Managed Exports and the Recovery of World Trade: The 7th GTA report

A Focus on Latin America

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Edited by Simon J. Evenett

About Global Trade Alert (GTA)

Global Trade Alert provides information in real time on state measures taken during the current global economic downturn that are likely to discriminate against foreign commerce. Global Trade Alert is:

Independent: GTA is co-ordinated by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, an independent academic and policy research think-tank based in London, UK. GTA draws upon expertise and analysis from 7 independent research institutions around the world.

Comprehensive: GTA complements and goes beyond the WTO and World Bank's monitoring initiatives by identifying those trading partners likely to be harmed by state measures.

Accessible: The GTA website allows policy-makers, exporters, the media, and analysts to search the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading partners harmed, and by sector. Third parties will be able to report suspicious state measures and governments will be given the right to reply to any of their measures listed on the website.

Transparent: The GTA website allows policymakers, government officials, exporters, the media, and analysts to report discriminatory measures, but also will provide data for all stakeholders on the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading partners harmed, and by sector.

Timely: The up-to-date information and informed commentary provided by Global Trade Alert will help ensure that the G20 pledge not to "repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras" is met, by maintaining confidence in the world trading system, deterring beggar-thyneighbour acts, and preserving the contribution that exports could play in the future recovery of the world economy.

For further information, visit www.GlobalTradeAlert.org

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Foreword

World trade has rebounded strongly in 2010, after its sharp fall in the previous year: the WTO estimates an increase of 9.5 per cent in 2010, with further strong growth in 2011 and 2012. Time for Global Trade Alert to declare victory in the war against protectionism and order its troops to return to their barracks?

Or then again, perhaps not. Even though world trade has started growing again, governments are implementing discriminatory measures at the same pace this year as in 2009. Each quarter, governments implement about 125 new protectionist measures and remove very few existing measures. How can world trade be growing in the face of a steady accumulation of discriminatory measures?

The seventh GTA Report helps us understand this apparent paradox. Part of the answer lies in the recovery of aggregate demand and the easing of pressures in financial markets, the result of the stimulus measures introduced in 2009. As the Report makes clear, there is a second factor at work: the radical change in the nature of protectionism in this recession. Many of the largest trading nations have implemented export promotion schemes and the rebound in world trade has been underwritten by subsidies, cheap access to credit, and tax rebates and exemptions for exporters. Protectionism today is thus very different from that of the 1930s, when across-the-board tariff increases stifled world trade. These aggressive export promotion schemes, coupled with a recovery in aggregate demand, seem to have more than offset the steady growth of discriminatory measures.

But world trade is growing again, so can we relax? The Report reminds us that "measures to promote exports also harm foreign commercial interests, waste national resources". In the short run these schemes involve reduced tax revenues, at a time when many countries already face intense pressures for fiscal consolidation. In the long run, these schemes, by distorting resource allocation, may threaten living standards." The Report also reminds us that such export promotion schemes invite retaliation, and such schemes may ultimately be much more costly than first seems.

We are, as always, grateful to Simon Evenett for the unbounded energy and enthusiasm he has shown in leading the GTA initiative. Thanks are also due once more to his hard-working team at the Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research in St. Gallen, who prepared the summary tables and maps and provided general research support – namely, Johannes Fritz, Darya Gerasimenko, Malwina Nowakowska, and Martin Wermelinger. CEPR's

Publications Team – Anil Shamdasani and Samantha Reid, provided invaluable support, as always.

We also owe thanks to GTA's supporters: the Centre for International Governance Innovation; the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the International Development Research Center; the Trade Policy Unit of the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department for International Development. In particular we would like to acknowledge financial support from the Global Trade and Financial Architecture project (an initiative of the UK Department for International Development and the World Bank). Indeed, the support from all our partners has been generous and most welcome, but they of course play no role in the operation of GTA, nor do they necessarily endorse the opinions expressed in this Report.

The task of collecting and analysing the data has been conducted very efficiently and professionally by GTA's regional network partners, notably, the African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET), the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), the Gulf Research Center (GRC), the Latin American Trade Network (LATN), and the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS).

Like many of its predecessors, this report has a regional focus. Governments in Latin America have reacted to the global economic crisis in different ways, especially in respect of their trade policies. Our Latin American team at LATN, led ably by Diana Tussie, have not only collected and evaluated data, but have also prepared several analyses that compare the factors responsible for the resort to protectionism in Latin America. Perhaps one of the most important lessons to take away from these papers is that the availability of other policy options is an important determinant of maintaining open borders during systemic economic crises

Global Trade Alert makes two contributions to discussions of trade policy: by monitoring the discriminatory measures proposed and implemented by governments; and by analyzing these measures in order to understand how governments are using trade policy to respond to the crisis. The experience of GTA's first year has convinced us that monitoring and analysis are of value to all those following developments in the world trading system. We hope to continue both activities in the coming years.

Stephen Yeo
Chief Executive Officer, CEPR
13 September 2010

1. Executive Summary

Simon J. Evenett
University of St. Gallen and CEPR

1. Introduction

While there remains considerable uncertainty about the pace of the recovery of the world economy, there is little doubt about the trajectory for world trade in 2010. Having fallen by 12.2% in 2009, according to the latest forecasts from the World Trade Organization, world trade is expected to grow 9.5% in 2010. Moreover recent World Bank forecasts, reported in Table 1 below, point to healthy growth of exports through 2012.

Table 1 Sustained export growth is expected through 2012

Group of countries	Forecasted total export growth rate (%) in		
	2010	2011	2012
Developing	9.4	8.3	8.1
High income	6.5	6.2	6.8

Source: World Bank, www.worldbank.org (accessed 10 September 2010)

No doubt a partial recovery of demand, inventory rebuilding, and the unfreezing of capital markets (which allows for greater working capital and trade finance) account for a large part of the recovery of world trade. Supply chains have regained some of their previous strength, and the associated movements of parts, components, and semi-finished goods across borders have added to recorded totals of international trade. In short, just as macroeconomic and financial factors probably accounted for much of the contraction of world trade in 2009, they bear the greatest responsibility for trade's recovery in 2010.

Some however have gone further, arguing that the recovery of world trade is inconsistent with rising protectionism. If protectionism is defined narrowly to include only import-reducing measures, such as tariff increases, then maybe there is something to this viewpoint. But as this seventh report of the Global Trade Alert will show, such a narrow definition overlooks important beggar-thy-neighbour measures that have been taken during the past year, many of which were designed to stimulate exports. The fact that Brazil, China, and India have joined the United States in taking measures to promote exports, typically at the expense of other nations' exporters, begs the following question: how much have "managed exports" contributed towards the recovery in world trade in 2010?

GTA: Contributing to policy dialogue through independent monitoring of state measures

Global Trade Alert (GTA) has always operated on the assumption that in current circumstances the most practical approach to resisting protectionism is to combine peer pressure with high-quality, current information about state measures and their actual or potential effects on foreign commercial interests. Governments, the media, and civil society are the key sources of the former; the job of Global Trade Alert and other monitoring exercises is to provide the latter.

This report also provides an assessment as to the extent and changes over time in protectionist dynamics. It considers not just the quarter-by-quarter changes in the numbers of protectionist measures implemented but also the number of pending measures that have been announced and are expected to implemented in the future. Information on the pending measures provides policymakers with an "early warning" of what is to come, a feature unique to the GTA's monitoring initiative.

The Global Trade Alert was formally launched on 8 June 2009 in London, UK. The GTA's database contains reports on state measures whose implementation might affect the treatment of foreign commercial interests. State measures announced on or after 1 November 2008 are eligible for inclusion in the GTA database. GTA is implemented by a team of part-time trade policy experts from all over the world. These experts investigate state measures, seeking to document them with official sources, and identify affected products, sectors, and trading partners. Reports on state measures are submitted to the GTA's Evaluation Group and, if approved, a measure is published on the GTA's website.

GTA has a group of eminent persons as advisors. They not only provide valuable advice but also stand as guardians of the independence of this initiative from any external influence.

In its first year of existence over 7,500 users have returned to the website 15 times or more. The reports of GTA have been mentioned in over 200 newspapers and media outlets. Leading business persons, political leaders, and analysts have referred to GTA in their speeches. This is the seventh GTA report. Other reports are available at: *www.globaltradealert.org*.

This report also focuses on developments in Latin America. The variation across governments from that region in their resort to discrimination against foreign commercial interests is considerable. Taken together, the country analyses provided in section two of this report shed light on the various factors responsible. Extensive diagnostics of the resort to protectionism and on the harm done by others' protectionism are presented in section three.

2. Measures to promote exports gained ground during 2009 and 2010

Mercantilism is the belief that exports are good and imports are bad. The harm done by measures that reduce imports to foreign commercial interests, to competitive pressures at home, and ultimately to the allocation of national resources and to living standards are well known. It is not for nothing that tariff increases and other import-reducing measures generally have a bad name.

What may not be that well known is that measures to promote exports also harm foreign commercial interests, waste national resources, and therefore are a threat to living standards. Reductions in export taxes – or greater rebates from domestic taxes for exporters – enable own exporters to lower their prices in foreign markets, forcing exporters from other countries to lower their prices as well and accept lower revenues. Any state measure that shifts exports towards own firms at the expense of other nations' exporters is therefore a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Managing trade, whether imports or exports, does not expand the pie it merely redistributes it.

Worse, a government may retaliate to other nations' export promotion efforts, adding export incentive upon incentive. The state budget bears the brunt of such export management contests (often through direct or indirect outlays or forgone tax revenues). As will become clear in the data presented below, 2009 and 2010 has seen a ratcheting up in export promotion measures. Unlike many contemporary tariff increases and trade defence measures, these export promotion measures often target a wide range of sectors.

Export promotion is not just the preserve of industrialised countries with deep pockets. Nor are such measures always widely publicised. While it is true that President Obama made a public commitment to double US exports over a five year timeframe, many developing countries have been willing to sacrifice tax revenues and to direct state banks to support national exporters. Indeed, some of the latter may be covert and under-reported in the GTA database. Sometimes export promotion measures are also part of a broader trade policy package (as is the case of Pakistan's pro-export measures) or as part of a broader financial package for a sector.

