) 11	Export taxes or restriction	Public procurement 5
Indonesia	Bail out / state aid measure, 16	Tariff measure, 15	Non tariff barrier (nes) 7	Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	Export subsidy 4
Japan	Tariff measure, 31	Bail out / state aid measure, 28	Non tariff barrier (nes) 11	Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	Export subsidy 9
Kazakhstan	Tariff measure, 11	Bail out / state aid measure, 9	Export subsidy 4	Export taxes or restriction, 3	Public procurement 2
New Zealand	Bail out / state aid measure, 18	Tariff measure, 13	Export subsidy 10	Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard), 3	Non tariff barrier (nes) 3
Pakistan	Bail out / state aid measure, 13	Tariff measure, 8	Export subsidy 6	Non tariff barrier (nes) 5	Migration measure 3
Republic of Korea	Tariff measure, 25	Bail out / state aid measure, 24	Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard) 12	Non tariff barrier (nes) 9	Export subsidy 8
Russian Federation	Tariff measure, 18	Bail out / state aid measure, 11	Export subsidy 9	Non tariff barrier (nes) 5	Public procurement 5
Turkey	Tariff measure, 24	Bail out / state aid measure, 23	Export subsidy 10	Export taxes or restriction 7	Non tariff barrier (nes) 7
Viet Nam	Bail out / state aid measure, 13	Tariff measure 10	Non tariff barrier (nes) 7	Public procurement 5	Export subsidy 3

Source: GTA downloaded 24 November 2009.

Table 5 brings together information on the number of discriminatory measures and coverage of those measures in terms of sectors and tariff lines, as well as trading partners. Countries are then ranked in terms of each of the component of protectionist behaviour. It seems that in all four categories of protectionist practices, Russian Federation, China, India and Indonesia are always among the top three offenders. The Russian Federation takes the lead in applying measures that harm the largest number of tariff lines (486), while China manages to inflict harm on the largest numbers of trading partners (164).

**Table 5** Top 10 Asia-Pacific countries that inflicted the most harm on other country's commercial interests.

Rank	Ranked by number of (almost certainly) discriminatory measures (red only) imposed	Ranked by number of tariff lines (product categories) affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures (red only)	Ranked by sectors affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures (red only)	Ranked by number of trading partners affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures (red only)
1	Russian Federation (37)	Russian Federation (486)	Indonesia (25)	China (164)
2	India, China, Indonesia (11)	China (331)	Russian Federation (24)	India (141)
3	Kazakhstan, Japan, Republic of Korea (8)	Indonesia (315)	China (23)	Russian Federation (132)
4	Republic of Korea, Viet Nam (5)	India (210)	India (14)	Indonesia (124)
5	Turkey, Australia (4)	Japan (134)	Malaysia, Thailand (10)	Malaysia, Japan (98)
6	Malaysia (2)	Malaysia, Thailand (26)	Japan (9)	Thailand (96)
7	New Zealand, Thailand, Mongolia, Philippines (1)	Viet Nam (14)	Republic of Korea (8)	Republic of Korea (88)
8		Republic of Korea (12)	Australia (5)	Australia (50)
9		Australia (10)	Kazakhstan, Turkey (4)	Viet Nam (28)
10		Kazakhstan (8)	Viet Nam (3)	Kazakhstan (23)

Source: GTA downloaded 24 November 2009.

#### 4. How special is the treatment of the least developed countries?

Out of 49 least-developed countries in the world, 14 are in the Asia-Pacific region, four of those are also land-locked countries, and seven are small island states. The international community has declared that these countries should be assisted in their efforts to integrate into the global economy, in the belief that this would improve the developmental prospects of the least developed economies. Traditionally, they have access to Special and Differential treatment through the multilateral trading rules. Additionally, they have been given special focus in the Millennium Development declaration through the adoption of Goal 8, which is focused on building global partnerships. Despite these special considerations, the 14 least developed countries in this region have been the target of discriminatory trade barriers (see Table 6), while none of them so far has implemented any of the trade-related measures. The last column in the table shows the percentage of red measures that are implemented by developing countries - in most cases most of these measures are implemented by other developing countries.

**Table 6** Asia-Pacific Least Developed Countries affected by foreign state measures.

Affected Trading Partner	Measures in database	(Green) Measures in database	(Amber) Measures in database	(Red) Measures in database	Number of implemented measures affecting specified partner	Number of pending measures likely to affect trading partner	Number of jurisdictions imposing Red measures with specified partner	Per cent of Red measures implemented by developing countries
Afghanistan	12	2	5	5	10	2	4	40
Bangladesh	28	6	8	14	25	3	12	78
Bhutan	5	2	2	1	4	1	1	100
Cambodia	17	4	8	5	12	5	4	60
Kiribati	5	2	1	2	5	0	2	50
Lao People's Democratic Republic	11	3	4	4	9	2	4	50
Myanmar	17	4	5	8	15	2	5	75
Maldives	9	3	2	4	8	1	3	75
Nepal	11	4	2	5	10	1	4	60
Samoa	8	3	2	3	7	1	4	66
Solomon Islands	4	3	1	0	4	0	0	0
Tuvalu	3	2	1	0	3	0	0	0
Vanuatu	4	2	1	1	4	0	1	0
Timor-Leste	3	2	1	0	3	0	0	0

Source: GTA downloaded 24 November 2009.

## 5. Overall, then, not everyone is seeing red!

So what have we learnt about crisis-era state measures and the Asia-Pacific?

1. In the past 12 months there is a significant asymmetry in the number of measures that have been inflicted on the Asia-Pacific region and the number imposed by the region. This asymmetry is at its worst for certain OECD members from the region. On the other hand, some middle- and low-income developing countries, as well as some resource-rich countries, have managed to balance own and faced protection.
2. There are relatively few countries in the region (five) that inflict most of the red discriminatory measures. Protectionism within the Asia-Pacific region, therefore, is relatively concentrated.
3. Most of the measures inflicted are directed against other Asia-Pacific countries, in conflict with the expectations arising from high activity in the preferential trade agreements in recent years in this region (more than 100 such trade agreements have been implemented and almost as many in various stages of negotiation).
4. Most of the measures that are inflicted on Asia-Pacific countries belong to the bail-out/state aid and tariff measures. While tariff measures are easy to monitor and check against the WTO and other trade agreements for their legitimacy, the measures related to state interventions to address economic downturn are more complex and potentially more difficult to restrain in future.
5. To date, the Least Developed Countries of the Asia-Pacific region have not

enjoyed special treatment. In contrast to multilateral and other promises, their commercial interests have been harmed by a number of discriminatory foreign measures - even if this class of developing countries has not been directly targeted. Moreover, the Least Developed Countries in this region have yet to impose any discriminatory measures.

6. Finally, on the GTA's colour coding of state measures there are traces of green on the Asia-Pacific canvas. Table 7 ranks the countries in the Asia-Pacific region by the number of liberalising or neutral (green) measures imposed. It is noteworthy that the country that did the most harm - the Russian Federation - also leads the way with the highest number of state measures coded green (10); even so the ratio of green to red Russian measures is almost 1:4. India is in second rank with a green:red ratio 1:2.2, indicating the relatively more liberal stance of India. The third-ranked countries go from an unfavourable ratio of almost 4 (China and Indonesia, same as Russian Federation) to the more favourable one closer to ratio of 1 (Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines).

**Table 7** Some green shoots.

Rank	Ranked by number of green measures imposed	Ratio of green to red measures imposed
<u>1</u>	Russian Federation (10)	1:3.7
<u>2</u>	India (5)	1:2.2
<u>3</u>	China, Indonesia, Australia, Viet Nam (3)	1: 3.7 (China and Indonesia), 1: 1.7 (Viet Nam), 1:1.3 (Australia)
<u>4</u>	Malaysia, Republic of Korea (2)	1:1 (Malaysia), 1:2.5 (ROK)
<u>5</u>	Thailand, Philippines, Mongolia, Pakistan (1)	1:1 (Thailand, Philippines)

Source: GTA downloaded 3 December 2009.

## References

- Baldwin, R. and S. Evenett. (2009) *Murky protectionism*, Vox.EU.org
- Evenett, S. (2009a) "The Devil is in Details: The Implementation of Stimulus Packages and Their Effects on International Commerce," *Aussenwirtschaft*.
- Evenett, S. (2009b) "What can be learned from crisis-era protectionism? An initial assessment", *Business and Politics* Vol.11, Issue 3, Article 4.
- ESCAP. (2009) *Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report 2009*, Bangkok: UN ESCAP
- IMF (2009) "Group of Twenty" Meeting of the Deputies, January 31-February 1, Note by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/020509.htm>
- Lamy, P. (2009) "Letter to the ministers dated 18 November 2009" available at [http://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/news09\\_e/pl\\_letter\\_to\\_minist\\_e.pdf](http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/pl_letter_to_minist_e.pdf)
- Lamy, P. (2008) "Opening address to the WTO Public Forum 2008 "Trading Into the Future", delivered on 24 Sep available at [http://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/sppl\\_e/sppl101\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl101_e.htm)
- OECD, WTO and UNCTAD. (2009) *Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures*. September 2009.
- Rodrik, D. (2009) "The Myth of Rising Protectionism" commentary, *Business*



Standard, 13 October

WTO (2009a) *World Trade Report 2009*, Geneva: WTO.

WTO (2009b) *International Trade Statistics 2009*, Geneva: WTO.

WTO (2009c) "Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment, Part a: Trade and Trade-related Deployments in 2009," Annual Report by the Director-General, WT/TPR/OV/12, 18 November, Trade Policy Review Body, WTO

**Mia Mikic** is an Economic Affairs Officer in the Trade and Investment Division, ESCAP. Previously, she was Professor of International Economics at the University of Zagreb, Senior Lecturer at the University of Auckland, Research Associate at the University of Canterbury and a visiting fellow at the Universite Lumiere, Lyon, and Oxford University. She is the author of *International Trade* (Macmillan, 1998), has contributed chapters to several edited volumes and published a number of journal articles and other papers. Her current work focuses on the impacts of preferential and multilateral trade liberalization.

## Annex

**Table A1.** Own protection by Asia-Pacific countries

Implementing Jurisdiction	Measures in database	(Green) Measures in database	(Amber) Measures in database	(Red) Measures in database	Number of tariff lines affected by red measures implemented by specified jurisdiction	Number of sectors affected by red measures implemented by specified jurisdiction	Number of trading partners affected by red measures implemented by specified
<b><i>East and North-East Asia</i></b>							
China	29	3	15	11	331	23	164
Hong Kong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DPR of Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Japan	10	0	2	8	134	9	98
Macao	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mongolia	2	1	0	1	2	2	2
Republic of Korea	10	2	3	5	12	8	88
<b><i>South-East Asia</i></b>							
Brunei Darussalam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cambodia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indonesia	20	3	6	11	315	25	124
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malaysia	6	2	2	2	26	10	98
Myanmar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	2	1	0	1	1	1	4
Singapore	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thailand	3	1	1	1	26	10	96
Viet Nam	9	3	1	5	14	3	28
Timor-Leste	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b><i>South and South-West Asia</i></b>							
Afghanistan	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Bangladesh	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bhutan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	51	5	35	11	210	14	141
Maldives	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nepal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	7	1	6	0	0	0	0
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b><i>Central Asia</i></b>							
Armenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kazakhstan	13	0	5	8	8	4	23
Kyrgyzstan	2	0	2	0	0	0	0

**Table A1.** Own protection by Asia-Pacific countries (contd.)

Russian Federation	55	10	8	37	486	24	132
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkey	12	0	8	4	7	4	16
<b><i>Pacific</i></b>							
American Samoa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia	12	3	5	4	10	5	50
Cook Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fiji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
French Polynesia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kiribati	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marshall Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Micronesia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nauru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Caledonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Zealand	4	0	3	1	1	1	1
Niue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern Mariana Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Palau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Samoa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Solomon Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tonga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tuvalu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vanuatu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b><i>Non-regional members</i></b>							
France	26	4	13	9	80	14	118
Netherlands	26	3	13	10	13	5	85
UK	29	3	13	13	132	6	122
USA	46	2	36	8	124	20	120

Source: GTA downloaded 24 November 2009



---

## **Section 2**

# **The impact of the crisis on policymaking and national commercial interests in the Asia-Pacific**



---

# Russia: From Collapse to an Economic Modernization Programme

Darya Gerasimenko

*University of St. Gallen*

"A crisis is an *opportunity* riding the dangerous wind." Chinese Proverb.

*"For Russia, the transformation of the world economy creates new opportunities for the development of external economic integration, for strengthening and widening the Russian position in the world markets, as well as for the import of technologies and capital."*

The Concept of Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation for the period up to the year 2020. (The Decree of the Russian Government dated 17 November 2008 # 1662-p).

## 1. Introduction

The current global systemic crisis has forced many governments to introduce various 'anti-crisis' strategies and programmes as a means of reducing the negative impacts of the crisis on their economies. The approach to these anti-crisis policies has varied, depending on conditions such as the structure of the economy, the level of development of the country, as well as in consideration of any binding international commitments that may be in place. Some countries have gone further than this by seeing the crisis as an opportunity to introduce development strategies within the context of a changing world economic map. One such country is Russia. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's announcement on 9 June 2009, concerning the accession to the WTO of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in the form of Customs Union, was the cause of some considerable controversy. Was this decision predictable and reasonable? What are the circumstances that made Russia follow this path and to choose regional integration and industrial development over binding international rules during the global recession? These are the questions that this paper addresses.

The Russian Federation has been involved in the WTO accession process for 16 years, with Russian state officials expecting the successful completion of the process by the end of each passing year. However, there have consistently been impediments to progress that have prevented the Russian WTO accession from concluding successfully. Despite this, however, Russian high-ranking state officials have consistently maintained that the WTO accession process has been one of Russia's priorities. Again on 4 June 2009, at the XVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the Minister of Economic Development, Mrs. Elvira Nabiullina, confirmed that the EC and Russia had agreed on the schedule of Russia's WTO accession being completed by the end of 2009.<sup>1</sup> Thus Prime Minister Putin's announcement, on 9 June 2009 (sever-

---

<sup>1</sup> Semenov, Aleksey. Nabiullina: Peregovory o vstuplenii Rossii v VTO zavershatsya k koncu goda. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 4 June 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/06/04/reg-szapad/vto-russia-anons.html>

al days later), that Russia would enter the WTO as part of a Customs Union with Kazakhstan and Belarus, was met with a good deal of surprise by Russia's international partners, and understandably so, when it is considered that Russia had already completed proximately 95 percent of its accession process, Kazakhstan 70 percent, and Belarus just 50 percent.<sup>2</sup>

The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: the next section discusses the socio-economic background of Russia's WTO accession; the third section provides details of the last two years of the WTO accession process in chronological order; section four attempts to explain the reasoning behind Russia's decision to rather speedily create the new Customs Union; the fifth section presents details of Russia's current strategies and programmes for its socio-economic development; and finally, conclusions are presented in section six.

## **2. Russia after the USSR - from collapse to an economic modernization programme**

The collapse of the Soviet system has opened new market opportunities in this part of the world. Taking into account the specifics of the economic structure of the USSR, some institutions, especially some services sectors, had to be developed almost from scratch. Thus, the financial services sector, which until then was a traditional comparative advantage of the so called 'western world', gained the advantage of at least a couple of hundred years over its Russian rivals, who have only just began the development of the financial services industry following the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, certain industries lost their comparative advantage during the transformation of the Russian Federation from a planned-, into a market-economy structure. As a result, a traditionally industrialized country lost around 20 years of intensive research and technological development in such areas as aircraft construction, ship-building, the rocket and space industry, and other areas where it is now seeking to make up for lost ground.<sup>3</sup> The agricultural sector simply collapsed during the transitional period, with the result that Russia became a food import-dependent country. The main export items of post-Soviet Russia have become oil (oil products), gas and military equipment.

Russia applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993, virtually immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Working Group on Russian accession to the GATT was duly created which, following the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995, became re-named the Working Group on Russia's Accession to the WTO. The accession negotiations process began in 1995. Initially, the negotiations were focused at the multi-party level in order to discuss the Russian trade policy regime. However, in 1998 bilateral negotiations commenced as Russia began to discuss access to its goods market and opened discussions on levels of

---

2 PRIME-TASS news Agency. Vstuplenie v VTO v sostave tamozhennogo soyuza ne yavlyaetsya demarshem ili politicheskim shagom - M. Medvedkov. 16 June 2009.

3 The Speech of the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Poslanie prezidenta RF Dmitriya Medvedeva Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federacii. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 5038 (214) from 13 November 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/11/13/poslanie-tekst.html>



agricultural support. Since 2000, the negotiations have covered all aspects of Russia's WTO accession process. Currently, the Working Group of Russia's WTO accession includes about 60 countries (the European Communities being counted as one partner).<sup>4</sup>

There has been some considerable discussion inside Russia regarding the timeliness, and even the necessity, of Russian accession to the WTO. On one side, Russian exporters (mainly the metallurgical sector and fertiliser industry, which together constitute just 8.6 percent of Russia's export, according to Table 2), and domestic firms that are heavily dependent upon imports in their production processes, as well as the average consumer, claim that it is necessary to join the WTO as soon as possible in order to secure market access for exports, as well as to reduce costs and improve the terms of imports so as to be able to enjoy a wider variety of goods and services. Thus, losses incurred by Russian producers as a result of other countries' trade restrictions are estimated to be around US\$2 billion, according to the Economic Development Ministry's monitoring of Russia's social and economic development in the first six months of 2009. Indeed, as of 1 July 2009 there were 93 restrictions on Russian goods in place that were introduced by foreign countries in order to protect their markets. Of these, 42 were anti-dumping measures, 7 were special protection measures, and 44 were non-tariff trade regulation measures. Over a half of all anti-dumping measures were against Russian steel and steel products. The second highest number of restrictions related to mineral fertilizers.<sup>5</sup> However, on the other side, actors in some sectors claimed to need additional time in order to develop certain industries before the WTO accession, as well as to gain special governmental treatment, or even government support, in those sectors (e.g., the agricultural sector, the car industry, the pharmaceutical industry, and others).

Recent research, conducted for the Russian Ministry of Economic Development regarding the consequences of the WTO accession for the Russian economy, was presented in February 2008 at the Moscow High School of Economics. The research was designed to answer the following question - what would happen to Russian industries and regions during the years 2009 to 2015 if Russia accedes to the WTO? The research identified several import-sensitive regions that would be harmed by the WTO accession. The general conclusion, however, was that the result of Russian accession would be neutral or positive, although the sectors most at risk were also highlighted - i.e., textiles, the car industry, the chemical industry, the pharmaceutical industry, and others.<sup>6</sup> However, the methodology, as well as the data set of that report, was heavily criticised by other Russian economists for its incompleteness.<sup>7</sup>

---


4 Russia and WTO - Information Bureau. On the Current State of Russia's WTO Accession negotiations prepared by the Trade Negotiations Department of the Ministry of Economic Development in December 2008. Available from <http://www.wto.ru/russia.asp?f=del&t=11>

5 Russian Financial Control Monitor, FC - Novosti. Russian producers suffer losses of \$ 2bn from other countries' restrictions. 27 July 2009

6 Arsyuhin, Evgenii. Vsemirnoe Torgovoe Otkrovenie - Rossiiskomu biznesu v poslednii raz raskryli blaga VTO. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 641 from 19 February 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/02/19/vto-doklad.html>

7 Veletninskii, Igor. Ili horosho, ili nichego - Maksim Medvedkov ne nashel negativnykh posledstviu vstupleniya Rossii v VTO. Video by Evgenii Arsyuhin. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/02/14/vto-medvedkov.html>

**Figure 1** GDP per capita growth (annual %) in 1990 - 2008 in Russia



Source: Calculated by author on the basis of the data provided by the World Development Indicators (WDI) database

Due to numerous difficulties at the country-management level following the collapse of the Soviet system, industrial policies, as well as business development generally, have not been a real government priority until only recently. It took almost 15 - 20 years to stabilize the society and create a steady platform for further development. Thus, by the year 2000, Russia was experiencing the disintegration of state institutions, systemic economic crises, side-effects of murky privatization processes, the highest level of corruption, serious mistakes in economic and social policies, and fall-out from many other misguided policies and programmes. Therefore, the last ten years of the 20th century became a period of de-modernization and general depression of the country. It took another 5-6 years (following 2000) to fix the system in such a way as to permit further modernization. (Please refer to Figure 1 for the annual GDP growth in percentage for the period 1991 - 2008, from which can be gleaned some sense of the economic conditions of the country following the collapse of the USSR). More recent developments, however, have brought the country to a level at which more significant economic modernization and development can become possible.

A result of this process has been the creation, in March 2006, of the Russian National Priority Projects of the Russian Federation, which are focused in the social sphere on developments in health, education and housing, as well as in agricultural systems.<sup>8</sup> The year 2006 has also become the birth year for the "Russian Long-Term Socio-Economic Development Strategy up to the year 2020". However, the selection of the specific development projects and economic development programmes for Russia (especially the long-term projects up to 2020) has occurred in the wake of the current global systemic crisis. Thus in some ways it could be considered that the crisis has opened up certain opportunities that Russia may seek to take advantage of in implementing its development strategy. The chronological list of the programmes is presented in Table 1.

8 The Russian Priority National Projects website. Available from <http://www.rost.ru>

**Table 1** The main programmes and decisions of the Russian Federation for Socio-Economic Development during the global systemic crisis

#	Programme/Decision	Date
1	The Strategy of Economic Development of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) until 2020	14 November 2008
2	The Concept of the Long-Term Economic Development of the Russian Federation for period until 2020 (Decree of the Russian Government from 17 November 2008 # 1662-p)	17 November 2008
3	The Main Directions of the Activity of the Government of Russia until 2020 (Decree of the Government from 17 November 2008 #1663-p)	17 November 2008
4	The Main Directions of External Economic Policy of the Russian Federation until 2020	November 2008
5	The Programme of the Anti-Crisis measures of the Russian Government for 2009	draft on 20 March 2009
6	The Strategy of the Russian National Security until the year 2020. (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation # 537 from 12 May 2009)	12 May 2009
7	St. Petersburg Economic Forum (meetings of Minister of Economic Development with foreign partners on the WTO accession issues)	4 - 7 June 2009
8	The meeting of the Eurasian Economic Community -- the decision announced by Prime Minister Putin on the Customs Union accession to the WTO	9 June 2009
9	The Main Directions of Customs Tariff Policy for the year 2010 and for the period 2011-2012. Presented by the Minister of Economic Development, Mrs. Elvira Nabiullina at the Russian Cabinet meeting on 11 June 2009	11 June 2009
10	The Programme of the Anti-Crisis measures of the Russian Government for 2009	19 June 2009
11	Amendment to the Main Directions of the Activity of the Government of Russia until 2020 (Decree of the Government from 17 November 2008 #1663-p)	8 August 2009

### **3. Russia's WTO accession path**

As was noted in the previous section, although the GATT had received Russia's accession application in 1993, the active stage of negotiations covering the full range of accession issues began in 2000, which is also connected with the relative stabilization of GDP growth performance (see Figure 1). In the same year, the Expert Council for Foreign Trade Legislation and Foreign Investment (renamed the Expert Council for Foreign Economic Activity Regulation) was established at the State Duma Committee for Economic Policy and Entrepreneurship, in order to assess the views of the state authorities, NGOs, academics, businessmen and lawyers on the regulation of foreign investment and foreign trade in terms of WTO requirements, and on the co-ordination of legislative work related to the WTO accession.

A Government Decree of 8 August 2001 (#1054) approved a plan for bringing legislation of the Russian Federation into conformity with the rules and regulations of the World Trade Organization. The plan provides for the elaboration of a series of draft laws that would provide a solution to the problem of legislation discrepancies with WTO provisions.

At the present time the plan has been virtually completed, as demonstrated by: the passage of the new version of the Customs Code of the Russian Federation (28 May 2003, # 61-FZ); the laws On the Foundations of State Regulation of External Trade Activities (28 May 2003, # 61-FZ); Special Anti-Dumping and Compensatory Measures During the Importation of Goods (8 December 8 2003, # 165-FZ); Currency Regulation and Currency Control (10 December 2003, # 173-FZ); Technical Regulation (27 December 2002, # 184-FZ); the laws On the Introduction of Amendments to the Customs Code of the Russian Federation Dealing with Customs Fees (11 November 2004, # 139-FZ) and On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Russian Federation Law on Customs Tariffs (8 November 2005, # 144-FZ). A set of laws on intellectual property rights protection was also introduced. An examination of departmental acts and regional legislation was also underway, with the purpose of determining their conformity with WTO requirements.

Consultations between the Russian delegation and representatives of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member countries are conducted on a regular basis, whilst decisions aimed at improvements in the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) countries' interaction at the WTO accession talks were taken in 2002-2006, during the EurAsEC meetings at the heads-of-state level. The EurAsEC Intergovernmental Council also discussed these questions at the heads-of-government level.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the reference to the WTO accession process helped state officials and parliamentarians to modernize the internal legal system and policies, and to introduce certain legislation that was necessary for reforms and modernization but was not popular inside the country, such as intellectual property rights protection or laws on the financial services industry regulation, and others.

In order to gain a better understanding of the current Russian position towards the WTO, it is worth referring to a number of articles that have appeared during the last

---

<sup>9</sup> Russia and WTO - Information Bureau. On the Current State of Russia's WTO Accession negotiations prepared by the Trade Negotiations Department of the Ministry of Economic Development in December 2008. Available from <http://www.wto.ru/russia.asp?f=delat&t=11>

2 years in the Russian official newspaper, *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*<sup>10</sup>. These years (October 2007 - November 2009) have been particularly important in terms of identifying the conditions and reasons for Russia's new strategic policy choice with regard to regional integration and WTO accession. It is also worth noting that the decision to create the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus was also taken in October 2007; one can therefore observe through these articles the particular circumstances surrounding WTO accession, as well as the prevailing economic conditions within the country that served to speed up the decision to implement the creation of the Customs Union.

By October 2007 there were just two countries, Saudi Arabia and Georgia, remaining in bilateral negotiations with Russia on its accession conditions. Shortly after that, Mr. Maxim Medvedkov announced the expected completion of the accession process would be in 2008.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, the modifications concerning intellectual property rights protection were introduced by the Government to the Russian Parliament. It was expected that Russian domestic law would be in full compliance with WTO law by the beginning of 2008. Also at this time the report on the consequences of the WTO accession, prepared by the Moscow High School of Economics for the Ministry of Economic Development, concluded that the accession would have neutral consequences for the Russian economy. In the medium-term however, the influence could be positive, as Russia moves away from the natural resources structure of its exports over the coming 4-5 years.<sup>12</sup> The ministry announcement stated that if Russia joined the WTO by the beginning of 2008, 22 regions (out of 89) would experience significant economic difficulties. The main problem would arise from the fact that increased imports would serve to reduce the income of the regions, as production in the 'company towns' formed by major enterprises becomes uncompetitive. (For example, the city Tolyatti, which has population of 720,000 and the city-plant "AutoVaz", the Russian car producer, is expected to suffer).<sup>13</sup>

By November 2007 the opinion was being formed that Russia would accede to the WTO with poorly developed adjustment processes for Russian business.<sup>14</sup> By December 2007, there were also several issues that had not been resolved at the WTO negotiating table: agricultural support, intellectual property rights (IPRs), sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT), export duties, as well as the regulation of state enterprises activities.<sup>15</sup>

At the beginning of February 2008, the official discussions of the new Russian socio-economic strategy were announced (discussed further in this paper - "The Concept of the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to 2020"), which positioned Russia as being one of the strongest economies in the

---

10 *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*. Available from <http://www.rg.ru>

11 Kukol, Elena. 'Medvedkov prognozov ne menyaet - Rossii ostalos' zavershit' peregovory o prisоеdinenii k WTO s Saudovskoi Araviei i Gruziei'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 4492 from 13 October 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2007/10/13/vto.html>

12 Ibid.

13 Kukol, Elena. 'V minuse - 22 regiona - Schetnaya palata podsчитаet effekt ot vstupleniya v WTO'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 4507 from 1 November 2007. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2007/11/01/vto.html>

14 Arsyuhin, Evgenii. 'Ruka utopayushhego - Biznesu predlozhili zaplatit' za zashitu ot VTO'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 4534 from 4 December 2007. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2007/12/04/vto.html>

15 Ibid.

world by 2020. One can also observe the beginning of the development of 'sub-strategies' - i.e., various strategies for the different industries.<sup>16</sup> In the same newspaper article<sup>17</sup> Mr. Shokhin (Head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs) stated that the imminent Ukrainian accession (which in fact happened in May 2008) could potentially cause another extension of the Russian accession process and that Russia might use the delay to increase the competitiveness of the Russian industries and to adapt itself to the level of international competition. He also emphasized that any prolongation of negotiations would negatively influence the Russian business community, who would prefer to have clarity and predictability, whether inside or outside the WTO system.<sup>18</sup>

As soon as Ukraine joined the WTO (after 14 years of the accession process) Russian state officials announced that they expected Ukraine to join the WTO Working Group on the Russian Accession. Taking into account the recent gas scandal between Russia and Ukraine, the state officials claimed the Ukraine could now significantly delay the Russian accession process. At that time, Russia had been conducting bilateral accession negotiations with the US (on IPRs), Georgia (on Abkhazia), with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with the EC on railway tariffs and Russian timber export conditions.<sup>19</sup>

By the middle of February 2008 the Ukrainian debt on Russian gas reached 500 million US dollars, and there was a new wave of conflict over gas. Ukraine joined the Working Group on Russian Accession to the WTO, and Russian officials expected a number of requirements from the Ukrainian side - specifically, to abolish export taxes on Russian oil and export restrictions, such as quotas on sugar, spirits and steel tubes, as well as on a number of others. At the official accession ceremony in Geneva the Ukrainian President declared that Ukraine would facilitate Russian WTO accession.<sup>20</sup>

In mid-March 2008 there were only 3 countries remaining in bilateral negotiations with Russia - Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Georgia. At this time, it was expected that Russia would become a WTO member by January 2009.<sup>21</sup>

In April 2008, at the meeting of presidents of the United States and Russia in Sochi, George W. Bush confirmed that the US supported Russia's WTO and OECD accession, adding that it was important to release Russia from the so-called 'Jackson-Vanik amendment'<sup>22</sup>. Vladimir Putin emphasised that both parties were in agreement on

---

16 Kukol, Elena. Proryv na Zapad - Aleksandr Shohin predlozhit sozdat' agentstvo po prodvizheniyu rossiiskih investitsii za rubezhom. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 4581 from 6 February 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/02/06/biznes-rspp.html>

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Arsyuhin, Evgenii. 'Ukraina nastupila na VTO - Chlenstvo Rossii v etoi organizatsii mozhet byt' snova otsrocheno'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 4581 from 6 February 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/02/06/ukraina-vto.html>

20 Veletminskii, Igor. 'Gazo - provody - Energeticheskie otnosheniya mogut stat' kamnem pretkoveniya v peregovorah Ukrainy s Rossiei'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 4585 from 12 February 2008. Available from <<http://www.rg.ru/2008/02/12/gaz.html>>

21 *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* website news. 'Rossiya mozhet stat' polnocennym chlenom Vsemirnoi torgovoi organizatsii s yanvarya 2009 goda.' 11 March 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/03/11/vto-anons.html>

22 The 'Jackson-Vanik amendment' is contained in Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act and is named after its major co-sponsors, Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson and Rep. Charles Vanik. The amendment denies most favoured nation status to certain countries with non-market economies that restrict emigration, which is considered a human right

Russia's WTO accession under conditions that did not harm Russian national economic interests, and that Russia would expect the US to release Russia from the 'Jackson-Vanik amendment' during the current year, thereby allowing the countries to establish normal trade relations.<sup>23</sup>

The newly-elected Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated at the beginning of his presidential term in April 2008, that Russia was ready to join the WTO in the current year (2008) but on conditions comparable with other countries (i.e., not to take on additional burdensome WTO-plus commitments).<sup>24</sup>

By the end of April 2008, Russia was left with only two partners with regard to the conclusion of the bilateral agreements - Saudi Arabia and Georgia. Georgia had signed a bilateral agreement with Russia in 2005, but one year later withdrew it. During April 2008 Georgia tried several times to block the negotiations on Russian accession, both at the bilateral as well as the multilateral level, trying to block the issuing of the new Working Party Report on Russia's accession. The issues of customs regulation of the Russian-Georgian border in Abkhazia and the South Ossetia were raised by the Georgian side (this was happening four months before the Russian-Georgian conflict in the South Ossetia).<sup>25</sup>

By 4 June 2008, Russia had completed the bilateral negotiations with Saudi Arabia. There were now only two countries left - Ukraine (which joined the Working Party on Russia in the second quarter of 2008) and Georgia. Due to historical circumstances, there is a certain amount of politics involved in Russia's relations with both countries. Thus Georgia continued to bring the issue of 'Russian help' to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the table at the WTO accession negotiations. Russia maintained that the WTO should not cover those issues.<sup>26</sup>

At the new round (June 2008) of the Russian accession negotiations, Russian agricultural support became the central issue, with the Russian side trying to negotiate at the 9 billion US dollars annually level, and the partners insisting on 3 billion US dollars annually.

After the conclusion of the Geneva Ministerial Conference on 1 August 2008, which did not bring any significant results, and following the Russian-Georgian conflict over the South Ossetia (7-16 August 2008), the Russian authorities announced that Russia would withdraw from certain signed agreements in Russia's WTO accession process that harm the interests of the Russian Federation. That announcement was initially interpreted as being Russia's withdrawal from the accession negotiations altogether. The Russian First Vice-Prime Minister, Igor Shuvalov, however, clarified that Russia fully intended to continue the WTO accession negotiations, but that it

---

23 Rossiiskaya Gazeta website news. 'USA podderzhivayut Rossiyu po voprosu o prisoedinenii ko Vsemirnoi trgovoi organizacii. Ob etom zayavil prezident SShA Dzhordzh Bush v Sochi na press-konferencii po itogam peregovorov s Prezidentom RF Vladimirom Putiny'm'. 7 April 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/04/07/wto-anons.html>

24 Rossiiskaya Gazeta website news. 'Dmitrii Medvedev: Rossiya gotova vstupit' vo Vsemirnuyu trgovuyu organizaciyu v nyneshnem godu'. 8 April 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/04/08/medvedev-vto-anons.html>

25 Kukol, Elena. 'Gruziya poshla v otkaz - I prervalo peregovory o vstuplenii Rossii v VTO'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 4651 from 30 April 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/04/30/russia-gruzia.html>

26 L'vov, Igor. *Odin plyus odin - Gruziya ostaetsya prepyatstviem dlya Rossii pri vstuplenii v VTO, Ukraina mozhet im stat'*. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 4676 from 4 June 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/06/04/vto.html>

also intended to withdraw from certain signed WTO accession agreements and wished simply to inform partners about it.<sup>27</sup>

Following the conflict in South Ossetia, the Russian Government took a more realistic approach towards Russia's WTO accession. At a Cabinet Meeting, the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that Russia had withdrawn from certain agreements with regard to the WTO accession because the Russian Federation had been executing the commitments while not benefiting from the WTO membership, and that the Russian economy carried a significant burden because of that. He stated that "we pay for the air but we were promised the WTO membership."<sup>28</sup> He also emphasized that Russia did not refrain from strategic movement towards the WTO accession, but that it was necessary to take into consideration the protection of domestic producers.<sup>29</sup> It is important to note that during the last 6 years of intensive negotiations, Russia has signed approximately 50 agreements on market access in goods and 20 in services.