What evidence is available on contemporary export promotion measures? Throughout the recent global economic crisis China's record on export management is hard to top. On eight occasions China has varied the rebates for domestically-charged value added tax (VAT) for its exporters[1]; six of those changes saw the rebates expanded, lowering Chinese exporters' costs, and the prices that Chinese firms can charge abroad. Taken together, these measures have applied almost across the board, affecting the incentives of many Chinese manufacturers.[2]

In fact, in the GTA's sixth report, Evenett and Fritz (2010) calculated the range of products affected by just one of these rebate-increasing Chinese measures. Exporters of goods from more than one in five product categories benefited. Exports of those products totalled US$412 billion in 2008, equivalent to just under 30% of the total value of Chinese exports in that year. These products were

1 China is not alone in offering VAT rebates to exporters. European Union nations offer full VAT rebates to their exporters. Where Chinese experience does stand out is that, to the best of our knowledge, no other country has amended its VAT rebates so many times during the global economic crisis. Eight changes in these rebates smacks of export management and not a one-off transition to a new tax regime for exporters. For a summary list of the eight Chinese VAT rebate changes from July 2007 to July 2010, see "Export Tax Rebate Changes in Recent Years," *Beijing Review*, 21 July 2010, at *http://www.bjreview.com/quotes/txt/2010-07/21/content_286035_2.htm*

2 The most recent occasion when changed VAT rebates came into effect for Chinese exporters was 15 July 2010. On this occasion the rebates for certain commodities were abolished, thereby providing less incentive to export after that date. News reports at the time suggested that exports of some goods surged before the implementation date.

exported to 155 countries, including 17 G20 members. Producers and exporters in those trading partners would have had to match lower prices from Chinese rivals, worsening the formers' competitive position and shifting pressures to adjust away from China. For example, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics recently reported that during the period July 2009-July 2010 only France and the ASEAN nations saw their exports to the United States rise less in price than China.[3]

The GTA database contains many sectoral export management initiatives as well as many that cut across sectors.[4] Table 2 provides a selection of these measures taken by developing countries in 2009 and 2010. The largest emerging markets are well represented in that table. Moreover some developing countries, such as Brazil and India, have implemented multiple schemes, many of whose coverage equals or exceeds a fifth of all exported products. The last column of Table 2 reports the number of trading partners that have exporters which compete in foreign markets with the country implementing the export management measure in question.

With the exception of the Pakistan and Nigeria, such is the wide range of goods being favoured that most of these export management schemes will affect to the conditions of competition in overseas markets to the detriment of over 100 trading partners. Therefore, the fallout from contemporary export management measures is unlikely to be confined to pockets of the world economy. This can be said even before the export management schemes of industrialised countries are taken into account.

The impact on the recovery of world trade, the implied diversion of exports away from one source to another, and the cost effectiveness of these export management measures are matters for further analysis. Export promotion measures have probably offset to some degree the impact of import-reducing trade policies during the recent rebound of world exports, just as the many non-financial sector bailouts probably cushioned the fall in world trade in the first place. The opposing effects on trade flows of different forms of discriminatory state policy makes observed changes in world trade a poor proxy for the total level of contemporary protectionism.

Here, as in other GTA analyses and reports, the key to understanding contemporary protectionism is to recognise its diverse composition and not to focus exclusively on its overall level or a selective set of import-reducing measures. Governments discriminate against foreign commercial interests in many different ways. If the scope of modern trade agreements is anything to go by, trade diplomats have long recognised this. The trade community's analyses of contemporary protectionism need to take this diversity on board.

3 See *http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ximpim.t07.htm*

4 One search of the GTA database, prepared for this Report, revealed 45 state measures of different types had as part of their goal, at least, to promote exports.

Table 2 Selected state measures to favour own exporters taken by developing countries in 2009 and 2010

Implementing jurisdiction: Title of measure in GTA database	Year	Percentage of total number of product categories exported that benefit from this measure	Number of nations whose exporters directly compete with the beneficiary exporters from the implementing jurisdiction
India: Incentives for leather and textile sector exports	2009	13.83%	110
Brazil: Interest rate reduction on public financing for the export of capital goods	2009	19.38%	122
India: Union Budget's implications for tariffs and other trade policies.	2009	21.57%	119
China: Export tax rebates.	2009	22.17%	155
Pakistan: Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2009-12	2009	38.81%	41
Nigeria: Loans for textile and cotton manufacturers.	2009	41.54%	24
Brazil: Public financing for the production of goods for exports by small and medium companies (pre-shipment phase)	2009	na	na
Brazil: Extension of the Drawback System	2010	10.63%	157
Brazil: New credit line for exports of consumer goods	2010	21.71%	130
India: Incentives for critical export sectors	2010	22.53%	127
India: Incentives to exporters through Market Linked Focus Programme	2010	32.18%	130
Argentina: Subsidised export credits for capital goods and related services	2010	37.31%	135

Source: Global Trade Alert database.

How GTA built its extensive database on contemporary protectionism

Since GTA was launched on 8 June 2009, over 1,200 state initiatives have been investigated by our independent team of trade policy analysts located around the globe. These initiatives vary from packages of wide-ranging public measures, with many implications for trade and investment policy instruments, to temporary tariff increases on single product lines. GTA's goal is to provide the most comprehensive online database of state measures taken since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008 that might affect foreign commercial interests. The latter are broadly conceived by the GTA team to include not just trade flows and foreign investments but also intellectual property rights and migrant workers deployed abroad. It is through careful, multi-faceted investigations of these initiatives that a rich evidential base was built, from which the contours of contemporary protectionism can be discerned. Users can access this evidence online at: *www.globaltradealert.org*

One of the most important steps in a GTA investigation is to establish whether the implementation of a state initiative has altered, or is likely to alter the relative treatment of domestic and foreign commercial interests in the markets where the initiative's effects will be felt. In other words, GTA checks whether a state initiative tilts the playing field against foreign firms. GTA, therefore, does not opine on the WTO legality of a measure or whether a measure is "appropriate," "fair," "reasonable" or "crisis-related" (there being no agreed definitions of these terms.)

State initiatives that almost certainly (or certainly) introduce or change asymmetries of treatment to the detriment of some foreign commercial interests are deemed by the Global Trade Alert to be contrary to the no-protectionism pledges made at the November 2008 G20 summit in Washington, DC, and reaffirmed at subsequent G20 Summits. In this Executive Summary, the phrases discriminatory and protectionist are used synonymously.

Without attempts to carefully enumerate the different types of state measures used and their various effects, any assessment of contemporary protectionism is likely to overlook key trends and is of diminished value to policymakers. That is why GTA goes beyond providing an assessment of the discriminatory impact of state initiatives. Examination of the tariff lines, sectors, and trading partners that are likely to be affected by each state initiative are carefully conducted so as to provide some indication of a public initiative's impact in what is still a relatively interdependent global economy even though, strictly speaking, there may be some circumstances where some form of discrimination is needed to attain a non-protectionist government objective.

No doubt purists will argue that a complete understanding of the consequences of crisis-era protectionism requires a detailed economic analysis of each state initiative. Such analyses could indeed be very useful, indeed the GTA team is and would gladly cooperate with experts interested in conducting such studies. But, leaving aside the question of resources and the availability of all the necessary data, quite frankly it is utopian to believe that over 1000 such analyses could be conducted in the timeframe necessary to influence policymaking. In short, we should not make the perfect the enemy of the very good. GTA's investigations go a long way towards indicating the scale of an initiative's effects by making extensive use of publicly available trade, investment, migration, and other data. Still, the GTA team welcomes suggestions that will result in further improvements in the coverage and assessment of state initiatives.

Note: See Evenett (2009a) for an overview of the GTA's methodology and Evenett (2009b) for a discussion of the concerns some have raised about the GTA's approach.

3. Mapping crisis-era protectionism

Sometimes averages and totals will obscure interesting variation across countries. To counter this, and to facilitate comparisons across jurisdictions, in each report of the Global Trade Alert several world maps will be included. These maps are reproduced at the end of this Executive Summary. Map 1.1 shows how many almost certainly discriminatory measures have been implemented by each jurisdiction since November 2008. There is considerable variation across countries. Almost every major trading nation has implemented 10 or more such measures since the first G-20 crisis meeting. In contrast, every African nation, with the exception of Nigeria, has implemented fewer than 10 discriminatory measures.

Some government initiatives affect very few trading partners, others many. Map 1.2. reports the total number of trading partners that – on the basis of existing flows of goods, investments, and people across borders – are likely to have been harmed by the implementation of a government's discriminatory measures. More than a dozen national governments have already taken measures that harm 100 or more of their trading partners. Maps 1.3. and 1.4. report the number of product categories (4 digit tariff lines) and economic sectors affected by the discriminatory measures that have been put in place since the first crisis-related G-20 summit in November 2008.

Maps have also been generated for the number of times that each jurisdiction's commercial interests have been harmed by other countries' discriminatory measures. The number of countries whose state measures have adversely affected a given jurisdiction's commercial interests is reported in Map 1.5. Map 1.6 shows how many times a jurisdiction's commercial interests have been harmed by the discriminatory state measures taken by other governments. This Map indicates that approximately a dozen countries have seen their commercial interests harmed 120 times or more by government measures taken since November 2008.

Given the enduring interest in whether the G20 member states have lived up to their no-protectionism pledge, Map 1.7. may be of particular interest. This map demonstrates the almost global reach of the harm done when G20 governments violated their own no-protectionism pledges.

Map 1.8. shows that the overwhelming majority of nations will find their countries' commercial interests harmed if the discriminatory measures in the pipeline are actually implemented. Forward-looking trade policymakers may find this map and the related information in the Global Trade Alert database helpful in identifying those pending foreign measures whose implementation could be usefully influenced. The largest trading nations, according to this map, could be harmed by 40 or more measures in the pipeline.

4. The organisation and contents of the remainder of this report

The rest of this report is organised as follows. The next chapter of this report provides a global overview of the resort to discrimination against foreign commercial interests since November 2008, the month when the first G20 pledge on protectionism was made. Given this report's focus on Latin America, a regional overview follows the global overview.

Section two of the report provides country-specific analyses of the factors responsible for protectionism in selected Latin American countries. A recurring theme of these chapters is that the availability – or otherwise – of alternatives to protectionism accounts in part for the variation witnessed across countries. For example, it is argued that with its effectively dollarised economy, Ecuador had few tools left other than trade policy to assist domestic firms and employees.

Section three of the report presents for each Latin American country summary information on the extent to which their commercial interests have been affected by other country's measures since November 2008. The information presented here is symmetric, therefore foreign measures that benefit a country's commercial interests are recorded, as are harmful foreign measures. Moreover, the discriminatory content of the measures taken by a each Latin American country are also reported here, again revealing the degree to which its actions have beggared its neighbours or helped them, as the case may be. The variation across Latin American countries, referred to earlier, will become evident should readers examine this section of the report.

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11 September 2010

Map 1.1 Number of discriminatory measures implemented by each jurisdiction since the first G20 crisis related summit





Map 1.2 Number of trading partners harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures

Map 1.3 Number of (4 digit) tariff lines harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures



Map 1.4 Number of sectors harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures



Map 1.5 Number of trading partners affecting a jurisdiction's commercial interests



Map 1.6 Number of times a jurisdiction's commercial interests are harmed by trading partners



Map 1.7 Number of harmful measures implemented by G20 countries affecting each jurisdiction



Map 1.8 Number of pending discriminatory measures likely to harm a jurisdiction



SECTION 1

Global Overview

2 Global Overview of Contemporary Protectionism: World Trade Recovers but Incremental Protectionism Still Matches the Pace Set During 2009

Simon J. Evenett
University of St Gallen and CEPR

The rate at which governments discriminated against foreign commercial interests in the first eight months of 2010 is closely tracked that observed during 2009. Such discrimination, therefore, has ratcheted up during the recovery of world trade as it has during its slump. Is this paradoxical? As was argued in the Executive Summary, difficulties only arise if discrimination (protectionism) is conceived of as constituting only import-reducing state measures. However, plenty of discriminatory measures implemented during this crisis are not; some are export-enhancing and some measures probably helped stabilised trade flows (such as the large number of recorded subsidies given selectively to firms in the non-financial sectors.)

The diversity of contemporary protectionism (summarised in Table 2.6 below and in Figures 2.3 and 2.4) is one of its key characteristics, making generalisations about its total impact on trade flows (etc) hard to take seriously. The diversity also calls into question drawing conclusions about the total impact of contemporary protectionism on the basis of estimates of the effects of a selection of trade instruments.

Perhaps what is most remarkable of all is that, while there may be important variation across nations, at the global level the patterns of observed discrimination against foreign commercial interests have settled down. Few breaks from the 2009 pattern can be found in the 2010 data. Observers can, therefore, have growing confidence in the trends recorded here and in previous reports.

Despite the recovery of world trade in 2010, evidence of discrimination against foreign commercial interests continues to mount.

1. Since the first G20 crisis-related summit in November 2008, the world's governments have together implemented 638 beggar-thy-neighbour policy measures. Add in another 108 implemented measures that are likely to have harmed some foreign commercial interests, and the total

reaches 746; that is, more than one for every day since the first G20 summit in November 2008. **See Tables 2.1. and 2.2.**

2. Since our last report was published in June 2010, the number of beggar-thy-neighbour measures reported (84) exceeds the number of benign or liberalising measures reported (71). This ratio was considerably more favourable to market opening than in the previous reports, and constitutes some good news. **See Table 2.1.**
3. Although there are a lot of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures in the pipeline, they still account for only 141 of the 638 harmful measures implemented since November 2008. The large numbers of discriminatory measures reported in the Global Trade Alert database are, therefore, not driven by so-called unfair trade actions. **See Table 2.1.**
4. No four-digit product line or 2-digit UN classified economic sector has emerged unscathed by crisis-era protectionism. This finding does not imply that every government has taken discriminatory measures that affect each product line or economic sector. **See Table 2.2.**
5. Despite taking their no-protectionism pledge, the G20 members have imposed 395 beggar-thy-neighbour policies since November 2008. Since our last report was published at the time of the Toronto G20 summit (in June 2010), a total of 58 more discriminatory measures implemented by G20 countries have been discovered. **See Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1.**
6. The G20 countries also implemented 144 of the 204 benign or liberalising measures recorded in the GTA database. To their credit, half of benign or liberalising measures discovered since the last GTA report was published have been implemented by G20 countries. **See Table 2.3.**
7. Typically, since the first G20 summit in November 2008, every other day a G20 government has broken the no-protectionism pledge. In contrast a benign or liberalising measure is implemented by a G20 government on average every 5 days. **See Table 2.3.**
8. While G20 governments have implemented many of the beggar-thy-neighbour policies since the Washington DC summit, approximately 40% (343) of protectionist measures have been implemented by other governments. **See Tables 2.2. and 2.3.**

Reporting lags must be taken into account when interpreting quarterly estimates of the rate of implementation of discriminatory measures.

9. In terms of raw numbers, there appears to be a reduction in the total number of almost certainly and probably discriminatory measures imposed from the second half of 2010 compared to the first half of 2010. **See Figure 2.2.**
10. However, a familiar pattern of reporting lags has emerged in this and previous GTA reports. Once they are taken into account clear findings emerge. Since 2009 the total number of discriminatory measures implemented per quarter converages relatively quickly to within a range of 100-125 measures per quarter. In fact, by now the reported

totals for the five quarters (Q1 2009 to Q1 2010) all lie within this range. Nothing in the stream of reports for Q2 or Q3 2010 suggests deviations from this convergence pattern. **See Figure 2.2**.

11. In short, once reporting lags are taken into account, the rate at which discriminatory measures are being imposed in 2010 does not appear to have departed from that witnessed in 2009, when fears about protectionism were at their peak. **See Figure 2.2.**

Plenty of protectionism is in the pipeline.

12. By the end of August 2010 the GTA found there were 234 potentially protectionist measures in the pipeline, 146 of which were ongoing trade defense investigations.[1] The total amount of protectionism in the pipeline is actually lower now than at the time of the Toronto summit (when 276 potentially harmful measures were in the pipeline.) **See Tables 2.1 and 2.2.**

China remains the most frequent target of crisis-era protectionism, but other nations are hit often too.

13. Since November 2008 China's commercial interests have been hit 320 times by protectionist measures. Only if the 27 members of the European Union are counted together, does any other jurisdiction come close to absorbing comparable harm (the EU27 group being hit 296 times). **See Table 2.4**.
14. Other than China, the top 10 target jurisdictions hit by the most number of harmful foreign measures are all industrialised countries. Thailand, Turkey, India, Brazil, and Mexico are in the top 20 most frequently hit jurisdictions. **See Table 2.4 and GTA website**.
15. 79 trading partners have imposed measures harmful to Chinese commercial interests. Taken together, 80 jurisdictions have imposed measures harmful to the commercial interests of the EU 27 (although this number includes cases where one EU member state has harmed another EU member state). The United States, India, Japan, the UAE, Turkey, Brazil, and Canada have each had 60 or more trading partners implement almost surely discriminatory measures against their respective commercial interests. **See Table 2.4 and the GTA website.**
16. In addition, 119 of the measures in the pipeline are likely to harm Chinese commercial interests, should those measures be implemented. No other jurisdiction comes close in terms of pending threats to its commercial interests. **See Table 2.4 and the GTA website**.

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1 For the purposes of this report (and the last one) the protectionist pipeline is said to include all those state measures that (i) have been publicly announced, (ii) that have yet to be implemented and (iii) upon examination are likely to harm foreign commercial interests. Such measures are classified amber in the GTA database until implemented, whereupon their classification may change (depending on the details about the potential discriminatory impact available at the time of implementation.)

Which nations have inflicted the most harm?

Since protectionist acts can affect different numbers of products, sectors, and trading partners, there is no single metric to identify the worst offending nations. The GTA reports four indicators of harm.[2] Compared to the last report, there have been few notable changes in the rankings.

17. Taken together the EU 27 retains the dubious distinction of being the only jurisdiction to be in the top-5 worst offenders on all four metrics. **See Table 2.5.**
18. On all four metrics, the Russian Federation, India, and Indonesia are in the top 10 worst offending nations. **See Table 2.5.**
19. With its latest deliberate, competitive devaluation Vietnam has the dubious honour of discriminating against foreign commercial interests in the most product categories (tariff lines.) The EU 27 now takes the prize for measures that harm foreign commercial interests in the largest number of economic sectors; Argentina for harming the most trading partners (174). **See Table 2.5.**
20. When nations are ranked by the number of trading partners their state measures have harmed, every one of the top-10 worst offenders has hurt the commercial interests of over 130 nations. Given the conservative methodology used to identify the harmed jurisdictions[3], this finding indicates the scale of the adverse impact of many governments' crisis-era state measures. **See Table 2.5.**

As far as the range of the products affected is concerned, contemporary protectionism falls short of its 1930's predecessor.

21. In the 1930s the across-the-board tariff increases are reported to have covered trade in almost all product categories (tariff lines). Taking the EU 27 countries as a single jurisdiction, there are now ten jurisdictions that have taken discriminatory measures against foreign commercial interests in more than a quarter of all the possible product categories. Emerging markets are well represented in those jurisdictions. In fact, Brazil is the only BRIC not to be included in that list. **See Table 2.5**.
22. During the past 12 months, the number of countries meeting the above-mentioned threshold has doubled, almost all of them emerging markets. Still, the world economy is a far from enduring discrimination across the range of products thought to have prevailed in the 1930s. **See Table 2.5 and previous GTA reports.**

Which types of beggar-thy-neighbour policies are used the most?

23. Since the first G20 crisis-summit, bailouts and state aids are the most frequent source of discrimination against other nations' commercial interests. Twenty-eight percent of all discriminatory measures were

2 Previous comparisons of the rankings of countries on the basis of these four rankings have shown a remarkably high degree of correlation. The Spearman rank correlations between the four rankings lied within the range 0.68-0.81.

3 In short, identification is on the basis of an existing non-trivial trade, investment, or other commercial flow, not indicators of potential harm.

bailouts. By now 117 out of the 192 discriminatory state aid/bail out measures in the Global Trade Alert database are in sectors other than the financial sector. It is a mistake to associate the discriminatory bailouts of the recent past only to banks and insurance companies and to the preservation of financial stability.[4] **See Table 2.6. and Figure 2.3.**

24. The implementation of discriminatory trade defence instruments is the second most common form of protectionism. Investigations associated with trade defence account for the largest number of measures in the pipeline. **See Table 2.6. and Figure 2.4.**
25. Since our last report was published in June 2010, tariff and trade defence measures account for the overwhelming majority of new discriminatory state measures that the GTA has uncovered. In the past three months then, it seems, the action is in these two policy instruments, with bailouts a poor third. **See Table 2.6.**
26. While analysts may have developed data sources and tools to study the impact of tariff changes and trade defence measures, it is worth bearing in mind that since November 2008 these measures together account less than 40% of all harmful discriminatory measures implemented by governments. **See Table 2.6. and Figure 2.3.**
27. Export taxes or restrictions, bailouts, export subsidies, buy national policies, tariff measures, trade defence measures, plus a rag-bag of non-tariff barriers imposed since November 2008 are each conservatively estimated to have harmed over 100 countries' commercial interests. **See Table 2.6.**
28. The last two remarks speak for the considerable diversity in contemporary protectionism, perhaps in contrast to the tariff-dominated accounts of 1930s protectionism. GTA reports have documented this diversity from the beginning, such diversity is not a recent phenomenon. **See Table 2.6 and previous GTA reports.**

Which sectors are most affected by protectionism?

29. The financial sector no longer stands out as an unusual recipient of state favours (discrimination). Firms in the transport equipment, basic metals, basic agricultural products, basic chemicals, and special purpose machinery have seen 60 or more discriminatory measures imposed since November 2008. **See Table 2.7.**
30. Looking ahead, the basic metals and basic chemical sectors could be affected by over 30 pending measures. Should this come to pass then over the next year or so, both sectors will eclipse the financial sector as the principal sectors most affected by contemporary era protectionism. **See Table 2.7.**

4 This latter finding can be confirmed by going on to the "Advanced Search" page of the GTA website and searching for the bailout measures that do not affect sector 81, namely, financial intermediation services and auxiliary services thereof.

Table 2.1 Total number of state measures reported in the GTA database

Statistic	This report (September 2010)		Increase from previous report (June 2010)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	1226	872	175	140
Total number of measures coded green	246	209	71	69
Total number of measures coded amber	342	166	20	17
Total number of measures coded red	638	497	84	54

How does the GTA colour code measures?

Color code	Criteria
Red	(i) The measure has been implemented and almost certainly discriminates against foreign commercial interests.
Amber	(i) The measure has been implemented and may involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests; OR (ii) The measure has been announced or is under consideration and would (if implemented) almost certainly involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests
Green	(i) The measure has been announced and involves liberalisation on a non-discriminatory (i.e., most favoured nation) basis; OR (ii) The measure has been implemented and is found (upon investigation) not to be discriminatory: OR (iii) The measure has been implemented, involves no further discrimination, and improves the transparency of a jurisdiction's trade-related policies.

Table 2.2 Measures implemented since first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008, totals for all jurisdictions and change since last report

Statistic	This report (September 2010)		Increase from previous report (June 2010)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	950	742	170	133
Total number of measures coded green	204	175	69	67
Total number of measures coded amber	108	70	17	9
Total number of measures coded red	638	497	84	54
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	1214	1214	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	67	67	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	216	216	*	*

Note: * The GTA periodically reviews the number of countries affected by implemented state measures. The conservative methodology used only identifies those trading partners that are actually trading more than a de minimus amount as being affected. The re-application of this conservative methodology led the GTA team to revise down the total number of harmed ju-risdictions on some measures. Overall, this reduced the total number of harmed jurisdictions from 233 to 216.