High-ranking state officials pointed out that they did not envisage Russian accession to the WTO, either in several months or in several years. Igor Shuvalov also added that Russia, hoping for imminent accession, undertook certain very burdensome commitments for its economy, as the government had seen the coming conclusion of the accession negotiations, but that the deal had not worked out. Russia had not become a WTO member on the terms and conditions that were agreed with the partners, therefore it did not wish to carry out those commitments without a membership. This point became especially clear after the US Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez stated that Russia would face problems in the WTO accession process with regard to the situation in the Caucasus Region in August 2008. Mr. Shuvalov stated that it was unfortunate for the Russian government, particularly after the US representative had stated several months earlier that the WTO accession was an economic issue and that politics should not interfere with it.<sup>30</sup>

The official media did not comment on which particular agreements were planned to be renegotiated, as it could compromise its current negotiating position. However, certain experts assumed these related to agriculture and some other industries. The Head of the Economic Policy Committee of the State Duma, Evgeny Fedorov, emphasised that the transfer of the terms and conditions of accession to the WTO could have been used for the restructuring of the economy and for the correction of laws.<sup>31</sup>

By October 2008, the global financial crisis had begun influencing the political and economic decisions of a number of countries. The Russian Chief Trade Negotiator stated that during the crisis it would be better for Russia to be in the WTO, as both history and practice shows that during a crisis, the country becomes a target if it is

---

27 *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* website news. 'Rossiya namerena uvedomit' ryad svoih partnerov po VTO o vyhode iz soglashenii, protivorechashih ee interesam'. 25 August 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/08/25/vto-anons.html>

28 Sidibe, Pierre. 'V VTO bez soglashenii - Rossiya vyhodit iz nekotorykh ekonomicheskikh dogovorennosti do momenta vstupleniya vo Vsemirnuyu torgovuyu organizaciyu'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 4736 from 26 August 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/08/26/vto.html>

29 Ibid.

30 Arsyuhin, Evgenii. 'Ne v to VTO'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 669 from 2 September 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/09/02/vto.html>

31 Kukol, Elena. 'Vystuplenie v VTO - Eksperty znayut, chem zapolnit' pauzu'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 4742 from 3 September 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/09/03/vto.html>



outside the WTO system and its exports can be heavily discriminated against.<sup>32</sup> The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, in December 2008 expressed his opinion concerning the relation between the crisis and WTO accession, was that "the accession to the WTO remains one of Russia's foreign policy priorities. Although during the crisis it is better to be outside the WTO, we look to the future and understand our responsibility... We see the WTO accession as one of the necessary conditions for improving the goods structure of Russian exports... Russia will not fight for the WTO accession at any price. There is only one way of accession - on the standard conditions."<sup>33</sup>

By May 2009, Ukraine had expressed its support of Russia's accession process.<sup>34</sup> The new round of Russia's WTO accession started at the end of May 2009, after both the EU and the US expressed their willingness to continue negotiations on Russia's accession. However, by that time Russia had already taken the decision to foster regional integration in the form of the Customs Union with Kazakhstan and Belarus from 1 January 2010. Therefore, the rapid accession of one of those states would significantly complicate the creation of the regional agreement.<sup>35</sup>

It is not a secret that with each one new accession to the WTO the price of the membership of the club goes up. In the modern accession processes countries have to face more sophisticated enquiries from the WTO partners with regard to the scope and depth of the commitments, which very often go beyond the WTO format and are called "WTO+" commitments. Thus, Russia was not an exception from this 'new' unwritten rule. Moreover, the table of accession negotiations is sometimes laden with issues of no direct relevance to trade, or even economic policy. Russian accession to the WTO has been always a very political arrangement (some relevant examples were noted earlier).

Russia had to face certain WTO+ requirements, such as the regulation of price control in energy products and in railway transport transit fees, the functioning of state enterprises, export tariffs, some issues in TRIPS, SPS, TBT, import licensing and other issues. Some of those issues have been accepted by the Russian side, some have not. The hot topics of the accession were also agricultural subsidies and import quotas, as well as financial services. All in all, a number of issues were solved, but there remains some vagueness with certain partners. The global systemic crisis, changing as it did the value of the accession conditions, as well as a number of other factors, pushed the Russian Federation into making the announcement that can be interpreted as an emphasis of the Customs Union priority over the binding international multilateral rules on the current proposed conditions.

---


32 Kamzolova, Yulia. 'Dogovor s obratnoi siloi Rossiya nachala peresmotr torgovyh soglashenii'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 673 from 30 September 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/09/30/torgovlya.html>

33 *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* website news. 'MID: Rossiya prisoedinit'sya k VTO lish' na standartnyh usloviyah.' 10 December 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/12/10/mid-anons.html>

34 *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* website news. 'Yuliya Timoshenko poobeshala Rossii podderzhku pri vstuplenii v VTO'. 26 April 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/04/29/timoshenko-vto-anons.html>


35 Tarasov, Vladimir. 'Pagubnaya toroplivost'. *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* # 703 (19) from 26 May 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/05/26/vto.html>

**Figure 2** The Russian trade with the Rest of the World in period January 2008 - September 2009 in million US dollars



Source: Calculated by author on the basis of the data provided by the Russian Federal Customs

**Figure 3** The Russian trade with the CIS countries in period January 2008 - September 2009 in million US dollars



Source: Calculated by author on the basis of the data provided by the Russian Federal Customs

The final stage of Russian accession has coincided with the toughest times in the world economy. (Please, refer to Figures 2 and 3 regarding the Russian export/import trade before and during the global systemic crisis.) The countries that are already WTO members have been regularly observed using protectionist policies to support their domestic producers and employment levels during the current systemic crisis.<sup>36</sup> One of the most valuable benefits of WTO membership is the predictability of the trade flows and guaranties of certain types of investments. However, countries seem to consider some protectionist policies as reasonable in this period of global systemic crisis.

<sup>36</sup> Please see the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database. Available from [www.globaltradealert.org](http://www.globaltradealert.org)

#### 4. Why a Customs Union?

Immediately following a meeting of the Board of the Customs Union and a meeting of the Interstate Committee of Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) on 9 June 2009, Prime Minister Putin announced that Russia should stop its WTO accession process at the national level but continue in the format of a Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.<sup>37</sup>

It is worth noting that the process of integration, or at least the attempts towards integration, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, is not a new idea. In a speech in March 1994 at the Moscow State University, Mr. Nursultan Nazarbaev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, announced the need for further Eurasian integration in the form of the Eurasian Union. Since then there have been several attempts towards regional integration. For example, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), created between 1991-1994, was constructed from the ruins of the USSR. However, this form of regional integration, having in theory significant economic potential, in practice poses many questions regarding its purpose and utility, in so far that it attempts to unite politically very different countries.

The next significant attempt towards integration was the Eurasian Economic Community (2000) - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and later Uzbekistan.<sup>38</sup> This was another format within which countries attempted to build a united economic space. It was created with the economy as its focus and, therefore, proved to be a somewhat more efficient design than the CIS format.<sup>39</sup> There have also been several attempts to bring to life the idea of the Customs Union (or the Eurasian Union that Mr. Nazarbaev was considering in 1994). Another attempt was the creation of a Common Economic Space among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which was announced following the meeting in the Moscow suburb of Novo-Ogarevo on 23 February 2003.

Clearly therefore, the idea of a Customs Union (CU) was neither new, nor unexpected. In October 2007 the heads of states took the decision to create a Customs Union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and approved the 2008 - 2010 action plan for its creation. This would have alerted the international community to the obvious technical challenges faced by Russia in trying to implement two major commitments simultaneously - i.e., WTO accession and the formation of the Customs Union. Nevertheless, as of 1 January 2009, the supranational Commission of the Customs Union commenced its work.

The EurAsEC is considered by its partners as the start of a major success story of

---

<sup>37</sup> Later this announcement was corrected with regard to the format of accession, but as the state officials insist - the accession of all three countries is going to be coordinated. In October 2009, the state officials announced that the countries will join the WTO as separate entities but "coordinated, at the same time and on equal conditions", because "the accession of the Customs Union to the WTO as juridical entity which does not exist yet and with unclear perspectives for the other countries would be implemented in a more technically complicated way," ("Medvedkov: Raznoglasiy po taktike i strategii vstupleniya v VTO net" ("Vzglyad", 16.10.2009). Available from [http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg\\_id=25101](http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg_id=25101))

<sup>38</sup> Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova are having an observer status at EurAsEC.

<sup>39</sup> The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (1994) as well as The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (2001) are focused on security issues

post-Soviet integration. The Eurasian Economic Community (2000) brought significant improvements in economic performance for its members. Due to the creation of a free trade area the trade turnover increased fourfold from 29 billion US dollars in 2000 to 123 billion in 2008.<sup>40</sup> This performance reflects the significant potential of the relationship. The countries of EurAsEC have territory covering 20,789.5 thousands square km (94 % of the CIS territory), with a total population of 208 million people (73% of the CIS population). The GDP of the agreement members constitutes 88 percent of the CIS GDP.<sup>41</sup>

The newly formed Customs Union creates a market of 170 million people (142 million in Russia, 16 million in Kazakhstan and 10 million in Belarus). For the Russian producers the market will extend by 15 percent, while for Kazakhstan it will grow by 10.5 times. According to the plan, by July 2010, the customs administration and control will be abolished within the CU, which will lead to a significant increase in trade volume inside the CU. Thus, the elimination of the customs barriers inside the CU is expected to bring GDP growth of between 15-20 percent by 2015. According to the Russian Transport Ministry, annual losses of the Russian economy due to transport waiting at the borders of those countries are around 7-7.5 billion rubles (approximately 300 million US dollars).

The Director of the Trade Negotiations Department of the Ministry of Economic Development, Mr. Maxim Medvedkov, has emphasized that the decision to accede to the WTO, in the form of the Customs Union, was not a demarche or a political step, but simply a result of the WTO dragging out the process of Russian accession for too long, with the result that the Customs Union ripened faster. Indeed, the processes of the CU creation and the Russian accession to the WTO have been going on in parallel since around 1996.<sup>42</sup>

At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2009, Russian state officials confirmed Russia's intention to join the WTO. Mr. Igor Shuvalov (the First Vice-Prime-Minister in charge of the Russian Accession to the WTO) gave the following backstage interview to the second Federal Channel (to TV news programme "Vesti") on 6 June 2009. He stated that in his opinion the American partners were demonstrating good intentions, but not willingness for the real agreement, therefore the Customs Union from 1 January 2010 looked more realistic than the Russian accession to the WTO. This statement could be connected to Russia's decision to renegotiate terms of its accession accords. In another interview a day earlier, Mr. Shuvalov stated that the CIS was a very useful format for interaction and that during the current crisis period it would become even stronger.<sup>43</sup>

The exact legal form of accession of the Customs Union to the WTO is still not defined. The last version was that the countries of the Customs Union will accede

---

40 The Eurasian Economic Community (2009). Quick-Reference Guide. Secretariat of EurAsEC, Moscow, p. 4. Available from <http://www.evrazes.com/i/data/item7182-2.pdf>

41 The Eurasian Economic Community website. Questions and Answers (in Russian) Available from <http://www.evrazes.com/about/questionanswer>

42 Prime-Tass. Economic News Agency. Vstuplenie v VTO v sostave Tamozhennogo soyuza ne yavlyaetsya demarshem ili politicheskim shagom - M.Medvedkov. 16 June 2009

43 Kazakhstan Press Club. Virus H1N1 Strashnee Krizisa?!. 5 June 2009

individually but in a synchronised way.<sup>44</sup> On 19 November, President Dmitry Medvedev claimed Russia would use the shortest way possible to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). He said the form of accession was less important. "What is important for us is the speed: whichever way is the shortest, we will use that way. If it turns out to be the way of concerted but individual accession, we will choose that way," Medvedev said after a Russia-EU summit in November 2009.<sup>45</sup> The President also emphasised that he did not consider the decision on the CU as going against Russia's WTO accession and that both processes were equally important for Russia.<sup>46</sup>

The decision to join as a Customs Union, which became further modified into a decision to join in a 'coordinated way, at the same time and on equal conditions,' could possibly have the following policy considerations as its basis:

- The systemic economic crisis might open new opportunities and introduce new rules for world (economic) governance. The vagueness of the Doha Round and the current format of multilateral negotiations in general, would suggest more careful decision-taking process for the new incoming members. New conditions may require a different set of commitments (there may even be a new organisation). This might allow Russia to enter on improved "standard conditions" without additional burdensome WTO+ commitments or even on renegotiated conditions.
- Due to the fact that, according to the Global Trade Alert (GTA) analysis, there is a significant amount of protectionism being implemented, even among the WTO members that have committed themselves to trade liberalisation and non-protectionism, the Russian decision in favour of the CU at this period of world history would provide the country with a wider policy space with respect to emergency measures it could undertake in order to control the economic performance of the Russian Federation during the crisis. It is important to note that the introduction of the new Russian Trade Strategy 2010 - 2012, which emphasises an active use of tariff policies for economic stabilisation during the crisis, coincided with the Russian decision to join the WTO in the form of Customs Union (9 - 11 June 2009)!
- Three markets (rather than one) increase the negotiating power of the Russian Federation on the formation of further accession terms and conditions.
- The Customs Union would bring economic benefits of increased trade and improved economic performance within the CU, which has been discussed earlier in this paper.
- This triple WTO accession (technically as separate countries but 'in coordination with each other') would allow Belarus and Kazakhstan to join the WTO without taking additional extended commitments that might occur with countries that join later. (Please refer to Table 2 for the export structure of the countries of the Customs Union). According to the Russian Chief Trade Negotiator, Mr. Medvedkov, Russia has passed approximately 95% of the way to the WTO,

---

44 Vedomosti. 'Moskva ob'yasnila ES pozitsiyu po VTO'. 18 November 2009. Available from [http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg\\_id=25276](http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg_id=25276)

45 Itar -Tass. 'Prezident RF Dmitrii Medvedev uveren, chto Rossiya poidet v VTO po kratchaishemu puti'. 18 November 2009. Available from [http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg\\_id=25284](http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg_id=25284)

46 Prime -Tass. 'Medvedev ne schitaet, chto dogovorennosti o sozdanii Tamozhennogo soyuza protivorechat planam po vstupleniyu Rossii v VTO'. 23 November 2009. Available from [http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg\\_id=25312](http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg_id=25312)

**Table 2** The Sector Structure of exports (more than 1% of the total export value) of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus in 2008 in million US dollars

	Sector HS #	Sector	Export Trade Value	Percentage of Total Export Value
<b>Russian Federation</b>				
	HS-TOTAL	ALL COMMODITIES	467994,0	100
	1HS-27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	307371,5	65,7
	2HS-99	Commodities not specified according to kind	34902,5	7,5
	3HS-72	Iron and steel	28602,7	6,1
	4HS-31	Fertilisers	11832,4	2,5
	5HS-76	Aluminum and articles thereof	8653,4	1,8
	6HS-44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	7785,9	1,7
	7HS-84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	7151,3	1,5
	8HS-75	Nickel and articles thereof	5189,2	1,1
	9HS-71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	4569,0	1,0
	10HS-74	Copper and articles thereof	4117,0	0,9
<b>Kazakhstan</b>				
	HS-TOTAL	ALL COMMODITIES	71172,0	100
	1HS-27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation	48910,9	68,7
	2HS-72	Iron and steel	6271,9	8,8
	3HS-74	Copper and articles thereof	2906,2	4,1
	4HS-26	Ores, slag and ash	2412,3	3,4
	5HS-28	Inorganic chemicals	2261,9	3,2
	6HS-10	Cereals	1633,8	2,3
	7HS-71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones	877,7	1,2
	8HS-11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin	875,7	1,2
	9HS-88	Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof	704,0	1,0
	10HS-25	Salt; sulfur; earths and stone; plastering materials	664,1	0,9

**Table 2** The Sector Structure of exports (more than 1% of the total export value) of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus in 2008 in million US dollars (contd.)

Belarus	HS-TOTAL	ALL COMMODITIES	32902,1587	100
		Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	12336,8586	37,5
	1HS-27	Fertilisers	3599,7553	10,9
	2HS-31	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and accessories thereof	3192,2202	9,7
	3HS-87	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	1849,1355	5,6
	4HS-84	Iron and steel	1475,7459	4,5
	5HS-72	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	1141,4723	3,5
	6HS-04	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	818,4933	2,5
	7HS-85	Articles of iron or steel	811,9358	2,5
	8HS-73	Plastics and articles thereof	654,1822	2,0
	9HS-39	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated name-plates and the like; prefabricated buildings	553,9365	1,7
	10HS-94	Rubber and articles thereof	548,565	1,7
	11HS-40	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	491,1169	1,5
	12HS-44	Miscellaneous chemical products	404,5354	1,2
	13HS-38	Meat and edible meat offal	353,293	1,1
	14HS-02	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	319,7619	1,0
	15HS-62			

Source: calculated by author on the basis of the data provided by UN Comtrade database

Kazakhstan 70%, and Belarus only 50%.<sup>47</sup> It is worth emphasising that Russian and Kazakh exports have a similar export structure, whereby a large share (more than 60%) belongs to mineral fuels exports. The Belorussian exports are more diversified, as one can observe, but the Belorussian economy has a significant preference from the Russian partners in terms of natural resources' prices it imports from Russia. Moreover, for a country such as Belarus, which raises a lot of questions amongst its European Partners, the accession on equal terms with the Russian Federation would allow it to benefit from the WTO system whilst avoiding additional discussions of Belorussian internal politics.

- The creation of a Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (and recently Kirgizstan has expressed willingness to join the CU)<sup>48</sup> has the potential for more than just economic integration. In this respect there is cooperation occurring at the political-parties level between Russia and Kazakhstan, which might even develop into closer integration. Moreover, in June 2009 the member countries of the EurAsEC founded the Anti-crisis Foundation, consisting of 10 billion US dollars, as an instrument for the stabilization and financial support of the EurAsEC countries that are currently in difficulty (US\$7.5 billion comes from Russia, US\$1 billion from Kazakhstan, US\$10 million from Belarus, and US\$1 million from other parties). The Foundation will add to the activities of the Eurasian Development Bank, which was founded by Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006 with the charter capital of US\$1.5 billion. The voting power in the new Foundation is distributed according to the level of contributions. Thus, countries such as Armenia and Kirgizstan have already announced their willingness to use this opportunity.
- Another important point to consider is the time and opportunity for Russia to develop certain industries - import substitution for the short term and export promotion strategy for the longer term, that are reflected in various strategies and concepts listed in Table 1.

However, there are also certain drawbacks. Investors do not welcome the uncertainty that could lead to the further outflow of foreign capital. The trust of Russia's international partners for its WTO accession could now be shaken. Whilst it can be calculated how much additional prosperity the CU could potentially bring, it is nevertheless important to consider the lost opportunities that would result as a consequence of being a non-Member of the WTO. It is indeed very difficult to estimate this, especially during the current crisis, at the end of which the world could be quite different.

With the creation of the Customs Union certain other issues are becoming central. The synchronization of two simultaneous processes, i.e., individual WTO accession commitments of the members of the CU (which had already in large part been negotiated during previous years, and can be different for each of the three countries involved) and the commitments under the common external tariff of the Customs Union's members, is a significant problem. Indeed, the synchronization itself could become a stumbling block to the realization of the CU's WTO accession (or individ-

---

47 Prime-Tass Economic News Agency. 'Vstuplenie v VTO v sostave Tamozhennogo soyuza ne yavlyaetsya demarshem ili politicheskim shagom' - M.Medvedkov. 16 June 2009

48 Russia and WTO - Information Bureau on the Russian Accession to the WTO. Kirgiziya gotova vstupit' v Tamozhennyi soyuz - Bakiev ("RIA Novosti", 27.11.2009). Available from [http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg\\_id=25334](http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg_id=25334)



ual accessions on equal terms and conditions). Another issue is the technical functioning of the CU and the sovereignty of the members over their trade and other policies. The challenge will be in defining the institutional design of the CU in such a way that it has no unregulated 'holes'. It could take some time before it actually starts functioning in a reasonable manner that would fully benefit its members.

## 5. Industrial policies and regional integration vs. binding international rules?

Following the historical failure of a 'planned economy' as a way of managing the economy of a state, the Government of the Russian Federation initially became cautious about any kind of planning, which it turns out was equally inappropriate. A strategy that provides goals and objectives and an appropriate method of identifying the means to execute the plan, is a necessary tool for any government involved in the design and implementation of public policy. For the first time in post-Soviet Russian history the country has a clear opportunity to plan constructively for the long term, as there is now an appropriate foundation for that. The socio-economic, and particularly industrial, development of Russia has now become a key issue and central to a range of programmes. Russia has chosen the **year 2020** as its reference year.

At the beginning of the global financial crisis the Russian government introduced "The Concept of Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to the year 2020", (hereafter referred to as 'the Concept'). This approach was approved by Government Decree # 1662-p on **17 November 2008**, but had started being developed two years earlier in 2006. The Russian Minister of Economic Development, in her speech from **15 October 2008**, emphasized that it was the first time the Russian Federation had prepared a long-term strategy for the country's development. The last attempt was made in 2000 and was supposed to cover 10 years, but in reality lasted 4 years. The new strategy is for a 12 year - period. In the section of her speech on external economic policies, certain initiatives were highlighted as being priority directions, notably the interstate cooperation within the CIS, the EurAsEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the Union State of Russia and Belarus. The issue of the WTO was not even mentioned, whilst cooperation with India and China, the importance of the export diversification, as well as support of export of the high processed products and services, were.<sup>49</sup>

The text of the Concept states that "for Russia, the transformation of the world economy (i.e., the global crisis) creates new opportunities for the development of external economic integration, for strengthening and widening the Russian position in world markets, as well as for the import of technologies and capital."<sup>50</sup> The Concept adds that Russia will strengthen its leadership in integration processes in Eurasia.<sup>51</sup>

---

49 The Speech of the Minister of Economic Development (Mrs. Nabiullina) to the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on 15 October 2008. Available from <http://www.economy.gov.ru/wps/wcm/myconnect/economylib/mert/welcome/pressservice/eventschronicle/doc1217949648141>

50 "The Concept of Long Term Social-Economic Development of the Russian Federation for period until the year 2020." The Decree of the Russian Government from 17 November 2008 # 1662 - p, p.5

51 *Ibid.*, p.9

The Concept consists of 2 main stages: (i) the consolidation of competitive advantage (2009-2012) in "traditional sectors"; adaptation to the crisis processes in the world economy; preparation of the ground for further innovative development; investments in people capital and infrastructure; and (ii) "innovation breakthrough" (2013 - 2020) - the increase of competitiveness based on the technological base; structural diversification of the economy and the conclusion of infrastructure sectors modernization; 'softening' social and regional diversification.

The document lists several high-tech industries where Russia has significant competitive advantage or seeks to build over the medium term. These are the aircraft industry and propulsion engineering, spacecraft and rocket industry, radio electronics industry, nuclear energy-industrial complex, as well as the info-communication technologies.

Establishing the appropriate goals and objectives for the Concept will account for only 50 percent of its success; the remaining 50 percent will be achieved through the competent estimation and allocation of resources, combined with the efficient coordination of the work of the different agents responsible for its planning and implementation. It was particularly in these areas that the Concept was criticized during its development and subsequent amendments.

Another document, also approved on 17 November 2008, "The Main Directions of the Activity of the Government of Russia up to 2020" introduces seven priority directions for Russian external economic policy. The fifth point is an integration of the Eurasian Economic space. The seventh, the last point, was the WTO accession - "the objectives of Russian accession to the WTO and OECD are still valid but on the terms of Russian economic interests."<sup>52</sup>

"The Strategy of Russian National Security up to the year 2020" (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation # 537 from **12 May 2009**) identifies import substitution and government support of the real sector of the economy (through active state anti-inflation, currency, money and tax-budget policies) as strengthening the national economic security of the Russian Federation.

Subsequently, at the Russian Cabinet meeting on **11 June 2009** (two days after the CU announcement by Putin), the Minister of Economic Development, Mrs. Elvira Nabiullina, introduced a new trade policy strategy for Russia. She presented a document titled "The Project of Main Directions of Customs Tariff Policy for the year 2010 and for the period 2011-2012", which was developed jointly by the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Finance, and the Federal Customs Services of the Russian Federation. This strategy takes into account the main points of other major statements of Russian state policy, namely, "The Concept of Long-Term Social-Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to 2020", "The Main Directions of the Activity of the Government of Russia up to 2020" and "The Main Directions of External Economic Policy of the Russian Federation up to 2020." This new perspective on the Russian trade policy also refers to the goal of creating a Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.<sup>53</sup> The strategy essentially demonstrates that Russia

---

52 "The Main Directions of the Activity of the Government of Russia until 2020", the Decree of the Russian Government from 17 November 2008 # 1663-p with amendments from 8 August 2009

53 Global Trade Alert (2009). Available from <http://globaltradealert.org/measure/russia-announcement-new-trade-strategy-2010-2012>

is ready to actively use the instruments of tariff policies during times of crisis in order to support domestic industries - which actually does not fit too well with Russian intentions to join the WTO, and may also indicate the willingness of the government to prioritize industrial policies over the WTO accession process, at least until the end of the hard phase of the global economic crisis.

Two stages are planned for Russian customs tariff policy. The first stage (lasting until the end of the year 2010) is characterized as "softening the crisis" phase. In this stage "the customs tariff policy is a part of anti-crisis economic policy. Thus, the implementation of the customs tariff measures will be directed towards the balanced protection of the interests of the state budget, domestic producers and consumers." At this stage, the most important objectives are (i) the protection of the internal market and support of the development of import substitution industries, whilst at the same time support of an effective competition environment; (ii) support and stimulation of exports; (iii) strengthening the fiscal effect of customs-tariff regulation. The import substitution policy together with support of an effective competition environment is indeed a very challenging policy mix!

The second stage - 2011-2012 years - is characterized by the stabilization of the Russian economy and the move towards sustainable development. The main objectives of that period will be the restoration of the balance between protectionism and the regulatory functions of the customs tariff policy, as well as the formation of the potential for a sustainable, post-crisis economic development. Here such goals as the increase of export potential, export diversification, as well as the support of export with instruments of customs-tariff policies are also stated.

The Anti-Crisis Programme of the Russian Government (developed in March 2009) and approved on **19 June 2009**, introduces systemic measures to support the real sector as well as to support particular sectors such as agriculture, the car industry, defense industry, transport sector, forestry, and the metallurgical sector, during the crisis. The agriculture, construction, food and textile industries, the pharmaceutical industry and the car industry are considered by the Government as prospective targets in terms of import substitution and domestic demand. With regard to import substitution, at the Cabinet meeting on 5 November 2009, the Minister of Industry and Trade introduced a report on the implementation of anti-crisis measures in the most promising industries from the import substitution point of view - these were the car industry, forestry, and the textile and pharmaceutical industries.<sup>54</sup> These programmes have been implemented over the period since 2007. The strategy for the development of the pharmaceutical industry was introduced very recently on **23 October 2009**, for the period up to 2020. (Please see Table 3 for the structure of the Russian imports).

President Medvedev has identified a list of 5 priorities for the modernisation of Russia during his speech to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on **12 November 2009**. These are medical technologies, increased energy efficiency, nuclear technologies, telecommunications and space industries, as well as information technologies and software.<sup>55</sup> He said: "The prestige of the Motherland and national wel-

---

54 Notes to the Cabinet Meeting of the Russian Government on 5 November 2009. Available from <http://www.government.ru/content/governmentactivity/rfgovernmentsession/2009/zas051109/materials/7592127.htm>

55 'Pyat' prioritetov modernizatsii - Opredeleny napravleniya razvitiya ekonomiki.' Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 5043 (219) from 19 November 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/11/19/npravlenie.html>

**Table 3** Russian Import Sectors (1% of the import value and more) in 2008 in million US dollars

Sector HS #	Sector	Import Trade Value	Percentage of Total Import Value
HS-TOTAL	All Commodities	267051,2	100
HS-87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and accessories thereof	48072,2	18,0
HS-84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	45942,3	17,2
HS-85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	28079,1	10,5
HS-99	Commodities not specified according to kind	12898,1	4,8
HS-30	Pharmaceutical products	9047,1	3,4
HS-39	Plastics and articles thereof	8478,7	3,2
HS-90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	7971,3	3,0
HS-02	Meat and edible meat offal	7194,8	2,7
HS-72	Iron and steel	6372,1	2,4
HS-73	Articles of iron or steel	6207,7	2,3
HS-08	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons	4462,7	1,7
HS-27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	4080,4	1,5
HS-48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	3879,9	1,5
HS-28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	3298,3	1,2
HS-33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	3022,8	1,1
HS-94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated name-plates and the like; prefabricated buildings	3009,7	1,1
HS-64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	2954,2	1,1
HS-22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	2610,0	1,0
HS-40	Rubber and articles thereof	2595,2	1,0

Source: Calculated by author on the basis of the data provided by UN Comtrade database

fare cannot be constantly defined by the achievements of the past. The industrial complexes for oil and gas refineries, which provide the main part of our budget income, nuclear weapons, which provide our security, industrial and communicational infrastructure - all of it was developed mostly by the Soviet specialists, in other words, *not by us*. Those achievements still support our country but the technologies are getting old. It is the right time for modern Russian generations to lift Russia to a new and higher level of development."<sup>56</sup>

As can be seen from the Global Trade Alert database, the Russian Government has already initiated the financial and tariff policy support of certain industries, such as the car industry, aircraft industry, shipbuilding industry, agriculture and agricultural machineries industry, military machineries industry, nanotechnologies and others.<sup>57</sup>

The Russian Government sees 2020 as a turning point in Russian history in terms of the country taking a position of economic leadership in the world.<sup>58</sup> However, in order to reach this point a whole range of social issues will need to be tackled in an appropriate way - including health, education reform, birth policy, effective anti-corruption policies, ethnic and religion dialogue issues, control over crime, as well as the stabilisation of the society as a whole. Thus, the 2020 point is a first long-term landmark.

## 6. Conclusion

"A crisis is an *opportunity* riding the dangerous wind", says the Chinese Proverb. The global systemic crisis changes the shape and the economic and political balances in the modern world. Multilateral trade rules might also take another shape. Therefore, these changes can bring some additional opportunities to Russia and its Eurasian partners which they might want to use.

Following the collapse of the Soviet system, Russia had to go through significant difficulties, but by now it has built a relatively stable social platform for further improvement. It has finally identified its strategic priorities, interests and goals for its socio-economic development. With regard to the WTO one point becomes clear - Russia wants to join the WTO with reasonable and adequate conditions that comply with Russia's current economic/political interests. This is, indeed, an unusual request-taking into account that the price of WTO accession tends to go up with every acceding member. Whether the international partners would accept Russia's demands here, and when, are indeed open questions.

The Russian decision to form the Customs Union cannot be considered unexpected, as the idea has been developing in parallel with the Russian WTO accession process, as was described in this paper. But, due to the crisis, the politicization of Russia's WTO accession process, as well as some other issues that have been discussed

---

56 The Speech of the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to the Federal Parliament. Poslanie prezidenta RF Dmitriya Medvedeva Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federacii. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 5038 (214) from 13 November 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/11/13/poslanie-tekst.html>

57 GTA (2009). Available from [http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure?tid=All&tid\\_1=444&tid\\_3=2209](http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure?tid=All&tid_1=444&tid_3=2209)

58 The Presentation of the Minister of Economic Development Mrs. Elvira Nabiullina, "Russia-2020: the Concept of Economic Leadership," Moscow, 1 October 2008. Available in Russian from <http://www.youngscience.ru/753/820/978/index.shtml>

in this paper, the Eurasian integration process emerges as a priority during this period. The Customs Union integration does indeed bring some benefits, such as increased trade flows inside the CU, increased negotiating power at the multilateral level, and others. But it also causes certain difficulties with regard to the institutional shape of the new integration, and connected to it problems such as the delegation of state sovereignty. Another problem is the wise synchronization of the Customs Union common external tariff with the individual WTO accession commitments that have already been negotiated. It is also difficult to calculate the lost opportunities from being a non-WTO member, especially during the current crisis (if indeed there are some).

The content of the economic programmes (the Long-Term Concept of Socio-Economic Development, the Anti-Crisis Programme, the Russian Trade Strategy, and others) gives the impression that the Russian Government does not seem to see the WTO accession as an urgent issue at any price. On the contrary, the choice in favour of the Customs Union and Eurasian integration in general (and through this - in favour of industrial development) is designed to provide an opportunity for further export diversification and modernization, through the mix of different policies at different stages, such as import substitution, export support, as well as even unilateral liberalization. This might allow domestic industries some time to adjust to the new world economic picture, to diversify exports into the highly processed, high-tech and 'new' products, and finally allow the Russian agricultural sector to demonstrate its potential. Whether this choice is the right one and whether Russia can achieve its announced 'modernization' via this route, only history will show us.

While it is too soon to say that Russia's new commercial policies are likely to work one can, however, state that the change in strategy with regard to the Customs Union was predictable. What made it so was the combination of the Russia's acceptance of need for socio-economic modernisation and development, the politicisation of Russia's WTO accession process, which delayed the desired outcome, as well as the global economic downturn which opened new opportunities.

## References

- Arsyuhin, Evgenii. Vsemirnoe Torgovoe Otkrovenie - Rossiiskomu biznesu v poslednii raz raskryli blaga VTO. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 641 from 19 February 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/02/19/vto-doklad.html>
- Arsyuhin, Evgenii. Ruka utopayushogo - Biznesu predlozhili zaplatit' za zashitu ot VTO. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4534 from 4 December 2007. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2007/12/04/vto.html>
- Arsyuhin, Evgenii. Ukraina nastupila na VTO - Chlenstvo Rossii v etoi organizacii mozhet byt' snova otsrocheno. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4581 from 6 February 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/02/06/ukraina-vto.html>
- Arsyuhin, Evgenii. Ne v to VTO. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 669 from 2 September 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/09/02/vto.html>
- Kukol, Elena. Medvedkov prognozov ne menyaet - Rossii ostalos' zavershit' peregovory o prisoedinenii k VTO s Saudovskoi Araviei i Gruziei. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4492 from 13 October 2009. Available from

- <http://www.rg.ru/2007/10/13/vto.html>
- Kukul, Elena. V minuse - 22 regiona - Schetnaya palata podschitaet effekt ot vstupleniya v VTO. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4507 from 1 November 2007. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2007/11/01/vto.html>
- Kukul, Elena. Proryv na Zapad - Aleksandr Shohin predlozhlil sozdat' agentstvo po prodvizheniyu rossiiskih investicii za rubezhom. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4581 from 6 February 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/02/06/biznes-rspp.html>
- Kukul, Elena. Gruzziya poshla v otkaz - I prervalo peregovory o vstuplenii Rossii v VTO. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4651 from 30 April 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/04/30/russia-gruzia.html>
- Kukul, Elena. Vystuplenie v VTO - Eksperty znayut, chem zapolnit' pauzu. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4742 from 3 September 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/09/03/vto.html>
- Kamzolova, Yulia. Dogovor s obratnoi siloi Rossiya nachala peresmotr torgovyh soglashenii. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 673 from 30 September 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/09/30/torgovlya.html>
- L'vov, Igor. Odin plus odin - Gruzziya ostaetsya prep'yatstviem dlya Rossii pri vstuplenii v VTO, Ukraina mozhet im stat'. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4676 from 4 June 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/06/04/vto.html>
- Sidibe, Pierre. V VTO bez soglashenii - Rossiya vyhodit iz nekotoryh ekonomicheskikh dogovorennoستي do momenta vstupleniya vo Vsemirnyuyu torgovuyu organizaciyu.
- Semenov, Aleksei. 'Nabiullina: Peregovory o vstuplenii Rossii v VTO zavershatsya k koncu goda' Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 4 June 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/06/04/reg-szapad/vto-russia-anons.html>
- Srokina, Nadezhda. "Lichnaya himiya" politikov - Sergei Yastrzhembskii rasskazal chitatel'nyam "RG" podrobnosti poslednego sammita Rossiya-ES. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4510 from 6 November 2007. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2007/11/06/politiki.html>
- Tarasov, Vladimir. Pagubnaya toroplivost'. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 703 (19) from 26 May 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/05/26/vto.html>
- Veletninskii, Igor. Gazo - provody - Energeticheskie otnosheniya mogut stat' kamnem pretknoveniya v peregovorah Ukrainy s Rossiei. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4585 from 12 February 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/02/12/gaz.html>
- Veletninskii, Igor. Ili horosho, ili nichego - Maksim Medvedkov ne nashel negativnykh posledstviy vstupleniya Rossii v VTO. Video by Evgenii Arsyuhin. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/02/14/vto-medvedkov.html>
- Rossiiskaya Gazeta website news. Rossiya mozhet stat' polnocennym chlenom Vsemirnoi torgovoi organizacii s yanvarya 2009 goda. 11 March 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/03/11/vto-anons.html>
- Rossiiskaya Gazeta website news. USA podderzhivayut Rossiyu po voprosu o prisoedinenii ko Vsemirnoi torgovoi organizacii. Ob etom zayavil prezident SShA Dzhordzh Bush v Sochi na press-konferencii po itogam peregovorov s Prezidentom RF Vladimirom Putinyem. 7 April 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/04/07/wto-anons.html>
- Rossiiskaya Gazeta website news. Dmitrii Medvedev: Rossiya gotova vstupit' vo Vsemirnyuyu torgovuyu organizaciyu v nyneshnem godu. 8 April 2008. Available

- from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/04/08/medvedev-vto-anons.html>
- Rossiiskaya Gazeta website news. Rossiya namerena uvedomit' ryad svoih partnerov po VTO o vyhode iz soglashenii, protivorechashih ee interesam. 25 August 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/08/25/vto-anons.html>
- Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 4736 from 26 August 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/08/26/vto.html>
- Rossiiskaya Gazeta website news. MID: Rossiya prisodinit'sya k VTO lish' na standartnyh usloviyah. 10 December 2008. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2008/12/10/mid-anons.html>
- Rossiiskaya Gazeta website news. Pyat' prioritetov modernizatsii - Opredeleny napravleniya razvitiya ekonomiki. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 5043 (219) from 19 November 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/11/19/napravlenie.html>
- Rossiiskaya Gazeta website news. Yuliya Timoshenko poobeshala Rossii podderzhku pri vstuplenii v VTO. 26 April 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/04/29/timoshenko-vto-anons.html>
- Interview with Mr. Igor Shuvalov can be watched in Russian from here <http://www.vesti.ru/videos?vid=221108>
- ITAR-TASS. Prezident RF Dmitrii Medvedev uveren, chto Rossiya poidet v VTO po kratchaishemu puti. 18 November 2009. Available from [http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg\\_id=25284](http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg_id=25284)
- Kazakhstan Press Club. Virus H1N1 Strashnee Krizisa?!. 5 June 2009.
- Prime-Tass Economic News Agency. Vstuplenie v VTO v sostave Tamozhennogo soyuza ne yavlyaetsya demarshem ili politicheskim shagom - M.Medvedkov. 16 June 2009.
- Prime-Tass. Medvedev ne schitaet, chto dogovorennosti o sozdanii Tamozhennogo soyuza protivorechat planam po vstupleniyu Rossii v VTO. 23 November 2009. Available from [http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg\\_id=25312](http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg_id=25312)
- RIA Novosti. Russia and WTO - Information Bureau on the Russian Accession to the WTO. Kirgiziya gotova vstupit' v Tamozhennyi soyuz - Bakiev, 27 November 2009. Available from [http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg\\_id=25334](http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg_id=25334)
- Russian Financial Control Monitor, FC - Novosti. Russian producers suffer losses of \$ 2bn from other countries' restrictions. 27 July 2009.
- Russia and WTO - Information Bureau. 'On the Current State of Russia's WTO Accession negotiations' prepared by the Trade Negotiations Department of the Ministry of Economic Development in December 2008. Available from <http://www.wto.ru/russia.asp?f=delat&t=11>
- The Eurasian Economic Community (2009). Quick-Reference Guide. Secretariat of EurAsEC, Moscow. Available from <http://www.evrazes.com/i/data/item7182-2.pdf>
- The Eurasian Economic Community website. Questions and Answers (in Russian). Available from <http://www.evrazes.com/about/questionanswer>
- Vedomosti. Moskva ob'yasnila ES pozitsiyu po VTO. 18 November 2009. Available from [http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg\\_id=25276](http://www.wto.ru/ru/news.asp?msg_id=25276)
- The Presentation of the Minister of Economic Development Mrs. Elvira Nabiullina, "Russia-2020: the Concept of Economic Leadership," Moscow, 1 October 2008. Available in Russian from <http://www.youngscience.ru/753/820/978/index.shtml>
- The Speech of the Minister of Economic Development (Mrs. Elvira Nabiullina) to the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on 15



- October 2008. Available from <http://www.economy.gov.ru/wps/wcm/myconnect/economylib/mert/welcome/pressservice/eventschronicle/doc1217949648141>
- Notes to the Cabinet Meeting of the Russian Government on 5 November 2009. Available from <http://www.government.ru/content/governmentactivity/rfgovernmentssession/2009/zas051109/materials/7592127.htm>
- "The Strategy of Economic Development of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) until 2020," 14 November 2008
- "The Concept of the Long-Term Economic Development of the Russian Federation for period until 2020." (Decree of the Russian Government from 17 November 2008 # 1662-p)
- "The Main Directions of the Activity of the Government of Russia until 2020." (Decree of the Government from 17 November 2008 #1663-p)
- "The Main Directions of External Economic Policy of the Russian Federation until 2020", November 2008
- "The Strategy of the Russian National Security until 2020." (The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation # 537 from 12 May 2009)
- "The Main Directions of Customs Tariff Policy for the year 2010 and for the period 2011-2012." Presented by the Minister of Economic Development, Mrs. Elvira Nabiullina at the Russian Cabinet meeting on 11 June 2009
- "The Programme of the Anti-Crisis measures of the Russian Government for 2009," 19 June 2009
- The Speech of the Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev to the Federal Assembly. Poslanie prezidenta RF Dmitriya Medvedeva Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federacii. Rossiiskaya Gazeta # 5038 (214) from 13 November 2009. Available from <http://www.rg.ru/2009/11/13/poslanie-tekst.html>
- Global Trade Alert (GTA) database. Available from [www.globaltradealert.org](http://www.globaltradealert.org)
- Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, website. Available from <http://www.economy.gov.ru>
- Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, website. Available from <http://www.minprom.gov.ru/>
- Rossiiskaya Gazeta. Available from <http://www.rg.ru>
- Russia and WTO - Information Bureau on the Russian Accession to the WTO. Available from <http://www.wto.ru>
- Russian Federal Customs website. Available from <http://www.customs.ru>
- Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs' web page on the Russia's WTO Accession. Available from <http://www.rgwto.com/>
- The Government of the Russian Federation website. Available from <http://www.government.ru>
- The Russian Priority National Projects website. Available from <http://www.rost.ru>
- UN Comtrade database. Available from <http://comtrade.un.org>
- World Development Indicators (WDI) online database. Available from <http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/>

**Darya Gerasimenko** is a Ph.D. candidate and Research Assistant to Prof. Simon Evenett at the Swiss Institute for International Economics at the University of St. Gallen. She is a graduate from the MILE programme (summa cum laude) at the World Trade Institute in Bern (WTI). She has working experience with the Trade in Services Section of the International Trade Center (ITC) as well as with the Investment Trends Section of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) where she contributed to the World Investment Report 2007. She is currently working as the analyst of the Global Trade Alert for the CIS region. Her professional interests and expertise are trade policies in post soviet area (CIS region), Russian trade and industrial policy, regional integration, trade in services as well as the WTO accession process and value of the WTO membership. She can be contacted at [darya.gerasimenko@unisg.ch](mailto:darya.gerasimenko@unisg.ch).

---

# China's Protective State measures<sup>1</sup> in the Crisis Era: Motivation and Effect

Yunxia Yue


*Chinese Academy of Social Sciences*

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Global protectionism in the crisis-era

The US subprime mortgage crisis eventually induced global financial turmoil, which in turn led the world into the most severe downturn since the Great Depression. In the current crisis era, there has been unprecedented government intervention on a large scale. With governments endeavouring to protect national economies and domestic industries, protectionism has staged a comeback. According to the Global Trade Alert (GTA), since the First G20 Crisis-Related Summit, 1,155 policy changes have been taken in 611 announced state initiatives. Among them, only 12% are found to benefit foreign nations or involve no changes in the treatment of foreign commercial interests<sup>2</sup>, while the rest (88%) are likely to<sup>3</sup>, or will almost certainly<sup>4</sup>, discriminate against foreign interests (see figure 1).

**Figure 1** State Measures classified by GTA (by the end of November 2009)



Source: Calculated from the GTA database.

---

1 In this paper, we define the protective state measures as those that are damaging or damage foreign commercial interests. Roughly speaking, these measures include GTA's amber and red measures. The colour coding scheme used in the GTA database is described in Chapter 2 of this report.

2 These measures are classified "green" in the GTA database.

3 These measures are classified "amber" in the GTA database.

4 These measures are classified "red" in the GTA database.

There are several characteristics typical of contemporary protectionism. First, current protectionist measures are much more flexible and covert. Except for the traditional trade remedies (such as antidumping, countervailing and safeguard actions), more murky trade barriers (for example, certain forms of intellectual property protection, migration measures, public procurement rules, technical barriers to trade, etc.) have been implemented, which leaves less room for exporters to secure access to customers in protected markets. Second, protection has been extending to the cross-border movement of capital and labour, not just goods and services. Third, more measures are specifically devised against China, which is manifested, amongst others, by the high frequency of the special-safeguard measures.

Under such circumstances, the emerging export-oriented economies have been suffering. However, some developing countries have also turned into active implementers of protectionist measures. According to the GTA, developing economies<sup>5</sup> have taken 59% of the red measures and 55% of the amber measures<sup>6</sup>. Russia, Argentina, China, India, and Indonesia are now among the top 10 countries to have imposed the most harmful discriminatory measures.

## **1.2 China's resort to protective state measures during the crisis**

Since 2007, China has adopted a more "neutral" foreign policy, aiming to achieve moderate, balanced export and import growth. Due to the negative impact of the crisis on the domestic economy, a sharp decline of trade volume since the third quarter of 2008, and growing foreign trade discrimination, China adjusted its policies somewhat more towards a protective dimension. Between December 2008 and November 2009, it announced or implemented 29 state measures, of which only 3 were green measures, whilst 15 were amber measures and 11 were red measures<sup>7</sup>. There were 23 sectors, 331 tariff lines and 164 trade partners affected by the red measures.

Despite the large number of affected trade partners it should be made clear that, with the exception of antidumping and countervailing, China's protective state measures have not discriminated against specific trading partners. Theoretically speaking, these measures set identical thresholds to foreign goods, services and investments. Furthermore, only 27 economies were affected by Chinese defensive measures towards domestic commercial interests, while the other 137 economies were damaged by the other measures. Moreover, figure 2 demonstrates that the frequency of Chinese antidumping usage has declined during the past 11 months. Such evidence reveals that China's contemporary state measures do not target countries but seek to mitigate external shocks. Still, most of these measures were devised to protect certain industries. And whilst these measures directly or indirectly provide domestic producers in targeted industries with preferential treatment or incentives, they are discriminatory.


In terms of the form of protective measures, China has not followed the powerful trend towards "murky protectionism" found in the industrialized world. The GTA's database reports that more than half of China's harmful measures were trade defence measures, such as antidumping, countervailing and safeguard actions. The remaining

---

5 The classification is based on the World Bank's definition on the developed and developing economies.

6 Both red and amber measures are thought to be harmful by GTA.

7 Source: GTA database.

**Figure 2** China's implication of defense trade measures (2000~2009.11)

Source: WTO database and the announcements of Chinese Ministry of Commerce.

measures, which are intended to enhance the competitiveness of Chinese companies or industries, include export taxes or restrictions, investment measures, local content requirements, public procurement privileges, tariff measures, and the imposition of non-tariff barriers. Thus far, it could be argued that China's protective state measures are predictable. To give further clarification in this respect, figure 2 shows that among China's trade defence measures, antidumping actions have appeared with higher frequency, whereas the countervailing and safeguards, which are generally thought to be more harmful and less transparent, are seldom implemented.

## 2. Motivation for China's protective state measures

Protective state measures are far more than a purely economic problem; they should be analysed in a political economy framework. Generally speaking, there have been four motivations for China to take protective actions during the crisis: balancing multiple policy goals; maintaining the fair trade; strengthening industry competitiveness; and trade retaliation.

### 2.1 Balancing multiple policy goals

Chinese macro-economic policies have multiple goals. Given the background of a global financial crisis, employment, growth and industrial restructuring are priorities for policymakers. Under pressure to relieve the negative impact of the crisis, China's neutral foreign policies took a somewhat protective tilt.

With respect to employment, existing jobs were significantly affected by the financial crisis and appeared to decline remarkably. According to a sample survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MORHSS), between October 2008 and January 2009, an average of 40% of companies had experienced a net shrinkage in jobs. Migrant workers, especially those in the coastal export-processing enterprises, bore the brunt of the impact of the financial crisis. According to the survey of the National Bureau of Statistics, in February 2009 there were more than 12 million migrant workers (accounting for 8.5% of the total) that had temporarily lost their jobs and returned home due to the impact of the financial crisis. At the same time, the registered urban unemployment rate rose, reaching new

records for the past three years. As the labour-intensive, export-oriented industries are the main employers for the surplus labour force, some protective policies were undertaken and targeted at stabilising and enlarging the relevant industries, such as the restructuring of the equipment manufacturing industry<sup>8</sup> and the increase in VAT rebates for exporters<sup>9</sup>.

In terms of economic growth, the contraction of exports was a major negative factor. In November 2008 China's exports experienced their first decrease in total value in seven years, a fall which then accelerated. By August 2009, the peak-to-trough percentage decline of total exports reached 22.2%. Given the high degree of export dependency of the Chinese economy, this plunge brought about great macroeconomic difficulties and dislocation. In order to alleviate such pressures, the government introduced policies with the objective of boosting exports and stimulating domestic demand. The related trade protective measures included the local content requirements<sup>10</sup>, public procurement schemes,<sup>11</sup> restructuring of equipment manufacturing industry, and the increase of VAT rebates for exporters. Industrial restructuring to develop the advanced and high-technology commercial activities represented another direction of adjustment. Consequently, incentive measures have been imposed, including the restructuring of the ship-building industry<sup>12</sup> and the increase in the export-tax rebates granted to producers of high-technology and high-value added equipment, and for the abolition of import tariffs on key components of these technologies and on raw materials.<sup>13</sup>

## **2.2 Maintaining fair trade**

The second motivation for China's protective measures is to maintain fair trade. This target has been achieved using antidumping investigations, all in line with WTO rules. Between December 2008 and November 2009, China initiated 9 antidumping investigations and took 9 antidumping measures, most of which were against raw chemical materials and chemical products. In fact, these products have always been the targets of anti-dumping investigations worldwide. In the case of China, some foreign companies, in order to seize the Chinese market, have taken to dumping which has resulted in serious harm to their Chinese rivals. Overall, China actively took trade remedy measures in order to protect the state and relevant corporate interests.

The example of China's antidumping against methanol helps to explain the factors motivating policy. Since 2008, China's methanol imports have surged. In the first four months of 2009, the total import of methanol was over 2 million tons and the

---

8 On 12 May 2009, Chinese Ministry of Information Industry (MII) issued a Planning Release entitled *Restructuring and Revitalization of Planning for the Equipment Manufacturing Industry*.


9 On 1 April 2009, Chinese Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation published a Notice in which it was stated that the rebates to exporters from Value Added Tax would be increased.

10 On 26 May 2009, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) officially announced its implementation of measures to ensure that local content would be prioritized in government contracts.

11 On 10 April 2009, the General Office of the State Council issued GUOBANFA (2009) No. 35, titled *Opinions for Further Strengthening the Management of Government Procurement*.

12 On 6 June 2009, Chinese Ministry of Information Industry (MII) issued a Planning Release entitled *Restructuring and Revitalization of Planning for the Ship-building Industry*.

13 On 12 May 2009, Chinese Ministry of Information Industry (MII) issued a Planning Release entitled *Restructuring and Revitalization of Planning for the Equipment Manufacturing Industry*.

**Figure 3** The Price gap between domestic and imported methanol, January-May 2009.

Source: CHEMINFO database. Note: The exchange rate: \$1=RMB6.8.

sales of foreign products in the domestic market increased by 838.3%, a manifestation of dumping. Behind the surge of imports, there was a large price gap between the domestic product and its foreign competitor (see Figure 3). The quantity of dumping and the abnormally low price of methanol have damaged the corresponding domestic companies and industry. According to the Chinese Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association, during the first quarter of 2009, the local methanol companies' average operating rate was only about 30%, and 90% of them saw their losses expand. Between January and April 2009, domestic methanol consumption increased by 51.5% while the production in the first five months of this year fell by 11.2%. Following WTO rules, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce initiated an anti-dumping investigation into the imports of methanol from Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Indonesia on 24 June 2009. This investigation sought to correct the distorted methanol market.

### 2.3 Strengthening industry competitiveness

Cultivating or strengthening industry competitiveness is another reason for protection. It is argued that proper protection in an open economy will help the emerging domestic industries to gain competitiveness. Some of China's recent protective trade policies were based on that premise.

Taking the dairy products as an example will explain the above logic for protective measures imposed in the crisis era. Seen comparatively, the Chinese dairy industry has a low competitiveness<sup>14</sup> and faces great pressures from foreign rivals. During 2009 the international milk powder price declined rapidly. The import price dropped from its peak of \$4,565/ton in March 2008 to \$2,155/ton in May 2009, a fall of 52.79%. Accordingly, Chinese imports soared. In the first five months of 2009, China's import of milk powder reached 106,638 tons, a rise of 152.57% over the same period of the previous year. A large amount of cheap foreign milk powder threatened Chinese competitors, whose costs were around \$30 000/ ton. To retain more space for the domestic manufacturers, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced that it would impose automatic import licensing on fresh milk, milk powder, and whey from 1 August 2009. The restriction on import volume may help the domestic companies to

<sup>14</sup> The revealed competitive advantage (RCA) index for Chinese dairy industry is 0.1, which should be explained as lack of competitiveness.

expand scale, so as to cut costs and gain competitiveness.

Similar to the restrictions in the dairy industry, China's ban on foreign entrants to the express business postal services sector provides another example of changed policy stance. Maintaining an average annual growth of over 20% in recent years, the express postal industry is one of the fastest growing sectors in China. As of April 2009, there were more than 2,000 express service providers and 7,000 branches. Despite this large number of providers, most companies were small-scale, which caused excessive competition and lower efficiency in the sector. In 2007, the volume of parcels and express post sent by Chinese companies was only 1.5 billion, which is one-fifth of that of comparable US companies. Statistics shows that UPS, FEDEX, DHL, and TNT, the four major international logistics giants, had together taken more than 70% of the Chinese market. To change the situation, China adopted a new Postal Law on 24 April 2009. Through preventing foreign capital from entering the express postal service and raising the entering threshold for local companies, the new law seeks to enhance Chinese companies' competitiveness in the corresponding field.

## **2.4 Trade retaliation**

Trade retaliation is a special protective method for China during circumstances of global protectionism. China has retained the record for being the biggest victim of antidumping actions for 14 consecutive years and of countervailing actions for three years. Even though it suffered from many strict foreign trade restrictions, China seldom took revenge. However, this mild attitude was not reciprocated with accommodative trade conditions. Indeed, 35% of antidumping and 71% of anti-subsidy actions were against Chinese exports in the first three quarters of 2009. Under these circumstances, trade retaliation became one of the options for the Chinese government in the struggle for a better trading environment.

A typical case of Chinese trade revenge is the tyre wars with the US. On 11 September 2009, the U.S. government decided to impose a 35% anti-dumping tariff on Chinese tyre exports. On 13 September 2009, China launched anti-dumping and anti-subsidies investigations into automobiles and chicken meat originating from the United States. The implementation of China's trade counteraction does not indicate a preference for an all-out trade war, but is more a means of curbing the protectionist tendencies of some trading partners, and in so doing, facilitate international trade in order to create a more stable, predictable environment for development.

## **3. Effect of China's protective measures**

### **3.1 Helpful in achieving the macro-economic goals**

During the crisis, China has launched a series of protective state measures, which have played an active role in achieving macroeconomic objectives. First of all, these policies were helpful in reversing the rapid decline of Chinese exports. Statistics show that the percentage export contraction began to turn around in September 2009, and kept growing for the seven consecutive months (see table 1). In particular, the highly-protected, labour-intensive products have led to resumed export growth.



**Table 1** Chinese export between October 2008 and October 2009

	<b>Export</b> (thousand US dollars)	<b>Accumulated Export</b> (thousand US dollars)	<b>Accumulated</b> <b>Growth Rate (%)</b>
Oct. 2008	128,327,028	1,202,330,946	21.9
Nov. 2008	114,987,285	1,317,161,607	19.3
Dec. 2008	111,157,222	1,428,545,709	17.2
Jan. 2009	90,453,600	90,453,600	-17.5
Feb. 2009	64,894,649	155,325,420	-21.1
Mar. 2009	90,290,547	245,539,934	-19.7
Apr. 2009	91,934,722	337,420,869	-20.5
May 2009	88,757,886	426,142,046	-21.8
Jun. 2009	95,411,208	521,531,055	-21.8
Jul. 2009	105,420,240	627,097,202	-22.0
Aug. 2009	103,707,009	730,736,122	-22.2
Sep. 2009	115,937,994	846,649,410	-21.3
Oct. 2009	110,762,383	957,360,575	-20.5

Source: Statistics of Chinese General Administration of Customs.

Secondly, the above-mentioned measures have effectively limited export volatility in labour-intensive sectors, thereby becoming positive factors for maintaining employment and growth. According to Customs, the decline of Chinese labour-intensive exports was 20.5% less than that for aggregate exports. Between January and October 2009, the export of clothing and accessories dropped by 10.9%, textile products by 12.9%, footwear by 6%, plastic products by 8.4%, and toys by 11.3%. In contrast, China's export of electrical products fell by a larger measure of 18.6% during the same period.


Thirdly, these measures helped to stimulate domestic demand and so have contributed significantly to the Chinese government's goal of "guaranteed growth". It is worth mentioning that the restructuring plans for ship-building and equipment manufacturing industries are seen as essential measures. Their supplier industries are situated upstream of traditional manufacturing industries. By providing the producers of the final consumer goods with capital and technical know-how, they have generated strong knock-on effects on surrounding industries. All of these measures will be conducive to achieving an 8% growth rate of GDP during the crisis-era and afterwards.

### 3.2 Effective on protecting domestic industries

Antidumping represents a large share of Chinese state measures taken during the crisis. Anti-dumping duties, like the ordinary tariff, will often raise the domestic price of imported goods and reduce imports. By doing so, it can enlarge the space for domestic industries to develop. Since December 2009, most of the antidumping investigations or duties have had the anticipated impact on import prices. In the case of phenol<sup>15</sup>, after the announcement of antidumping duties, the import price rose from \$513.9/ton in February to \$931.3/ton. At the same time, the import volume,

15 Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced the antidumping duties on phenol origin from Japan, Korea, US and Taiwan on February 1 2009.

**Figure 3** Import volume and price of phenol (2009.1~2009.10)



Source: Statistics of Chinese General Administration of Customs.

although not so sensitive as the price to the antidumping duties, tended to decline (see figure 4). In most of the other antidumping actions, there existed a similar adjustment on import price and volume of the relevant products. In summary, antidumping measures improved the business condition for the damaged companies and enhanced their competitiveness.

Quantity restrictions, for example the automatic import licensing of dairy products, are another form of state measure imposed with the aim of protecting certain industries. Such restrictions are also efficient at squeezing out room for the development of upstream industries. Since the imposition of restrictions on dairy goods, the imports of milk, milk powder, and whey have dropped significantly. To compensate, domestic production has been raised. Statistics show that profitability has returned after one-year of losses in the dairy industry. Meanwhile, the domestic dairy producers recovered with higher production and better quality. In September 2009 alone dairy production increased by 30.92%.

### 3.3 Ineffective in deterring foreign protectionism

During the crisis, one of the rationales for undertaking China's state measures is to curb foreign discriminatory measures against Chinese exports. However, current steps have not reached the expected results. Compared with other times in history, there is no apparent decrease in antidumping and countervailing actions against Chinese exports. China is still the biggest victim of such damaging foreign measures. According to the GTA, during the crisis 284 unfavourable foreign measures have been announced or implemented against China.

Perhaps one of the reasons for this outcome is that most Chinese policies do not target particular trading partners, or maybe even the right trading partners. For sure,

some of China's protective measures concentrate on products originating from its major trade partners: Japan, South Korea, EU, and U.S. The fact is, however, that many of the discriminatory measures taken against Chinese products have been initiated by other economies including India, Russia, Argentina, and Turkey<sup>16</sup>. It is therefore evident that China could hardly prevent the latter unless it takes actions which clearly target those economies that frequently target Chinese commercial interests.

#### **4. Conclusions**

During the financial crisis, China has put forward a series of protective state measures aimed at providing itself with stable, sustainable, and predictable external conditions for development. In this regard, Chinese state measures are of the nature of moderate protection. It has been argued that these moderate protective policies were effective in solving the employment, industrial nurturing, and economic growth-related challenges facing China, but lack effectiveness in overcoming external difficulties. In particular, these policies were not enough to change the fact that China is suffering disproportionately under global protectionism. At present, the intensity and frequency of China's protective measures are much less than the attacks it is facing. Chinese protective policies are far from curbing the foreign protectionism attacks. In the future, China should devise policies with more externalities so as to increase its bargaining counters in international negotiations, and strive for a more friendly international environment for development.

Most of China's protective measures in the current crisis era have not been clearly targeted against specific trading partners; even the trade-remedy actions taken were rather more defensive than offensive. Meanwhile, such policies have identified definite sectors and goals to protect, and therefore have become predictable. In addition, China's state measures during the financial crisis can be classified into two forms: industry policies and trade remedies. Among them, the former aimed at achieving multiple macro-economic goals. Abiding by WTO's rules, the latter was expected to facilitate fair and stable trade and to eliminate possible industrial damage. Accordingly, Chinese state measures taken during the financial crisis, although to a certain degree protective, are much less damaging than traditional protectionist measures.

#### **References**

- Prusa, T. J. "The Trade Effects of US Anti - Dumping Actions". In R. Feenstra. eds., *The Effects of US trade Protection and Trade Promotion Policies* . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
- Sheng, Bin. *Political Economy Analysis on China's Trade Policies*. Shanghai: Shanghai Joint Publishing Company, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2002.

---

<sup>16</sup> According to GTA, the top 10 economies that have discriminated against China are Korea, Japan, United State, EU, Russia, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines and Thailand.

- Gu, Kejian. "Modeling Synthesis in Application to Endogenized Trade Policy in China". *Economic Research*, 2003, (9): 2- 131.
- Yin, Xiuling and Fan, Aijun. "Is China's Antidumping Policy Endogenous?" *Research on Financial and Economic*, 2009 (5): 124-128.
- Wang, Wenchuang and Yuan, Tao. "On Condition and Effect of China's Antidumping." *Theory Journal*, 2008 (8): 55-59.
- Wei, Fang, "On moderate Protection of China's trade Policies in a Political Economy Perspective". Available at: [http://d.wanfangdata.com.cn/Thesis\\_Y1083647.aspx](http://d.wanfangdata.com.cn/Thesis_Y1083647.aspx)

**Yunxia Yue** is Associate Professor of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and a member of the Chinese Association of Latin American studies. She obtained her Ph.D. in Economics from University of International Business and Economics (UIBE). She is particularly interested in international trade and FDI, trade frictions between China and its partners, China's foreign economic relations and Latin American economy. Now she leads a project supported by CASS on so-called Strategy for Sino-Latin American Economic Relations. Her recent papers include: "On Sino-Latin American trade frictions", "China & Mexico: Comparison of Trade Competitiveness", "Evaluation on APEC Trade Liberation" (Co-authored with Yu Chai), "Analysis on Board Structure of Chinese Listed Companies", "Evaluation on Sino-Chile FTA".

---

# The Impact of Cross-Border Discrimination on Japanese Exports: A Sectoral Analysis<sup>1</sup>

**Anirudh Shingal**

*CARIS, University of Sussex*

## 1. Introduction

Japan is the second largest trading economy in the Asia-Pacific after China, and the fourth largest in the world after the United States (US), Germany, and China. Globally, two-thirds of Japan's exports go to five principal destinations - China, the US, the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU) and South Korea. Moreover, Japan sources two-thirds of its imports from almost the same set of countries - China, ASEAN, the US, EU, and Australia. Given this pattern of trade, how has crisis-era protectionism affected Japan's exports?

Looking at monthly trade data for Japan over the period November 2008 - July 2009, one can see that both Japanese exports and imports have contracted during the recent global recession. This is true of both its trade with its major trading partners as well as with the rest of the world (ROW). However, Japanese exports have witnessed a sharper fall on a year-on-year (YoY) basis than Japanese imports. While this latter outcome probably reflects falling global demand, it can also be hypothesised that the protectionist measures taken by Japan's major trading partners have also been a contributing factor. This matter is explored in a preliminary statistical analysis presented in this chapter of discriminatory measures reported in the GTA's database. Controlling for changes in incomes, prices and other factors—including the extent and form of foreign discrimination against Japanese commercial interests and for discrimination by Japan—it was found that foreign discriminatory measures, other than bailouts and subsidies, have reduced Japanese exports. Interestingly, Japanese discrimination against foreign commercial interests in a given sector was found to reduce Japanese exports from the same sector; suggesting that discrimination may not have been an effective way of improving sectoral trade imbalances.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: the next section looks at Japanese trade performance over the period November 2008 - July 2009, examining monthly import and export data from the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO). Section 3 provides a snapshot of the trends in global demand and supply over this period, looking at YoY percentage changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and industrial production (IIP) for Japan's major trading partners, extracted from various editions of *The Economist*. Section 4 analyzes the data on discriminatory measures either imposed on, or by, Japan over this nine-month period, using the information from the GTA data-

---

1 I would like to thank Simon Evenett for inviting this contribution. The usual disclaimer applies.

base; while Section 5 does the same for Japan's major trading partners. Section 6 examines empirically if the number of discriminatory measures facing a Japanese export sector has had a negative impact on export performance during the past one year. Section 7 concludes.

## 2. Recent Japanese trade performance

In this section we look at Japan's trade performance over a nine-month period since November 2008. Tables 1 and 2 break down Japanese exports and imports by destination, respectively. As Table 1 shows, Japanese exports have fallen in absolute value between November 2008-July 2009, from USD 54.3 bn to USD 50.9 bn. While the fall in exports has been arrested since April 2009, the value has still not regained its pre-crisis level. The distribution of exports amongst the principal destinations has also witnessed a change - the US was the most important market for Japanese exports until January 2009 but was overtaken by China in April 2009 (the nine-month average over this period in fact places China in first place with an export share of 17.4%). However, amongst the top 5 destinations, the US has witnessed the biggest fall in Japanese exports (average YoY decline of 35.8%) followed by the EU. On the other hand, Japanese exports to China fell by an average 22% over this period.

A similar analysis of Japanese imports in Table 2 shows that, while her imports have fallen as well over this time period, from USD 56.6 bn to USD 46.9 bn, the YoY decline has not been as much as that for exports (in fact it is only in July 2009 that the YoY fall in imports exceeds the corresponding figure for exports). For the nine-month period since the beginning of this crisis, Japanese imports have had an average YoY fall of 21% compared to 28.9% YoY decline for exports.

**Table 1** Value, share, and percentage change in Japanese exports by destination

Exports Country/Area	2008/11			2009/01			2009/04			2009/07		
	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)
Total	54360291	-15.0	100.0	38368462	-34.1	100.0	42399029	-38.0	100.0	50941109	-28.5	100.0
USA	9532802	-23.2	17.5	6303777	-42.9	16.4	6603072	-45.4	15.6	8125192	-31.9	16.0
China	8735294	-12.4	16.1	5636319	-33.5	14.7	8224955	-24.6	19.4	9916945	-17.3	19.5
ASEAN	7498087	-2.4	13.8	5108279	-28.9	13.3	5389578	-39.8	12.7	7547621	-22.3	14.8
EU-27	7252146	-19.8	13.3	5754806	-36.2	15.0	5614440	-44.4	13.2	5876657	-39.1	11.5
South Korea	3728194	-24.6	6.9	3080655	-30.1	8.0	3625535	-33.1	8.6	4045276	-25.0	7.9

Source: JETRO

**Table 2** Value, share, and percentage change in Japanese imports by source

Imports Country/Area	2008/11			2009/01			2009/04			2009/07		
	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)
Total	56677638	-0.6	100.0	48929404	-17.0	100.0	41787668	-34.6	100.0	46967446	-33.4	100.0
China	11983434	2.2	21.1	11861640	2.1	24.2	10046339	-20.3	24.0	10490934	-17.3	22.3
ASEAN	8153467	5.0	14.4	7041185	-14.4	14.4	5836363	-33.2	14.0	6649861	-29.7	14.2
USA	5798786	-4.5	10.2	4842984	-20.9	9.9	4586096	-28.0	11.0	4624271	-26.9	9.9
EU-27	5444507	-8.0	9.6	5450399	-6.9	11.1	4248490	-29.9	10.2	4786055	-22.3	10.2
Australia	4638260	64.4	8.2	4059265	40.2	8.3	2829701	-17.1	6.8	2892663	-35.7	6.2

Source: JETRO

### 3. Relevant global economic developments

The sharp fall in Japanese exports can be attributed to the fall in global income as well as to the sluggish domestic economy. Similarly, falling demand in Japan and sluggish supply in ROW would have a bearing on Japanese imports. This can be seen in Tables 3 and 4 which show the percentage change in quarterly GDP and monthly IIP for Japan<sup>2</sup> and her major trading partners over this period. With the exception of China and Australia, GDP has fallen sharply on a YoY basis for all the other economies in the last three quarters. Industrial production has contracted substantially in all economies, except for the Chinese.

**Table 3** Percentage change in quarterly GDP on a YoY basis

Country/Area	2008-09 Q3	2008 - 09 Q4	2009 - 10 Q1	2009 - 10 Q2
USA	0.7	-0.8	-2.5	-3.8
Japan	-0.1	-4.3	-8.8	-6.4
China	9.0	6.8	6.1	7.9
Euro Area	0.7	-1.5	-4.9	-4.7
South Korea	3.8	-3.4	-4.2	-2.2
Australia	1.9	0.3	0.4	0.6

Source: *The Economist* newspaper, various editions

**Table 4** Percentage change in monthly IIP on a YoY basis

Country/Area	2008/11	2009/01	2009/04	2009/07
USA	-5.5	-10.0	-12.5	-13.1
Japan	-16.6	-30.8	-31.2	-22.9
China	5.4	3.8	7.3	10.8
Euro Area	-7.7		-21.6	-15.9
South Korea	-14.1	-25.6	-8.2	0.7

Source: *The Economist* newspaper, various editions

It is interesting to note that amongst all economies that have shown a decline in GDP and IIP over the corresponding period of the preceding year, the fall in GDP and IIP has been the most for Japan throughout this period. Clearly then, both demand and supply has fallen by more in Japan than in the US and EU, but Japanese imports have suffered less than her exports. *Prima facie* and *ceteris paribus*, this suggests that other factors may be at work as well here, and we argue that one of these could be the discriminatory measures that have been imposed on Japanese commercial interests, especially by her major trading partners. Exploring this contention further is the goal of the following section.

### 4. Review of protectionist measures affecting Japan

Table 5 provides a summary of measures from the GTA database that have either harmed or are likely to harm Japanese commercial interests. As this table shows, of

the 133 measures affecting Japan, 105 have been classified as "amber"<sup>3</sup> (measures implemented and likely to be discriminatory/measures announced but not implemented and discriminatory) and "red" (implemented and almost certainly discriminatory). Of the 25 pending measures likely to affect Japan, 23 are likely to have an adverse effect. Moreover, 46 of Japan's trading partners have imposed measures that almost certainly discriminate ("red" measures) against Japanese commercial interests.

**Table 5** Snapshot of trade restrictive measures affecting Japan

Statistic	All measures	All measures excluding trade defense measures
Number of measures in database affecting specified partner	133	117
Number of measures in database affecting specified partner classified ( <b>green</b> )	18	18
Number of measures in database affecting specified partner classified ( <b>amber</b> )	37	28
Number of measures in database affecting specified partner classified ( <b>red</b> )	78	71
Number of implemented measures affecting specified partner	108	99
Number of pending measures likely to affect trading partner	25	18
Number of pending measures likely to harm trading partner, ie. classified ( <b>amber</b> , <b>red</b> )	23	16
Number of jurisdictions imposing <b>red</b> measures on specified partner	46	45

Source: GTA database

A further breakdown of these measures by implementing jurisdiction and type is provided in Table 6. This reveals that almost half of the 105 "red" and "amber" measures have been imposed by her top five trading partners, which does not contradict our working hypothesis. The 27 members of the EU and ASEAN member states have imposed most of these measures, followed by China and the US. Table 6 also shows that government bail outs and tariff measures dominate in the list of discriminatory measures affecting Japan.

The GTA's website also makes it possible to look at the effect of these measures at a sectoral level. Table 7 captures the frequency of these measures affecting specific Japanese sectors.

As Table 7 shows, the sectors that have been the most affected by restrictive measures include: 1 (agriculture/horticulture), 23 (grain mill products), 27 (textiles other than apparel), 28 (knitted or crocheted fabric), 29 (leather products and footwear), 34 (basic chemicals), 35 (other chemical products), 36 (rubber and plastic products), 38 (furniture), 41 (basic metals), 42 (fabricated metal products), 43 (general purpose machinery), 44 (special purpose machinery), 46 (electrical machinery and apparatus), 47 (radio, TV and communication equipment) and 49 (transport equipment).

<sup>3</sup> This is the classification adopted by the GTA team.