Table 2.3 Measures implemented by G20 countries in the year since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008, totals for all G20 jurisdictions and change since last report

Statistic	This report (September 2010)		Increase from previous report (June 2010)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	774	495	98	72
Total number of measures coded green	144	117	34	32
Total number of measures coded amber	235	106	6	7
Total number of measures coded red	395	272	58	31
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	1020	1014	16	16
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	63	63	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	209	208	1	1

Figure 2.1 The G20 members implement a higher share of beggar-thy-neighbor policies than other countries



Figure 2.2 Once reporting lags are taken into account, since 2009 began each quarter has seen between 100 and 125 discriminatory measures imposed. So far 2010 is replicating the pattern seen in 2009; therefore, the recovery in world trade has occurred despite the continued resort to protectionism



Note: In Figures 2.1 and 2.2. a harmful measure is taken to be one which has been implemented since November 2008 and is almost certainly discriminatory (coded red) or likely to be discriminatory (coded amber).

Table 2.4 Top 10 biggest targets of discriminatory measures

Target	Number of discriminatory measures imposed on target		Number of trading partners imposing discriminatory measures		Number of pending measures, which if implemented, would harm target too	
	This report (September 2010)	Increase fromlast report (June 2010)	This report (September 2010)	Increase fromlast report (June 2010)	This report (September 2010)	Increase fromlast report (June 2010)
China	321	39	79	1	118	-7
EU27	299	33	80	3	80	0
USA	240	27	70	2	45	-1
Germany	227	23	53	2	54	-2
France	205	17	55	2	44	-2
UK	202	21	53	3	42	-2
Italy	196	21	50	4	48	-2
Japan	184	16	63	0	45	-2
Belgium	179	9	48	2	40	-2
Netherlands	178	15	49	2	41	-1

Note: The number of pending measures can rise and fall over time.

Table 2.5 Which countries have inflicted the most harm?

<table>
<tr><th rowspan="2">Rank</th><th colspan="4">Metric, Country in specified rank, Number</th></tr>
<tr><th>Ranked by number of (almost certainly) discriminatory measures imposed</th><th>Ranked by the number of tariff lines (product categories) affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures</th><th>Ranked by the number of sectors affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures</th><th>Ranked by the number of trading partners affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures</th></tr>
<tr><td>1.</td><td>EU27 (154)</td><td>Viet Nam (925)</td><td>EU27 (56)</td><td>Argentina (174)</td></tr>
<tr><td>2.</td><td>Russian Federation (75)</td><td>Venezuela (784)</td><td>Algeria (54)</td><td>EU27 (168)</td></tr>
<tr><td>3.</td><td>Argentina (49)</td><td>Kazakhstan (719)</td><td>Nigeria (45)</td><td>China (160)</td></tr>
<tr><td>4.</td><td>India (46)</td><td>Nigeria (599)</td><td rowspan="2">Venezuela (38)
Viet Nam (38)</td><td>Indonesia (151)</td></tr>
<tr><td>5.</td><td>Germany (32)</td><td>EU27 (440)</td><td>Viet Nam (148)</td></tr>
<tr><td>6.</td><td rowspan="2">Brazil (29)
UK (29)</td><td>Russian Federation (421)</td><td>Kazakhstan (36)</td><td rowspan="2">India (143)
Russian Federation (143)</td></tr>
<tr><td>7.</td><td>Argentina (393)</td><td>Russian Federation (34)</td></tr>
<tr><td>8.</td><td>Indonesia (24)</td><td>India (363)</td><td rowspan="3">Ethiopia (32)
India (32)
Indonesia (32)</td><td rowspan="3">Finland (132)
Germany (132)</td></tr>
<tr><td>9.</td><td>Italy (22)</td><td>Indonesia (347)</td></tr>
<tr><td>10.</td><td>Austria (20)</td><td>Ethiopia (345)</td></tr>
</table>

Note: There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect different numbers of products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA reports four measures of harm.

Table 2.6 Ten most used state measures to discriminate against foreign commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting
(Ranked by number of discriminatory measures imposed)

State measure	Number of discriminatory (red) measures imposed.		Number of measures implemented (red, amber, or green).		Number of jurisdictions that imposed these discriminatory measures.		Number of jurisdictions harmed by these discriminatory measures.	
	This report (September 2010)	Increase from previous report (June 2010)	This report (June 2010)	Increase from previous report (June 2010)	This report (September 2010)	Increase from previous report (June 2010)	This report	Increase from previous report (June 2010)
Bail out / state aid measure	192	9	205	10	45	1	185	0
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	142	30	209	42	56	2	77	4
Tariff measure	93	18	216	64	34	3	143	2
Export taxes or restriction	40	9	61	15	46	3	184	0
Public procurement	31	3	36	3	19	1	133	0
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	28	4	42	8	19	0	95	0
Migration measure	28	2	43	4	18	2	129	0
Export subsidy	22	3	29	5	40	3	167	15
Import ban	18	*	60	*	16	*	73	*
Local content requirement	18	3	21	3	12	1	124	0

Figure 2.3 Top 10 implemented measures used to discriminate against foreign commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting



Figure 2.4 Top 10 pending measures that target foreign commercial interests.



Table 2.7 Top 20 sectors most affected by discriminatory measures.

CPC code, Affected Sector	Number of discriminatory (red) measures affecting commercial interests in this sector	Number of implemented measures affecting specified sector	Number of jurisdictions implementing measures affecting specified sector and classified as red	Number of pending measures affecting specified sector
81 (Financial intermediation services and auxiliary services therefor)	75	81	26	4
49 (Transport equipment)	72	117	54	24
41 (Basic metals)	70	112	54	32
01 (Products of agriculture, horticulture and market gardening)	62	97	38	15
34 (Basic chemicals)	61	99	50	45
44 (Special purpose machinery)	61	107	28	16
21 (Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats)	49	74	31	12
42 (Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment)	49	76	24	27
23 (Grain mill products, starches and starch products; other food products)	42	71	49	11
02 (Live animals and animal products)	40	59	48	8
35 (Other chemical products; man-made fibres)	39	73	48	17
22 (Dairy products)	38	52	45	8
26 (Yarn and thread; woven and tufted textile fabrics)	37	69	49	8
27 (Textile articles other than apparel)	35	61	25	16
43 (General purpose machinery)	35	67	20	14
38 (Furniture; other transportable goods n.e.c.)	33	54	20	10
36 (Rubber and plastics products)	32	55	20	16
46 (Electrical machinery and apparatus)	32	64	18	10
37 (Glass and glass products and other non-metallic products n.e.c.)	31	60	21	24
47 (Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus)	31	55	18	4

3 Global Crisis and Trade Barriers in Latin America

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1. Introduction

Historically, most governments have been tempted to raise trade barriers in times of crisis. While trade restrictions have increased over the last two years, the protectionist threat has not been as bad as might be expected given the severity of the crisis. This has been due in large part to the fact that the recession in major world economies was partially offset by the dynamism of emerging countries and, to a lesser extent, the commitment of many countries to preserve the multilateral trade system. Despite this, risks of rising protection remain if economic growth is slower than expected or, even worse, if the recession makes a comeback. This paper focuses on Latin America, where the worsening of trade balances could encourage more restrictive trade policies.

Our aim is to provide a regional perspective on trade barriers involving Latin America since November 2008, according to Global Trade Alert (GTA) database. The second section presents a methodological note The third section will assess protectionist measures faced and enacted. We review geographical and sectoral trends and also the policy instruments, identifying those countries and trade blocs suffering most as well as those using more protectionist policies. We then compare results from Latin America with the rest of the world before concluding in section four.

2. Methodological note

The trade restrictions studied were extracted from GTA database (see http://www.globaltradealert.org) and comprise barriers established from November 2008 (when GTA started registering these measures) through to 22 June 2010 when the research for this paper was closed. The database includes several types of measures. From mere trade barriers (e.g. tariffs, anti-dumping measures), to others only indirectly related to trade policy (e.g. foreign investment related measures). GTA classifies measures into three categories: (i) green, which involve liberalisation on a non-discriminatory basis or increase transparency, (ii) amber, which may involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests (including already applied measures and measures announced or under consideration which, if implemented, would discriminate those interests) and (iii) red, which are already in force and almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests.

Yet the database faces some limitations for our regional focus. First, information is not available for all Latin American countries. Data on 17 economies (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) were considered in the case of measures affecting the region. However, information on measures imposed by Latin America refers only to the 11 countries for which data was available (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela). Second, not all countries started being monitored at the same time, which could be a bias against the largest, which were first included. In addition, the information on red measures faced by Latin America on a regional basis could be overestimated because while the database provides information on all sectors and countries affected by each measure, it does not specify which sectors are affected in each country. In this analysis, the information regarding Latin America usually corresponds to the sum of country data. For example, if a measure adopted by one jurisdiction affects two Latin American economies, it will be considered as two measures.

3. The landscape of protection

After six years of expanding on an annual average rate of 16.3%, world exports took a hit during the crisis of 2009 plunging by almost a quarter (22.6%). Latin American exports (for our 17 selected countries), which grew 16.8% from 2003 to 2008, decreased 22.5% in 2009. Imports contracted 24.7% after increasing at an annual rate of 17.4% during the preceding six years. Although the magnitude of the fall varied, all the selected economies faced contractions of trade flows (Figure 1). In other words, Latin America expanded faster than developed countries but slower than other emerging economies, such as Asian countries.

Several factors contributed to the sharp drop of world trade during 2009. First, demand contracted 0.6% worldwide as a result of the recession in developed countries (-3.2% in 2009) and the slowdown in emerging economies (2.5% growth in 2009 vs. 6.5% in 2008). Although output in Latin America decreased 8% in 2009, most countries showed a better performance than in previous crises, as a result of stronger fundamentals. Second, the drop in commodity prices (-31%) is crucial to understand the fall of exports in Latin America, where primary products have a significant share. Third, trade plunged due to a credit shortage and, fourth, a moderate increase in protectionism also contributed to the contraction of world trade. In this context, all selected Latin American countries were harmed by measures implemented by their partners and at least 11 economies (for no information is available for the remaining ones as mentioned above) also enacted restrictive measures against foreign interests. The following sections provide a landscape of protectionist measures faced and imposed by Latin American countries and contrast them with global trends.

Figure 1 Contraction of trade in the context of the crisis: Annual percent change of exports and imports in Latin America in 2009



Note: LA: sum of selected countries.

Source: Authors' elaboration with data from WTO.

Figure 2 Number of measures in database harming specified partner, according to GTA classification



Source: GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

3.1. Protection measures faced by Latin America

From November 2008 to June 2010, all the selected countries faced restrictions from their trade partners. Although they benefited from some green measures, the ratio of protectionist (red and amber) to green measures faced by Latin America reached 5.2 under the period. The most affected were Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, and Peru (Figure 2 and Annex 1). As shown in Figure 3 there is a positive correlation between a country's share in world exports and the protectionist measures faced. Larger exporters with a more diversified production structure confronted more restrictions. However, some small economies (Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia) and Peru also show high ratios of restrictive/green measures.