**Table 6** Break-up of protectionist measures affecting Japan by partner and type of measure

Type of measure/Partner	USA	EU 27	China	South Korea	ASEAN	ROW	Total
Bail out / state aid measure	1	14		1	1	5	22
Competitive devaluation					1		1
Consumption subsidy		1				2	3
Export subsidy	1	3				4	8
Export taxes or restriction			1		1	4	6
Import ban					1	1	2
Import subsidy							0
Intellectual property protection							0
Investment measure		1	1				2
Local content requirement	1		1				2
Migration measure	1			1		1	3
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)					3	6	9
Other service sector measure					1	2	3
Public procurement	1	3				2	6
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)							0
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure						1	1
State trading enterprise							0
State-controlled company							0
Sub-national government measure							0
Tariff measure			1	1	5	16	23
Technical Barrier to Trade						1	1
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)			3			6	9
Trade finance						4	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>105</b>

Source: GTA database; own calculations.

**Table 7** Tally chart of restrictive measures affecting individual Japanese sectors

Sector	Number	Sector	Number	Sector	Number	Sector	Number	Sector	Number	Sector	Number
0	1	15	2	26	9	37	5	48	5	81	7
1	13	16	3	27	16	38	11	49	16	85	2
2	7	17	3	28	15	39	6	51	2	86	1
3	4	18	3	29	12	41	15	52	2	88	1
4	5	20	1	31	6	42	15	53	2	91	1
10	1	21	9	32	5	43	13	71	1	92	1
11	2	22	7	33	1	44	17	72	2	93	1
12	4	23	15	34	13	45	3	73	2	94	1
13	1	24	4	35	12	46	12	74	1	95	1
14	4	25	2	36	10	47	12	75	1	96	1

Source: GTA database; own calculations.

**Table 8** Value, share and percentage change in Japanese exports by sector

Exports	2008/11			2009/01			2009/04			2009/07		
	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)	Value (USD '000s)	YoY (%)	Share (%)
Total	54360291	-15.0	100.0	38368462	-34.1	100.0	42399029	-38.0	100.0	50941109	-28.5	100.0
Transport Equipment	13843665	-16.8	25.5	8992022	-43.9	23.4	8144056	-52.5	19.2	11767097	-32.0	23.1
Machinery	10705730	-11.0	19.7	7844003	-28.3	20.4	7771224	-43.6	18.3	8379751	-39.0	16.5
Electrical Machinery	10625351	-18.5	19.6	6784027	-36.1	17.7	8812014	-32.8	20.8	10408195	-22.2	20.4
Manufactured Goods	7248266	1.8	13.3	5513009	-16.0	14.4	5396203	-33.4	12.7	6425375	-28.0	12.6
Chemicals	4361935	-23.7	8.0	3507081	-35.8	9.1	4868411	-23.5	11.5	5582830	-16.4	11.0

Source: JETRO

Significantly, the sectors that have been hit the most by foreign protectionism tend to be sectors in the Japanese economy that have witnessed the greatest fall in exports on a YoY basis. This can be seen in Table 8 above. The average YoY decline over this period has been the most for transport equipment (-36.3%) and machinery (-30.5%).

In further support of our argument, we also provide, in Table 9, a snapshot of discriminatory measures that have been imposed by Japan on its trading partners. It is interesting to note that as opposed to 105 "red" and "amber" measures affecting Japanese exports, there are only 9 "red" and "amber" measures that affect Japanese imports from ROW. This also suggests why Japanese exports may have fallen more than Japanese imports over this period, possibly as a result of Lerner Symmetry<sup>4</sup>.

**Table 9** Snapshot of trade restrictive measures by Japan on its partners

Statistic	All measures	All measures excluding trade defence measures
Number of measures in database by specified jurisdiction	9	4
Number of measures in database by specified jurisdiction classified ( green)	0	0
Number of measures in database by specified jurisdiction classified ( amber)	2	2
Number of measures in database by specified jurisdiction classified ( red)	7	2
Number of tariff lines affected by red measures implemented by specified jurisdiction	133	130
Number of sectors affected by red measures implemented by specified jurisdiction	9	9
Number of trading partners affected by red measures implemented by specified jurisdiction	97	97

Source: GTA database.

## 5. How do comparators fare in terms of measures?

It may also be revealing to look at the number of discriminatory measures affecting and imposed by Japan's major trading partners. This is done in Table 10 below.

Significantly, while the US, China and EU have had a greater number of measures harming their commercial interests compared to Japan, they have also imposed far more restrictions on their imports from ROW than the Japanese have. Unfortunately, monthly trade data is currently unavailable for China and the EU otherwise our pre-

4 This Theorem due to Abba P. Lerner (1936) states that, given balanced trade, a tax on imports has the same effect as a tax on exports. Across the board increases in Japanese tariffs, therefore, cannot improve the Japanese trade balance (as exports fall by the same amount as imports do.) In section 6 of this paper a more restrictive hypothesis, motivated by but distinct from Lerner's Symmetry, is evaluated. In that section, we examine whether Japanese discrimination against foreign commercial interests in a sector reduces Japanese exports from that sector. Why might this occur? The former discrimination may increase the incentive of Japanese firms to supply Japanese customers at home relative to supplying foreign customers abroad.

liminary findings on Japan could have been compared with an analysis of these partners' trade performance over this time period.

**Table 10** Snapshot of trade restrictive measures on and by Japan's trading partners

Country/Area	No. of red & amber measures affecting		No. of red & amber measures imposed	
	All measures	Excluding trade defence	All measures	Excluding trade defence
USA	128	105	38	21
China	212	123	22	10
EU-27	163	129	74	66
Japan	115	99	9	4
South Korea	104	84	7	7
Australia	79	73	8	2

Source: GTA database.

## 6. Estimating the impact of discriminatory measures on Japanese exports<sup>5</sup>

To provide additional weight to our arguments, we next examine empirically if the number of discriminatory measures facing a Japanese export sector has had a negative impact on export performance during the past year. To do this, we modify the standard export supply function to include the number of discriminatory measures facing a Japanese export sector as an explanatory variable, in addition to standard income and price variables. Given the prominence of subsidies and bailouts in the past year, and no clear supposition that their effect on Japanese exports must be the same as other discriminatory measures, we divide each reported foreign measure that harmed Japanese commercial interests in the GTA database into subsidy<sup>6</sup> measures and all other discriminatory ("non-subsidy"<sup>7</sup>) measures. We also control for measures the Japanese take to discriminate against foreign commercial interests in a given sector, ie, measures that may include outright protection of Japanese firms and that might induce Japanese firms to shift resources away from exporting to supplying the domestic market. The functional form of the econometric specification employed are as follows:

$$x_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 WY\_YoY_{it} + \alpha_2 iip_t + \alpha_3 xpi_t + \alpha_4 neert + \alpha_5 sbsdy_i + \alpha_6 nonsbsdy_i + \alpha_7 by\_jap_i + v_{it}$$

where subscript 'i' stands for sector, subscript 't' for month, all variables in lower case are logarithms of their original values, X is the total Japanese exports, XPI is the export price index for Japan, WY is an indicator of global purchasing power, IIP is Japan's index of industrial production, NEER is the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate for Japan, SBSDY and NONSBSDY are the number of subsidy and all other discriminatory measures imposed on Japanese export sectors, respectively, By\_Japi is the total

5 I would like to thank Simon Evenett for both suggesting that I include this empirical analysis and for his useful inputs in this section.

6 These include state bail outs, competitive devaluation, all forms of subsidies and trade finance.

7 These include all measures in Table 6 except for the subsidy measures outlined above.

number of discriminatory measures imposed by Japan in a given sector and  $\alpha_4$  is the error term. *A priori*, we expect  $\alpha_1$  through  $\alpha_3$  to be positive and  $\alpha_4$  through  $\alpha_7$  to be negative.

It is important to point out that the data employed differs in its availability and variation across sectors and time. Some variables, such as IIP, XPI, and NEER are not available on a sectoral basis, while the measures of cross-border discrimination do not have a temporal dimension. Also, since real GDP data is available only on a quarterly basis, to control for the effect of global demand on Japanese export supply we use IIP data instead which is available on a monthly basis. To construct our measure of changes in global demand, we calculated the weighted average of the YoY changes in IIP over the period November 2008 - September 2009 of Japan's top five export destinations, using as weights the share of Japanese exports in a given sector to the country in question in the year before global trade collapsed, namely, 2008. This computation renders the WY variable variant over both sector and time. As more data becomes available over time, this and similar analyses can be repeated and refined. At the moment, then, it is best to regard what follows as a preliminary analysis whose conclusions need not survive the test of time.

We assembled monthly data for these variables over the period November 2008 - September 2009 and consider 12 broad sectors for which data is available - manufacture of metals, non-ferrous metals, paper and paper manufactures, scientific and optical instruments, chemicals, textile yarn & fabrics, machinery, electrical machinery, foodstuff, raw materials, mineral fuels and transport equipment. The summary statistics and correlation between variables are provided in the Appendix.

We estimated this panel using simple OLS and report the results from estimation in Table 11 below. As expected, global demand, Japanese IIP, and export prices have a positive impact on Japanese exports but the result for the latter two lack statistical significance. The negative estimates of parameters  $\alpha_6$  and  $\alpha_7$  seem imply that foreign discriminatory measures against Japanese exports, other than subsidies, reduce Japanese exports--as do Japanese discrimination against foreign commercial interests in the same sector. Foreign tariff increases, anti-dumping investigations, "buy national procurement policies," therefore, are found to have reduced Japanese sectoral exports. Furthermore, Japanese policymakers should be under no illusion that discriminating against foreign commercial interests can proceed without harm being done to Japanese export interests--not through subsequent foreign retaliation as is often supposed but through shifting resources in Japan away from exporting.

Discriminatory foreign subsidies are estimated to have a positive impact on Japanese export performance, highlighting the importance of not always associating discrimination with falling trade. What might account for the finding that foreign discriminatory bailouts and subsidies have cushioned the fall in Japanese exports during the current global economic downturn? Suppose the foreign bailout or subsidy limits the capacity and output reductions of the beneficiaries of the foreign state's largesse. If Japanese firms seek to preserve their share of the foreign market in question (perhaps because brand strength, which has intangible value, is associated with market presence or share), then Japanese firms may respond by limiting their export reductions more than would otherwise be the case.

Interestingly, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients on the terms capturing cross-border discrimination imply that the indirect impact of discrimination by Japan

on its own export performance may be larger than the impact of discriminatory measures imposed by foreigners. Indeed, the econometric estimates reported here imply that the combined effect of an equal percentage increase in the number of measures imposed abroad<sup>8</sup> and in Japan would be to slightly raise Japanese sectoral exports. Once uncertainty in the statistical estimates is taken into account, the net effect of any escalation in discrimination worldwide would not affect the level of Japanese sectoral exports. That such discrimination may not affect sectoral trade flows does not imply that it is not distorting the allocation of national resources and creating constituencies that will oppose further liberalisation.

**Table 11** Estimation results

Depdt var: ln(Exports)		
Indpdt var	Coeff	Std Err
WY YoY	0.05***	0.014
ln(IIP)	0.15	0.31
ln(XPI)	2.90	3.7
ln(NEER)	1.90	2.1
ln(SBSDY)	2.4***	0.08
ln(NONSBSDY)	-0.29***	0.04
ln(BY_JAP)	-1.9***	0.04
constant	-7.3	28.8
no of obs	55	
R-squared	0.99	

Note: Levels of significance - \* 10%, \*\* 5%, \*\*\* 1%

## 7. Conclusion

In the recent sharp global economic downturn, Japanese exports have witnessed a sharper fall year-on-year than Japanese imports. While the export contraction can certainly be attributed in part to falling global demand and to shrinking domestic supply during this period, it has also been the case that Japan's commercial interests have been harmed by many measures taken by its trading partners. In a preliminary econometric analysis, the results of which were presented in this chapter, the impact of different types of foreign discrimination on Japanese sectoral exports was found to differ. Foreign subsidies and bailouts tend to have limited Japanese export falls, while foreign tariffs have exacerbated the contraction of Japanese exports. Given the prominence of discriminatory subsidies and bailouts in the past year, this empirical finding casts doubt on the wisdom of attempts to summarise the impact of contemporary protectionism, by examining only the effect of tariff increases and other more transparent discriminatory policy instruments.

The findings of this study have several implications, some for policymakers. First, the study confirms that the Japanese government has a considerable stake in the measures taken during the crisis by governments abroad. The imposition of foreign measures, other than subsidies, reduces Japanese exports. Second, defensive measures

8 Both subsidy and non-subsidy.

by the Japanese government that involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests are foolish on two grounds. For one, these measures invite potential retaliation that could harm Japanese exports. In addition, such discrimination may increase the incentives of Japanese firms to supply domestic markets and cut back on exports. In short, there are no free lunches here: attempts to protect Japanese firms from import competition will have knock-on harmful effects for Japanese exports. It would be useful to know whether this finding is unique to Japan or of more general policy relevance. Third, given the widespread resort to subsidies and bailouts by many industrialised countries during the past year, the finding reported here that foreign subsidies may have limited the retrenchment of Japanese exports surely casts doubt on any presumption that every discriminatory state measure taken in the past year has reduced trade. Economists have long recognised that the impact of policies on the allocation of resources within a society is ultimately the right metric to assess government interventions; providing another reason to cast aside the presumption that more (less) trade is equated with less (more) resource misallocation and larger (smaller) national income.

## References

Bank of Japan website: <http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/stat/index.htm>

Global Trade Alert website: <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>

Japan External Trade Organization website: <http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/>

Lerner, Abba P. (1936). 'The Symmetry between Import and Export Taxes,' *Economica* 3, (August), pp. 306-313.

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry: <http://www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/index.html>

*The Economist*, various editions UN Comtrade

A DPhil in Economics from the University of Sussex, **Anirudh Shingal** specializes in International Economics, Econometrics and Development. Anirudh has worked in International Trade for over 7 years including at the WTO and the World Bank and has conducted specific research on trade in services, government procurement, regional trade, LDC market access, trade defence, trade facilitation, competition policy, trade in agriculture and SPS issues. He has also published in these areas, including for the World Bank, the WTO, the European Commission, UNCTAD and the Commonwealth Secretariat. Anirudh has been working on issues of regional integration at the Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (CARIS) since 2006 and has co-authored several reports on the impact of various RTAs on excluded and partner countries. Anirudh graduated summa cum laude on the MILE Program at the World Trade Institute in Berne and also holds a Masters degree in Economics from the Delhi School of Economics. His undergraduate degree was in Economics (Honors) from St. Stephen's College, Delhi University.

## Appendix

**Table A1** Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
x_yoy	132	-25.9	14.5	-66.9	24.9
neer	132	366.7	13.0	351.4	390.0
xpi_yoy	132	-12.5	2.5	-15.5	-7.5
xpi	132	89.0	1.7	86.1	91.3
iiip	132	80.2	6.7	69.5	93.1
iiip_yoy	132	-25.3	6.1	-34.2	-16.6
x_val (USD mn)	132	3180	3860	160	13800
wyi_yoy	132	-1.9	2.9	-6.5	7.2
sbsdy	132	8.6	7.4	0	25
nonsbsdy	132	18.6	12.8	3	39
by_jap	132	1.6	3.3	0	12

**Table A2** Correlation between variables

(n = 55)	lx_val	wyi_yoy	lnonsbsdy	lsbsdy	lby_jap	lxpi	liip	lneer
<b>lx_val</b>	1							
<b>wyi_yoy</b>	-0.50	1						
<b>lnonsbsdy</b>	-0.49	0.19	1					
<b>lsbsdy</b>	0.02	-0.28	-0.17	1				
<b>lby_jap</b>	-0.74	0.25	0.19	0.65	1			
<b>lxpi</b>	0.01	0.19	0	0	0	1		
<b>liip</b>	0.05	0.40	0	0	0	0.17	1	
<b>lneer</b>	-0.02	-0.26	0	0	0	-0.95	-0.16	1





---

# Does the Crisis Alter Indian Trade Priorities?

**Nilanjan Banik**

*Institute for Financial Management and Research, Chennai*

## 1. Introduction

In this chapter the consequences for Indian trade policymaking of the recent global economic downturn are examined. In the light of these developments, particular attention is given to the relative weight that India might give to further regional integration within South Asia and to advancing multilateral trade initiatives, recognising that these options are not mutually exclusive.

Having outlined recent trade policy developments during the crisis, attention will turn in this chapter to the menu of trade policy options facing India. Evidence will be marshalled in support of the contention that the countries in South Asia share, more or less, similar economic profiles that make them ideal candidates to become part of a regional trade agreement (RTA). Despite this, support for the freeing of intra-regional trade is not gaining ground in South Asia for the following reasons: (1) the continued unwillingness of the governments of the two largest economies - India and Pakistan - to grant each other the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status; (2) India turning more protectionist in the wake of the global economic slowdown; and (3) high trade costs in South Asia undermining what any lower tariffs may bring. While South Asian regional trading options appear even less viable, other RTAs may still hold appeal and multilateral options remain open. Ultimately, it is argued that India's stake in a successful multilateral trading system - including the successful conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda - seems as large as ever.

## 2. The global economic downturn and trade policy developments

Notwithstanding the recent global financial crisis, the economies of South Asia are still some of the fastest growing in the world. Within this region, India is the largest and the fastest growing economy - growing on average at a rate of around 7.3 per cent (in real terms) since 2001. Much of the reason for this faster growth process is attributed to economic reform programmes that India has embarked upon since the early 1990s.<sup>1</sup> The effect of reforms on India's external sector has been positive. India's exports crossed the \$159 billion mark in 2007/08. There has been an increase in both the volume and the value of exports. During 2007/08, the export unit value has

---

<sup>1</sup> Economic reforms essentially brought down interest rates, and government liberal attitude to allow private participation in manufacturing and services did the rest.

increased by 25.8 per cent over the previous year. Moreover, trade plays a larger role in the Indian economy, with India's total trade (merchandise exports plus imports) as a proportion of GDP increasing from 21.2 per cent in 1997/98 (the year of the East Asian financial crisis) to 34.7 per cent in 2007/08 (Reserve Bank of India, various years).

Any 'feel-good' factor associated with recent Indian export growth is overshadowed at present by the global financial crisis adversely affecting most parts of the world economy. Three of India's largest trading partners - USA, Japan and the EU - are worst hit. By early January 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its forecast for global growth downwards - from 3.9 per cent to 3.7 per cent for 2008, and from 3.0 per cent to 0.5 per cent for 2009 (*World Economic Outlook*, IMF). Faced with a slump in demand from industrialised countries, policymakers in developing economies, including India, are focusing on increasing trade amongst themselves. For example, in August 2009 India signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with South Korea, and another with the ten members of the Association of South-East Asian nations (ASEAN). India is also contemplating signing two more FTAs, one with the European Union and the other with Australia ("After ASEAN, India mulls FTAs with EU, Oz", *The Economic Times*, 25 September 2009).<sup>2</sup>

However, the slump in global demand has made countries around the world cautious about opening up markets further, and some governments are resorting to protectionist measures. The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in its *G20 Report on Trade and Investment Measures 2009* states: "The main risk is that G20 members will continue to cede ground to protectionist pressures, even if only gradually, particularly as unemployment continues to rise" (OECD Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures, p.6). Protectionism is not just confined to any one group of countries or trade policy instruments (see the entries in the Global Trade Alert database). Indeed, protectionism is becoming evident in terms of higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), mainly in the form of antidumping measures, sanitary and phytosanitary sanctions, and even through the provisions granting subsidies to domestic producers. It should be noted that much of this discrimination against foreign commercial interests does not break any World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. For example, some countries are increasing their applied tariffs while keeping them below the rates they bound at the WTO. The increase earlier in the year in import tariffs for steel items by India is a case in point ("Govt. to consider additional tax on steel imports", *The Economic Times*, 29 May 2009).<sup>3</sup> Similarly, countries are using NTBs on the pretext of safeguarding the health of their consumers and to stop predatory pricing strategies - again perfectly permissible under WTO rules. In this vein, India has recently banned imports of a number of live animal products, including processed meat, eggs, pigs, etc., from the rest of the world because of the avian influenza (swine flu) virus.<sup>4</sup> India has also emerged as the largest user of antidumping measures, having initiated 68 antidumping investigations between January 2008 and

---

2 Source: <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/Politics/Nation/After-ASEAN-India-mulls-FTAs-with-EU-Oz/articleshow/5053420.cms> (Accessed: 9/28/2009).

3 Source: <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/Economy/Foreign-Trade/Govt-to-consider-additional-tax-on-steel-imports/articleshow/4593094.cms> (Accessed: 9/23/2009).

4 Notification number S.O. 2208 (E) dated 28th August 2009, and issued by Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, Government of India.

June 2009.<sup>5</sup>

India's actions should not be looked at in isolation. The Global Trade Alert (GTA) has been playing a role in documenting the cross-border implications of various state measures undertaken during the present global downturn. Reports are prepared and posted on government actions all over the world. In Asia, China banned imports of Irish pork, Belgian chocolate, Italian brandy, British sauces, Dutch eggs, and Spanish dairy products. Indonesia has restricted imports by allowing entry points only through five designated ports and airports. Japan and South Korea have restricted foreigners from bidding for any government projects worth less than \$22 million dollars. Elsewhere, in the United States "Buy American" provisions were inserted in their US \$787 billion economic stimulus package, and the generous provisions of subsidies in France, Germany, and the UK are nothing but a reflection of protectionism.<sup>6</sup>

The silver lining, however, is that during recent times the WTO has been quite effective in terms of reducing the intensity of usage of protectionist measures. Considering the case of the Caucasus and Central Asian (CIS) countries, Gerasimenko (2009) found that, other things being equal, the percentage fall in total exports of a WTO member had been less than that of a country which is not a member of WTO. Moreover, the OECD *Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures* observes: "WTO rules and its dispute settlement mechanism continue to provide a strong defence against protectionism" (p.6).

Pressures to restrict foreign commercial opportunities have grown during the global economic downturn, while resistance to across-the-board (multilateral) trade reform persists. Negotiations at the WTO have not dealt successfully with the diversity of national trade interests. With respect to agriculture, for example, India is rather passive when it comes to negotiating for greater market access. In contrast, countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and South Africa, which are net agricultural exporters, want trading partners to reduce tariffs on agricultural items. India's justification for maintaining high tariffs is to protect the interests of its marginal farmers. The average size of land holdings for Indian farmers is around 1.3 hectare ("India's average farm land holding shrinks to 1.3 hectare", *The Press Trust of India*, 7 December, 2007). These marginal farmers also often work on the land of big farmers. Should tariffs on agricultural goods fall, the fear is that bigger farmers might make losses and reduce - or even cease - production. This would result in rising joblessness among marginal farmers, further worsening the already unequal income distribution.

More generally, cheaper agricultural imports may jeopardise the income of the 58 per cent of India's 1.14 billion population that earns their livelihood from agriculture and the agriculture-related informal sector (such as cooperatives, fishing, dairies, etc.). This fear accounts for the fact that, although the overall average applied tariff on Indian imports fell from over 32 per cent in 2001/02 to almost 16 per cent in 2006/07, in the case of agricultural products the average duty remained at 40.8 per cent.<sup>7</sup> It is also worth noting that India does not provide any direct subsidies to its agricultural exports.

---

5 Chad Bown, Global Antidumping Database (July 2009). Available at: [http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global\\_ad/ad/](http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/ad/)

6 For detailed information about various protectionist measures taken during the current economic downturn visit: <http://www.globaltradealert.org/>

7 WTO Secretariat, WTO Trade Policy Review, WT/TPR/S/182, 18 April 2007, p. 85.

While multilateral trade talks on the Doha Development Agenda have yielded limited results, in an effort to increase their share of world markets, countries around the world are increasingly entering into Regional Trading Agreements (RTA) with others.<sup>8</sup> India, in fact, is a member of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which also comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In theory, from 1 January 2006 the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) came into effect. Such RTAs, although preferable to autarky and high tariff walls, are suboptimal in terms of global growth and welfare. The recent decision of Hyundai Motor - a South Korean automobile manufacturer - to move production of one of its hatchback cars from India to Turkey, because India does not have an RTA with Europe, is a classic example of where such an agreement can divert production from its lowest-cost location ("Turkey to be production base for Hyundai's i20 cars for European markets", *The Hindu*, 2 September 2009).<sup>9</sup> Still, many governments find the allure of RTAs too much to resist.

Having laid out these recent trade policy developments, attention turns to one of the key trade policy options facing India, namely, the implementation of the SAFTA.

### **3. The SAFTA and the conditions for regional integration in South Asia**

From the welfare perspective, becoming part of a RTA, like SAFTA, is desirable if the impact of the so-called trade creation effect outweighs the trade diversion effect. Unfortunately, in many instances it becomes difficult to measure the exact nature of the gains and losses, and hence economists have based their comments concerning the desirability of a country joining a RTA on a number of metrics that are thought to be correlated with the strength of these effects. Frequently-used metrics include:

*Country characteristics:* A country is likely to gain more if its economic characteristics are somewhat similar to other member countries in the RTA. Similarities are measured in terms of economic development and geographical proximity. The more similar are the economies (in terms of per capita gross domestic product), the more is the likelihood of intra-industry trade.

*Symmetric Economic Activities:* Symmetric economic activities among member nations help forge deeper forms of economic integration, such as customs and economic unions. Symmetry in economic activity implies that there is a smaller tension in terms of formulating internal and external macroeconomic policies - a factor thought necessary for policy cooperation.

*Extent of Trade:* If the country is more likely to trade with other member countries in the RTA, then it makes sense to join that RTA. The likelihood that industry associations will demand protection is less when two-way intra-industry trade occurs.

---

<sup>8</sup> Around 205 RTAs notified under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO are in force today ([http://www.wto.org/English/tratop\\_e/region\\_e/regfac\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm) (Accessed: 8/19/2009)).

<sup>9</sup> Source: <http://beta.thehindu.com/news/cities/Chennai/article13672.ece> (Accessed: 10/13/2009)

Given these aforementioned criteria, we analyse how well SAARC member nations fulfil these desirable criteria for forming an RTA.

*Country (economic) characteristics:* In terms of the sectoral distribution of GDP and demographic profile, SAFTA member countries are fairly similar (Table 1). The industrial sector constitutes roughly a quarter of GDP in all countries, while services is the most important sector in terms of its contribution to the national output. Although a majority of the population still lives in rural areas, all of these countries are urbanising at an increasing rate. These countries also share a similar demographic profile: in all of them, age 65 and above is a small percentage of the population (varying between 4 per cent in Bangladesh to 7 per cent in Sri Lanka), which implies that these economies have a much younger working population.

**Table 1** Socioeconomic characteristics of SAARC member nations, 2007

Countries	Bangladesh	Bhutan	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Maldives	Sri Lanka
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US\$)	419	1086	634	242	635	3251	1070
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	20	22	18	34	19	..	16
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	28	38	28	16	27	..	27
Services, value added (% of GDP)	52	40	54	50	54	..	57
Rural population (% of total population)	74	89	71	84	65	70	85
Population ages 65 and above (% of total)	4	5	5	4	4	4	7

Source: World Bank (2009).

*Symmetric Economic Activity:* Two recent papers have suggested that South Asian countries have similar economic structures (Banik et al., 2006; Banik et al., 2009). Decomposing output and industrial production data into supply-side component (read, permanent component) and demand-side component (read, cyclical component), these studies have found evidence of long term relationships between the supply-side components of output in the SAARC region.

*Extent of Trade:* The latest available data indicate that intra-SAFTA trade as a percentage of total trade is quite low (see, Table 2). This was true even before the start of the recent economic slowdown. South Asia's intra-regional trade, as a percentage of its total trade volume, has barely changed, from around 2 per cent in 1980 to 5 per cent in 2004 (Newfarmer and Pierola, 2006). Lower levels intra-SAFTA trade might raise doubts about the desirability and economic impact of SAFTA. The next section seeks to shed light on why South Asia's intra-regional trade is so low, which in turn may reveal more about the likelihood of further regional integration.

**Table 2** Intra-regional and World Trade of South Asian Countries, 2003-2006

Year	% Share of Intra South Asian Imports in Total Imports of South Asian Countries	% Share of Intra South Asian Exports in Total Exports of South Asian Countries	% Share of Intra South Asian Trade in Total Trade of South Asian Countries
2003	4.71	6.40	5.46
2004	4.45	6.23	5.20
2005	4.54	6.45	5.32
2006	3.85	6.16	4.73

Source: *Direction of Trade Statistics*, IMF-DOTS Online Database.

#### 4. Why is intra-SAFTA trade so low?

The following four factors account for the current low levels of trade among the South Asian nations.

(1) *Trade costs*: Much of the source of trade costs in South Asia is a result of a lack of trade facilitation and a lack of availability of physical infrastructure.<sup>10</sup> For instance, at the India-Bangladesh border a consignment needs at least 22 documents, more than 55 signatures, and a minimum 116 copies for final approval. As many as 38 signatures are required to clear a consignment imported into Pakistan. While importing perishable items into India, checks are performed by laboratories located in cities that are far away from the port of entry. For instance, for importing through the port of Chennai in India, goods have to be sent to the Central Food Technology Research Institute in Mysore - a city located 476 km away. To gain smooth entry traders often resort to paying bribes. Across South Asia the size of bribes generally varies from between 2.2 per cent and 2.5 per cent of firm sales (Sadiq and Ghani, 2007). More generally, according to Wilson and Ostuki (2007), if countries in South Asia raised their capacity in trade facilitation halfway towards that of East Asia's capacity, then average trade would be estimated to increase by \$2.6 billion (an amount equal to approximately 60 per cent of the regional trade within South Asia). Banik and Gilbert (2009) estimated the impact of cutting trade costs on intra-regional trade too. This study found that eliminating trade costs would raise Indian exports to its South Asian neighbours by between 42 and 73 per cent.

(2) *Political unwillingness*: Pakistan, the other large economy in South Asia, has not given India Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment. Pakistan's trade with India is not free and is based on the 'positive list' of 1078 items.<sup>11</sup> For its own part, India has unilaterally withdrawn tariff concessions given to Pakistan. Despite the brazenness of these moves neither country has dragged the other to the Dispute Settlement Body of

10 Trade costs are any such costs which are in addition to marginal cost of production. Transport costs, information costs, contract enforcement costs, local distribution costs, and costs arising because of lack of trade facilitation measures, all qualify as trade costs.

11 In fact, soon after formation of SAFTA, the then Pakistan prime minister has said, "Unless and until there is visible progress on political issues between the two countries including the Kashmir issue, Pakistan cannot initiate open trade with India". Quote taken from United News of India (UNI), available at [http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php?id\\_article=3908](http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php?id_article=3908) (Accessed: 8/21/2009).

**Table 3** Protectionist measures taken by India

Date	Protectionist Measure	Source
2 April 2009	Initiation of safeguard investigation (China specific) on imports of front axle, beam, steering knuckle and crankshaft.	WTO Document G/SG/N/16/IND/6 of 11 May 2009
9 April 2009	Initiation of safeguard investigation on imports of acrylic fibre.	WTO Document G/SG/N/6/IND/21 of 11 May 2009
9 April 2009	Initiation of safeguard investigation on imports of Hot-rolled coils, sheet, strips.	WTO Document G/SG/N/6/IND/22 of 11 May 2009
20 April 2009	Initiation of safeguard investigation on imports of coated paper and paper board.	WTO Document G/SG/N/6/IND/23 of 11 May 2009
20 April 2009	Initiation of safeguard investigation on imports of uncoated paper and copy paper.	WTO Document G/SG/N/6/IND/24 of 26 May 2009
22 April 2009	Initiation of safeguard investigation on imports of plain particle board.	WTO Document G/SG/N/6/IND/25 of 26 May 2009
5 May 2009	Initiation of anti-dumping investigation on imports of DVDs from Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.	Ministry of Commerce and Industry Gazette of India Extraordinary No. 14/16/2009- DGAD.
18 May 2009	Initiation of safeguard investigation (China specific) on imports of passenger car tyres.	WTO Document G/SG/N/16/IND/7 of 4 June 2009
16 June 2009	Initiation of anti-dumping investigation on imports of barium carbonate from China.	Ministry of Commerce and Industry Gazette of India Extraordinary F. No. 14/18/2009- DGAD.
16 April 2009	Different charges levied on steel imports; import duty (5 per cent); ocean freight (\$50/tonne); and incidental charges (\$85/tonne).	<i>The Economic Times</i>
13 July 2009	Re-imposition of ban on wheat exports	<i>The Economic Times</i>

Source: Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures (p.22 and p.25), OECD.

the WTO for violating one of the most established rules of the multilateral trading system. Political stability is a pre-requisite for instituting and locking-in economic liberalisation measures in trade accords, an environment that South Asia has not been able to develop.

(3) *High tariff barriers*: The South Asian countries still maintain relatively high tariffs. In 2006 the weighted average tariffs for Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal, were 19.9 per cent, 14.5 per cent, 12.2 per cent, 7 per cent and 13.4 per cent, respectively. This is much higher than certain other Asian economies, such as Singapore (0 per cent), Hong Kong (0 per cent), Philippines (3.2 per cent), Indonesia (4.3 per cent) and Thailand (4.7 per cent).<sup>12</sup> Higher tariffs within the region have

<sup>12</sup> Source: 2009 Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation, available at <http://www.heritage.org/index/Default.aspx>

probably neutralised the benefits of common cultural affinity, common geography and the advantage of common borders that India shares with other SAARC nations.

(4) *Non-Tariff barriers*: As increases in tariffs above bound rates are not permissible under WTO rules, countries are increasingly taking advantage of permissible NTBs. Arguably, resort to NTBs has worsened during the recent global economic downturn. In Table 3, some of the protectionist measures that India has initiated since the start of economic slowdown are listed. All are NTBs.

Hence, it is quite apparent that despite having economic potential SAFTA, in its present form, is more of a 'framework agreement' than a full blown FTA. The utility and impact of an RTA - particularly regarding its ability to drive integration and cooperation in terms of working for lower tariffs, phasing out of NTBs, and reducing trade costs - is not fully apparent in the case of SAFTA. In addition, there are no provisions for trade in services, where certain SAFTA members have pronounced comparative advantages. For instance, Pakistan and Sri Lanka's low-cost transport-based services; India's computer- and information-related services, and the Maldives and Nepal's expertise in tourism-related services, are not subject to SAFTA provisions. As the services sector contributes a lot to GDP in the South Asian region, it would make sense to allow trade in services something that will contribute to regional prosperity.

To sum up, trade is far from free in South Asia. Reducing trade costs and enhancing political cooperation to better unify South Asia will take some time; reaping the commercial benefits from SAFTA seem, therefore, far off. In the near and possibly medium term, then, Indian firms may gain better access to foreign markets through extra-regional RTAs and through the successful conclusion of multilateral trade talks. Now we turn to examining the latter option.

## **5. An alternative: North-South negotiations at the WTO**

The Doha Development Round, which commenced in November 2001, is yet to be concluded. The last major negotiation (in Geneva in July 2008) failed, mainly because of arguments centring on Agriculture and Safeguards. In addition, there was a lack of consensus between the developed and the developing economies on issues relating to Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Each matter is considered in turn below.

*Agriculture*: Broadly speaking, the leading association of developing nations - the G20 group of countries - want subsidies given by the developed countries to their farmers and processed food manufacturers to be reduced. On the other side, the US and the EU want large developing economies, such China and India, to open up their markets in industrial goods as well as farm products in return. The argument of the G20 group was that farm subsidies threaten the livelihoods and subsistence of poor farmers.<sup>13</sup> Without further reduction in subsidies and an acceptable modification in the

---

<sup>13</sup> The group known by G20 - comprising of 21 developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America - was formed during Cancun ministerial meet on September, 2003.



agricultural safeguard clause the negotiation has stalled. Although the US was willing to reduce their bound farm subsidies to \$14.5 billion, they could not agree to a key demand of India, namely, for a reduction in the threshold level of imports to trigger remedial agricultural safeguards. ("Farm tariffs sink world trade talks", *The Washington Times*, 30 July 2008).<sup>14</sup> India is arguing for the safeguard measures to apply when imports exceed 20 per cent of the average of the previous three years' imports, not 40 percent as was proposed by some.

*NAMA*: In case of items such as manufacturing products, fuels and mining products, fish and fish products, and forestry products, that is, items not covered by Agreement on Agriculture but classified under NAMA, developing countries submitted a number of proposals to modify the application of the so-called Swiss formula for cutting tariffs. According to this formula, higher tariffs would be subject to a greater cut compared to lower tariffs. Since bound tariffs levels for most developing countries are higher than in industrialised countries, the burden of tariff cutting falls on the former.

*TRIPS*: Developing countries still have concerns about binding multilateral rules on intellectual property on the grounds that they seem to be discriminatory and welfare-reducing. With respect to even-handedness the current TRIPS agreement provides higher degrees of protection for wines and spirits than for other exports of interest to developing countries, such as Basmati rice, Tequila, Szatmar plums, etc. India, for one, wanted extensions of "geographical indications" to go beyond wine and spirits to other products. Additionally, developing countries also demanded patent provisions on so-called traditional knowledge. With respect to welfare impacts, research has cast doubt on some of the alleged benefits of strong intellectual property rights protection. Apparently, royalty payments accruing to firms because of patent protection seldom lead to innovation and cost reduction. Examining 177 patent policy changes across 60 countries, over a period of 150 years, Lerner (2001) found that patent protection does not necessarily lead to innovation and cost reduction.

*TRIMS*: Developing countries have long opposed the inclusion of TRIMS in the WTO on the grounds that the relevant provisions impede the process of industrialisation and balance of payments stability. Moreover, there is a belief that firms with considerable lobbying power are using this Agreement for their own benefit.

*Services*: Typically, developing countries have advantages in Mode 1 type services (eg, outsourcing of office works), and Mode 4 type services (eg, movement of natural persons). Developed countries have advantages in Mode 3 type services, like financial and professional services. In Mode 4, developing countries would like to be issued with short-term visas at very short notice; exemption from social security contributions; de-linking the movement of natural persons from the requirement to set up an office or firm in a foreign country; removal of quantitative restrictions on issuance of visa; and removing Economic Needs Tests (ENTs). In Mode 1, the demands are for the removal of any form of government ban on outsourcing; the removal of federal and

---

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jul/30/farm-tariffs-sink-world-trade-talks/> (Accessed: 8/19/2009)

state level protectionist legislation relating to outsourcing; and caller identification requirements.

Securing benefits for India from the multilateral track will require overcoming the current negotiating impasse. This will undoubtedly require some compromises by each side; compromises that would be all the better if they had a sound economic motivation. Take for example the goal of protecting marginal farmers. For sure, a rush of import competition following a multilateral trade deal could jeopardise these farmers' living standards. Yet balance requires observing that much of the benefits of agricultural production are lost to middlemen between the farmer and retailer, and that certain packages of multilateral and domestic reforms could do much to secure and even improve the livelihood of marginal farmers. In a similar spirit, industrialised countries should consider whether their current redistributive policies towards agriculture could be replaced by funds for public agricultural research investment, which are an important source of productivity growth in agriculture. Revisiting the logic of state interventions may well reveal acceptable alternative measures that involve less discrimination against foreign commercial interests, potentially expanding the basis of mutually acceptable multilateral outcomes.

## **6. Concluding remarks**

In this chapter, certain potential Indian trade policy initiatives were evaluated in the light of evidence that suggests that many countries have resorted to protectionism in the wake of the global economic slowdown. It was argued that long-standing and recent protectionism, high trade costs, and political animosity with neighbouring Pakistan have prevented SAFTA from emerging into a successful regional trade agreement. The multilateral path was seen as a more attractive option. While it is well recognised that negotiation under the WTO umbrella takes time, and that progress to date has remained limited because of the diversity of WTO membership, it was argued that India stands to gain from the successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round and that, in collaboration with its trading partners, India should seek innovative means to overcome the current negotiating impasse.

## **References**

- Banik, N., Biswas, B., and K. Criddle (2009) "Optimum Currency Area in South Asia: A State Space Approach" *International Review of Economics and Finance*, 18:3, 502-510, Elsevier Science
- Banik, N., and J. Gilbert (2008) "Trade Cost and Regional Integration in South Asia" Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper No. 127, December
- Banik, N., Biswas, B., and P. Saunders (2006) "An optimum currency area in South Asia: Is it plausible?" *Journal of World Trade*, 40:3, June
- Bhagwati, J., D. Greenaway and A. Panagariya (1998) "Trading Preferentially: Theory and Policy", *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 108, p. 1128-48
- Bown, C. (2009) "Global Antidumping Database", available at: [http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global\\_ad/](http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/), accessed on 27 September 2009.

- Gerasimenko, D. (2009) "Did WTO Membership Reduce the Collapse of Trade? Evidence from the CIS region", in Simon J. Evenett, ed., *Broken Promises: A G-20 Summit Report by Global Trade Alert*, Center for Economic Policy Research: London.
- Huffman, W. E. and R.E. Evenson (1992) "Contributions of public and private science and technology to U.S. agricultural productivity", *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. Vol. 74 p. 751-56.
- International Monetary Fund (2008) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) Database, available at: <http://www.imfstatistics.org/DOT/>, accessed on 1 October 2009.
- (2009) *World Economic Outlook*, 28 January, 2009.
- Lerner, J., (2001) "150 years of patent protection", Harvard University (mimeo).
- Newfarmer, R. and M. D., Pierola (2006) "SAFTA: Promise and Pitfalls of Preferential Trade Agreements", Mimeo, Washington DC: World Bank.
- OECD (2009) "Report on G20 trade and investment measures" September 14, OECD: Paris.
- Reserve Bank of India (various years). Bulletin (Mumbai).
- Sadiq A. and E. Ghani (2007) "South Asia's growth and regional integration", in a report titled, 'South Asia: growth and regional integration', Washington DC: World Bank.
- Wilson, J. S., and T. Ostuki (2007) "Cutting Trade Costs and Improved Business Facilitation in South Asia", in a report titled, 'South Asia: growth and regional integration', Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Bank (2009) World Development Indicators Online, available at: <http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/>, accessed on 21 August 2009.

**Dr Nilanjan Banik**, is an Associate Professor and Program Director (Development and Sustainable Finance), at Institute for Financial Management and Research, Chennai. He holds degrees in Economics from Utah State University and Delhi School of Economics. His areas of interest lie in strategic trade policies and time series econometrics. Nilanjan has teaching experiences with Utah State University, Indian Institute of Management, Madras School of Economics and Reserve Bank of India Staff College. He has project experiences with Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia; Laffer Associates, USA; Ministry of Commerce, Government of India; Research and Information System for Developing Countries, New Delhi; Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi; Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo; and Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade, Bangkok. He has publication in many peer reviewed journals.



---

## **Section 3**

# **Worldwide assessments of selected aspects of crisis-era protectionism**



---

# Has the Crisis Changed the Use of Antidumping? A Comparative Analysis

**Johannes Fritz and Martin Wermelinger**

*University of St. Gallen*

*Using detailed trade and tariff data, in this chapter various features of the antidumping investigations initiated in the first three quarters of 2009 are contrasted with similar investigations for the same three quarter period in 2007. This comparison reveals whether the targets of antidumping investigations have changed during the recent crisis.*

## **Introduction**

Previous economic downturns have seen many governments resort to greater use of antidumping measures. Recent trade policy monitoring initiatives have reported a substantial increase in antidumping actions in the third quarter of 2009 and, the evidence so far for the fourth quarter appears to reinforce this impression (Bown 2009, Global Trade Alert database). Given the considerable research and evidential base on antidumping investigations, duties, and their effects, surely policymakers and firms have some idea what to expect from the recent increase in antidumping filings? Much depends on whether during the current global economic crisis antidumping is being employed in the same way as before. The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether certain pre-crisis empirical regularities concerning antidumping filings have carried over to filings during the crisis era.

Checking whether anti-dumping has been employed differently during this crisis may have policy and commercial significance. If the characteristics of the products and importers targeted for such investigations changed during the past 12 months, then this directly impinges on the commercial interests of trading partners. Moreover, given the discretion built into the implementation of antidumping legislation, during a severe global economic downturn governments may employ antidumping differently than they do in typical business conditions. For example, falling prices may raise fears that foreign firms are engaging in predation, a commercial practice that can get caught in the antidumping net. In other cases, governments may want to use antidumping measures that affect many import sources as a substitute for safeguard actions, the multilateral rules on the latter requiring a higher legal standard to be met than on the former.

In addition, governments may be tempted--and encouraged by some import-competing domestic firms--to use antidumping investigations during a crisis to effectively reverse the effects of previous tariff cuts. Of course, it may be the case that the relative importance of the different motivations for, and factors affecting, the targeting of antidumping investigations have not changed during the recent economic crisis

and confirming such a finding would be useful.

To make a meaningful comparison between different features of antidumping usage before and during the recent global economic downturn two samples of antidumping investigations were collected. One sample includes all of the known antidumping investigations that were initiated in the first three quarters of 2009. Likewise, the other sample was created from all the known investigations two years prior to the first sample, namely, in the first three quarters of 2007. It being taken as given that any turbulence in global financial markets did not influence international trade flows and the enforcement of antidumping legislation in the first nine months of 2007, this period therefore being taken as a representative sample of the pre-crisis era. For each investigation (disaggregated) HS (2002) 6-digit level trade data was collected on the imports from all foreign sources of the product that would subsequently come under investigation. Moreover, the World Trade Organization's Tariff Download Facility was used to assemble information on the Most Favoured Nation tariff rates applied on a product by a given government in the years before any antidumping investigation was initiated.

It should be acknowledged up front that, for several reasons, any conclusions drawn from the empirical analysis conducted here is necessarily preliminary. For a start the global economy has not fully recovered and more crisis-era antidumping investigations may be launched. Second, some may prefer a different benchmark for the pre-crisis era. While subsequent analyses may call for the findings and policy implications of this chapter to be revisited, given the pervasive use of antidumping at present putting together some fact-driven assessment for public and private sector decision-makers may be of interest.

The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, more information on the two samples of antidumping investigations is presented. The third section reports the main findings and the fourth draws out some implications for decision-makers and for interpreting contemporary policymaking as it relates to antidumping.

## **Two samples of antidumping filings**

The comparisons made later in this chapter are between two samples of antidumping cases, one of those cases initiated in the first three quarters of 2007 and a second for the same quarters in 2009.<sup>1</sup> The samples contain similar numbers of antidumping investigations; with 63 in the pre-crisis sample and 84 in the crisis sample.<sup>2</sup> The antidumping cases in these samples were initiated by 14 individual countries and the European Union.<sup>3</sup>

---

1 The source of the antidumping data used here is Bown (2009).

2 Regrettably due to lack of data a total of nine antidumping actions that were found in Bown (2009) for 2007 and 2008 were not included in our analysis. Five of those actions refer to the 2007 sample, four to the 2009 sample. The codes to identify the dropped cases are: ARG-AD-195; ARG-AD-196; ARG-AD-222; ARG-AD-223; BRA-AD-197; BRA-AD-199; BRA-AD-200; BRA-AD-231; USA-AD-1173.

3 These countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Turkey, and United States.



Our samples share the same characteristics of many analysed in the literature. For example, the so-called historic users of antidumping no longer account for the majority of cases filed.<sup>4</sup> In fact, the new users were responsible for initiating 92 of the 147 filings, roughly two thirds of all the cases considered here. The jurisdiction filing the most antidumping cases was India (26 filings), the United States second (25 filings), Argentina third (24 filings) with the European Union a distant fourth (11 filings).

Altogether forty-two countries have been targeted antidumping filings in our two samples. Most prominent among these targets are Asian countries with the People's Republic of China being targeted in 106 of 147 cases. With the Republic of Korea (18 cases), Taiwan (14 cases), Thailand and Indonesia (both 12 cases) Asia ranks prominently in the Top 5 of investigated countries. In contrast, the European Union and its member states have been investigated in 16 cases, the United States in 13 and Canada in a mere 3 cases. By far the most affected sector has been the chemical sector with 22 filings reported for that industry. The second and third most affected sectors are iron or steel (8 filings) and plastics (7 filings), respectively.

## **Empirical evidence on changes in antidumping practice during the crisis**

The manner in which an antidumping regime is implemented may vary over time even if the governing legislation does not. The products targeted, the attributes of the products targeted, the identity and number of trading partners investigated are characteristics that, amongst others, can change over time. In this section a comparison is made between a set of antidumping investigations initiated before the crisis and one set during the current global economic downturn. The goal is to ascertain what, if anything, about antidumping practice has changed--indeed to what extent our understanding of pre-crisis determinants of antidumping activity provides a reliable guide to the use of antidumping during the crisis.


Given the legal standard to met for imposing an across-the-board safeguard is higher than that for antidumping (at least in respect of the injury standard) one concern is, by naming many trading partners in an antidumping suit, that essentially antidumping could be used as a "cheap" or "easier" safeguard measure during straightened economic times. The evidence does not seem to support this concern. First, before the crisis the mean number of trading partners named in an antidumping investigation was 1.95. During the crisis, the mean number rose to 2.11, which is hardly dramatic. Second, as Figure 1 makes clear crisis-era antidumping investigations tend to target smaller shares of imported products than their pre-crisis predecessors. As a general matter, then, it seems hard to argue that each antidumping suit is being used to target a broader range of commerce. Having said that, this evidence does not discount the possibility that from time to time the occasional antidumping investigation is used in such a manner.

If anything, the evidence in Figure 1 is potentially consistent with greater selectivity in targeting trading partners in during the crisis. Figures 2 and 3 also indicate dis-


---

<sup>4</sup> Historic users are: Australia, European Union, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and United States. New users are: Argentina, China, India, and Pakistan.


**Figure 1** Crisis-era antidumping investigations target smaller shares of product imports



**Figure 2** More investigations target faster growing foreign competition during the crisis



**Figure 3** Most crisis-related cases are brought against foreign firms raising their prices



tinctive crisis-era patterns of targeting trading partners during the first three quarters of 2009. Before the crisis two-thirds of antidumping actions concerned products where the previous year's growth of total imports exceeded the world average; during the crisis this fraction had risen to three-quarters (see Figure 2). Given that world trade was falling in 2009, the latter finding implies that antidumping actions targeted more often those products where imports into the investigating jurisdiction did not fall fast enough.

Another characteristic of the products targeted more often during the crisis relates to pricing (see Figure 3). Specifically, during the crisis a smaller proportion of antidumping actions have targeted imports with falling unit values (prices). This finding is significant because some policymakers and commentators might fear that foreign firms take advantage of the global economic downturn to engage in predatory pricing and to drive out import-competing rivals. The evidence presented here seems to suggest that this fear has not played a greater role in the decisions as to which products to target in antidumping investigations. An alternative interpretation is that, compared to before the crisis, during the past year import-competing firms facing falling prices from foreign rivals have not increased their demands and lobbying for antidumping anymore than other firms.

Next, the relationship between antidumping actions and tariffs was explored. Figure 4 confirms that before the recent crisis half of antidumping investigations were in products where there the bound (maximum legal) tariff rate was very close to the tariff rate actually applied. Crisis-era antidumping actions share the same property. Whatever the era, it seems that governments are less likely to resort to antidumping actions when they can legally raise tariffs on a product; it being possible to execute the latter without following the procedural steps associated with the former.<sup>5</sup> The crisis does not appear to have altered the relevance of this logic.


Differences between the crisis and pre-crisis era do emerge, however, when considering the extent of prior tariff reform. For each antidumping investigation the change in the Most Favoured Nation tariff treatment over the previous five years of the product in question was calculated. Before the crisis, approximately half of antidumping actions were against products where the tariff cut over the previous five years was greater than the respective national average. During the crisis this fraction fell to a quarter. Large prior tariff falls were even less likely to trigger antidumping actions during the first three quarter of 2009 than before. This finding is significant, precisely because some have argued that governments are more willing to cut tariffs if they know they can use antidumping duties to reverse the reform should hard times occur after the reform takes place. Most would agree that times were hard in 2009, yet products where tariff reforms were larger than the national average now account for a lower proportion of antidumping cases.

The matter of retaliation is often mentioned in the context of antidumping actions. Is there any evidence that governments target products from trading partners where the former's exporters are less exposed? For each investigation the share of the investigation country's exports to a targeted trading partner was calculated at the product level (that is, the product under investigation), at the sectoral level (that


---

5 Once the gap between bound and applied rates exceeds 25 percent, however, there seems to be an increase in the proportion of antidumping cases.


**Figure 4** Half the antidumping investigations have little water in the tariff



**Figure 5** Less than a quarter of of crisis investigations are in products were tariffs have been cut a lot



**Figure 6** Where nations export less, they target more



includes the product under investigation), and at the national level. The relationship between the proportion of antidumping investigations and the share of the investigating country's exports that could be subject to retaliation is plotted in Figure 6 for the pre-crisis era.

Figure 6 shows quite clearly that before the recent crisis most investigations are in products where the targets are such that the investigating country has few exports at risk of retaliation. (Indeed, as one might expect there is an inverse relationship between the percentage of own exports at risk and the proportion of cases brought.) Plotting a similar figure for the crisis era reveals exactly the same pattern. This casts doubt on any claim that the crisis exacerbated the fear of retaliation deterred the bringing of antidumping cases because governments would react to such a fear by targeting on those products and trading partners where even fewer exports are at risk. The very fact that the distributions plotted in Figure 6 for the pre-crisis era almost exactly overlap with the comparable distributions for the crisis-era suggests that any changes in the fear of retaliation have so far had no impact on the targeting behaviour by governments.

## **Concluding remarks**

Policymakers, analysts, and businesspeople might be concerned about the implications for their interests of the growing resort to antidumping actions witnessed in 2009. Analysis of antidumping actions is not new, but the question still arises as to whether crisis-era antidumping follows the same pattern as in more settled economic times. The purpose of this chapter was to ascertain if the antidumping measures initiated in the first three months of 2009 differed in material respects from before the crisis. Without doubt, as time goes by much more analysis of these matters could be conducted, and such analysis may qualify the conclusions presented here. Still, certain potentially significant differences were uncovered; perhaps the most important of which is that crisis-era antidumping actions have tended to target more often products and trading partners where imports and their associated prices have fallen less in the past year. If anything, targeting has become more selective. Crisis-era antidumping use does not appear to be substituting for safeguard actions, nor is it compensating for prior tariff reforms, nor does it appear to have changed in response to greater fears of retaliation, should those fears exist.

## **Reference**

Bown (2009). Chad P. Bown "Global Antidumping Database," [Version 5.1, October], available at [www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global\\_ad/](http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/)

**Johannes Fritz** is member of the Global Trade Alert team in Europe and works as a research assistant to Prof. Simon Evenett at the Swiss Institute for International Economics, University of St. Gallen. He studied International Affairs in St.Gallen, Geneva and Barcelona and is currently enrolled in the Ph.D. Program in Economics and Finance (PEF) with a specialisation in economics.

**Martin Wermelinger** is member of the Global Trade Alert team in Europe and works as a research assistant to Prof. Simon Evenett at the Swiss Institute for International Economics, University of St. Gallen. His principal research interests are international trade and development economics, in particular trade remedies and trade finance. He is a Ph.D. candidate with specialization in economics and econometrics at the University of St. Gallen and graduate in Economics of the University of St. Gallen (M.A.) and the University of Lausanne (B.Sc.).

---

# Is Full Recovery of Global Production Networks Inevitable?<sup>1</sup>


**Olivier Godart and Holger Görg**

*Kiel Institute for the World Economy and Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel*

## 1. Introduction

Since the start of the current economic crisis, trade has fallen dramatically and rapidly. Figure 1 illustrates this dramatic decline: after a steady increase between 2005 and the third quarter of 2008, world merchandise exports have fallen back to the level of 2005 at the end of the first quarter of 2009. As Yi (2009) shows, there have been considerable reductions in exports in the third quarter of 2008 in the three major exporting nations: the US (-43 percent), Germany (-80 percent) and China (-37 percent). The collapse has involved virtually all countries that trade. Yi (2009) also presents data for South Korea, where exports fell by just over 60 percent in the last quarter of 2008.

**Figure 1** Quarterly world merchandise export developments, 2005 - 2009 (2005Q1=100, in current US dollars)



Source: WTO secretariat, available at <http://www.wto.org>

---

1 The authors are very grateful to Malte Rengel for excellent research assistance.

Partly as a response to the economic crisis, many countries discussed and implemented an array of protectionist measures in order to support local industry in an attempt to fend off the negative consequences of the downturn. The rise of protectionism, even since the G20 summit in November 2008, at which government leaders pledged to eschew protectionist measures, has been forcefully demonstrated in the second Global Trade Alert report *Broken Promises: A G20 Summit Report by the Global Trade Alert* (which was published earlier in 2009.)

This chapter argues that such protectionist measures are likely to be counterproductive, to say the least. The economies of Asia/Pacific, Europe, America and, to a lesser extent, Africa are inextricably linked through the importance of global production networks. These networks crucially depend on the ability to export and import goods relatively frictionless around the globe. Hence, putting up protectionist fences around your country and impeding the flow of such goods, means shooting yourself in the foot. As we show, the global economy relies heavily on this mode of production organization.

To set out this argument, this chapter begins by presenting some evidence on the use of protectionist measures, using information from the Global Trade Alert data base. We then document the importance of global production networks, focusing on East Asia. The final section links the harm done by protectionist measures, to known determinants of outsourcing behaviour, to whether the restoration of global production networks is inevitable following the current crisis.

## **2. The (re-)emergence of protectionism**

The Global Trade Alert Report *Broken Promises* clearly documents the rise in protectionist measures taken by countries since the start of the economic crisis. Evenett (2009) describes and interprets some of the data collected by Global Trade Alert. His conclusion is that "the protectionist juggernaut continues". This assessment is backed up by a whole range of data relating to newly established discriminatory measures against foreign commercial interests, implemented since the November 2008 crisis meeting of the G20. In his paper, Evenett shows that, overall, G20 members implemented 121 discriminatory initiatives that were against foreign commercial interests. However, not only G20 members, but also many other countries jumped on the bandwagon.

Overall, the data analyzed by Evenett show that China has been the most frequent target of protectionist measures taken by other countries. On the other side of the coin, however, China has also been one of the top countries in terms of implementing such measures that are harmful to their trade partners. Interestingly, Indonesia is one of the worst offenders against China; it is one of the countries imposing the largest number of harmful measures against China. Hence, this is detrimental to trade relationships within the East Asia region.

A closer look at the country tables in *Broken Promises* shows that China implemented measures that are harmful to the commercial interests of 163 trade partner countries. The equivalent numbers for Indonesia and South Korea are 124 and 88, respectively. Global Trade Alert of course reports on a large number of possible protectionist measures. But the database also allows one to be more specific. For exam-



ple, based on accessing the Global Trade Alert website on 29 November 2009, the data show that China implemented 11 instances of import bans that are harmful to foreign commercial interests and obviously impact directly on trade. These measures affect 42 trade partner jurisdictions and 22 sectors. On the other hand, 8 jurisdictions implemented export taxes or restrictions that harm their trade relationships with China. These affect 19 industrial sectors.

These data give only a very brief overview of what has happened in terms of protectionism. The Global Trade Alert website, as well as reports, provide much more detailed and broader information, which shows that not only East Asian countries, but also in particular American and European countries have not abstained. The negative consequences this may have for the flow of trade in goods and services across the globe are obvious. Protectionist measures hamper trade and put sand in the wheels of commerce. This is particularly worrisome, as trade is not just in final goods destined for the consumer. A large and rising share is in intermediate products, which are shipped from one country to another for further processing. This is what is referred to as global production networks. We describe the importance of these in the next section, focusing in particular on East Asia.

### **3. The importance of global production networks**

Global production networks are an important aspect of the current globalised world economy. This is evident not only from anecdotal evidence on where firms source their inputs, but also from more aggregate statistics on imports of intermediate products and international sourcing behaviour.

The World Trade Organization (1998, p. 36) provides a good example of the extent of internationally linked production activities when it describes the geographic sources of inputs for the average American car:

"30% of the car's value goes to Korea for assembly, 17.5% to Japan for components and advanced technology, 7.5% to Germany for design, 4% to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2.5% to the UK for advertising and marketing services and 1.5% to Ireland and Barbados for data processing. Only 37% of the production value is generated in the United States."

Another illustration is provided by Linden et al. (2007), who determine the source of inputs for an iPod, sold by the US company Apple. They estimate that the hard-drive, produced by the Japanese company Toshiba using affiliates based in China, accounts for 51% of the cost of all iPod parts. The display module and display driver, produced by Japanese companies in Japan, account for 16% of input costs. Two percent of the value of inputs are supplied by Samsung, a Korean company that happens to produce the input in question in Korea. The final assembly, accounting for 3% of the input cost, is carried out by a Taiwanese company in a plant in China. The source of 20% of inputs could not be determined by the researchers. This leaves 9% of input costs that are supplied by US firms, who provide the video/multimedia processor as well as the portal player CPU. The former input is produced, however, in either Singapore or Taiwan, while the CPU may be made in production plants in either the US or Taiwan. This evidence shows the importance of global production networks in the assembly

of an iPod.

Examining the importance of such production sharing at a more aggregate level is not straightforward, as no harmonised and internationally comparable statistics are available. Still, one can use trade statistics to get an impression of how important global production networks may be. For example, Haddad (2007) analyses data on trade in parts and components (i.e., intermediate goods) for East Asia and concludes that global production networks are at the heart of any attempt to explain the growth of trade in that region over the recent decade. She shows that trade in components rises much faster than trade in "traditional" final goods. Interestingly, she finds that among the reasons for such expanding global production networks are not only low wage costs (compared to industrialised countries) but also, and perhaps more importantly, low trade costs and favourable policy settings for international production (such as liberalisation of international capital flows, protection of intellectual property rights, to mention but two). Obviously, the rise in protectionism works straight against these favourable settings, hence, impeding the successful use of international production sharing.

We can illustrate the importance of global production by looking further at data on trade in parts and components. This is based on trade statistics that distinguish, for certain sectors, trade of components and final goods. The latest data available to us relate to 2007. We follow a much-cited analysis by Ng and Yeats (1999) who also look at the rise of global production sharing in East Asia in the 1990s using similar, but older, data. Table 1 shows the share of parts and components (P&C) imports in total imports in the sector. We have calculated these shares for the whole East Asia region, as well as separately for China as the largest player in the region.<sup>2</sup>

The data show that, overall, about 22 percent of manufacturing imports in East Asia are parts and components. As to the development over time, we see that the number in 2007 is comparable to that in 1996. However, the share of P&C imports increased somewhat between those two years and then fell back to its 1996 level. What is perhaps more striking is the sectoral information. Here, we see that in all machinery sectors, as well as in telecommunications, imports of P&C have increased substantially over the period. In particular, in Office Machinery, imports of P&C account for well over half of all imports in that sector in 2007. These trends are similar in China, although there they are particularly pronounced in the industrial machinery and metal working sectors.

Table 2 presents the other side of the production networks, namely, exports of parts and components from East Asia and China. As can be seen, these exports have been on the rise over the last decades in almost all sectors listed. This clearly shows the importance of East Asia as a node for production networks, importing and exporting parts and components that are used in international production.

Table 3 presents an alternative view on the importance and growth of trade in P&C, and hence, the importance of East Asia's role in global production networks. In this table we focus on the export side and, specifically, show some aggregate summary data on trends in exports in East Asia. The top two rows show the absolute value of exports to the East Asian region (i.e., intra-region exports) and the world, respec-

---

2 For East Asia we include data for China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, Japan, Philippines and Singapore.

tively. The following two rows report the corresponding growth rates of exports. Finally, the last row reports the share of intra-region (East Asia) trade in global exports.

What is of most interest here is the last column, which demonstrates the importance of exports of parts and components - i.e., exports of intermediate goods that are shipped abroad for further processing in other countries. As the table shows, the absolute value of exports of parts and components (P&C) to the world increased two-and-a-half fold between 1996 and 2007, from US\$136bn to US\$350bn. Exchange of parts and components within East Asia plays an important part, as it accounts for roughly half of all exports of P&C (US\$175bn) in 2007. The share of intra-region exports is much higher for P&C than for manufacturing overall, as demonstrated in the last row.

**Table 1** Relative importance of parts and components imports across sectors

Regional and Product Group (SITC Rev.3)	Share of Parts and Components In Product Group Imports (%)			
	1996	2000	2004	2007
<b>EAST ASIA</b>				
Power Generating Equipment (71)	37.74	41.42	42.01	41.43
Special Industry Machinery (72)	18.16	20.82	19.46	23.99
Metal Working Machinery (73)	16.25	19.73	17.96	21.40
General Industrial Machinery (74)	16.62	19.45	19.23	21.69
Office Machinery (75)	48.23	53.12	55.72	55.37
Telecommunications (76)	38.36	44.16	46.66	48.79
Electric Machinery (77)	15.32	15.08	12.29	9.36
Road Vehicles (78)	34.93	40.57	45.61	42.90
Other Transport Machinery (79)	31.92	35.18	36.30	33.61
Misc. Manufactures (8)	4.41	3.99	3.81	2.85
<b>All above Products</b>	<b>21.85</b>	<b>23.88</b>	<b>23.43</b>	<b>21.67</b>
<b>CHINA</b>				
Power Generating Equipment (71)	34.85	33.23	35.42	33.10
Special Industry Machinery (72)	9.13	11.27	11.40	13.15
Metal Working Machinery (73)	11.29	12.43	14.87	15.48
General Industrial Machinery (74)	12.81	14.85	14.48	17.35
Office Machinery (75)	69.33	54.94	49.05	49.30
Telecommunications (76)	61.50	64.00	72.55	68.99
Electric Machinery (77)	11.38	6.17	4.01	3.14
Road Vehicles (78)	61.28	66.17	58.32	50.01
Other Transport Machinery (79)	16.56	21.83	14.25	16.17
Misc. Manufactures (8)	14.52	10.96	3.48	2.05
<b>All above Products</b>	<b>22.41</b>	<b>23.84</b>	<b>19.29</b>	<b>16.93</b>

Source: Authors' calculations based on UN COMTRADE data, following Table 2 in Ng and Yeats (1999).

**Table 2** Relative importance of parts and components exports across sectors

Regional and Product Group (SITC Rev.3)	Share of Parts and Components In Product Group exports (%)			
	1996	2000	2004	2007
<b>EAST ASIA</b>				
Power Generating Equipment (71)	34.96	36.51	38.76	38.42
Special Industry Machinery (72)	15.01	16.57	19.45	22.75
Metal Working Machinery (73)	13.90	14.80	17.81	19.86
General Industrial Machinery (74)	14.88	17.72	19.15	22.14
Office Machinery (75)	39.26	49.11	44.16	38.34
Telecommunications (76)	27.07	30.54	31.66	45.23
Electric Machinery (77)	8.04	6.98	7.28	8.47
Road Vehicles (78)	25.21	21.68	24.10	23.11
Other Transport Machinery (79)	10.95	12.41	12.71	14.96
Misc. Manufactures (8)	2.95	2.63	2.68	2.22
<b>All above Products</b>	<b>16.59</b>	<b>18.15</b>	<b>19.14</b>	<b>20.29</b>
<b>CHINA</b>				
Power Generating Equipment (71)	25.08	21.48	23.25	29.06
Special Industry Machinery (72)	15.87	22.48	23.45	25.09
Metal Working Machinery (73)	23.37	30.22	30.32	35.02
General Industrial Machinery (74)	14.75	21.19	20.20	22.45
Office Machinery (75)	28.41	32.54	28.50	23.31
Telecommunications (76)	24.42	27.97	26.58	25.14
Electric Machinery (77)	4.87	4.81	7.73	6.29
Road Vehicles (78)	29.60	28.66	37.92	39.18
Other Transport Machinery (79)	6.73	17.97	16.10	10.74
Misc. Manufactures (8)	1.51	1.40	1.74	1.81
<b>All above Products</b>	<b>8.06</b>	<b>11.10</b>	<b>15.14</b>	<b>14.47</b>

Source: Authors' calculations based on UN COMTRADE data, following Table 2 in Ng and Yeats (1999).


**Table 3** East Asian Global and Regional Trade Trends for parts and components and other major product groups

Year	All Items	Of which:				
		All Manufactures	Chemicals	Transport & Machinery	Other Manufactures	Parts & Components
Value of exports to East Asia in terms of US\$ million						
1996	539,235	349,181	39,588	237,332	72,261	62,278
2000	625,292	437,843	49,735	304,058	84,051	88,976
2004	1,005,658	731,206	83,308	522,221	125,677	159,716
2007	1,501,822	1,084,315	128,219	778,166	177,929	175,863
Value of exports to the world in terms of US\$ million						
1996	1,204,079	894,959	71,041	610,374	213,543	136,075
2000	1,511,004	1,170,955	92,430	814,480	264,045	193,886
2004	2,214,069	1,707,675	152,096	1,203,329	352,251	293,776
2007	3,449,149	2,590,185	244,000	1,805,940	540,245	348,803
Annual growth rate of exports to East Asia (%)						
2004-2007	14.30%	14.04%	15.46%	14.22%	12.29%	3.26%
2000-2007	13.33%	13.83%	14.49%	14.37%	11.31%	10.22%
1996-2007	9.76%	10.85%	11.28%	11.40%	8.54%	9.90%
Annual growth rate of exports to the world (%)						
2004-2007	15.92%	14.90%	17.06%	14.49%	15.32%	5.89%
2000-2007	12.51%	12.01%	14.87%	12.05%	10.77%	8.75%
1996-2007	10.04%	10.14%	11.87%	10.36%	8.80%	8.93%
Share of East Asian intra-trade in total exports of groups (%)						
1996	44.8%	39.0%	55.7%	38.9%	33.8%	45.8%
2000	41.4%	37.4%	53.8%	37.3%	31.8%	45.9%
2004	45.4%	42.8%	54.8%	43.4%	35.7%	54.4%
2007	43.5%	41.9%	52.5%	43.1%	32.9%	50.4%

Source: Authors' calculations based on UN COMTRADE data, following Table 3 in Ng and Yeats (1999).

To provide a different angle from which to examine global production networks, we can look at Europe's international sourcing of intermediate inputs. Here, Eurostat, using results from a survey on international sourcing behaviour of European firms with more than 100 employees over the period 2001 to 2006, provides some illuminating data. Figure 2, taken from their publication, shows the destinations of sourcing partners for European firms. While, not surprisingly, the majority of sourcing relationships are with partners in Europe, the importance of Asia is also clear. For example, in the UK, roughly 30 percent of sourcing is with countries other than America or Europe, and half of that again is with India and China specifically. This number is even higher for most other countries. For example, in Germany, about 30 percent of sourcing is with partners in China and India (20 percent alone with China).

**Figure 2** Destinations for international sourcing by European enterprises



Notes: Information is based on an ad-hoc survey of enterprises in 12 European countries, covering the period 2001 - 2006 \*CZPT: provisional data; Total, NL: unreliable data. The percentages are calculated on the basis of the number of times the enterprises have mentioned the countries and/or country groups as a definition for international sourcing.

Source: Eurostat: International Sourcing in Europe, Statistics in Focus 4/2009

Hence, from the above data, it is clear that global production networks are at the heart of East Asian trade growth. These networks are not only important for trade between industrialised countries (such as Europe) and East Asia, but also, and perhaps even more so, for trade within the region. In particular for East Asian regions, the free flow of intermediate goods is important to fuel the international production networks that exist and that are growing. This is strongly impeded by countries taking up protectionist measures, in particular within the region.

## 4. The future of global production networks

Global production networks are likely to have been significantly harmed during the current financial crisis. While data on this are still hard to get, there are two sound economic reasons for this expectation.

The first reason is the fall in exports. The financial crisis has translated into a world-wide drop in consumer spending. Since consumers demand not only locally produced goods but also exports, this has led to a quite substantial decrease in export activity in world exports, as shown above in Figure 1, especially in North America, Europe and East Asia. Given the existence of global production networks, a fall in exports of final goods also implies lower demand for intermediate inputs, and hence a decrease in the value of vertical specialisation. Indeed, a number of economists, for example Yi (2009), have recently voiced the opinion that the rapid decline in exports is partly due to the importance of vertical specialisation, where the drop in demand for the final good induces a domino effect onto intermediate inputs. Hence, the strong collapse in exports in the recent month, is at least partly driven by the same forces that allowed global trade to expand much faster than global GDP in the last two decades, i.e. global production networks.

The second reason concerns the availability of financing instruments related to trade. Access to services in general, and financial services in particular, are vitally important for exports and imports. Firms need access to available bank loans in order to finance imports of intermediate goods, that will only after some value-adding and sale, translate into revenues. Furthermore, exporters are dependent on access to finance in order to bridge the gap between the date of invoice and the receipt of the payment, which may only happen with a substantial delay when interacting with customers abroad. Furthermore, financial instruments, like letters of credit, play an important role as insurance against default of the buyer or any risk in international transactions. Due to the financial crisis, banks in need of liquidity in an uncertain environment, tend to be much more reluctant to provide such credit easily. This implies that exporting and importing are additionally constrained: a further reason to expect that some global production networks are hurt during the financial crisis.

Some anecdotal evidence illustrates the potential severity of the problem. The *Financial Times*, for example, has reported that Sony plans to halve its supplier networks in an effort to cut costs in order to deal with the slump in sales. Specifically, Sony plans to reduce its current network of roughly 2,500 suppliers to about 1,200 by March 2011, with the expectation of cutting its procurement costs by roughly \$5.3bn as a result.<sup>3</sup> Ford is also quoted by the *Financial Times* as engaging in a similar exercise. They have cut back from more than 3,000 suppliers to around 2,000, with a target of reducing this further to 750. Indeed, Ford's procurement chief is quoted as saying that he expects "more stress in the supply base in the short term, not less".<sup>4</sup> For the *International Herald's Tribune*, Hiroko Tabuchi reports that Japanese small and midsize exports of intermediate components are the most vulnerable to the global downturn. They supply many firms abroad and are at the "heart of the economy".