Figure 3 Larger exporters face more restrictive measures



Source: Author's elaboration with data from WTO and GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

Figure 4 shows that bail out/state aid measures are the main restrictions harming Latin America, representing 23.4% of the total and being the most important category of trade barriers faced by all selected countries, except from Argentina. Tariff measures account for 13.1% and are particularly relevant for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile. Export subsidies represent 10.6% of red and amber measures affecting Latin America (mainly in Central America, Colombia, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay), followed by export taxes (8.6%, being more important for Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay) and non-tariff barriers (6.4%, especially for Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay). Other restrictions represent individually less than 5% of total barriers (Annex 2).

Concerning the geographical origin of restrictions, Argentina and the Russian Federation are the main sources of red measures harming the region (6.2% and 6.1% of total, respectively), followed by some European countries: Indonesia and India (Figure 5). Argentina is the jurisdiction imposing more red measures on

Figure 4 Red and amber measures harming LA, by type of measure



Note: Sum of measures affecting each country.
Source: Authors' elaboration with data from GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

Figure 5 Jurisdictions imposing red measures on LA



Note: Sum of measures affecting each country.
Source: Authors' elaboration with data from GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Red measures imposed by trade partners affected a variety of sectors. The most frequent are related to agriculture, where most Latin American countries are highly competitive, such as grain mill products, starches and starch products and other food products; live animals and animal products; dairy products; products of agriculture, horticulture and market gardening; and meat, fish, fruit, vegetables,

Figure 6 Red measures harming Latin America, by sector



Note: Sum of measures affecting each country.
Source: Authors' elaboration with data from GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

oils and fats. In manufacturing, there are more restrictions in textile and apparel industry; special purpose machinery; furniture; other tradeables such as basic metals; leather and leather products and footwear; basic metals; and transport equipment. As mentioned earlier, the GTA database provides information on all sectors and countries affected by each measure, but it does not specify which sectors are affected in each country. For this reason, information presented in Figure 6 should be considered only as a guide. Latin American exports of these products are restricted by specific measures, as well as general measures which affect many sectors. The largest economies in the region (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina), with a more diversified production structure, face restrictions in more sectors than other Latin American countries.

3.2. Protection measures enacted by Latin American countries

During the period, almost all South American countries and Costa Rica imposed protectionist measures. No information is available for Uruguay and other Central American economies. Argentina leads in red and amber measures (69 in total), followed by Brazil (32) and Mexico (11) (Figure 7). Argentina also shows the highest ratio of protectionist to green measures (11.5) in the region and Venezuela is the country in Latin America with the highest number of products affected (784 tariff lines) (Annex 3).

All these countries were affected by more red and amber measures than they imposed. However, the ratio of measures faced to measures imposed differs substantially among countries, from 1.9 in Argentina to 99 in Chile. In contrast to many G20 members like the US, the European countries and Russia, where bail out/state aid measures were very important, the most frequent restrictions in Latin America are trade defence measures (anti-dumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards), the same as in other large emerging economies such as China and India. In Latin America, trade defence represents 46.5% of red and amber measures (Figure 8). These are the main restrictions used by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Other instruments imposed frequently are tariff and non-tariff barriers, bail out/state aid measures and export taxes or restrictions.

Figure 7 Number of measures imposed by specified partner



Source: GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

Figure 8 Red and amber measures imposed by Latin America, by type of measure



Note: Sum of measures affecting each country.
Source: Authors' elaboration with data from GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

Figure 9 Red measures imposed by Latin America, by affected country



Note: Sum of measures affecting each country.
Source: Authors' elaboration with data from GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

Following the world trend, China is affected by more red measures (4.5% of total), followed by the US, Germany, Brazil, France, Spain, Japan and India (Figure 9). Restrictions on China are frequent in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Paraguay.

All countries in the region for which information is available, with the exception of Colombia, imposed red measures to other Latin American economies. These regionally focused restrictions represent 17.1% of barriers in Latin America. In other words, regional trade agreements are no safe haven: Latin America does not provide better treatment to regional partners, despite often being the main source of imports. For example, red measures enacted by Costa Rica (related to migration issues) harmed other members of the Central American Common Market (CACM) and Panama. MERCOSUR members are among the most affected economies by red measures imposed by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay (no information is available for Uruguay). MERCOSUR countries used several measures which restricted intra-zone trade, such as non-automatic licensing on imports (NAL) (of any origin, including MERCOSUR), the spread of the use of "criterion values" by customs and the application of antidumping duties. In 2008 8% of Argentina's imports were affected by NAL, and in the case of imports from Brazil this share reached 8.9%. Considering other measures, such as safeguards and anti-dumping duties, 10.6% of imports from Brazil were affected by restrictions in Argentina. One of the most relevant issues related to intra-zone trade in the Andean Community was the safeguard imposed in 2009 by Ecuador on imports of 1,346 products from Colombia, with the aim of counteracting the effect of the depreciation of the Colombian peso. Products subjected to safeguards represented more than one third of Ecuadorian imports from Colombia in 2008. In addition, products from all origins (including members of the Andean Community) had to pay the balance of payments safeguard imposed by Ecuador.

Figure 10 Red measures in database imposed by Latin America, by sector



Source: Authors' elaboration with data from GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

From a sectoral point of view, most red measures enacted by Latin American countries involve restrictions on manufactures, such as machinery, metal products, furniture, textile and apparel, chemicals, basic metals, and transport equipment (Figure 10). In foodstuffs and agricultural products, the most restricted are meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats; dairy products; and grain mill products, starches and starch products; other food products. Venezuelan red measures affected more sectors, especially the measure referring to the competitive devaluation of its currency, considered as a jumbo measure by Evenett and Fritz (2010). Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador also imposed red measures on several sectors.

3.3. Is Latin America more protectionist than the rest of the world?

It is interesting to compare restrictive measures faced and imposed by Latin America with the rest of the world. The simple average of 11 Latin American countries indicates that the region imposed fewer protectionist measures than the world average (12.8 vs. 13.7, respectively). It also faces fewer restrictive measures (91.2 vs. 105.5) (Table 1). The amount of red and amber measures enacted by Latin America represents 11.3% of restrictive measures harming the region (simple average of selected countries). This indicator is below the world average (14.5%), which suggests that Latin America might be less protectionist than other regions. This mass the fact that the situation varies substantially among the countries within the region. Argentina and to a lesser extent, Brazil are the only countries where the restrictive measures implemented exceed those confronted (52.3% and 16.1%, respectively). In fact, Argentina ranks second in the list of countries which enact more red and amber measures and it is the 35th position in the ranking of countries which face restrictive measures. Brazil ranks 9th and 16th, respectively (Table 1).

Table 1 Is Latin America more protectionist than the rest of the world? Faced vs. implemented protectionist measures in Latin American and selected countries

Country/ Region	Faced				Implemented				Implemented/ Faced
	Red	Amber	Total[a]	Ranking[b]	Red	Amber	Total[a]	Ranking[c]	
World average[d]	70.5	34.9	105.5		7.5	6.1	13.7		14.5%
LA average[e]	60.1	31.1	91.2	53.3	7.2	5.6	12.8	54.1	11.3%
Argentina	86	46	132	35	41	28	69	2	52.3%
Bolivia	25	13	38	82	2	0	2	80	5.3%
Brazil	132	67	199	16	17	15	32	9	16.1%
Chile	62	37	99	50	1	0	1	86	1.0%
Colombia	54	31	85	52	1	4	5	57	5.9%
Costa Rica	34	22	56	63	1	1	2	75	3.6%
Ecuador	32	16	48	71	2	2	4	65	8.3%
Mexico	117	53	170	22	6	5	11	43	6.5%
Paraguay	28	15	43	77	3	0	3	71	7.0%
Peru	51	20	71	58	1	5	6	53	8.5%
Venezuela	40	22	62	60	4	2	6	54	9.7%

Notes: a: Total protectionist (red + amber) measures. b: Ranking: 1 to 106. The higher the position, most measures faced by the country. c: Ranking: 1 to 106. The higher the position, most measures implemented by the country. d: World average: simple average of 106 countries for which data on faced and imposed restrictive measures is available. e: World average: simple average of 11 selected countries for which data on faced and imposed restrictive measures is available.
Source: Authors' elaboration with data from GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

4. Conclusions

During the recent global crisis, output fell and unemployment rose in many countries, fuelling concerns of a rise in protectionism. Although this time the threat was not as bad as expected, restrictions have increased steadily during last two years contributing to the contraction of trade, initially triggered by the drop in world demand. In Latin America, after a six year rapid expansion, trade flows decreased more than 20% in 2009. Although the magnitude of the fall varied from country to country, exports and imports fell in all the selected countries.

Over the period under consideration, all countries analysed here were harmed by measures implemented by their partners while at least 11 of 17 selected economies also enacted restrictive measures against foreign interests. In general, larger exporters in Latin America with a more diversified production structure faced more restrictions and they were affected in more sectors than smaller countries. The economies most affected by restrictive measures were Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia and Peru. The activities which faced barriers most frequently are the ones related to agriculture (where the region is very competitive) and some manufacturing industries, such as textile and apparel, machinery, furniture. Most of the restrictions harming the region were bail out/state aid measures and tariff barriers. Argentina and the Russian Federation were the main sources of red measures harming the region, followed by some European countries, Indonesia and India.

Almost all South American countries and Costa Rica imposed measures which affected their trade partners (although little information is available for the rest of Central America and Uruguay). Argentina is the country in Latin America which imposed more red and amber measures, followed by the two other big economies, Brazil and Mexico. As well as in many other developing countries, trade defence measures and tariff barriers are the most frequent restrictions. The main destinations of red measures imposed by Latin American economies were China, the US, Germany, Brazil, France, Spain, Japan, and India.

From a sectoral point of view, most red measures enacted by Latin American countries involve restrictions to manufactured goods, such as machinery, metal products, furniture, textile and apparel, chemicals, basic metals and transport equipment. All countries in the region for which information is available, with the exception of Colombia, imposed red measures on other Latin American economies. In other words, partners in regional trade agreements did not receive better treatment than the rest of the world.

Latin America imposed fewer protectionist measures than the world average, but it has also faced fewer restrictions. In that sense, the data suggests that Latin America may well be less protectionist than other regions, but the situation varies substantially among countries.

As to the future, if the global recovery is strong then pressures for protectionism are likely to decrease. Governments would be tempted to use fewer restrictive measures and even to remove some border measures, such as NALs and safeguards, given that once the recovery picks up bottlenecks also emerge swiftly. Yet many of the measures enacted during the crisis, especially bail out/state aids and other instruments used mainly by industrialised countries, would be difficult to eliminate at the same speed. Moreover, the end of the crisis is far from clear. As mentioned earlier, if growth is slower than expected or, even worse, the world economy turns back into recession there are some risks of increasing protectionism. In many Latin American economies, the worsening of trade balances could lead to a new rise in restrictions on commerce.