---

3 *Financial Times* (2009a).

4 *Financial Times* (2009b).

If these cases are anything to go by, then international sourcing and global production networks may become somewhat less important as a result of the financial crisis. Moreover, the value of foreign nodes in global international networks should be lost for all participants of these networks. Raising protectionist fences would be another nail in the coffin of global production networks. These networks not only exist because of the potential for exploiting differential factor costs abroad, but they depend crucially on low transport and trade costs, and on a generally positive institutional environment that is conducive to trade and investment. Therefore, implementing import tariffs, for example, raises the costs of trading within the global production network and may outweigh any factor cost savings available through trade. If this were the case, the network may be discontinued, as the anecdotal evidence above suggests. This shows that protectionist measures throw sand in the wheels of commerce and hinder the use of global production networks.

One may argue that such protectionist measures are only short-term defences against the implications of the current crisis, and that they would be removed again in the foreseeable future. Leaving aside the issue of whether that would be politically feasible, the question is whether production networks, once severed, would re-establish themselves. The answer is: maybe, but probably not - or at least not so easily and so quickly.


Why this pessimistic view? Recent work in international economics, using both theoretical analysis and careful evaluation of firm-level data tells us that "sunk costs matter". This means, in a nutshell, that the setting up of global production networks and exporting involves substantial set-up costs which cannot be fully recouped once a firm terminates its international customer-supplier relationships. Examples of this are: costs for market research: searching for adequate suppliers or customers abroad; setting up foreign distribution and sourcing networks; paying for lawyers versed in the law of the foreign country, etc. While setting up a global production network means that the firm has covered these costs and got the knowledge, the value of this knowledge tends to depreciate rather quickly once the firm stops international sourcing.

The empirical relevance of this argument is illustrated in a number of empirical studies of export decisions of firms. These studies show that firms are more likely to export in a given year if they were also export-active the year before. What this also implies is that if firms are out of the export market it is very difficult for them to get back in. A study for Colombia by Roberts and Tybout (1997), for example, calculates that a firm was about 60 percent more likely to be an exporter if it also was one in the previous period. However, once a firm has left an export market for longer than one year, it was just as likely as a domestic firm, that has never exported before, to re-enter the export market. This indicates how important it is for a firm to stay in the export market.

It is likely that a similar mechanism would be at work for global production networks. After all, producers that are part of a global production network import and export intermediate goods. Both exports of final goods and international sourcing involve substantial sunk costs of a similar nature. Once out of the sourcing market, much of these costs would have to be borne again by a firm wishing to re-enter after a pause. Let us assume that sunk costs are as important for international sourcing as they are for exporting. This would imply that, as in the Colombian case, firms that



**Figure 3** Level of international sourcing of enterprises during 2001-2006 and planned international sourcing 2007-2009



*Notes:* Information is based on an ad-hoc survey of enterprises in 12 European countries, covering the period 2001 - 2006 \*CZPT: provisional data; Total, NL: unreliable data for enterprises having international sourcing plans 2007-2009. Enterprises with plans for 2007-2009 only include enterprises not having sourced internationally in the previous period 2001-2006.

*Source:* Eurostat: International Sourcing in Europe, Statistics in Focus 4/2009

drop out of their international sourcing network for more than one year, are as likely to re-establish global production networks as are firms that never previously engaged in international sourcing.

Figure 3, which is also taken from the Eurostat survey of European firms as described above, presents some interesting statistics in this respect. The figure reports the percentage of firms that engaged in international sourcing over the period analysed, but, more to the point of our argument, also includes firms that did not previously conduct any international sourcing.. These firms were asked how many of them were planning to do so in the future. The green column in Figure 3 reports the percentage of firms that were planning to start international sourcing. This is below five percent in most cases.<sup>5</sup> So, among those firms that never engaged in any international sourcing, the probability of starting to do so is definitely quite low. This probability may be similarly low for firms that did do some international sourcing before, but ceased doing so for a year or more.

What does this imply? If, as a result of protectionist measures, firms stop sourcing inputs internationally, then re-entrance into international sourcing will be seriously hampered, even if the measure is revoked. So, once a firm stops, the concern is that it is going to be hard to re-establish foreign trade nodes and get 'back in'. A firm may be likely to decide not to re-establish global production networks again, or, at least, it would be likely to take some time before it is able to do so.

Of course one could argue that it may not be so problematic if firms exit global production networks and stop exporting. After all, the government can simply use addi-

<sup>5</sup> This survey was undertaken in 2006, before the crisis started. Were it taken today, one may expect even lower numbers wishing to start international sourcing.

tional protectionist policies and subsidise these firms in the future, and then they would be able to start to link into the network again and resume exporting. Leaving aside the argument of whether this subsidisation would be good economics (or politics for that matter), the more serious concern is that it is unlikely to work. There are a number of recent studies using firm-level data for various countries, among them China (Girma et al., 2009) that have looked in detail at whether government subsidies can help firms to start exporting. The answer is generally: no! These studies clearly show that subsidies do not help firms to start exporting, if they have not been exporting before.

This brings us to the final punch line: What global production networks certainly do not need in order to re-establish themselves after the current crisis, is protectionism, which hampers trade and puts 'sand in the wheels' of commerce.

## References

- Evenett, S.J. (2009), "The emerging contours of crisis-era protectionism", in S.J. Evenett (ed.), *Broken Promises: A G-20 Summit Report by the Global Trade Alert*, available at [www.globaltradealert.org](http://www.globaltradealert.org).
- Financial Times*. (2009a). "Sony plans to halve supplier network," 22 May 2009.
- Financial Times*. (2009b). "Toyota knocked as suppliers' top customer." 25 May 2009.
- Girma, S., Y. Gong, H. Görg and Z. Yu (2009), "Can production subsidies foster export activity? Evidence from Chinese firm level data", *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 111(4).
- Haddad, M. (2007), "Trade integration in East Asia: The role of China and production networks", World Bank Policy Research Paper 4160
- Linden, G., K.L. Kraemer and J. Dedrick (2006), "Who captures value in a global innovation system? The case of Apple's ipod", Working Paper, Personal Computing Industry Center, University of California, Irvine.
- Ng, F. and A. Yeats (1999), "Production sharing in East Asia: Who does what for whom, and why?", World Bank Policy Research Paper 2197
- Roberts, M.J. and J.R. Tybout (1997), "The decision to export in Colombia: An empirical model of entry with sunk costs", *American Economic Review*, 87, 545-564
- Tabuchi, H. (2009), "Japan's small exporters are hit hardest", *International Herald's Tribune*, March 26th
- World Trade Organization (1998), *Annual Report 1998*, Geneva, World Trade Organization
- Yi, K.M. (2009), "The collapse of global trade: the role of vertical specialization", in Baldwin R. and S. Evenett (eds.), *The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis: Recommendations for the G 20*. Available at [www.voxeu.org](http://www.voxeu.org)

**Olivier Godart** is a researcher at the Chair of International Economics , Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. In his research he examines the link between firm characteristics and firm adjustments when active in more than one market.

**Holger Görg** is Professor of International Economics at Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. He is also a CEPR research affiliate in the international trade programme and has been a consultant to the World Bank, UN Economic Commissions for Europe and Africa, European Commission, Inter-American Development Bank and the European Central Bank. His research looks at activities of multinational firms, and firm adjustments related to exporting and outsourcing.



---

## **SECTION 4**

# **Country-by-country reports on the resort to discrimination and its consequences**

The following tables refer to jurisdictions that are members of UN ESCAP for which data is available in the GTA database



# Afghanistan

**Table 10.1. Foreign state measures affecting Afghanistan's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Afghanistan's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Afghanistan's commercial interests.	12	11
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Afghanistan's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Afghanistan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Afghanistan's interests. [2]	5	6
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Afghanistan's interests. [3]	6	5
Total number of implemented measures affecting Afghanistan's commercial interests.	10	9
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Afghanistan's commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Afghanistan's foreign commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Afghanistan's commercial interests.	5	4

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to*

*<http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Afghanistan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

[1] *These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

[2] *These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

[3] *These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

**Table 10.2. Afghanistan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Afghanistan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Afghanistan's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of Afghanistan's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	none	none
Total number of Afghanistan's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of Afghanistan's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	none	none
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Afghanistan that harm foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Afghanistan that harm foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Afghanistan that harm foreign commercial interests.	none	none

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to*

*<http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Afghanistan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

*[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.*



**Table 10.3. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Afghanistan's commercial interests**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
India	2
Japan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Mexico	1
Russian Federation	1

**Table 10.4. Implemented measures that harm Afghanistan's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	2	13.33%
Tariff measure	2	13.33%
Export subsidy	2	13.33%
Export taxes or restriction	2	13.33%
Trade finance	2	13.33%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	6.67%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	6.67%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	6.67%
Other service sector measure	1	6.67%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	6.67%
Total	15	100.00%

**Table 10.5. Afghanistan's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Public procurement	1	100.0%
Total	1	100.0%

**Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Afghanistan's state measures.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.



# American Samoa

**Table 10.6. Foreign state measures affecting American Samoa's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting American Samoa's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting American Samoa's commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of American Samoa's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm American Samoa's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against American Samoa's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against American Samoa's interests. [3]	1	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting American Samoa's commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect American Samoa's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm American Samoa's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm American Samoa's commercial interests.	1	1

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "American Samoa" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

- [1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
- [2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
- [3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.7. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting American Samoa's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Mexico	1

**Table 10.8. Implemented measures that harm American Samoa's commercial interests, by**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	50.00%
Trade finance	1	50.00%
Total	2	100.00%

**American Samoa's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Armenia

**Table 10.9. Foreign state measures affecting Armenia's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Armenia's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Armenia's commercial interests.	26	24
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Armenia's commercial interests. [1]	2	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Armenia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Armenia's interests. [2]	6	6
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Armenia's interests. [3]	18	17
Total number of implemented measures affecting Armenia's commercial interests.	24	22
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Armenia's commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Armenia's foreign commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Armenia's commercial interests.	36	36

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Armenia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.10. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Armenia's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	6
France	5
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
Finland	3
Germany	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Italy	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Netherlands	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Spain	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
India	2
Indonesia	2
Belarus	1
China	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1

**Table 10.11. Implemented measures that harm Armenia's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	6	27.27%
Consumption subsidy	1	4.55%
Export subsidy	4	18.18%
Export taxes or restriction	3	13.64%
Public procurement	1	4.55%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	4.55%
Tariff measure	5	22.73%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	4.55%
Trade finance	2	9.09%
Total	22	100.00%

**Armenia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database





# Australia

**Table 10.12. Foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Australia's commercial interests.	106	98
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Australia's commercial interests. [1]	12	12
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Australia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Australia's interests. [2]	31	26
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Australia's interests. [3]	63	60
Total number of implemented measures affecting Australia's commercial interests.	85	81
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Australia's commercial interests.	21	17
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Australia's foreign commercial interests.	19	15
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Australia's commercial interests.	43	43

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Australia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

*[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

**Table 10.13. Australia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Australia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Australia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	12	4
Total number of Australia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	3	2
Total number of Australia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	5	none
Total number of Australia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	4	2
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests.	10	8
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests.	5	3
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests.	50	50

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to*

*<http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Australia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

*[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

**Table 10.14. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Australia's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	10
Indonesia	8
France	5
Germany	5
India	5
Japan	4
Poland	4
Spain	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
China	3
Italy	3
Netherlands	3
Republic of Korea	3
Switzerland	3
United States of America	3
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malaysia	2
Malta	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Sweden	2
Viet Nam	2
Algeria	1
Argentina	1
Brazil	1
Mexico	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1

**Table 10.15. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Australia's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures
Germany	3
Austria	2
Belgium	2
China	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Finland	2
France	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Italy	2
Poland	2
Portugal	2
Slovakia	2
Spain	2
Sweden	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
United States of America	2
Argentina	1
Belarus	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	1
Canada	1
Chile	1
Cyprus	1
Estonia	1
Hong Kong	1
India	1
Indonesia	1
Ireland	1
Japan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malaysia	1
Malta	1
Mexico	1
Netherlands	1
New Zealand	1
Norway	1
Republic of Korea	1
Romania	1
Singapore	1
Slovenia	1

**Table 10.15. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Australia's state measures (contd.)**

South Africa	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Turkey	1
United Arab Emirates	1
Viet Nam	1

**Table 10.16. Implemented measures that harm Australia's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	22	25.3%
Tariff measure	17	19.5%
Export subsidy	12	13.8%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	7	8.0%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	4	4.6%
Export taxes or restriction	3	3.4%
Local content requirement	3	3.4%
Public procurement	3	3.4%
Migration measure	2	2.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	2.3%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	2.3%
Trade finance	2	2.3%
Competitive devaluation	1	1.1%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.1%
Import ban	1	1.1%
Investment measure	1	1.1%
Other service sector measure	1	1.1%
State trading enterprise	1	1.1%
State-controlled company	1	1.1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.1%
Total	87	100.0%

**Table 10.17. Australia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	2	25.0%
Bail out / state aid measure	1	50.0%
Public procurement	1	25.0%
Total	4	100.0%



# Azerbaijan

**Table 10.18. Foreign state measures affecting Azerbaijan's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Azerbaijan's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Azerbaijan's commercial interests.	33	32
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Azerbaijan's commercial interests. [1]	3	3
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Azerbaijan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Azerbaijan's interests. [2]	9	8
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Azerbaijan's interests. [3]	21	21
Total number of implemented measures affecting Azerbaijan's commercial interests.	28	28
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Azerbaijan's commercial interests.	5	4
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Azerbaijan's foreign commercial interests.	5	4
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Azerbaijan's commercial interests.	10	10

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to*

*<http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Azerbaijan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

*[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

**Table 10.19. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Azerbaijan's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	6
India	3
Ukraine	3
France	2
Argentina	1
China	1
Germany	1
Mexico	1
Republic of Korea	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1

**Table 10.20. Implemented measures that harm Azerbaijan's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	10	38.5%
Tariff measure	6	23.1%
Export subsidy	2	7.7%
Export taxes or restriction	2	7.7%
Trade finance	2	7.7%
Consumption subsidy	1	3.8%
Public procurement	1	3.8%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	3.8%
State trading enterprise	1	3.8%
Total	26	100.0%

**Azerbaijan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.



# Bangladesh

**Table 10.21. Foreign state measures affecting Bangladesh's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Bangladesh's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Bangladesh's commercial interests.	29	27
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Bangladesh's commercial interests. [1]	5	4
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Bangladesh's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Bangladesh's interests. [2]	8	7
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Bangladesh's interests. [3]	16	16
Total number of implemented measures affecting Bangladesh's commercial interests.	26	25
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Bangladesh's commercial interests.	3	2
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Bangladesh's foreign commercial interests.	3	2
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Bangladesh's commercial interests.	14	14

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to*

*<http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Bangladesh" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

[1] *These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

[2] *These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

[3] *These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

**Table 10.22. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Bangladesh's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
India	3
Argentina	2
Indonesia	2
China	1
Germany	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Poland	1
Russian Federation	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United States of America	1
Viet Nam	1

**Table 10.23. Implemented measures that harm Bangladesh's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	7	31.8%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	3	13.6%
Tariff measure	3	13.6%
Export subsidy	2	9.1%
Export taxes or restriction	2	9.1%
Trade finance	2	9.1%
Local content requirement	1	4.5%
Public procurement	1	4.5%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	4.5%
Total	22	100.0%

**Bangladesh's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Bhutan

**Table 10.24. Foreign state measures affecting Bhutan's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Bhutan's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Bhutan's commercial interests.	5	4
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Bhutan's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Bhutan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Bhutan's interests. [2]	2	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Bhutan's interests. [3]	2	2
Total number of implemented measures affecting Bhutan's commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Bhutan's commercial interests.	1	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Bhutan's foreign commercial interests.	1	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Bhutan's commercial interests.	2	2

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Bhutan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.25. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Bhutan's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
India	1
Mexico	1
Total	2

**Table 10.26. Implemented measures that harm Bhutan's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Tariff measure	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**Bhutan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Brunei Darussalam

**Table 10.27. Foreign state measures affecting Brunei Darussalam's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Brunei Darussalam's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Brunei Darussalam's commercial interests.	12	12
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Brunei Darussalam's commercial interests. [1]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Brunei Darussalam's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Brunei Darussalam's interests. [2]	5	5
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Brunei Darussalam's interests. [3]	5	5
Total number of implemented measures affecting Brunei Darussalam's commercial interests.	8	8
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Brunei Darussalam's commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Brunei Darussalam's foreign commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Brunei Darussalam's commercial interests.	5	5

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Brunei Darussalam" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.28. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Brunei Darussalam's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Indonesia	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Republic of Korea	1
United States of America	1

**Table 10.29. Implemented measures that harm Brunei Darussalam's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	2	28.6%
Local content requirement	1	14.3%
Migration measure	1	14.3%
Public procurement	1	14.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	14.3%
Trade finance	1	14.3%
Total	7	100.0%

**Brunei Darussalam's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Cambodia

**Table 10.30. Foreign state measures affecting Cambodia's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Cambodia's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Cambodia's commercial interests.	18	17
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Cambodia's commercial interests. [1]	3	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Cambodia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Cambodia's interests. [2]	8	8
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Cambodia's interests. [3]	7	7
Total number of implemented measures affecting Cambodia's commercial interests.	13	12
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Cambodia's commercial interests.	5	5
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Cambodia's foreign commercial interests.	5	5
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Cambodia's commercial interests.	6	6

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to*

*<http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Cambodia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

[1] *These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

[2] *These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

[3] *These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

**Table 10.31. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Cambodia's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
India	2
Argentina	1
Mexico	1
Ukraine	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United States of America	1

**Table 10.32. Implemented measures that harm Cambodia's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	18.2%
Tariff measure	2	18.2%
Trade finance	2	18.2%
Bail out / state aid measure	1	9.1%
Export subsidy	1	9.1%
Local content requirement	1	9.1%
Public procurement	1	9.1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	9.1%
Total	11	100.0%

**Cambodia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.



# China

**Table 10.33. Foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting China's commercial interests.	311	178
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of China's commercial interests. [1]	26	23
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm China's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against China's interests. [2]	139	45
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against China's interests. [3]	146	110
Total number of implemented measures affecting China's commercial interests.	198	149
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect China's commercial interests.	113	29
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm China's foreign commercial interests.	109	26
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm China's commercial interests.	58	53

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "China" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

*[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

**Table 10.34. China's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of China's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of China's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	29	13
Total number of China's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	3	3
Total number of China's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	15	6
Total number of China's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	11	4
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests.	331	325
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests.	23	21
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests.	164	137

*Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.*

*Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "China" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".*

*[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

*[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.*

**Table 10.35. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting China's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	23
Argentina	16
Germany	11
France	9
Indonesia	9
Spain	9
India	8
Brazil	7
Italy	7
Poland	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
United States of America	7
Netherlands	6
Sweden	6
Austria	5
Belgium	5
Bulgaria	5
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Estonia	5
Finland	5
Greece	5
Hungary	5
Ireland	5
Latvia	5
Lithuania	5
Luxembourg	5
Malta	5
Portugal	5
Romania	5
Slovakia	5
Slovenia	5
Viet Nam	5
Belarus	4
Republic of Korea	4
Ukraine	4
Canada	3
Japan	3
Mexico	3
Switzerland	3
Australia	2
Nigeria	2
Paraguay	2

**Table 10.35. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting China's commercial interests (contd.)**

South Africa	2
Turkey	2
Algeria	1
Colombia	1
Ecuador	1
Ghana	1
Iraq	1
Jordan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Malaysia	1
Mongolia	1
New Zealand	1
Philippines	1
Thailand	1

**Table 10.36. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by China's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
Republic of Korea	8
Japan	7
Netherlands	7
United States of America	7
Germany	6
Italy	6
Belgium	5
France	5
Poland	5
Russian Federation	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Austria	4
Czech Republic	4
Lithuania	4
Luxembourg	4
Malaysia	4
Mexico	4
New Zealand	4
Norway	4
Philippines	4
Portugal	4
Spain	4
Thailand	4
Argentina	3
Australia	3
Brazil	3
Bulgaria	3
Canada	3
Costa Rica	3
Croatia	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
Finland	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
India	3
Indonesia	3
Ireland	3
Israel	3
Latvia	3
Malta	3
Morocco	3
Romania	3
Singapore	3

**Table 10.36. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by China's state measures (contd.)**

Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
South Africa	3
Sweden	3
Switzerland	3
Turkey	3
Ukraine	3
Viet Nam	3
Belarus	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2
Chile	2
Chinese Taipei	2
El Salvador	2
Hong Kong	2
Iceland	2
Jordan	2
Kazakhstan	2
Kenya	2
Kuwait	2
Kyrgyzstan	2
Lebanon	2
Macedonia	2
Madagascar	2
Malawi	2
Mali	2
Mauritania	2
Mauritius	2
Mongolia	2
Mozambique	2
Myanmar	2
Namibia	2
Nicaragua	2
Niger	2
Nigeria	2
Oman	2
Pakistan	2
Palestinian	2
Panama	2
Paraguay	2
Peru	2
Qatar	2
Tunisia	2
Albania	1
Antigua and Barbuda	1
Armenia	1

**Table 10.36. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by China's state measures (contd.)**

Armenia	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Barbados	1
Bolivia	1
Botswana	1
Burundi	1
Cape Verde	1
Colombia	1
Cuba	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Fiji	1
Georgia	1
Greenland	1
Grenada	1
Guatemala	1
Guinea	1
Guyana	1
Honduras	1
Jamaica	1
Kiribati	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Lesotho	1
Liberia	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Liechtenstein	1
Macao	1
Maldives	1
Marshall Islands	1
Martinique	1
Mayotte	1
Micronesia	1
Monaco	1
Montenegro	1
Montserrat	1
Nauru	1
Nepal	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
New Caledonia	1

**Table 10.36. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by China's state measures (contd.)**

Niue	1
Norfolk Island	1
Northern Mariana Islands	1
Palau	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Pitcairn	1
Puerto Rico	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Rwanda	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Samoa	1
Sao Tome and Principe	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Senegal	1
Serbia	1
Seychelles	1
Sri Lanka	1
Suriname	1
Swaziland	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Togo	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Uganda	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uruguay	1
Yemen	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1



**Table 10.37. Implemented measures that harm China's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	47	23.5%
Tariff measure	44	22.0%
Bail out / state aid measure	31	15.5%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	13	6.5%
Export subsidy	12	6.0%
Public procurement	8	4.0%
Export taxes or restriction	6	3.0%
Import ban	6	3.0%
Consumption subsidy	4	2.0%
Local content requirement	4	2.0%
Migration measure	4	2.0%
Other service sector measure	4	2.0%
Investment measure	3	1.5%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	1.5%
State trading enterprise	3	1.5%
Trade finance	3	1.5%
Competitive devaluation	2	1.0%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	0.5%
State-controlled company	1	0.5%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.5%
Total	200	100.0%

**Table 10.38. China's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	9	52.9%
Export taxes or restriction	2	11.8%
Investment measure	2	11.8%
Local content requirement	1	5.9%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	5.9%
Public procurement	1	5.9%
Tariff measure	1	5.9%
Total	17	100.0%

# Cook Islands

**Table 10.39. Foreign state measures affecting Cook Islands' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Cook Islands' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Cook Islands' commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Cook Islands' commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Cook Islands' commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Cook Islands' interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Cook Islands' interests. [3]	2	2
Total number of implemented measures affecting Cook Islands' commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Cook Islands' commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Cook Islands' foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Cook Islands' commercial interests.	2	2

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Cook Islands" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.40. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Cook Islands' commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Japan	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.41. Implemented measures that harm Cook Islands' commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	33.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**Cook Islands's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Democratic People's Republic of Korea

**Table 10.42. Foreign state measures affecting Democratic People's Republic of Korea's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Democratic People's Republic of Korea's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Democratic People's Republic of Korea's commercial interests.	15	15
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Democratic People's Republic of Korea's commercial interests. [1]	3	3
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Democratic People's Republic of Korea's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Democratic People's Republic of Korea's interests. [2]	3	3
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Democratic People's Republic of Korea's interests. [3]	9	9
Total number of implemented measures affecting Democratic People's Republic of Korea's commercial interests.	14	14
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Democratic People's Republic of Korea's commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Democratic People's Republic of Korea's foreign commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Democratic People's Republic of Korea's commercial interests.	8	8

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.  
 [2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.  
 [3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.43. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Democratic People's Republic of Korea's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
India	1
Argentina	1
Belarus	1
China	1
Mexico	1
Russian Federation	1
Ukraine	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1

**Table 10.44. Implemented measures that harm Democratic People's Republic of Korea's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	3	27.27%
Export taxes or restriction	2	18.18%
Trade finance	2	18.18%
Tariff measure	1	9.09%
Export subsidy	1	9.09%
Local content requirement	1	9.09%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	9.09%
Total	11	100.00%

**Democratic People's Republic of Korea state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

**Table 10.45. Foreign state measures affecting Fiji's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Fiji's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Fiji's commercial interests.	15	14
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Fiji's commercial interests. [1]	4	3
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Fiji's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Fiji's interests. [2]	4	4
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Fiji's interests. [3]	7	7
Total number of implemented measures affecting Fiji's commercial interests.	14	13
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Fiji's commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Fiji's foreign commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Fiji's commercial interests.	32	32

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Fiji" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.46. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Fiji's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
India	2
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Bulgaria	1
China	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
France	1
Germany	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Indonesia	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Japan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Mexico	1
Netherlands	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Spain	1
Sweden	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1



**Table 10.47. Implemented measures that harm Fiji's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	3	27.3%
Export subsidy	2	18.2%
Trade finance	2	18.2%
Export taxes or restriction	1	9.1%
Migration measure	1	9.1%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	9.1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	9.1%
Total	11	100.0%

**Fiji's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.



# France

**Table 10.48. Foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting France's commercial interests.	176	153
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of France's commercial interests. [1]	18	18
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm France's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against France's interests. [2]	52	36
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against France's interests. [3]	106	99
Total number of implemented measures affecting France's commercial interests.	140	129
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect France's commercial interests.	36	24
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm France's foreign commercial interests.	33	21
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm France's commercial interests.	34	33

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "France" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.49. France's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of France's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of France's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	26	9
Total number of France's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	4	2
Total number of France's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	13	1
Total number of France's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	9	6
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests.	80	79
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests.	14	14
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests.	118	117

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "France" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.50. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting France's commercial interests..**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	25
Indonesia	8
India	7
Germany	6
Argentina	5
China	5
Belarus	4
Italy	4
Spain	4
Ukraine	4
United States of America	4
Switzerland	3
Australia	2
Brazil	2
Canada	2
Ecuador	2
Japan	2
Nigeria	2
Poland	2
Republic of Korea	2
Algeria	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1
Israel	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Netherlands	1
Portugal	1
Sweden	1
Thailand	1
Turkey	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Viet Nam	1
Zambia	1

**Table 10.51. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by France's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	9
Argentina	6
Canada	6
Israel	6
South Africa	6
Thailand	6
Turkey	6
United States of America	6
Armenia	5
Australia	5
Brazil	5
Colombia	5
Japan	5
Mexico	5
New Zealand	5
Serbia	5
Singapore	5
Switzerland	5
Austria	4
Belarus	4
Belgium	4
Bulgaria	4
Costa Rica	4
Croatia	4
Czech Republic	4
Denmark	4
Egypt	4
Estonia	4
Greece	4
India	4
Ireland	4
Italy	4
Kenya	4
Lithuania	4
Malaysia	4
Pakistan	4
Peru	4
Portugal	4
Romania	4
Russian Federation	4
Senegal	4
Slovakia	4
Sweden	4
Tunisia	4

**Table 10.51. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by France's state measures (contd.)**

Ukraine	4
United Arab Emirates	4
Algeria	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3
Chile	3
Côte d'Ivoire	3
Ethiopia	3
Finland	3
Germany	3
Guatemala	3
Honduras	3
Hong Kong	3
Iceland	3
Indonesia	3
Lebanon	3
Luxembourg	3
Morocco	3
Netherlands	3
Nicaragua	3
Norway	3
Oman	3
Paraguay	3
Philippines	3
Republic of Korea	3
Slovenia	3
Trinidad and Tobago	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Uruguay	3
Viet Nam	3
Albania	2
Azerbaijan	2
Bolivia	2
Cuba	2
Cyprus	2
Dominican Republic	2
Ecuador	2
El Salvador	2
Ghana	2
Hungary	2
Jordan	2
Kazakhstan	2
Latvia	2
Macedonia	2
Madagascar	2
Palestinian	2

**Table 10.51. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by France's state measures (contd.)**

Poland	2
Republic of Moldova	2
Saudi Arabia	2
Spain	2
Togo	2
Venezuela	2
Zambia	2
Bahrain	1
Benin	1
Burkina Faso	1
Cameroon	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Fiji	1
Georgia	1
Iran	1
Jamaica	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Mali	1
Mauritius	1
Namibia	1
Nigeria	1
Panama	1
Qatar	1
Saint Lucia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Suriname	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Yemen	1
Zimbabwe	1



**Table 10.52. Implemented measures that harm France's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	36	25.2%
Bail out / state aid measure	35	24.5%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	11	7.7%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	11	7.7%
Export subsidy	10	7.0%
Public procurement	6	4.2%
Export taxes or restriction	5	3.5%
Local content requirement	4	2.8%
Trade finance	4	2.8%
Consumption subsidy	3	2.1%
Other service sector measure	3	2.1%
State trading enterprise	3	2.1%
Import ban	2	1.4%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	1.4%
State-controlled company	2	1.4%
Competitive devaluation	1	0.7%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.7%
Investment measure	1	0.7%
Migration measure	1	0.7%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	0.7%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.7%
Total	143	100.0%

**Table 10.53. France's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	3	27.3%
Export subsidy	3	27.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	3	27.3%
Consumption subsidy	1	9.1%
Public procurement	1	9.1%
Total	11	100.0%



# French Polynesia

**Table 10.54. Foreign state measures affecting French Polynesia's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting French Polynesia's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting French Polynesia's commercial interests.	5	5
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of French Polynesia's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm French Polynesia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against French Polynesia's interests. [2]	3	3
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against French Polynesia's interests. [3]	1	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting French Polynesia's commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect French Polynesia's commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm French Polynesia's foreign commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm French Polynesia's commercial interests.	1	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "French Polynesia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.55. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting French Polynesia's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Mexico	1

**Table 10.56. Implemented measures that harm French Polynesia's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	1	33.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**French Polynesia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Georgia

**Table 10.57. Foreign state measures affecting Georgia's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Georgia's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Georgia's commercial interests.	26	23
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Georgia's commercial interests. [1]	2	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Georgia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Georgia's interests. [2]	9	7
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Georgia's interests. [3]	15	15
Total number of implemented measures affecting Georgia's commercial interests.	20	19
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Georgia's commercial interests.	6	4
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Georgia's foreign commercial interests.	6	4
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Georgia's commercial interests.	9	9

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Georgia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.58. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Georgia's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	5
Ukraine	3
Belarus	2
Argentina	1
China	1
France	1
Japan	1
Mexico	1
United States of America	1

**Table 10.59. Implemented measures that harm Georgia's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	6	30.0%
Tariff measure	4	20.0%
Export taxes or restriction	2	10.0%
Public procurement	2	10.0%
Consumption subsidy	1	5.0%
Local content requirement	1	5.0%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	5.0%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	5.0%
State trading enterprise	1	5.0%
Trade finance	1	5.0%
Total	20	100.0%

**Georgia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Guam

**Table 10.60. Foreign state measures affecting Guam's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Guam's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Guam's commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Guam's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Guam's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Guam's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Guam's interests. [3]	2	2
Total number of implemented measures affecting Guam's commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Guam's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Guam's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Guam's commercial interests.	2	2

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Guam" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.61. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Guam's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Japan	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.62. Implemented measures that harm Guam's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	33.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**Guam's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.



# Hong Kong

**Table 10.63. Foreign state measures affecting Hong Kong's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Hong Kong's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Hong Kong's commercial interests.	55	52
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Hong Kong's commercial interests. [1]	6	6
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Hong Kong's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Hong Kong's interests. [2]	15	14
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Hong Kong's interests. [3]	34	32
Total number of implemented measures affecting Hong Kong's commercial interests.	48	46
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Hong Kong's commercial interests.	7	6
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Hong Kong's foreign commercial interests.	7	6
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Hong Kong's commercial interests.	44	43

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Hong Kong" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.64. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Hong Kong's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Indonesia	7
France	3
Germany	3
India	3
Italy	3
Spain	3
United States of America	3
Argentina	2
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Brazil	2
Bulgaria	2
China	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Netherlands	2
Poland	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Sweden	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
Australia	1
Belarus	1
Ghana	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Republic of Korea	1
Russian Federation	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Turkey	1

**Table 10.65. Implemented measures that harm Hong Kong's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	9	19.6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	8	17.4%
Export subsidy	6	13.0%
Tariff measure	6	13.0%
Export taxes or restriction	4	8.7%
Trade finance	3	6.5%
Local content requirement	2	4.3%
Other service sector measure	2	4.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	2	4.3%
Competitive devaluation	1	2.2%
Import ban	1	2.2%
Public procurement	1	2.2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	2.2%
Total	46	100.0%

**Hong Kong's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.



# India

**Table 10.66. Foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting India's commercial interests.	119	106
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of India's commercial interests. [1]	17	15
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm India's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against India's interests. [2]	39	30
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against India's interests. [3]	63	61
Total number of implemented measures affecting India's commercial interests.	91	86
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect India's commercial interests.	28	20
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm India's foreign commercial interests.	27	19
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm India's commercial interests.	48	48

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "India" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.67. India's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of India's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of India's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	51	12
Total number of India's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	5	5
Total number of India's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	35	2
Total number of India's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	11	5
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests.	210	203
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests.	14	13
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests.	141	140

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "India" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.68. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting India's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	10
Argentina	6
Indonesia	6
Germany	5
Spain	5
France	4
China	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	3
Ecuador	2
Malaysia	2
Netherlands	2
Nigeria	2
Poland	2
Republic of Korea	2
Ukraine	2
Algeria	1
Australia	1
Austria	1
Belarus	1
Belgium	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	1
Canada	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Japan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Mexico	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1

**Table 10.68. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting India's commercial interests (contd.)**

Sweden	1
Thailand	1
Viet Nam	1
Zambia	1

**Table 10.69. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by India's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	8
Germany	8
Japan	8
United States of America	8
Belgium	7
Brazil	7
France	7
Italy	7
Republic of Korea	7
Singapore	7
Spain	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
Israel	6
South Africa	6
Sweden	6
Australia	5
Canada	5
Denmark	5
Indonesia	5
Malaysia	5
Mexico	5
Saudi Arabia	5
Thailand	5
Austria	4
Chile	4
Finland	4
Greece	4
Iran	4
Ireland	4
Kuwait	4
Netherlands	4
Norway	4
Oman	4
Poland	4
Portugal	4



**Table 10.69. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by India's state measures (contd.)**

Russian Federation	4
Switzerland	4
Turkey	4
Ukraine	4
United Arab Emirates	4
Algeria	3
Argentina	3
Azerbaijan	3
Bangladesh	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3
Bulgaria	3
Colombia	3
Croatia	3
Czech Republic	3
Côte d'Ivoire	3
Ecuador	3
Egypt	3
Estonia	3
Ethiopia	3
Guatemala	3
Hong Kong	3
Hungary	3
Jordan	3
Kazakhstan	3
Kenya	3
Kyrgyzstan	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Macedonia	3
Madagascar	3
Malawi	3
Mauritius	3
Morocco	3
Mozambique	3
New Zealand	3
Niger	3
Nigeria	3
Pakistan	3
Peru	3
Philippines	3
Qatar	3
Romania	3
Senegal	3
Slovakia	3

**Table 10.69. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by India's state measures (contd.)**

Slovenia	3
Sri Lanka	3
Sudan	3
Syrian Arab Republic	3
Togo	3
Tunisia	3
Uganda	3
United Republic of Tanzania	3
Uruguay	3
Viet Nam	3
Yemen	3
Zambia	3
Zimbabwe	3
Angola	2
Armenia	2
Bahamas	2
Belarus	2
Benin	2
Cambodia	2
Congo	2
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	2
Djibouti	2
Dominican Republic	2
Fiji	2
Gabon	2
Gambia	2
Ghana	2
Guinea	2
Honduras	2
Lebanon	2
Lesotho	2
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	2
Maldives	2
Mali	2
Mauritania	2
Myanmar	2
Nepal	2
Netherlands Antilles	2
Panama	2
Trinidad and Tobago	2
Turkmenistan	2
Venezuela	2
Afghanistan	1
Albania	1
Bhutan	1

**Table 10.69. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by India's state measures (contd.)**

Bolivia	1
Botswana	1
Burundi	1
Costa Rica	1
Cyprus	1
El Salvador	1
Iceland	1
Iraq	1
Malta	1
Mongolia	1
Nicaragua	1
Palestinian	1
Paraguay	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Serbia	1
Swaziland	1

**Table 10.70. Implemented measures that harm India's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	22	24.4%
Bail out / state aid measure	21	23.3%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	11	12.2%
Export taxes or restriction	6	6.7%
Public procurement	5	5.6%
Migration measure	4	4.4%
Import ban	3	3.3%
Local content requirement	3	3.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	3	3.3%
Export subsidy	2	2.2%
Other service sector measure	2	2.2%
Competitive devaluation	1	1.1%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.1%
Investment measure	1	1.1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1.1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	1.1%
State-controlled company	1	1.1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.1%
Trade finance	1	1.1%
Total	90	100.0%

**Table 10.71. India's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	12	57.1%
Export subsidy	4	19.0%
Tariff measure	3	14.3%
Public procurement	1	4.8%
Trade finance	1	4.8%
Total	21	100.0%

# Indonesia

**Table 10.72. Foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests.	103	80
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Indonesia's commercial interests. [1]	13	12
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Indonesia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Indonesia's interests. [2]	41	24
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Indonesia's interests. [3]	49	44
Total number of implemented measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests.	70	63
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Indonesia's commercial interests.	33	17
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Indonesia's foreign commercial interests.	31	15
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Indonesia's commercial interests.	42	42

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Indonesia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.73. Indonesia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Indonesia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Indonesia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	20	15
Total number of Indonesia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	3	3
Total number of Indonesia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	6	1
Total number of Indonesia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	11	11
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests.	315	315
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests.	25	25
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests.	124	124

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Indonesia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.74. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	8
Argentina	5
India	5
Republic of Korea	4
China	3
France	3
Spain	3
Ukraine	3
Belarus	2
Germany	2
Italy	2
Japan	2
Mexico	2
Poland	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
Viet Nam	2
Australia	1
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Bulgaria	1
Canada	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malaysia	1
Malta	1
Netherlands	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Sweden	1
United States of America	1

**Table 10.75. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Indonesia's state**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	9
Germany	9
Singapore	9
United States of America	9
Australia	8
France	8
Japan	8
Netherlands	8
Thailand	8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	8
Belgium	7
Hong Kong	7
Malaysia	7
Philippines	7
Republic of Korea	7
Spain	7
Austria	6
Brazil	6
Canada	6
Denmark	6
Finland	6
India	6
Italy	6
New Zealand	6
South Africa	6
Sweden	6
Switzerland	6
Ukraine	6
Viet Nam	6
Argentina	5
Czech Republic	5
Ireland	5
Luxembourg	5
Mexico	5
Norway	5
Russian Federation	5
United Arab Emirates	5
Egypt	4
Hungary	4
Poland	4
Romania	4
Slovakia	4
Turkey	4
Belarus	3



**Table 10.75. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Indonesia's state measures**

Bulgaria	3
Chile	3
Estonia	3
Greece	3
Guatemala	3
Israel	3
Jordan	3
Kenya	3
Morocco	3
Namibia	3
Oman	3
Portugal	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Tunisia	3
United Republic of Tanzania	3
Albania	2
Armenia	2
Bahrain	2
Bangladesh	2
Bolivia	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2
Colombia	2
Croatia	2
Côte d'Ivoire	2
Ecuador	2
El Salvador	2
Ethiopia	2
Ghana	2
Kazakhstan	2
Latvia	2
Lebanon	2
Lithuania	2
Macedonia	2
Malta	2
Nigeria	2
Pakistan	2
Palestinian	2
Peru	2
Republic of Moldova	2
Senegal	2
Serbia	2
Slovenia	2
Sri Lanka	2
Swaziland	2
Syrian Arab Republic	2

**Table 10.75. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Indonesia's state measures**

Trinidad and Tobago	2
Uganda	2
Uruguay	2
Venezuela	2
Yemen	2
Zambia	2
Zimbabwe	2
Andorra	1
Barbados	1
Botswana	1
Brunei Darussalam	1
Cape Verde	1
Central African Republic	1
Costa Rica	1
Cyprus	1
Dominican Republic	1
Fiji	1
Honduras	1
Iceland	1
Iran	1
Jamaica	1
Kuwait	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Malawi	1
Mali	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mauritius	1
Mozambique	1
Niger	1
Panama	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Paraguay	1
Qatar	1
Sudan	1

**Table 10.76. Implemented measures that harm Indonesia's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	16	21.9%
Tariff measure	16	21.9%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	7	9.6%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	8.2%
Export subsidy	4	5.5%
Export taxes or restriction	4	5.5%
Public procurement	4	5.5%
Local content requirement	3	4.1%
Migration measure	2	2.7%
Other service sector measure	2	2.7%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	2	2.7%
Trade finance	2	2.7%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.4%
Import ban	1	1.4%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1.4%
State-controlled company	1	1.4%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.4%
Total	73	100.0%



# Iran

**Table 10.78. Foreign state measures affecting Iran's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Iran's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Iran's commercial interests.	54	47
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Iran's commercial interests. [1]	6	6
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Iran's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Iran's interests. [2]	17	11
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Iran's interests. [3]	31	30
Total number of implemented measures affecting Iran's commercial interests.	41	40
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Iran's commercial interests.	13	7
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Iran's foreign commercial interests.	12	6
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Iran's commercial interests.	14	14

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Iran" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.79. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Iran's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	10
India	4
Germany	3
Ukraine	3
Belarus	2
Argentina	1
France	1
Indonesia	1
Iraq	1
Japan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Mexico	1
Republic of Korea	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1

**Table 10.80. Implemented measures that harm Iran's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	13	27.1%
Tariff measure	9	18.8%
Export taxes or restriction	5	10.4%
Export subsidy	4	8.3%
State trading enterprise	3	6.3%
Consumption subsidy	2	4.2%
State-controlled company	2	4.2%
Trade finance	2	4.2%
Import ban	1	2.1%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	2.1%
Other service sector measure	1	2.1%
Public procurement	1	2.1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	2.1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	2.1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	2.1%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	2.1%
Total	48	100.0%

**Iran's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Japan

**Table 10.81. Foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Japan's commercial interests.	168	144
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Japan's commercial interests. [1]	21	21
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Japan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Japan's interests. [2]	48	32
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Japan's interests. [3]	99	91
Total number of implemented measures affecting Japan's commercial interests.	134	123
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Japan's commercial interests.	34	21
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Japan's foreign commercial interests.	32	19
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Japan's commercial interests.	48	47

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Japan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.82. Japan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Japan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Japan's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	10	4
Total number of Japan's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	none	none
Total number of Japan's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	2	2
Total number of Japan's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	8	2
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests.	134	130
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests.	9	9
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests.	98	97

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Japan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 10.83. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Japan's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	15
Germany	8
India	8
Indonesia	8
China	7
Italy	6
Spain	6
Argentina	5
France	5
United States of America	5
Belarus	4
Brazil	4
Poland	4
Viet Nam	4
Republic of Korea	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Bulgaria	2
Canada	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Ecuador	2
Estonia	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Netherlands	2
Nigeria	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Ukraine	2
Australia	1
Ghana	1
Malaysia	1

**Table 10.83. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Japan's commercial interests (contd.)**

Mexico	1
Philippines	1
Thailand	1
Uganda	1

**Table 10.84. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Japan's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
Belgium	5
Australia	4
Netherlands	4
China	3
Germany	3
Singapore	3
United States of America	3
Canada	2
Chile	2
Denmark	2
France	2
Indonesia	2
Italy	2
Malaysia	2
Morocco	2
New Zealand	2
Norway	2
Philippines	2
Republic of Korea	2
South Africa	2
Switzerland	2
Thailand	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
Afghanistan	1
Argentina	1
Austria	1
Bolivia	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	1
Burkina Faso	1
Colombia	1
Cook Islands	1
Costa Rica	1
Croatia	1
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1

**Table 10.84. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Japan's state measures**

Czech Republic	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Fiji	1
Finland	1
Georgia	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Greenland	1
Guam	1
Guatemala	1
Hong Kong	1
Hungary	1
Iceland	1
India	1
Iran	1
Ireland	1
Israel	1
Kenya	1
Kiribati	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Maldives	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mauritius	1
Mexico	1
Mozambique	1
Myanmar	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Nicaragua	1
Nigeria	1
Oman	1
Pakistan	1
Palau	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Russian Federation	1
Saint Helena	1

**Table 10.84. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Japan's state measures**

Serbia	1
Seychelles	1
Spain	1
Sri Lanka	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tonga	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Tunisia	1
Turkey	1
Uganda	1
Ukraine	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uruguay	1
Vanuatu	1
Venezuela	1
Viet Nam	1

**Table 10.85. Implemented measures that harm Japan's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	33	24.8%
Bail out / state aid measure	28	21.1%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	11	8.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	11	8.3%
Export subsidy	9	6.8%
Export taxes or restriction	6	4.5%
Public procurement	6	4.5%
Import ban	4	3.0%
Consumption subsidy	3	2.3%
Local content requirement	3	2.3%
Migration measure	3	2.3%
Other service sector measure	3	2.3%
Investment measure	2	1.5%
Competitive devaluation	1	0.8%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.8%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	0.8%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	1	0.8%
State trading enterprise	1	0.8%
State-controlled company	1	0.8%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.8%
Trade finance	4	3.0%
Total	133	100.0%

**Table 10.86. Japan's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	66.7%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	22.2%
Bail out / state aid measure	1	11.1%
Total	9	100.0%



# Kazakhstan

**Table 10.87. Foreign state measures affecting Kazakhstan's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Kazakhstan's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Kazakhstan's commercial interests.	50	45
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Kazakhstan's commercial interests. [1]	5	5
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Kazakhstan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Kazakhstan's interests. [2]	14	10
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Kazakhstan's interests. [3]	31	30
Total number of implemented measures affecting Kazakhstan's commercial interests.	40	38
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Kazakhstan's commercial interests.	10	7
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Kazakhstan's foreign commercial interests.	10	7
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Kazakhstan's commercial interests.	39	39

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Kazakhstan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.88. Kazakhstan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Kazakhstan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Kazakhstan's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	13	8
Total number of Kazakhstan's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	none	none
Total number of Kazakhstan's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	5	1
Total number of Kazakhstan's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	8	7
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Kazakhstan that harm foreign commercial interests.	8	5
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Kazakhstan that harm foreign commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Kazakhstan that harm foreign commercial interests.	23	23

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Kazakhstan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 10.89. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Kazakhstan's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	12
India	3
China	2
France	2
Germany	2
Indonesia	2
Spain	2
Ukraine	2
Austria	1
Belarus	1
Belgium	1
Bulgaria	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malaysia	1
Malta	1
Mexico	1
Netherlands	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Sweden	1
Thailand	1
Turkey	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United States of America	1
Viet Nam	1

**Table 10.90. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Kazakhstan's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	5
Poland	3
Ukraine	3
Belarus	2
Brazil	2
Cuba	2
Turkey	2
Afghanistan	1
Canada	1
China	1
Finland	1
Hungary	1
Iran	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Netherlands	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Switzerland	1
Turkmenistan	1
Uzbekistan	1

**Table 10.91. Implemented measures that harm Kazakhstan's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	12	31.6%
Bail out / state aid measure	9	23.7%
Export subsidy	4	10.5%
Export taxes or restriction	3	7.9%
Public procurement	2	5.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	2	5.3%
Trade finance	2	5.3%
Local content requirement	1	2.6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	2.6%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	2.6%
State-controlled company	1	2.6%
Total	38	100.0%

**Table 10.92. Kazakhstan's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Export taxes or restriction	2	20.0%
Public procurement	2	20.0%
Competitive devaluation	1	10.0%
Local content requirement	1	10.0%
Migration measure	1	10.0%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	10.0%
Tariff measure	1	10.0%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	10.0%
Total	10	100.0%



# Kiribati

**Table 10.93. Foreign state measures affecting Kiribati's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Kiribati's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Kiribati's commercial interests.	5	4
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Kiribati's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Kiribati's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Kiribati's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Kiribati's interests. [3]	3	2
Total number of implemented measures affecting Kiribati's commercial interests.	5	4
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Kiribati's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Kiribati's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Kiribati's commercial interests.	3	2

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Kiribati" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Kiribati's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

**Table 10.94. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Kiribati's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Japan	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.95. Implemented measures that harm Kiribati's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	25.0%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	25.0%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	25.0%
Trade finance	1	25.0%
Total	4	100.0%

# Kyrgyzstan

**Table 10.96. Foreign state measures affecting Kyrgyzstan's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Kyrgyzstan's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Kyrgyzstan's commercial interests.	26	24
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Kyrgyzstan's commercial interests. [1]	3	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Kyrgyzstan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Kyrgyzstan's interests. [2]	5	5
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Kyrgyzstan's interests. [3]	18	17
Total number of implemented measures affecting Kyrgyzstan's commercial interests.	24	22
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Kyrgyzstan's commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Kyrgyzstan's foreign commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Kyrgyzstan's commercial interests.	37	37

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Kyrgyzstan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.97. Kyrgyzstan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Kyrgyzstan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Kyrgyzstan's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	2	none
Total number of Kyrgyzstan's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	none	none
Total number of Kyrgyzstan's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	2	none
Total number of Kyrgyzstan's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	none	none
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Kyrgyzstan that harm foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Kyrgyzstan that harm foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Kyrgyzstan that harm foreign commercial interests.	none	none

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Kyrgyzstan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 10.98. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Kyrgyzstan's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	7
India	3
China	2
Germany	2
Austria	1
Belarus	1
Belgium	1
Bulgaria	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
France	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Indonesia	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Kazakhstan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malaysia	1
Malta	1
Mexico	1
Netherlands	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Spain	1
Sweden	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1

**Table 10.99. Implemented measures that harm Kyrgyzstan's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	6	26.1%
Tariff measure	4	17.4%
Export subsidy	3	13.0%
Export taxes or restriction	3	13.0%
Trade finance	2	8.7%
Migration measure	1	4.3%
Public procurement	1	4.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	4.3%
State-controlled company	1	4.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	4.3%
Total	23	100.0%

**Table 10.100. Kyrgyzstan's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	100.0%
Total	1	100.0%

**Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Kyrgyzstan's state measures.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Lao People's Democratic Republic

**Table 10.101. Foreign state measures affecting Lao People's Democratic Republic's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Lao People's Democratic Republic's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Lao People's Democratic Republic's commercial interests.	11	10
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Lao People's Democratic Republic's commercial interests. [1]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Lao People's Democratic Republic's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Lao People's Democratic Republic's interests. [2]	4	4
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Lao People's Democratic Republic's interests. [3]	5	4
Total number of implemented measures affecting Lao People's Democratic Republic's commercial interests.	9	8
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Lao People's Democratic Republic's commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Lao People's Democratic Republic's foreign commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Lao People's Democratic Republic's commercial interests.	5	4

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Lao People's Democratic Republic" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

- [1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.  
 [2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.  
 [3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.102. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Lao People's Democratic Republic's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Germany	1
Indonesia	1
Mexico	1
United States of America	1

**Table 10.103. Implemented measures that harm Lao People's Democratic Republic's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	1	12.5%
Local content requirement	1	12.5%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	12.5%
Public procurement	1	12.5%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	12.5%
Tariff measure	1	12.5%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	12.5%
Trade finance	1	12.5%
Total	8	100.0%

**Lao People's Democratic Republic's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Macao

**Table 10.104. Foreign state measures affecting Macao's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Macao's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Macao's commercial interests.	6	5
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Macao's commercial interests. [1]	3	3
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Macao's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Macao's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Macao's interests. [3]	2	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting Macao's commercial interests.	6	5
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Macao's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Macao's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Macao's commercial interests.	2	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Macao" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.105. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Macao's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.106. Implemented measures that harm Macao's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**Macao's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Malaysia

**Table 10.107. Foreign state measures affecting Malaysia's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Malaysia's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Malaysia's commercial interests.	111	90
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Malaysia's commercial interests. [1]	17	15
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Malaysia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Malaysia's interests. [2]	35	20
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Malaysia's interests. [3]	59	55
Total number of implemented measures affecting Malaysia's commercial interests.	83	76
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Malaysia's commercial interests.	28	14
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Malaysia's foreign commercial interests.	25	12
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Malaysia's commercial interests.	44	43

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Malaysia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.108. Malaysia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Malaysia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Malaysia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	6	6
Total number of Malaysia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	2	2
Total number of Malaysia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	2	2
Total number of Malaysia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	2	2
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Malaysia that harm foreign commercial interests.	26	26
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Malaysia that harm foreign commercial interests.	10	10
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Malaysia that harm foreign commercial interests.	98	98

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Malaysia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 10.109. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Malaysia's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Indonesia	7
Russian Federation	6
India	5
China	4
France	4
Spain	4
Argentina	3
Republic of Korea	3
Ukraine	3
Viet Nam	3
Belarus	2
Germany	2
Italy	2
Japan	2
Mexico	2
Netherlands	2
Poland	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
United States of America	2
Australia	1
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Ecuador	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1

**Table 10.109. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Malaysia's commercial interests (contd.)**

South Africa	1
Sweden	1

**Table 10.110. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Malaysia's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
Australia	2
Canada	2
Germany	2
India	2
New Zealand	2
Pakistan	2
Philippines	2
Singapore	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
United States of America	2
Albania	1
Argentina	1
Armenia	1
Austria	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Belarus	1
Belgium	1
Bolivia	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
Brazil	1
Brunei Darussalam	1
Bulgaria	1
Chile	1
China	1
Colombia	1
Costa Rica	1
Croatia	1
Czech Republic	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Denmark	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
El Salvador	1
Ethiopia	1
Finland	1

**Table 10.110. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Malaysia's state measures (contd.)**

France	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Guatemala	1
Honduras	1
Hong Kong	1
Hungary	1
Indonesia	1
Ireland	1
Israel	1
Italy	1
Jamaica	1
Japan	1
Jordan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Latvia	1
Lebanon	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Macedonia	1
Malawi	1
Malta	1
Mexico	1
Morocco	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands	1
Nigeria	1
Norway	1
Oman	1
Palestinian	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Republic of Korea	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Romania	1
Russian Federation	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Senegal	1
Serbia	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1

**Table 10.110. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Malaysia's state measures (contd.)**

South Africa	1
Spain	1
Sri Lanka	1
Swaziland	1
Sweden	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Tunisia	1
Turkey	1
Uganda	1
Ukraine	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uruguay	1
Viet Nam	1
Yemen	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 10.111. Implemented measures that harm Malaysia's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	19	23.8%
Tariff measure	18	22.5%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	8	10.0%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	7.5%
Export subsidy	5	6.3%
Public procurement	5	6.3%
Consumption subsidy	2	2.5%
Export taxes or restriction	2	2.5%
Import ban	2	2.5%
Local content requirement	2	2.5%
Other service sector measure	2	2.5%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	2.5%
Trade finance	2	2.5%
Competitive devaluation	1	1.3%
Migration measure	1	1.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1.3%
State-controlled company	1	1.3%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.3%
Total	80	100.0%

**Table 10.112. Malaysia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Export taxes or restriction	1	33.3%
Migration measure	1	33.3%
Tariff measure	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%



# Maldives

**Table 10.113. Foreign state measures affecting Maldives' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Maldives' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Maldives' commercial interests.	9	7
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Maldives' commercial interests. [1]	2	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Maldives' commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Maldives' interests. [2]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Maldives' interests. [3]	5	4
Total number of implemented measures affecting Maldives' commercial interests.	8	6
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Maldives' commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Maldives' foreign commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Maldives' commercial interests.	4	3

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Maldives" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.114 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Maldives' commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
India	2
China	1
Japan	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.115. Implemented measures that harm Maldives' commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Trade finance	2	33.3%
Export subsidy	1	16.7%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	16.7%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	16.7%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	16.7%
Total	6	100.0%

**Maldives' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.



# Marshall Islands

**Table 10.116. Foreign state measures affecting Marshall Islands' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Marshall Islands' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Marshall Islands' commercial interests.	9	8
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Marshall Islands' commercial interests. [1]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Marshall Islands' commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Marshall Islands' interests. [2]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Marshall Islands' interests. [3]	5	4
Total number of implemented measures affecting Marshall Islands' commercial interests.	8	7
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Marshall Islands' commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Marshall Islands' foreign commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Marshall Islands' commercial interests.	5	4

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Marshall Islands" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.117. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Marshall Islands' commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Indonesia	1
Japan	1
Mexico	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1

**Table 10.118. Implemented measures that harm Marshall Islands' commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	1	16.7%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	16.7%
Other service sector measure	1	16.7%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	16.7%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	16.7%
Trade finance	1	16.7%
Total	6	100.0%

**Marshall Islands's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Micronesia

**Table 10.119. Foreign state measures affecting Micronesia's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Micronesia's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Micronesia's commercial interests.	5	4
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Micronesia's commercial interests. [1]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Micronesia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Micronesia's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Micronesia's interests. [3]	2	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting Micronesia's commercial interests.	5	4
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Micronesia's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Micronesia's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Micronesia's commercial interests.	2	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Micronesia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.120. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Micronesia's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.121. Implemented measures that harm Micronesia's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**Micronesia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Mongolia

**Table 10.122. Foreign state measures affecting Mongolia's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mongolia's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Mongolia's commercial interests.	20	18
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Mongolia's commercial interests. [1]	2	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Mongolia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mongolia's interests. [2]	8	8
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mongolia's interests. [3]	10	9
Total number of implemented measures affecting Mongolia's commercial interests.	16	14
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Mongolia's commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Mongolia's foreign commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Mongolia's commercial interests.	8	8

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Mongolia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.123. Mongolia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Mongolia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Mongolia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of Mongolia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of Mongolia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	none	none
Total number of Mongolia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	1	1
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Mongolia that harm foreign commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Mongolia that harm foreign commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Mongolia that harm foreign commercial interests.	2	2

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Mongolia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.124. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Mongolia's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	3
China	2
Belarus	1
Germany	1
India	1
Kuwait	1
Mexico	1
United States of America	1
Total	11

**Table 10.125. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Mongolia's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	1
Russian Federation	1
Total	2

**Table 10.126. Implemented measures that harm Mongolia's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	3	20.0%
Public procurement	2	13.3%
Tariff measure	2	13.3%
Export taxes or restriction	2	13.3%
Local content requirement	1	6.7%
Export subsidy	1	6.7%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	6.7%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	6.7%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	6.7%
Trade finance	1	6.7%
Total	15	100.0%

**Table 10.127. Mongolia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	1	100.0%
Total	1	100.0%





# Myanmar

**Table 10.128. Foreign state measures affecting Myanmar's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Myanmar's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Myanmar's commercial interests.	17	15
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Myanmar's commercial interests. [1]	3	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Myanmar's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Myanmar's interests. [2]	5	5
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Myanmar's interests. [3]	9	8
Total number of implemented measures affecting Myanmar's commercial interests.	15	13
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Myanmar's commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Myanmar's foreign commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Myanmar's commercial interests.	6	6

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Myanmar" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.129. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Myanmar's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	2
India	2
Republic of Korea	2
Germany	1
Japan	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.130. Implemented measures that harm Myanmar's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	3	25.0%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	16.7%
Trade finance	2	16.7%
Bail out / state aid measure	1	8.3%
Export subsidy	1	8.3%
Local content requirement	1	8.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	8.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	8.3%
Total	12	100.0%

**Myanmar's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Nauru

**Table 10.131. Foreign state measures affecting Nauru's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Nauru's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Nauru's commercial interests.	4	3
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Nauru's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Nauru's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Nauru's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Nauru's interests. [3]	2	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting Nauru's commercial interests.	4	3
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Nauru's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Nauru's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Nauru's commercial interests.	2	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Nauru" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.132. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Nauru's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.133. Implemented measures that harm Nauru's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**Nauru's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Nepal

**Table 10.134. Foreign state measures affecting Nepal's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Nepal's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Nepal's commercial interests.	11	8
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Nepal's commercial interests. [1]	3	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Nepal's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Nepal's interests. [2]	2	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Nepal's interests. [3]	6	5
Total number of implemented measures affecting Nepal's commercial interests.	10	8
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Nepal's commercial interests.	1	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Nepal's foreign commercial interests.	1	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Nepal's commercial interests.	5	4

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Nepal" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.135. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Nepal's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Germany	1
India	2
Mexico	1
United States of America	1

**Table 10.136. Implemented measures that harm Nepal's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Trade finance	2	25.0%
Bail out / state aid measure	1	12.5%
Export subsidy	1	12.5%
Local content requirement	1	12.5%
Public procurement	1	12.5%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	12.5%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	12.5%
Total	8	100.0%

**Nepal's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Netherlands

**Table 10.137. Foreign state measures affecting Netherlands' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Netherlands' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Netherlands' commercial interests.	156	137
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Netherlands' commercial interests. [1]	18	18
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Netherlands' commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Netherlands' interests. [2]	40	28
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Netherlands' interests. [3]	98	91
Total number of implemented measures affecting Netherlands' commercial interests.	126	116
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Netherlands' commercial interests.	30	21
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Netherlands' foreign commercial interests.	26	17
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Netherlands' commercial interests.	34	33

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Netherlands" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.138. Netherlands' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Netherlands' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Netherlands' measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	26	9
Total number of Netherlands' measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	3	1
Total number of Netherlands' measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	13	1
Total number of Netherlands' measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	10	7
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Netherlands that harm foreign commercial interests.	13	10
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Netherlands that harm foreign commercial interests.	5	4
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Netherlands that harm foreign commercial interests.	85	84

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Netherlands" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 10.139. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Netherlands' commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	20
Indonesia	8
China	7
Germany	5
Belarus	4
India	4
Italy	4
Japan	4
Spain	4
Ukraine	4
Argentina	3
Brazil	3
France	3
Switzerland	3
Denmark	2
Ecuador	2
Poland	2
United States of America	2
Viet Nam	2
Algeria	1
Australia	1
Canada	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1
Israel	1
Kazakhstan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Nigeria	1
Portugal	1
Republic of Korea	1
Sweden	1
Thailand	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1

**Table 10.140. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Netherlands' state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	6
Argentina	3
Armenia	3
Australia	3
Brazil	3
Chile	3
New Zealand	3
Republic of Korea	3
Switzerland	3
Thailand	3
Turkey	3
United States of America	3
Algeria	2
Bolivia	2
Canada	2
Colombia	2
Costa Rica	2
El Salvador	2
Guatemala	2
Honduras	2
Hong Kong	2
Iceland	2
India	2
Israel	2
Japan	2
Jordan	2
Lebanon	2
Macedonia	2
Malaysia	2
Mexico	2
Nicaragua	2
Oman	2
Palestinian	2
Paraguay	2
Peru	2
Russian Federation	2
Saudi Arabia	2
Serbia	2
Singapore	2
South Africa	2
Trinidad and Tobago	2
Uruguay	2
Zambia	2
Austria	1

**Table 10.140. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Netherlands' state measures (contd.)**

Bahrain	1
Belarus	1
Belgium	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Croatia	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Fiji	1
France	1
Germany	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Indonesia	1
Italy	1
Jamaica	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Luxembourg	1
Morocco	1
Nigeria	1
Norway	1
Pakistan	1
Panama	1
Philippines	1
Poland	1
Romania	1
Senegal	1
Spain	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Togo	1
Tunisia	1
Ukraine	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Viet Nam	1
Yemen	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 10.141. Implemented measures that harm Netherlands' commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	32	24.8%
Tariff measure	32	24.8%
Export subsidy	10	7.8%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	10	7.8%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	10	7.8%
Export taxes or restriction	6	4.7%
Public procurement	5	3.9%
Local content requirement	4	3.1%
Consumption subsidy	3	2.3%
Other service sector measure	3	2.3%
Import ban	2	1.6%
Investment measure	2	1.6%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	1.6%
Trade finance	2	1.6%
Competitive devaluation	1	0.8%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.8%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	0.8%
State trading enterprise	1	0.8%
State-controlled company	1	0.8%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.8%
Total	129	100.0%

**Table 10.142. Netherlands' implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	6	54.5%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	3	27.3%
Export subsidy	2	18.2%
Total	11	100.0%

# New Caledonia

**Table 10.143. Foreign state measures affecting New Caledonia's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting New Caledonia's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting New Caledonia's commercial interests.	8	7
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of New Caledonia's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm New Caledonia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against New Caledonia's interests. [2]	5	5
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against New Caledonia's interests. [3]	2	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting New Caledonia's commercial interests.	5	4
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect New Caledonia's commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm New Caledonia's foreign commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm New Caledonia's commercial interests.	2	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "New Caledonia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

- [1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.  
 [2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.  
 [3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.144. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting New Caledonia's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.145. Implemented measures that harm New Caledonia's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	25.0%
Tariff measure	1	25.0%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	25.0%
Trade finance	1	25.0%
Total	4	100.0%

**New Caledonia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# New Zealand

**Table 10.146. Foreign state measures affecting New Zealand's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting New Zealand's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting New Zealand's commercial interests.	73	68
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of New Zealand's commercial interests. [1]	5	5
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm New Zealand's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against New Zealand's interests. [2]	21	19
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against New Zealand's interests. [3]	47	44
Total number of implemented measures affecting New Zealand's commercial interests.	59	56
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect New Zealand's commercial interests.	14	12
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm New Zealand's foreign commercial interests.	13	11
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm New Zealand's commercial interests.	41	41

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "New Zealand" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.147. New Zealand's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial**

Summary statistic of New Zealand's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of New Zealand's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	4	1
Total number of New Zealand's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	none	none
Total number of New Zealand's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	3	1
Total number of New Zealand's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	1	none
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by New Zealand that harm foreign commercial interests.	1	none
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by New Zealand that harm foreign commercial interests.	1	none
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by New Zealand that harm foreign commercial interests.	1	none

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "New Zealand" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 10.148. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting New Zealand's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Indonesia	6
Russian Federation	6
France	5
Germany	5
China	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
India	3
Netherlands	3
Republic of Korea	3
Spain	3
Switzerland	3
Argentina	2
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Italy	2
Japan	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malaysia	2
Malta	2
Poland	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Sweden	2
Viet Nam	2
Australia	1
Mexico	1
Thailand	1
United States of America	1

**Table 10.149. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by New Zealand's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	1

**Table 10.150. Implemented measures that harm New Zealand's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	18	28.1%
Tariff measure	13	20.3%
Export subsidy	10	15.6%
Export taxes or restriction	3	4.7%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	3	4.7%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	3	4.7%
Local content requirement	2	3.1%
Migration measure	2	3.1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	3.1%
Trade finance	2	3.1%
Competitive devaluation	1	1.6%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.6%
Other service sector measure	1	1.6%
Public procurement	1	1.6%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	1.6%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.6%
Total	64	100.0%

**Table 10.151. New Zealand's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Migration measure	1	50.0%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	50.0%
Total	2	100.0%

# Niue

**Table 10.152. Foreign state measures affecting Niue's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Niue's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Niue's commercial interests.	4	3
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Niue's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Niue's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Niue's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Niue's interests. [3]	2	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting Niue's commercial interests.	4	3
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Niue's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Niue's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Niue's commercial interests.	2	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Niue" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.153. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Niue's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.154. Implemented measures that harm Niue's commercial interests, by type..**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**Niue's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Northern Mariana Islands

**Table 10.155. Foreign state measures affecting Northern Mariana Islands' commercial**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Northern Mariana Islands' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Northern Mariana Islands' commercial interests.	4	3
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Northern Mariana Islands' commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Northern Mariana Islands' commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Northern Mariana Islands' interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Northern Mariana Islands' interests. [3]	2	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting Northern Mariana Islands' commercial interests.	4	3
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Northern Mariana Islands' commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Northern Mariana Islands' foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Northern Mariana Islands'	2	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Northern Mariana Islands" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

- [1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
- [2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
- [3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.156. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Northern Mariana Islands' commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.157. Implemented measures that harm Northern Mariana Islands' commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**Northern Mariana Islands's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Pakistan

**Table 10.158. Foreign state measures affecting Pakistan's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Pakistan's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Pakistan's commercial interests.	61	55
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Pakistan's commercial interests. [1]	9	8
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Pakistan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Pakistan's interests. [2]	20	16
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Pakistan's interests. [3]	32	31
Total number of implemented measures affecting Pakistan's commercial interests.	50	48
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Pakistan's commercial interests.	11	7
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Pakistan's foreign commercial interests.	11	7
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Pakistan's commercial interests.	41	41

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Pakistan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.159. Pakistan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Pakistan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Pakistan's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	7	1
Total number of Pakistan's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	1	none
Total number of Pakistan's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	6	1
Total number of Pakistan's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	none	none
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Pakistan that harm foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Pakistan that harm foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Pakistan that harm foreign commercial interests.	none	none

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Pakistan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 10.160. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Pakistan's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
France	4
Germany	4
India	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	3
Argentina	2
China	2
Indonesia	2
Malaysia	2
Republic of Korea	2
Russian Federation	2
Spain	2
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Bulgaria	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Japan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Mexico	1
Netherlands	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Sweden	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1

**Table 10.161. Implemented measures that harm Pakistan's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	13	28.3%
Tariff measure	8	17.4%
Export subsidy	6	13.0%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	5	10.9%
Migration measure	3	6.5%
Consumption subsidy	2	4.3%
Export taxes or restriction	2	4.3%
Trade finance	2	4.3%
Local content requirement	1	2.2%
Other service sector measure	1	2.2%
Public procurement	1	2.2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	2.2%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	2.2%
Total	46	100.0%

**Table 10.162. Pakistan's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	1	14.3%
Export subsidy	1	14.3%
Export taxes or restriction	1	14.3%
Other service sector measure	1	14.3%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	14.3%
Tariff measure	1	14.3%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	14.3%
Total	7	100.0%

**Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Pakistan's state measures.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Palau

**Table 10.163. Foreign state measures affecting Palau's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Palau's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Palau's commercial interests.	6	5
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Palau's commercial interests. [1]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Palau's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Palau's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Palau's interests. [3]	3	2
Total number of implemented measures affecting Palau's commercial interests.	6	5
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Palau's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Palau's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Palau's commercial interests.	3	2

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Palau" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.164. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Palau's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Japan	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.165. Implemented measures that harm Palau's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	25.0%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	25.0%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	25.0%
Trade finance	1	25.0%
Total	4	100.0%

**Palau's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Papua New Guinea

**Table 10.166. Foreign state measures affecting Papua New Guinea's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Papua New Guinea's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Papua New Guinea's commercial interests.	11	9
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Papua New Guinea's commercial interests. [1]	3	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Papua New Guinea's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Papua New Guinea's interests. [2]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Papua New Guinea's interests. [3]	6	5
Total number of implemented measures affecting Papua New Guinea's commercial interests.	10	8
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Papua New Guinea's commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Papua New Guinea's foreign commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Papua New Guinea's commercial interests.	6	5

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Papua New Guinea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.167. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Papua New Guinea's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	1
Germany	1
Indonesia	1
Mexico	1
Russian Federation	1
Spain	1

**Table 10.168. Implemented measures that harm Papua New Guinea's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	3	42.9%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	14.3%
Tariff measure	1	14.3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	14.3%
Trade finance	1	14.3%
Total	7	100.0%

**Papua New Guinea's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Philippines

**Table 10.169. Foreign state measures affecting Philippines' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Philippines' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Philippines' commercial interests.	72	65
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Philippines' commercial interests. [1]	8	7
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Philippines' commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Philippines' interests. [2]	21	17
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Philippines' interests. [3]	43	41
Total number of implemented measures affecting Philippines' commercial interests.	57	54
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Philippines' commercial interests.	15	11
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Philippines' foreign commercial interests.	15	11
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Philippines' commercial interests.	40	40

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Philippines" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.170. Philippines' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Philippines' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Philippines' measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	2	1
Total number of Philippines' measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of Philippines' measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	none	none
Total number of Philippines' measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	1	none
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Philippines that harm foreign commercial interests.	1	none
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Philippines that harm foreign commercial interests.	1	none
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Philippines that harm foreign commercial interests.	4	none