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Annex 1 Measures harming selected partners and share in world exports, by effect on trade and country

Description	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Number of measures in database affecting specified partner	159	44	239	116	102	67	57	45	63	42	206	38	65	48	81	100	74
Number of measures in database affecting specified partner classified green	27	6	40	17	17	11	9	7	12	9	36	7	10	5	10	13	12
Number of measures in database affecting specified partner classified amber	46	13	67	37	31	22	16	14	20	13	53	14	23	15	20	29	22
Number of measures in database affecting specified partner classified red	86	25	132	62	54	34	32	24	31	20	117	17	32	28	51	58	40
Number of restrictive measures in database affecting specified partner (red + amber)	132	38	199	99	85	56	48	38	51	33	170	31	55	43	71	87	62
Number of jurisdictions imposing red measures on specified partner	57	37	58	48	48	44	42	40	43	37	55	37	45	37	47	50	21
Share in world exports	0.45%	0.04%	1.24%	0.43%	0.27%	0.07%	0.11%	0.03%	0.06%	0.04%	1.86%	0.01%	0.01%	0.03%	0.22%	0.04%	0.47%

Source: GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10) and WTO.

Annex 2 Red and amber measures harming selected partners, by type of measure and country

Description	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	ECU	ELS	GUA	HON	MEX	NIC	PAN	PAR	PER	URU	VEN
Bail out / state aid measure	28	10	39	23	19	13	11	10	13	9	48	9	14	11	17	17	13
Tariff measure	30	1	35	13	5	6	3	2	5	2	27	3	6	2	7	16	7
Export subsidy	13	5	14	8	12	7	5	5	7	5	15	5	8	6	9	10	4
Export taxes or restriction	7	7	13	8	8	6	7	5	4	2	8	3	6	5	7	9	6
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	8	4	14	7	6	3	4	0	1	1	9	1	2	5	5	10	3
Public procurement	8	2	9	4	4	2	1	3	3	1	7	1	0	1	5	2	6
Trade finance	4	3	5	4	4	2	4	2	3	2	5	2	4	3	4	4	3
Import ban	4	1	7	3	3	2	2	1	2	1	5	1	3	1	3	2	3
Local content requirement	6	2	8	2	2	3	1	2	1	1	8	1	0	0	2	3	1
Competitive devaluation	3	1	4	2	3	1	3	3	1	1	4	1	1	2	3	2	2
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	4	0	6	3	4	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	2	0
Trade defense measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	5	0	9	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	5	0	0	1	1	1	0
Consumption subsidy	2	0	5	1	2	2	1	0	0	0	6	0	0	1	1	0	0
Investment measure	2	1	2	3	3	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	2	1	1
Migration measure	2	0	4	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	4	1	1	0	0	0	1
Intellectual property protection	1	0	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	1	1	1
Technical Barrier to Trade	2	1	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
State-controlled company	2	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other service sector measure	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	1	0
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Import subsidy	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
State trading Enterprise	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0
Sub-national government measure	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	*132*	*38*	*199*	*99*	*85*	*56*	*48*	*38*	*51*	*33*	*170*	*31*	*55*	*43*	*71*	*87*	*62*

Source: GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

Annex 3 Measures imposed by selected partners and share in world exports, by effect on trade and country

Description	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	ECU	MEX	PAR	PER	VEN
Number of measures in database by specified jurisdiction	75	2	47	2	6	2	6	18	3	7	9
Number of measures in database by specified jurisdiction classified green	6	0	15	1	1	0	2	7	0	1	3
Number of measures in database by specified jurisdiction classified amber	28	0	15	0	4	1	2	5	0	5	2
Number of measures in database by specified jurisdiction classified red	41	2	17	1	1	1	2	6	3	1	4
Number of tariff lines affected by red measures implemented by specified jurisdiction	336	21	217	1	1	0	83	63	67	1	784
Number of sectors affected by red measures implemented by specified jurisdiction	25	4	24	1	1	0	22	24	10	1	38
Number of trading partners affected by red measures implemented by specified jurisdiction	161	13	131	1	1	6	45	32	15	1	72
Number of measures in database affecting specified partner classified red + amber	69	2	32	1	5	2	4	11	3	6	6
Share in world imports	0.31%	0.04%	1.06%	0.34%	0.26%	0.09%	0.12%	1.92%	0.05%	0.17%	0.34%

Note: No information is available on El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay.
Source: GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10) and WTO.

Annex 4 Red and amber measures imposed by selected partners, by type of measure and country

Description	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	CRI	ECU	MEX	PAR	PER	VEN
Trade defense measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	29	0	9	1	1	0	0	5	0	2	0
Tariff measure	0	1	10	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Bail out / state aid measure	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Export taxes or restriction	5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Import ban	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Trade finance	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Export subsidy	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Investment measure	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Public procurement	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Competitive devaluation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Intellectual property protection	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Local content requirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Migration measure	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
State-controlled company	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Consumption subsidy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Import subsidy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other service sector measure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
State trading enterprise	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sub-national government measure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	*48*	*2*	*27*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*2*	*8*	*3*	*2*	*6*

Note: No information is available on El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay.
Source: GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10) and WTO.

Annex 5 Red measures imposed by selected partners, by sector and country

Sector	AL	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	ECU	MEX	PAR	PER	VEN
Special purpose machinery	18	8	0	2	0	1	2	1	2	0	2
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment	17	10	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	1
Furniture; other transportable goods n.e.c.	13	7	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	1
Knitted or crocheted fabrics; wearing apparel	12	4	1	1	0	0	2	0	3	0	1
Other chemical products; man-made fibres	12	3	0	3	0	0	1	1	2	1	1
Electrical machinery and apparatus	12	4	0	4	0	0	2	1	0	0	1
Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus	12	7	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	1
Textile articles other than apparel	11	3	1	0	0	0	2	1	3	0	1
Basic metals	11	5	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Transport equipment	11	6	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	1
General purpose machinery	10	5	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	2
Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats	9	2	0	1	0	0	2	1	2	0	1
Dairy products	9	5	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Yarn and thread; woven and tufted textile fabrics	9	4	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Leather and leather products; footwear	9	3	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	1
Rubber and plastics products	9	3	0	2	0	0	2	1	0	0	1
Grain mill products, starches and starch products; other food products	8	3	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	1
Basic chemicals	8	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	1
Glass and glass products and other non-metallic products n.e.c.	8	3	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	1
Medical appliances, precision and optical instruments, watches…	8	2	0	2	0	0	2	1	0	0	1
Products of agriculture, horticulture and market gardening	7	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	1
Live animals and animal products	7	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1
Beverages	7	2	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	1
Pulp, paper and paper products; printed matter and related article	5	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	1
Fish and other fishing products	4	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1
Electricity, town gas, steam and hot water	4	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1
Office, accounting and computing machinery	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1

Sector	AL	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHI	COL	ECU	MEX	PAR	PER	VEN
Water	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0
Wastes or scraps	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Forestry and logging products	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Tobacco products	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Construction work	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Constructions	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Land	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Retail trade services; repair services of personal and household…	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Coal and lignite; peat	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Crude petroleum and natural gas	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Metal ores	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Stone, sand and clay	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Other minerals	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Coke oven products; refined petroleum products; nuclear fuel	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Computer and related services	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Recreational, cultural and sporting services	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Note: No information is available on El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay.

Source: Authors' elaboration with data from GTA database (downloaded on 6/22/10).

SECTION 2

COUNTRY ANALYSES FROM LATIN AMERICA

4 In Case of Fire, Break the Glass: Argentina's Border Emergency-Kit in Times of Global Crisis

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1. Introduction

After the outbreak of the Global Recession in 2008, unilateral discriminatory trade measures mushroomed. Developed countries put in place gigantic stimulus packages.[1] Some high- and middle-income countries set up catch-all tariff and non-tariff measures (Evenett and Fritz 2010). Those that had been applying import-duty rates below bound levels raised them up to bound ceilings.

Argentina lacked the resources to keep the pace with these massive stimulus packages[2]; and regional commitments tied its hands to unilaterally raise tariffs. Instead, it started to deploy a unique trade policy template, characterised by the resort to border measures. The main components of this border emergency-kit have been non-automatic licenses, antidumping duties, and reference prices. Even though Argentina is a minor player in global trade[3], the implementation of this customs package raised concerns. The country was singled out in many of the monitoring exercises carried out since the onset of the crisis as one of the most recurrent users of potentially trade-restrictive measures.[4] Furthermore, its poor performance in these reports caused some uneasiness among G20 members,

1 A large number of countries have implemented fiscal policy measures to support aggregate Demand since late 2008, totaling $2.6 trillion. The US, China, Japan and Germany represented 73% of the total (see United Nations 2010).

2 According to the UN's World Economic Situation and Prospects 2010, United States spent $969 billon in stimulus packages. This represents circa 1.7 times Argentinean total GDP (PPP) (see United Nations 2010).

3 With 0.27% of total imports in 2009, Argentina ranked 53rd in the list of world major importers according to the CIA's WorldFactbook, available at *https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html*

4 See for instance Global Trade Alert Reports; European Commission (2009), European Commission (2010), European Commission 2010 OECD 2009 and 2010, and WTO 2010.

in light of its pledge at the Washington summit (reiterated in the London and Pittsburg summits) not to respond to the crisis with protectionist measures.[5]

This paper sheds light on Argentina's post-crisis trade policy and explores some of its actual impact. The first section will briefly describe the three most recurrent measures of the kit: non-automatic licenses, antidumping duties, and reference prices. The second section will seek to explore the incidence that this triad of trade instruments has had on trade flows. The focus will then turn to the one component of the kit that has captured most of the attention: non-automatic licenses. The last section will present some final remarks.

2. Breaking the glass: Argentina deploys its border emergency-kit

Argentina's applied import-duty rates are well below the levels bound at the WTO[6]. However, as a member of MERCOSUR, Argentina cannot modify its duty rates without the express consent of its three regional partners, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, except for a number of limited exceptions.[7] Different views on how to deal with the crisis and, more generally, divergent defensive interests make Common External Tariff (CET) modifications a very cumbersome task (see Aragao 1993). The fact that members managed to agree only once on an increase in the CET since the onset of the crisis, clearly illustrates these difficulties.[8] As a result, Argentina faced the crises deprived of perhaps the most straightforward way of cushioning its effects, i.e. unilaterally raising its customs duty rates up to the bound levels. To aggravate matters, a severe drought hit the production of foodstuffs – the mainstay of exports. However, the government did not stand still as the crisis unleashed. In November 2008, it started to deploy a series of border instruments.[9] Three of them stand up from the rest, both in terms of frequency and coverage:

5 See for instance European Commission, Fifth Report on Potentially Trade Restrictive Measures in the Context of the Global Economic Crisis, supra note 4, p. 15

6 According to the WTO, in 2008 Argentina's simple average bound tariff was 31.9% and its simple average applied tariff was 11.6% (see *http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=AR*).

7 Argentina was authorised by MERCOSUR to maintain exceptions to the Common External Tariff on certain capital goods, computing and telecommunications goods, chemicals and a limited number of other products. It should be noted that most of these exceptions to the CET are biased to greater levels of openness.

8 In December 2009, the bloc approved tariff increases for several tariff positions, including dairy products, textiles, luggage goods (MERCOSUR Decisions CMC N°26/09 and 27/09 - for a detailed analysis of these measures, see GTA Measure #1619 and Measure #1618, available at *http://www.globaltradealert.org*). Argentina also adopted a decision in October 2008 to increase the CET to either 26% or 35% (from a prior ceiling of 20%) on several tariff lines in textiles, footwear, automobiles, and auto parts. However, this decision was in fact implementing legislation of a MERCOSUR decision adopted prior to the crisis, in September 2007 (MERCOSUR Resolution GMC N° 17/07).