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Philippines" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 10.171. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Philippines' commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Indonesia	7
China	4
Russian Federation	4
Spain	4
France	3
India	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	3
Viet Nam	3
Argentina	2
Germany	2
Japan	2
Malaysia	2
Mexico	2
Republic of Korea	2
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Bulgaria	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Netherlands	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Sweden	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1

**Table 10.172. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Philippines' state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	1
Japan	1
Republic of Korea	1
Russian Federation	1

**Table 10.173. Implemented measures that harm Philippines' commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	11	18.6%
Tariff measure	11	18.6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	6	10.2%
Migration measure	5	8.5%
Public procurement	5	8.5%
Export subsidy	4	6.8%
Export taxes or restriction	3	5.1%
Local content requirement	2	3.4%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	2	3.4%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	2	3.4%
Trade finance	2	3.4%
Competitive devaluation	1	1.7%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.7%
Import ban	1	1.7%
Other service sector measure	1	1.7%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1.7%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.7%
Total	59	100.0%

**Table 10.174. Philippines' implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	100.0%
Total	1	100.0%

# Republic of Korea

**Table 10.175. Foreign state measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests.	150	122
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Republic of Korea's commercial interests. [1]	20	20
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Republic of Korea's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Republic of Korea's interests. [2]	48	29
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Republic of Korea's interests. [3]	82	73
Total number of implemented measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests.	118	106
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Republic of Korea's commercial interests.	32	16
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Republic of Korea's foreign commercial interests.	32	16
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Republic of Korea's commercial interests.	46	45

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Republic of Korea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.176. Republic of Korea's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Republic of Korea's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Republic of Korea's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	10	8
Total number of Republic of Korea's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	2	1
Total number of Republic of Korea's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	3	2
Total number of Republic of Korea's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	5	5
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Republic of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests.	12	12
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Republic of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests.	8	8
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Republic of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests.	88	88

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Republic of Korea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.177. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	16
China	8
Germany	7
India	7
Indonesia	7
Spain	6
Belarus	4
Italy	4
Poland	4
United States of America	4
France	3
Netherlands	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Viet Nam	3
Argentina	2
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Brazil	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Japan	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Nigeria	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Sweden	2
Ukraine	2
Australia	1
Canada	1
Ecuador	1
Malaysia	1

**Table 10.177. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests (contd.)**

Mexico	1
Philippines	1
Thailand	1

**Table 10.178. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Republic of Korea's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	4
Indonesia	4
Australia	3
Japan	3
Malaysia	3
New Zealand	3
Russian Federation	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Turkey	3
United States of America	3
Algeria	2
Belgium	2
Brazil	2
Canada	2
Chile	2
Cyprus	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Finland	2
France	2
Germany	2
Guinea	2
Iceland	2
India	2
Israel	2
Italy	2
Kuwait	2
Latvia	2
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	2
Mexico	2
Myanmar	2
Nigeria	2
Norway	2
Oman	2

**Table 10.178. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Republic of Korea's state measures (contd.)**

Pakistan	2
Panama	2
Philippines	2
Poland	2
Qatar	2
Romania	2
Singapore	2
South Africa	2
Spain	2
Sweden	2
Switzerland	2
Thailand	2
Tunisia	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
Uruguay	2
Viet Nam	2
Angola	1
Argentina	1
Austria	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bahrain	1
Republic of Korea	1
Bulgaria	1
Cameroon	1
Congo	1
Costa Rica	1
Croatia	1
Czech Republic	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Greenland	1
Guinea-Bissau	1
Hong Kong	1
Iran	1
Iraq	1
Ireland	1
Kenya	1
Lithuania	1
Mauritania	1
Morocco	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands	1

**Table 10.178. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Republic of Korea's state measures (contd.)**

Peru	1
Portugal	1
Samoa	1
Senegal	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Yemen	1

**Table 10.179. Implemented measures that harm Republic of Korea's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	27	24.3%
Bail out / state aid measure	24	21.6%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	12	10.8%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	9	8.1%
Export subsidy	8	7.2%
Export taxes or restriction	6	5.4%
Public procurement	5	4.5%
Import ban	3	2.7%
Local content requirement	3	2.7%
Consumption subsidy	2	1.8%
Migration measure	2	1.8%
Trade finance	2	1.8%
Competitive devaluation	1	0.9%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.9%
Other service sector measure	1	0.9%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	0.9%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	1	0.9%
State trading enterprise	1	0.9%
State-controlled company	1	0.9%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.9%
Total	111	100.0%

**Table 10.180. Republic of Korea's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	2	33.3%
Tariff measure	2	33.3%
Migration measure	1	16.7%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	16.7%
Total	6	100.0%



# Russian Federation

**Table 10.181. Foreign state measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests.	99	81
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Russian Federation's commercial interests. [1]	7	7
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Russian Federation's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Russian Federation's interests. [2]	35	21
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Russian Federation's interests. [3]	57	53
Total number of implemented measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests.	75	70
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Russian Federation's commercial interests.	24	11
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Russian Federation's foreign commercial interests.	23	10
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Russian Federation's commercial interests.	48	47

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Russian Federation" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.182.. Russian Federation's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial**

Summary statistic of Russian Federation's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Russian Federation's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	55	49
Total number of Russian Federation's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	10	10
Total number of Russian Federation's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	8	6
Total number of Russian Federation's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	37	33
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Russian Federation that harm foreign commercial interests.	486	483
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Russian Federation that harm foreign commercial interests.	24	23
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Russian Federation that harm foreign commercial interests.	132	132

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Russian Federation" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.183. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
China	5
Indonesia	5
Kazakhstan	5
Spain	5
Belarus	4
France	4
Germany	4
India	4
Ukraine	4
Brazil	3
Republic of Korea	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	3
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Italy	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Netherlands	2
Poland	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Viet Nam	2
Argentina	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Mongolia	1
Nigeria	1

**Table 10.183. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests (contd.)**

Philippines	1
Russian Federation	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Turkey	1

**Table 10.184. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Russian Federation's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
France	25
Germany	24
United States of America	24
China	23
Ukraine	23
Italy	22
Sweden	21
Belgium	20
Netherlands	20
Poland	20
Finland	19
Czech Republic	18
Denmark	18
Slovakia	18
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	18
Austria	17
Canada	17
Hungary	17
Lithuania	17
Spain	17
Turkey	17
Republic of Korea	16
Brazil	15
Japan	15
Latvia	13
Switzerland	13
Bulgaria	12
Kazakhstan	12
Mexico	12
Romania	12
Thailand	12
Argentina	11

**Table 10.184. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Russian Federation's state measures (contd.)**

Norway	11
Singapore	11
Slovenia	11
Australia	10
Estonia	10
India	10
Iran	10
Portugal	10
Republic of Moldova	10
Uzbekistan	10
Greece	9
Serbia	9
Indonesia	8
Israel	8
South Africa	8
Egypt	7
Ireland	7
Kyrgyzstan	7
Viet Nam	7
Armenia	6
Azerbaijan	6
Croatia	6
Luxembourg	6
Malaysia	6
New Zealand	6
Turkmenistan	6
Georgia	5
United Arab Emirates	5
Uruguay	5
Cyprus	4
Iceland	4
Philippines	4
Chile	3
Kenya	3
Malta	3
Mongolia	3
Panama	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Tajikistan	3
Tunisia	3
Albania	2
Algeria	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2
Colombia	2
Côte d'Ivoire	2

**Table 10.184. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Russian Federation's state measures (contd.)**

Guatemala	2
Kuwait	2
Mauritania	2
Namibia	2
Nigeria	2
Pakistan	2
Peru	2
Sri Lanka	2
Syrian Arab Republic	2
United Republic of Tanzania	2
Afghanistan	1
Bahamas	1
Bangladesh	1
Barbados	1
Belarus	1
Bolivia	1
British Virgin Islands	1
Cameroon	1
Costa Rica	1
Cuba	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
El Salvador	1
Ethiopia	1
Gambia	1
Ghana	1
Guinea	1
Honduras	1
Hong Kong	1
Jamaica	1
Jordan	1
Lebanon	1
Liberia	1
Malawi	1
Montenegro	1
Mozambique	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Nicaragua	1
Niger	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Paraguay	1
Qatar	1
Russian Federation	1

**Table 10.184. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Russian Federation's state measures (contd.)**

Rwanda	1
Samoa	1
Sudan	1
Togo	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Uganda	1
Venezuela	1
Yemen	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 10.185. Implemented measures that harm Russian Federation's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	19	25.7%
Bail out / state aid measure	11	14.9%
Export subsidy	9	12.2%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	5	6.8%
Public procurement	5	6.8%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	5	6.8%
Export taxes or restriction	4	5.4%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	3	4.1%
Competitive devaluation	2	2.7%
Consumption subsidy	2	2.7%
Import ban	2	2.7%
Local content requirement	2	2.7%
Migration measure	2	2.7%
Trade finance	2	2.7%
Investment measure	1	1.4%
Total	74	100.0%

**Table 10.186. Russian Federation's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	17	37.0%
Bail out / state aid measure	9	19.6%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	5	10.9%
State-controlled company	4	8.7%
State trading enterprise	3	6.5%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	4.3%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	4.3%
Consumption subsidy	1	2.2%
Export taxes or restriction	1	2.2%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	2.2%
Public procurement	1	2.2%
Total	46	100.0%



# Samoa

**Table 10.187. Foreign state measures affecting Samoa's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Samoa's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Samoa's commercial interests.	8	8
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Samoa's commercial interests. [1]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Samoa's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Samoa's interests. [2]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Samoa's interests. [3]	4	4
Total number of implemented measures affecting Samoa's commercial interests.	7	7
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Samoa's commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Samoa's foreign commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Samoa's commercial interests.	5	5

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Samoa" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.188. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Samoa's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Belarus	1
China	1
Mexico	1
Republic of Korea	1
Russian Federation	1

**Table 10.189. Implemented measures that harm Samoa's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Export taxes or restriction	2	40.0%
Bail out / state aid measure	1	20.0%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	20.0%
Trade finance	1	20.0%
Total	5	100.0%

**Samoa's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Singapore

**Table 10.190. Foreign state measures affecting Singapore's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Singapore's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Singapore's commercial interests.	111	100
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Singapore's commercial interests. [1]	14	14
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Singapore's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Singapore's interests. [2]	32	26
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Singapore's interests. [3]	65	60
Total number of implemented measures affecting Singapore's commercial interests.	92	85
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Singapore's commercial interests.	19	15
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Singapore's foreign commercial interests.	18	14
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Singapore's commercial interests.	48	48

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Singapore" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.191. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Singapore's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	11
Indonesia	9
India	7
France	5
Germany	4
Viet Nam	4
Argentina	3
China	3
Italy	3
Japan	3
Poland	3
Spain	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malaysia	2
Malta	2
Netherlands	2
Portugal	2
Republic of Korea	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Sweden	2
United States of America	2
Australia	1
Belarus	1
Brazil	1
Canada	1
Ecuador	1
Ghana	1

**Table 10.191. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Singapore's commercial interests (contd.)**

Mexico	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Uganda	1
Ukraine	1

**Table 10.192. Implemented measures that harm Singapore's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	21	22.3%
Bail out / state aid measure	18	19.1%
Export subsidy	10	10.6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	9	9.6%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	7	7.4%
Export taxes or restriction	6	6.4%
Local content requirement	3	3.2%
Other service sector measure	3	3.2%
Public procurement	3	3.2%
Trade finance	3	3.2%
Competitive devaluation	1	1.1%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.1%
Import ban	1	1.1%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.1%
Investment measure	1	1.1%
Migration measure	1	1.1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1.1%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	1	1.1%
State trading enterprise	1	1.1%
State-controlled company	1	1.1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.1%
Total	94	100.0%

**Singapore's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.



# Solomon Islands

**Table 10.193. Foreign state measures affecting Solomon Islands' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Solomon Islands' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Solomon Islands' commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Solomon Islands' commercial interests. [1]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Solomon Islands' commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Solomon Islands' interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Solomon Islands' interests. [3]	1	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting Solomon Islands' commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Solomon Islands' commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Solomon Islands' foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Solomon Islands' commercial interests.	1	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Solomon Islands" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.194. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Solomon Islands' commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Mexico	1

**Table 10.195. Implemented measures that harm Solomon Islands' commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	50.0%
Trade finance	1	50.0%
Total	2	100.0%

**Solomon Islands' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.



# Sri Lanka

**Table 10.196. Foreign state measures affecting Sri Lanka's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Sri Lanka's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Sri Lanka's commercial interests.	29	27
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Sri Lanka's commercial interests. [1]	3	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Sri Lanka's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Sri Lanka's interests. [2]	9	8
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Sri Lanka's interests. [3]	17	17
Total number of implemented measures affecting Sri Lanka's commercial interests.	23	22
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Sri Lanka's commercial interests.	6	5
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Sri Lanka's foreign commercial interests.	6	5
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Sri Lanka's commercial interests.	14	14

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Sri Lanka" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.197. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Sri Lanka's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
India	3
Indonesia	2
Russian Federation	2
United States of America	2
Argentina	1
China	1
France	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1

**Table 10.198. Implemented measures that harm Sri Lanka's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	4	19.0%
Export subsidy	4	19.0%
Tariff measure	3	14.3%
Local content requirement	2	9.5%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	9.5%
Public procurement	2	9.5%
Trade finance	2	9.5%
Export taxes or restriction	1	4.8%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	4.8%
Total	21	100.0%

**Sri Lanka's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Tajikistan

**Table 10.199. Foreign state measures affecting Tajikistan's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Tajikistan's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Tajikistan's commercial interests.	11	10
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Tajikistan's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Tajikistan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Tajikistan's interests. [2]	4	3
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Tajikistan's interests. [3]	6	6
Total number of implemented measures affecting Tajikistan's commercial interests.	9	9
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Tajikistan's commercial interests.	2	1
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Tajikistan's foreign commercial interests.	2	1
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Tajikistan's commercial interests.	4	4

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Tajikistan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.200. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Tajikistan's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Belarus	1
Germany	1
Mexico	1
Russian Federation	3

**Table 10.201. Implemented measures that harm Tajikistan's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	3	37.5%
Export taxes or restriction	2	25.0%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	12.5%
Tariff measure	1	12.5%
Trade finance	1	12.5%
Total	8	100.0%

**Tajikistan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Thailand

**Table 10.202. Foreign state measures affecting Thailand's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Thailand's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Thailand's commercial interests.	133	112
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Thailand's commercial interests. [1]	17	16
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Thailand's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Thailand's interests. [2]	42	27
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Thailand's interests. [3]	74	69
Total number of implemented measures affecting Thailand's commercial interests.	104	95
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Thailand's commercial interests.	29	17
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Thailand's foreign commercial interests.	28	16
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Thailand's commercial interests.	44	44

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Thailand" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.203. Thailand's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interest**

Summary statistic of Thailand's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Thailand's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of Thailand's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of Thailand's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of Thailand's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	1	1
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Thailand that harm foreign commercial interests.	26	26
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Thailand that harm foreign commercial interests.	10	10
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Thailand that harm foreign commercial interests.	96	96

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Thailand" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.204. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Thailand's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	12
Indonesia	8
Spain	7
France	6
Argentina	5
India	5
Belarus	4
China	4
Germany	4
Italy	4
Poland	4
Ukraine	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
Viet Nam	4
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
Finland	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Netherlands	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
Switzerland	3
Japan	2
Mexico	2
Republic of Korea	2
United States of America	2
Australia	1
Canada	1

**Table 10.204. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Thailand's commercial interests (contd.)**

Ecuador	1
Ghana	1

**Table 10.205. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Thailand's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
Albania	1
Argentina	1
Armenia	1
Australia	1
Austria	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Belarus	1
Belgium	1
Bolivia	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	1
Canada	1
Chile	1
China	1
Colombia	1
Costa Rica	1
Croatia	1
Czech Republic	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Denmark	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
El Salvador	1
Ethiopia	1
Finland	1
France	1
Germany	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Guatemala	1
Honduras	1
Hong Kong	1
Hungary	1
India	1



**Table 10.205. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Thailand's state measures (contd.)**

Ireland	1
Israel	1
Italy	1
Jamaica	1
Japan	1
Jordan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Latvia	1
Lebanon	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Macedonia	1
Malawi	1
Malta	1
Mexico	1
Morocco	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands	1
New Zealand	1
Nigeria	1
Norway	1
Oman	1
Pakistan	1
Palestinian	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Philippines	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Republic of Korea	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Romania	1
Russian Federation	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Senegal	1
Serbia	1
Singapore	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
South Africa	1
Spain	1
Sri Lanka	1
Swaziland	1

**Table 10.205. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Thailand's state measures (contd.)**

Sweden	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Tunisia	1
Turkey	1
Uganda	1
Ukraine	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
United States of America	1
Uruguay	1
Viet Nam	1
Yemen	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 10.206. Implemented measures that harm Thailand's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	27	25.5%
Bail out / state aid measure	17	16.0%
Export subsidy	11	10.4%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	11	10.4%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	8	7.5%
Public procurement	6	5.7%
Consumption subsidy	4	3.8%
Export taxes or restriction	4	3.8%
Local content requirement	4	3.8%
Import ban	3	2.8%
Other service sector measure	3	2.8%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1.9%
Trade finance	2	1.9%
Competitive devaluation	1	0.9%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	0.9%
State-controlled company	1	0.9%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.9%
Total	106	100.0%

**Table 10.207. Thailand's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Export taxes or restriction	1	50.0%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	50.0%
Total	2	100.0%

# Timor-Leste

**Table 10.208. Foreign state measures affecting Timor-Leste's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Timor-Leste's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Timor-Leste's commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Timor-Leste's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Timor-Leste's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Timor-Leste's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Timor-Leste's interests. [3]	1	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting Timor-Leste's commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Timor-Leste's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Timor-Leste's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Timor-Leste's commercial interests.	1	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Timor-Leste" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.209. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Timor-Leste's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Mexico	1

**Table 10.210. Implemented measures that harm Timor-Leste's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	50.0%
Trade finance	1	50.0%
Total	2	100.0%

**Timor-Leste's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Tonga

**Table 10.211. Foreign state measures affecting Tonga's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Tonga's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Tonga's commercial interests.	6	5
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Tonga's commercial interests. [1]	2	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Tonga's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Tonga's interests. [2]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Tonga's interests. [3]	2	2
Total number of implemented measures affecting Tonga's commercial interests.	5	4
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Tonga's commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Tonga's foreign commercial interests.	1	1
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Tonga's commercial interests.	2	2

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Tonga" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.212. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Tonga's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Japan	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.213. Implemented measures that harm Tonga's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	33.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**Tonga's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Turkey

**Table 10.214. Foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests.	120	109
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Turkey's commercial interests. [1]	11	10
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Turkey's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Turkey's interests. [2]	34	26
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Turkey's interests. [3]	75	73
Total number of implemented measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests.	97	92
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Turkey's commercial interests.	23	17
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Turkey's foreign commercial interests.	22	16
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Turkey's commercial interests.	49	48

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Turkey" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.215. Turkey's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Turkey's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Turkey's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	12	1
Total number of Turkey's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	none	none
Total number of Turkey's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	8	none
Total number of Turkey's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	4	1
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests.	7	4
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests.	4	1
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests.	16	13

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Turkey" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 10.216. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	17
France	6
Spain	6
Germany	5
Belarus	4
India	4
Indonesia	4
Ukraine	4
Argentina	3
China	3
Italy	3
Netherlands	3
Poland	3
Republic of Korea	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	3
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Brazil	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Kazakhstan	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Sweden	2
Australia	1
Ecuador	1
Ghana	1
Iraq	1
Israel	1

**Table 10.216. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests (contd.)**

Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Nigeria	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1

**Table 10.217. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Turkey's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	2
Germany	2
Romania	2
United States of America	2
Bulgaria	1
Cyprus	1
France	1
Hong Kong	1
Hungary	1
Italy	1
Kazakhstan	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Russian Federation	1
Spain	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Ukraine	1

**Table 10.218. Implemented measures that harm Turkey's commercial interests, by type**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	26	25.5%
Bail out / state aid measure	23	22.5%
Export subsidy	10	9.8%
Export taxes or restriction	7	6.9%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	7	6.9%
Public procurement	6	5.9%
Consumption subsidy	4	3.9%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	4	3.9%
Local content requirement	2	2.0%
Other service sector measure	2	2.0%
State trading enterprise	2	2.0%
Trade finance	2	2.0%
Import ban	1	1.0%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.0%
Migration measure	1	1.0%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1.0%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	1.0%
State-controlled company	1	1.0%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.0%
Total	102	100.0%

**Table 10.219. Turkey's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	4	80.0%
Tariff measure	1	20.0%
Total	5	100.0%



# Turkmenistan

**Table 10.220. Foreign state measures affecting Turkmenistan's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Turkmenistan's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Turkmenistan's commercial interests.	18	18
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Turkmenistan's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Turkmenistan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Turkmenistan's interests. [2]	4	4
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Turkmenistan's interests. [3]	13	13
Total number of implemented measures affecting Turkmenistan's commercial interests.	16	16
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Turkmenistan's commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Turkmenistan's foreign commercial interests.	2	2
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Turkmenistan's commercial interests.	8	8

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Turkmenistan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.221. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Turkmenistan's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	6
India	2
Argentina	1
Belarus	1
Germany	1
Kazakhstan	1
Mexico	1
United States of America	1

**Table 10.222. Implemented measures that harm Turkmenistan's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	4	23.5%
Public procurement	2	11.8%
Tariff measure	2	11.8%
Trade finance	2	11.8%
Export subsidy	1	5.9%
Export taxes or restriction	1	5.9%
Local content requirement	1	5.9%
Migration measure	1	5.9%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	5.9%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	5.9%
State trading enterprise	1	5.9%
Total	17	100.0%

**Turkmenistan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Tuvalu

**Table 10.223. Foreign state measures affecting Tuvalu's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Tuvalu's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Tuvalu's commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Tuvalu's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Tuvalu's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Tuvalu's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Tuvalu's interests. [3]	1	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting Tuvalu's commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Tuvalu's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Tuvalu's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Tuvalu's commercial interests.	1	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Tuvalu" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.224. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Tuvalu's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Mexico	1

**Table 10.225. Implemented measures that harm Tuvalu's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	50.0%
Trade finance	1	50.0%
Total	2	100.0%

**Tuvalu's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.



# United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

**Table 10.226. Foreign state measures affecting United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's commercial interests.	161	142
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's commercial interests. [1]	18	18
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's interests. [2]	48	35
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's interests. [3]	95	89
Total number of implemented measures affecting United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's commercial interests.	129	118
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's commercial interests.	32	24
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's foreign commercial interests.	28	20
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's commercial interests.	32	31

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.227. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	29	12
Total number of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	3	1
Total number of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	13	1
Total number of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	13	10
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that harm foreign commercial interests.	132	131
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that harm foreign commercial interests.	6	5
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that harm foreign commercial interests.	122	121

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.228. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	18
Indonesia	8
India	7
China	5
Germany	4
Italy	4
Spain	4
Ukraine	4
United States of America	4
Argentina	3
Belarus	3
France	3
Switzerland	3
Australia	2
Brazil	2
Canada	2
Denmark	2
Ecuador	2
Japan	2
Malaysia	2
Poland	2
Republic of Korea	2
Algeria	1
Finland	1
Israel	1
Mexico	1
Netherlands	1
Portugal	1
Sweden	1
Thailand	1
Uganda	1
Zambia	1

**Table 10.229. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	7
Australia	4
New Zealand	4
South Africa	4
Thailand	4
United States of America	4
Algeria	3
Argentina	3
Armenia	3
Bolivia	3
Brazil	3
Canada	3
Chile	3
Costa Rica	3
Iceland	3
India	3
Israel	3
Japan	3
Lebanon	3
Macedonia	3
Oman	3
Pakistan	3
Philippines	3
Republic of Korea	3
Russian Federation	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Serbia	3
Singapore	3
Switzerland	3
Trinidad and Tobago	3
Turkey	3
Belarus	2
Colombia	2
Croatia	2
Côte d'Ivoire	2
Egypt	2
El Salvador	2
Ghana	2
Guatemala	2
Honduras	2
Hong Kong	2
Indonesia	2
Jordan	2
Kenya	2

**Table 10.229. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's state measures (contd.)**

Malaysia	2
Mexico	2
Morocco	2
Nicaragua	2
Nigeria	2
Norway	2
Palestinian	2
Paraguay	2
Syrian Arab Republic	2
Tunisia	2
Ukraine	2
United Arab Emirates	2
Uruguay	2
Viet Nam	2
Yemen	2
Zambia	2
Zimbabwe	2
Albania	1
Angola	1
Austria	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Barbados	1
Belgium	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
British Virgin Islands	1
Bulgaria	1
Cambodia	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Congo	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Denmark	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Estonia	1
Ethiopia	1
Fiji	1
Finland	1
France	1
Germany	1
Greece	1

**Table 10.229. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's state measures (contd.)**

Guyana	1
Hungary	1
Iran	1
Iraq	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Jamaica	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kuwait	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mauritius	1
Netherlands	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Panama	1
Peru	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Qatar	1
Romania	1
San Marino	1
Senegal	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Spain	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sweden	1
Togo	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 10.230. Implemented measures that harm United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	34	25.6%
Tariff measure	29	21.8%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	11	8.3%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	10	7.5%
Export subsidy	9	6.8%
Public procurement	7	5.3%
Export taxes or restriction	6	4.5%
Local content requirement	4	3.0%
Trade finance	4	3.0%
Migration measure	3	2.3%
Consumption subsidy	2	1.5%
Import ban	2	1.5%
Investment measure	2	1.5%
Other service sector measure	2	1.5%
State trading enterprise	2	1.5%
Competitive devaluation	1	0.8%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.8%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	0.8%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	0.8%
State-controlled company	1	0.8%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.8%
Total	133	100.0%

**Table 10.231. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	8	57.1%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	3	21.4%
Export subsidy	2	14.3%
Migration measure	1	7.1%
Total	14	100.0%





# United States

**Table 10.232. Foreign state measures affecting United States' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting United States' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting United States' commercial interests.	195	161
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of United States' commercial interests. [1]	24	23
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm United States' commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against United States' interests. [2]	53	29
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against United States' interests. [3]	118	109
Total number of implemented measures affecting United States' commercial interests.	162	149
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect United States' commercial interests.	33	12
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm United States' foreign commercial interests.	30	10
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm United States' commercial interests.	49	49

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United States" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.233. United States' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial**

Summary statistic of United States' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of United States' measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	46	28
Total number of United States' measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	2	2
Total number of United States' measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	36	19
Total number of United States' measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	8	7
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by United States that harm foreign commercial interests.	124	123
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by United States that harm foreign commercial interests.	20	20
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by United States that harm foreign commercial interests.	120	120

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United States" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.234. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting United States' commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	24
Indonesia	9
India	8
China	7
Germany	7
France	6
Italy	6
Spain	6
Argentina	4
Belarus	4
Mexico	4
Poland	4
Ukraine	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
Brazil	3
Finland	3
Japan	3
Netherlands	3
Portugal	3
Republic of Korea	3
Sweden	3
Switzerland	3
Viet Nam	3
Australia	2
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Bulgaria	2
Canada	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Ecuador	2
Estonia	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malaysia	2
Malta	2
Nigeria	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2

**Table 10.234. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting United States' commercial interests (contd.)**

Slovenia	2
Turkey	2
Algeria	1
Ghana	1
Thailand	1

**Table 10.235. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by United States' state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	7
Mexico	6
Canada	5
Germany	5
Japan	5
France	4
Republic of Korea	4
Sweden	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
Argentina	3
Australia	3
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Brazil	3
Colombia	3
Finland	3
Hong Kong	3
Hungary	3
India	3
Israel	3
Italy	3
Pakistan	3
Philippines	3
Portugal	3
Russian Federation	3
Slovakia	3
South Africa	3
Turkey	3
Belarus	2
Bolivia	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2
Bulgaria	2
Chile	2
Chinese Taipei	2

**Table 10.235. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by United States' state measures (contd.)**

Costa Rica	2
Croatia	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Egypt	2
El Salvador	2
Estonia	2
Greece	2
Guatemala	2
Honduras	2
Ireland	2
Jamaica	2
Jordan	2
Kenya	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Macedonia	2
Malaysia	2
Netherlands	2
Nicaragua	2
Norway	2
Oman	2
Peru	2
Poland	2
Romania	2
Singapore	2
Slovenia	2
Spain	2
Sri Lanka	2
Switzerland	2
Thailand	2
Trinidad and Tobago	2
Tunisia	2
United Arab Emirates	2
Uruguay	2
Venezuela	2
Albania	1
Algeria	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Barbados	1
Botswana	1
Brunei Darussalam	1
Cambodia	1

**Table 10.235. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by United States' state measures (contd.)**

Cyprus	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Ethiopia	1
Georgia	1
Ghana	1
Guyana	1
Haiti	1
Iceland	1
Indonesia	1
Kazakhstan	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Lebanon	1
Lesotho	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Mali	1
Mauritius	1
Mongolia	1
Morocco	1
Namibia	1
Nepal	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
New Zealand	1
Palestinian	1
Panama	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Senegal	1
Serbia	1
Swaziland	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tokelau	1
Turkmenistan	1
Uganda	1
Ukraine	1
Uzbekistan	1
Viet Nam	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 10.236. Implemented measures that harm United States' commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	39	24.4%
Bail out / state aid measure	35	21.9%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	13	8.1%
Export subsidy	12	7.5%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	11	6.9%
Public procurement	6	3.8%
Export taxes or restriction	5	3.1%
Consumption subsidy	4	2.5%
Import ban	4	2.5%
Migration measure	4	2.5%
Trade finance	4	2.5%
Investment measure	3	1.9%
Local content requirement	3	1.9%
Other service sector measure	3	1.9%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	3	1.9%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	1.9%
State trading enterprise	3	1.9%
State-controlled company	2	1.3%
Competitive devaluation	1	0.6%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.6%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.6%
Total	160	100.0%

**Table 10.237. United States' implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	1	10.0%
Export subsidy	1	10.0%
Import ban	1	10.0%
Local content requirement	1	10.0%
Migration measure	1	10.0%
Other service sector measure	1	10.0%
Public procurement	1	10.0%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	10.0%
Tariff measure	1	10.0%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	10.0%
Total	10	100.0%





# Uzbekistan

**Table 10.238. Foreign state measures affecting Uzbekistan's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Uzbekistan's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Uzbekistan's commercial interests.	29	27
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Uzbekistan's commercial interests. [1]	4	4
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Uzbekistan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Uzbekistan's interests. [2]	6	4
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Uzbekistan's interests. [3]	19	19
Total number of implemented measures affecting Uzbekistan's commercial interests.	25	25
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Uzbekistan's commercial interests.	4	2
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Uzbekistan's foreign commercial interests.	4	2
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Uzbekistan's commercial interests.	7	7

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Uzbekistan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.239. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Uzbekistan's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	10
Ukraine	3
Belarus	2
Germany	1
Kazakhstan	1
Mexico	1
United States of America	1

**Table 10.240. Implemented measures that harm Uzbekistan's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	6	25.0%
Tariff measure	5	20.8%
Consumption subsidy	2	8.3%
Export taxes or restriction	2	8.3%
Public procurement	2	8.3%
State-controlled company	2	8.3%
Export subsidy	1	4.2%
Local content requirement	1	4.2%
Migration measure	1	4.2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	4.2%
Trade finance	1	4.2%
Total	24	100.0%

**Uzbekistan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Vanuatu

**Table 10.241. Foreign state measures affecting Vanuatu's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Vanuatu's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Vanuatu's commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Vanuatu's commercial interests. [1]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Vanuatu's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Vanuatu's interests. [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Vanuatu's interests. [3]	2	2
Total number of implemented measures affecting Vanuatu's commercial interests.	4	4
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Vanuatu's commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Vanuatu's foreign commercial interests.	none	none
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Vanuatu's commercial interests.	2	2

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Vanuatu" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.242. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Vanuatu's commercial interests.**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Japan	1
Mexico	1

**Table 10.243. Implemented measures that harm Vanuatu's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	33.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	33.3%
Trade finance	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

**Vanuatu's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction in the GTA database.

# Viet Nam

**Table 10.244. Foreign state measures affecting Viet Nam's commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Viet Nam's commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Viet Nam's commercial interests.	70	67
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Viet Nam's commercial interests. [1]	7	7
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Viet Nam's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Viet Nam's interests. [2]	21	18
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Viet Nam's interests. [3]	42	42
Total number of implemented measures affecting Viet Nam's commercial interests.	53	53
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Viet Nam's commercial interests.	17	14
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Viet Nam's foreign commercial interests.	16	13
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Viet Nam's commercial interests.	42	42

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Viet Nam" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.245. Viet Nam's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.**

Summary statistic of Viet Nam's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	All measures.	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions.
Total number of Viet Nam's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.	9	8
Total number of Viet Nam's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests. [1]	3	3
Total number of Viet Nam's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests. [2]	1	none
Total number of Viet Nam's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. [3]	5	5
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Viet Nam that harm foreign commercial interests.	14	14
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Viet Nam that harm foreign commercial interests.	3	3
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Viet Nam that harm foreign commercial interests.	28	28

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Viet Nam" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 10.246. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Viet Nam's commercial interests..**

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures.	Number of measures.
Russian Federation	7
Indonesia	6
Spain	4
Argentina	3
China	3
France	3
India	3
Belarus	2
Germany	2
Mexico	2
Poland	2
Republic of Korea	2
Ukraine	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
Australia	1
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Bulgaria	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Japan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malaysia	1
Malta	1
Netherlands	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Sweden	1
Thailand	1
United States of America	1

**Table 10.247. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Viet Nam's state measures.**

Foreign jurisdictions affected.	Number of measures.
China	5
Japan	4
Singapore	4
Thailand	4
Malaysia	3
Philippines	3
Republic of Korea	3
United States of America	3
Australia	2
Germany	2
Indonesia	2
Netherlands	2
New Zealand	2
Russian Federation	2
South Africa	2
Argentina	1
Bangladesh	1
Belgium	1
Bulgaria	1
Denmark	1
France	1
India	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Kazakhstan	1
Spain	1
Switzerland	1
United Arab Emirates	1



**Table 10.248. Implemented measures that harm Viet Nam's commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Bail out / state aid measure	13	25.0%
Tariff measure	11	21.2%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	7	13.5%
Public procurement	5	9.6%
Export subsidy	3	5.8%
Export taxes or restriction	3	5.8%
Local content requirement	2	3.8%
Trade finance	2	3.8%
Competitive devaluation	1	1.9%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.9%
Other service sector measure	1	1.9%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1.9%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	1.9%
State-controlled company	1	1.9%
Total	52	100.0%

**Table 10.249. Viet Nam's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type.**

Type of measure.	Number of measures.	As percentage of measures.
Tariff measure	5	100.0%
Total	5	100.0%

At a time when more commentators are becoming cautiously optimistic about the prospects for 2010, this Report from *Global Trade Alert* reports the latest data on the protectionist dynamics at work since the first G20 crisis-related Summit in November 2008 and highlights the many anti-trade measures that are in the pipeline. Drawing upon a rich evidential base of over 600 completed investigations of state measures that could affect foreign commercial interests, the Report's main findings are:

- Together the world's governments have implemented 297 beggar-thy-neighbour policy measures since last November; that is, more than one for every working day. G20 governments were responsible for imposing 184 of these protectionist measures.
- Since the GTA's last report was published in September 2009, the number of protectionist measures discovered (105) was more than eight times the number of benign or liberalising measures (12). Protectionist pressure has not relented.
- Recently reported falls in the number of protectionist measures imposed are more apparent than real. In fact, information received by GTA since September 2009 has forced us to revise up the amount of quarter-by-quarter harm done to the world economy in 2009 by protectionism.
- Only 5 jurisdictions have taken measures that affect more than a quarter of all traded products – demonstrating that the across-the-board protectionism seen in the 1930s has not yet been repeated.

In addition to monitoring protectionist developments this Report has a particular focus on developments in the Asia-Pacific region, which contains several export-led powerhouses. Analyses of the impact of the crisis on the trade and commercial priorities of China, India, Japan, and Russia are included in the Report. A novel analysis of the extent to which antidumping practices have changed during the crisis is also presented. Moreover, the long-term impact of protectionism on global supply chains, a central feature of Asian-Pacific trade, received attention too.

Whether interested in "naming and shaming" protectionist governments, in detailed country and sectoral information on beggar-thy-neighbour policies, or in up-to-date analyses of commercial policymaking in leading Asian nations, *Global Trade Alert* provides a fresh, independent perspective on crisis-era protectionism.

## Centre for Economic Policy Research