9 To be sure, Argentina had been exploring alternatives ways of walling its borders since 2002. The first signs of this quest can be traced back to the imposition of export duties on hydrocarbon and agricultural commodities after the massive peso devaluation in early 2002. These restrictions on exports were subsequently accompanied by sporadic measures affecting imports of certain sensitive e-products. But it was not until the outbreak of global crisis in mid-2008 that this embryonic trade emergency-kit began to take shape.

- Reference Prices ("*valores criterio*"): In June 2005, and with the declared purpose of strengthening customs control and preventing under-invoicing, the Federal Public Revenue Agency (the acronym in Spanish is AFIP) adopted a resolution establishing a regime of "*valores criterio*".[10] Under this regime, reference prices are fixed by the Agency for products and origins in which fraudulent practices have been found to be frequent. Any importer attempting to clear customs of a good covered by the regime is required to post a guarantee amounting to the difference between the "reference price" set by the AFIP and the declared import value. Since November 2008, the government adopted a total of 29 specific measures imposing or amending reference prices[11], which affected tariff positions in 38 headings of the Harmonised System for classifying traded products (HS).[12] Measures involving reference prices currently account for 27% of all measures reported for Argentina within the GTA studied period (See Table 1 below).
- Antidumping Duties: In September 2008, Argentina tightened the procedures for antidumping investigation so as to shorten the period of time that elapses between the initiation of the investigation and the imposition of definitive antidumping duties.[13] Since November 2008, Argentina has initiated 27 dumping investigation for 28 different tariff positions and 8 origins; imposed provisional antidumping duties on three of these positions; and established definitive antidumping duties on 14. Moreover, according to GTA statistics, antidumping activity (initiations of AD investigations, impositions of provisional AD duties and imposition of definitive AD duties) in Argentina is five times more intense than the world average.[14]
- Non-Automatic Licenses (NALs): In 2005 Argentina began to require non-automatic licenses for the importation of certain goods, particularly footwear[15] and toys[16]. These licensing regimes require the submission of an application or supporting documentation (other than the one required for customs purposes) as a prior condition for importation.[17] According to the government, the measures were merely required for informational purposes. With the onset of the global crisis in November 2008, the list of products subject to this requirement expanded significantly. Since then, 14 specific measures imposing or

10 The regime was established by General Resolution 1907 of 5/7/2005, and was subsequently amended by General Resolution 2730, of 17/12/2009.

11 For the purposes of this paper, we have counted each "legislative act" (law, decree, resolution, etc.) imposing a potentially trade-restrictive measure as one measure. Since the GTA Database sometimes groups more than one specific legislative act in one "GTA Measure", the total number of measures of each type reported in its Database may be lower

12 Since tariff positions affected by a measure are registered in the GTA Database at a four-digit level (heading level), our calculations most probably overestimates the real coverage of Reference Prices (for instance, a reference price affecting one tariff position is registered in the GTA Database as affecting the whole heading of this position).

13 Decree N° 1393/2008

14 By "intensity" of trade defense activity we refer to frequency of amber and red trade defence measures per year. There are 131 trade defense measures reported in the GTA Database for 2009, imposed by 25 countries, i.e. 5.25 trade defense measures per country for that year. Argentina has adopted 25 trade defense measures in the same period.

15 Resolution M.E. y P. N° 486/2005.

16 Resolution M.E. y P. N° 485/2005.

17 World Trade Organization, Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Article 1.

amending licensing requirements on tariff positions in 73 HS headings have been passed.

Altogether, these three instruments constitute the core of Argentina's border emergency-kit. They represent 82% of the total trade-restrictive measures reported for Argentina in the GTA Database since November 2008.[18] Table 1 below shows how these three components of the kit are distributed.

Table 1 Number of measures per type

	Total	NALs	AD	RP	Total Emergency-Kit	Other measures
Number of legislative acts	106	14	44	29	87	13
Percentage of legislative acts	100%	13%	42%	27%	82%	12%

Source: Authors' calculations based on GTA Database and *www.Infoleg.gov.ar*, accessed 20 August 2010.

The remaining 12% of "other measures" encompassed a wide array of different instruments of trade policy. Among them, one that seems to be gaining prominence is subsidies. Since the outbreak of the crisis, Argentina implemented a number of state-aid initiatives, ranging from modest programmes targeted at specific sectors or activities (such as subsidised loans for wheat producers[19]) to the main "jumbo" (Evenett and Fritz 2010) tax exemption for locally-produced capital goods [20].

One aspect that distinguishes all three tools in the emergency-kit is their micro nature and hence rather limited coverage. In stark contrast with catch-all "jumbo measures" adopted by other countries, which restrict entire families of headings or even whole chapters of the HS (Evenett and Fritz 2010), the three typical measures in this emergency-kit are "surgically" targeted at specific tariff positions. Thus, while by definition a jumbo measure may have the ability to hamper the entry of dozens and even hundreds of tariff positions, NALs, reference prices and antidumping duties are meant to affect a limited number of "sensible" products and origins.

As a result, though representing 82% of trade-policy legislative activity, the triad of Argentina's most frequent measures accounted for less than half of the HS headings affected by all the potentially trade-restrictive measures reported for Argentina in the GTA Database (See Table 2 below).

These numbers confirm that Argentina has been an extensive user of micro measures. They also show that most of this activity took the form of a triad of targeted customs instruments, to which we have referred as the border emergency-

18 As explained in footnote 11, we are counting each specific legislative act (law, decree, resolution) as a unit. The numbers presented in the table may thus exceed the ones reported in the GTA Database (which sometimes groups more than one specific legislative act in one GTA Measure).

19 For a detailed analysis of this subsidy, see GTA Measure #1099, available at *www.globatradealert.org*

20 For a detailed analysis of this subsidy, see GTA Measure #1171, available at *www.globatradealert.org*

kit. The next section will look at the actual impact that this trade-policy toolkit has had on trade flows.

Table 2 Number of affected headings and participation per type

	NLAs	Reference Prices	Antidumping	Total Emergency-Kit	TOTAL MEASURES
Affected headings	73	38	49	160	324
Percentage of affected headings	23%	12%	15%	49%	100%

3. The emergency-kit in motion: Some remarks on the impact of Argentina's post-crisis trade policy

Argentinean imports dropped from $5.2 billion in May 2008 to $2.7 billion in May 2009, i.e. a 49% decrease. However, it would not be fair to blame the emergency-kit as the main culprit for this dramatic fall. Purchases abroad are mainly composed of capital goods, and parts and accessories thereof. These items represented 41% of total purchases in 2009. The figure rises up to 73% of total imports if we include imports of intermediate inputs. As a decrease in domestic economic activity has a negative impact on the demand for these items and ultimately drags down total imports. The main factor behind the collapse of imports after September 2008 thus appears to be the slowdown of economic activity. Chart 1 below confirms this view: It shows the high positive correlation between the evolution of imports and domestic economic activity.

In order to have a clearer picture of the emergency-kit's restrictive impact, we need to inspect the behavior of the specific tariff positions on which the kit was applied. We will focus on its most controversial component: the non-automatic licenses.

3.1. A closer look at the restrictive impact of non-automatic licenses

Currently Argentina has in place 17 non-automatic licensing regimes (NALs) in place[21], affecting a total of 415 tariff positions. Given the targeted nature, NALs cover a small share of imports. Based on the GTA database and statistical information provided by the National Statistics Department, we estimate that in value terms the proportion of goods that in 2008 were subsequently subject to NALs in 2009 amounted to 8.5%.[22]

21 "Certificates are required for a large list of consumer goods such as toys, footwear, bicycles, motor cycles , paper, tyres, yarns, autoparts, etc.

22 We have calculated this proportion for 2008 since this is a more "standard" year than 2009, during which the measure started to bite.

Chart 1 Annual variation of total imports and domestic economic activity (2008-2010)



Source: Own calculations based on information provided by the National Direction of Customs and AFIP

Chart 2 Annual variation of total imports and NALS (2008-2010)



Source: Own calculations based on information provided by the National Direction of Customs.

The impact on such imports has far from innocuous. While total imports in May 2009 were 49% lower than in May 2008, the plunge in products subject to NALs in the same period reached 54%. Chart 2 below seeks to capture this trade-restrictive effect over time. It shows the evolution of the quantity of imports of goods pertaining to any of the 415 tariff positions, at eight-digit level, covered by NALs since the outbreak of the crisis (November 2008). In order to control for other variables that may be affecting quantities of imports under NALs (notably, variation on prices and exchange rates[23]), the chart below compares their evolution with that of total imports. Further, in light of the high incidence of seasonal factors on many of the goods covered by NALs (e.g., textiles, footwear), the chart has also been seasonally adjusted.

23 Management of the real exchange rate to prevent over valuation has been a key component of economic policy since 2003.

Three stages may be identified in the charter. In the period that preceded the crisis, imports of (by then, "to-be") covered goods show a quite dynamic behavior. Its year-over-year growth is in general higher than – or at least equal to – the one of total imports. During the seven-month downward period that followed the outbreak of the crisis, the evolution of imports of goods subject to NALs shows a pattern remarkably similar to the one of total imports. May 2009 seems to constitute a turning point. As from June 2009, quantities of both covered imports and total imports started to grow. It is during this upturn stage, when demand picked up, that the effect of NALs emerged stronger. As can be observed, while NALs are not impeding the rebound in imports of covered goods, the pace of their recovery seems to lag behind total imports.

4. Final remarks

Argentina has ranked high on the lists of protectionist-inclined countries in the post-crisis era. Based on the information posted in the GTA Database, this paper confirms that, in fact, Argentina stands out an intense user of restrictions. It also shows that most of these restrictions took the form of one of three "targeted" types of border measures: non-automatic licenses, references prices, and antidumping duties. We refer to this triad of instruments as the border "emergency-kit", used for frequent laparoscopic interventions.

Since all three types of measures are "surgically" targeted at specific tariffs positions, their incidence on aggregate imports has been rather limited. But the emergency-kit was effective at the micro level, in restricting imports of specific sensible tariff positions. This is the case in particular of non-automatic licenses, which were not wound up when growth resumed and seem to have been slowing down the recovery of covered imports since mid-2009.

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5 Peru and Colombia: Similar Strategies, Contrasting Results

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1. Introduction

The story of Peru

Between 2002 and 2008, the Peruvian economy grew at an average rate of 6.73% per annum – one of the country's most dynamic periods in the last five decades. The main reasons were unprecedented increases in exports, dynamism of domestic demand, especially in certain sectors such as construction, and increased levels of investment.

Exports during this period almost quintupled, growing at an average rate of about 8% due to both higher volumes and higher prices of minerals and non-traditional products. Yet when the crisis broke out the Peruvian authorities did not adjust their growth expectations, and as a result neglected to take any action. On the contrary, concerned about inflationary pressures, Peru applied a fiscal adjustment in the final quarter of 2008. Only afterwards in a second stage, were a fiscal stimulus package that focused primarily on infrastructure implemented and interest rates lowered. Despite growth rates dropping from 9% to 0.9% in 2009 , Peru did not resort to active protectionism. In fact, the government continued to reduce tariffs unilaterally as well as in the context of free trade agreements.

The story of Colombia

Before the global crisis, Colombia was already growing at a slower rate. In 2008, its growth was only 2.5%. It even had a negative change (-0.7%) in the last quarter of that year. Growth in every sector decreased over the same period of 2007, except for mining. While exports increased by 8.1%, imports did so by 10.1%. The weakening performance of exports started in late 2008 as a result of the decreased demand from four major partners: US , EU, Ecuador, and Venezuela. These four countries accounted for 70% of exports. Considering that more than 37% of Colombia's exports were destined for the USA, Colombia was extremely vulnerable to the crisis. Since mid-2009, Colombia has also been affected by Venezuela's trade embargo with Venezuela's share in exports falling from 18% to 4%. Colombia reported a loss of 170,000 jobs due to the trade embargo. The sharp contraction prompted government plans to contain the shock which included some new trade protection measures as well as the strengthening of other measures already in place.

2. Peru

Peru opted to support exporters in the context of the crisis in contrast to most of its neighbours whose initial reaction was to find ways to increase border measures to restrict imports (See Rozemberg and Gaya in this issue). The most important measures are detailed below.

2.1 Export support

The drawback rebate rate on non-traditional exports was temporarily increased (from 5% to 8%). It is estimated that during the first five months of 2009, the government gave back about $80 million to exporters such that by the end of 2009 the increase over the year was 44.4%. Between January and September of 2009, nearly 1,500 companies made use of drawback, while out of the 2.208 companies that stopped exporting due to the crisis, only 24 benefited from this mechanism. The exemption from sales tax on port services for importers and exporters was also removed.

In the Economic Stimulus Plan, the government had announced a special credit line for the export sector – which would work through the Development Finance Corporation – as well as a $300 million Guarantee Fund for exporting companies. Yet very few applied for the first credit line, and as of October 2009 only $4 million of the Guarantee Fund had been executed[1]. In early 2009, another measure was announced relating to an increase in the amount of insurance coverage of the Export Credit for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), as well as a reform of the insurance instrument. The number of new operations doubled in 2009. As a complement to this measure, a Post Shipment Credit Insurance was also created.

As a simplification of customs procedures, 29 Easy Export Peru offices were installed in 15 regions of the country, with the aim of reducing export procedures (for products up to $5,000 and 30 kg per package). An Integrated Information System for Foreign Trade (Exporter Peru) was also implemented. This system brought together product information sheets, markets and fair information in a bid to help SMEs. A Multisectoral Committee on International Markets has also been established to monitor major destination markets. Finally, the government has implemented the Single Window for Foreign Trade . This platform has two components: *restricted goods* that will connect eight institutions responsible for

1 *La República: http://www.larepublica.pe/archive/all/larepublica/20091001/11/14/todos/14*

issuing permits for imports and exports and *port services* that will automate the process of shipping agents to six public institutions.

Figure 1. Number of applications, ongoing investigations and definitive duties, 2000-2010



Source: INDECOPI

Notes: 1/ Second Semester; 2/ New and renewed duties

2.2 Trade defence

True to its free trade tenets, Peru did not apply any safeguards. Indeed, an application for cotton yarn imports in August 2009 was even refused despite the recommendations of the Committee on Antidumping and Subsidies. Peru did however show an increase in requests to start investigations of dumping. A greater number of anti-dumping duties were also approved in comparison to previous years.

Following the global trend, China was the most frequently targeted country. As for other countries (Argentina, USA, Chile among others) only one anti-dumping duty was imposed on each in the past two years. The largest number of definitive anti-dumping duties were imposed on textiles, steel, and footwear.

2.3. Trade negotiations

Peru continued its policy of unilateral trade liberalisation in 2009. Along this line, the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Chile, USA, Singapore, and Canada came into force. The negotiations with China concluded while those with Japan, EFTA, South Korea, as well as the multipart agreement between Colombia, Peru, and the EU continued. The government hoped that this measure would help to diversify the destination for exports in the context of the global crisis.

As part of the FTA implementation with USA, Peru had to eliminate its price band for sensitive agricultural products. While this measure could have resulted in trade diversion, world food prices remained relatively high. Nonetheless the overall rise in imports from the US in recent months includes agricultural products and has displaced regional partners. Against this backdrop, Peru for the first time seriously used sanitary measures. In 2009 Peru banned the entry of three products from Chile, Ecuador and the US that were found to be harmful to health.

3. Colombia

The financial crisis led Colombia into recession in the final quarter of 2008. The country suffered a decline in the terms of trade and in exports and investment flows while lending rates soared. During 2008, the exchange rate to US dollar had two contrasting trends. Until August it had kept appreciating because of dollar weakness. To offset this trend the government chose not to monetise external loans. Zero tariffs were granted to imports of raw materials, in order to generate greater demand for dollars to import and drive up the exchange rate. However, the quick reversal of the trend after September led to the removal of restrictions on capital inflows. The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) rule of a minimum resident period was revoked. Throughout 2009 the economy remained in recession with growth around 0.5%. The causes were associated to the contraction of exports which fell on average 12.7% while FDI also decreased by 18.6%.

Colombia´s strategy against the crisis had four components:

- i) counter-cyclical fiscal stance (in debt sustainability conditions), prioritising public expenditure to infrastructure programmes;
- ii) guaranteeing access to external financing;
- iii) ensuring domestic financing of productive activity,
- iv) protecting jobs and promoting competitiveness.

Colombia implemented a more comprehensive response to the crisis than Peru with a set of trade defence instruments on sensitive sectors (especially agriculture) and greater support to the export sector. Other measures implemented were food subsidies and the strengthening of credit programmes for rural producers (see Bianchi et al 2009). Colombia did not resort to an across the board tariff increase, although it did apply some quantitative restrictions due to pressure from unions to raise protection in textiles and agriculture. The following sections will review the anti-crisis measures implemented in 2008 and 2009 that had an impact on trade flows.

3.1 Export credits and subsidies

In March 2009 the government implemented a system of soft loans with a value of up to $260 million for companies affected by falling external demand and the exchange rate appreciation , in particular for automotive and household appliances. The terms for the loans had installments up to three years with interest rates below Libor for dollar loans and three percentage points below the benchmark rate for loans in local pesos (see Government of Colomia 2009a b).

Figure 2. Number of ongoing investigations and definitive duties



Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade of Colombia.

Note: It takes ongoing investigations and definitive duties according to the WTO report for each year.

The following year the government implemented a Tax Refund Certificate (TRC) was implemented. The TRC as a means to supports non-traditional exports. Among tThe beneficiary sectors included: textiles, clothing, footwear, leather goods, plastic manufacturing, foodstuffs, printing, auto parts, wood furniture and jewelry. The criteria for selection included the employed workforce, the number of jobs at risk without the benefit, and also the sector's share in exports.

3.2 Trade defence measures

Colombia has not shown a significant increase in the number of anti-dumping investigations and definitive duties. In 2007, Colombia reported ten investigations to the WTO related to exports from China. In 2008, the number of investigations related to Chinese products numbered only six. In 2009, when the investigations were completed, only three definitive duties had been established.

In 2009 some investigations were opened on Brazilian and Mexican rubber and Chinese products (blenders and intubation tubes) with anti-dumping duties imposed as a result. In 2010, investigations on wire rod from Brazil and Mexico and blenders from China were initiated[2] (GTA database). Investigations on sodium bicarbonate (not for pharmaceutical purposes) also began in 2009, but no damage to domestic production could be found.

Colombia also applied a safeguard to flexible PVC films from Brazil. A tariff quota of 645 tons with a tariff of 9.2% for 2009 and 7.8% for 2010 has been established.

2 The investigation on Chinese Casing began in 2009 and is still ongoing.

3.3 Treatment of agriculture

In March of 2009, using the argument of health risks, the Colombian government suspended import permits for rice. This measure affected Peruvian and Ecuadorian exports. In response, Peru filed a lawsuit a in the Court of Justice of the Andean Community. The Court ruled that Colombia should reopen its market to rice exports from Peru. However, there was strong pressure from the Federation of Rice Farmers of Colombia to impose a quota system and even renegotiate the Andean Community agreements on agriculture.

Public purchases were activated in the dairy sector which had been strongly affected by the global crisis. During 2008, there was a combination of overproduction, increase of USA and EU subsidies, and a reduction of domestic and international sales. When China stopped its milk purchases, international prices fell and the government bought the surplus to improve nutrition for 300,000 children living in poverty (Government of Colombia 2008).

Colombia has supported agriculture beyond the dairy sector. Before the crisis it had created a project to improve competitiveness and to face increasing trade liberalisation. When the crisis broke out, the Colombian government worked as a channel to support the rural sector. The government pointed out that aid to agriculture in the crisis context, through the Fund for Financing the Agricultural Sector, had provided producers with credit lines for approximately $1.7 million dollars.

In 2009 a special line of credit was created which led to 31,000 credit operations for a total of $207 million dollars. The Rural Capitalisation Incentive (RCI) programme has been used to promote modernisation and provide support to exports (such as improving product traceability). For the RCI, a budget for the year 2009 of $ 64 million dollars was defined and the amount was doubled in 2010 to safeguard farmers from the economic crisis (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Colombia 2010)

During 2008 and 2009, the use of the Andean System of Price Bands applied by Colombia was suspended at different times for cotton, yellow and white corn, and soybeans while severalquotas were also established.

3.4 Treatment of industry

While protection was increased in agriculture, in industry the government effort was aimed at promoting competitiveness. From October to December 2009 tariff exemptions were granted for a list of 1,627 subheadings, mainly referred to raw materials and machinery. The beneficiaries were chemical and pharmaceutical industries and producers of agrochemicals and fertilizers.

4. Conclusions

The measures to face the economic crisis in Peru were mainly fiscal instruments. Peru marched on with its bilateral trade negotiations and did not resort to increased protection except to correct the prior negative (effective) protection on a limited number of products. Peru only applied anti-dumping duties essentially to textile and metal-mechanics products. In contrast Colombia had a dual track approach, protection for agriculture and freer access to imports of raw materials to a number of industrial sectors.

Peru continued its trade negotiations and signed agreements with key trading partners. It also implemented the FTAs with USA, Singapore, Canada and Thailand. As a result the liberalisation of the agricultural sector continued apace, especially due to implementation of the trade agreement with USA which eliminated variable levies. The government has given priority to strengthening the policy of openness rather than the defence of vulnerable sectors. The main measure of export support was the increase in drawback duties.

Trade protection policies undertaken by Colombia were a combination of distinct features for industry and agriculture. For the industrial export sector, a major supplier of industrial goods to its neighbours, the main concern was to offset the appreciation of the Colombian peso, the credit squeeze, and lower demand. Thus, policies were aimed at credit easing through development banks, and lowering taxes in order to reduce costs. To promote competitiveness tariffs were also eliminated on a temporary basis on a large number of inputs and capital goods not produced at home. In the case of final goods, quotas were imposed o protect textiles and footwear from Chinese imports.

In the case of agriculture meanwhile, the trade defence measures have been more protectionist. Direct subsidies were granted to cover interest on loans. In addition, sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions were imposed which were subsequently questioned by the Andean Community. There was a tariff increase and government purchasing of surpluses in the dairy sector. There was a slight increase of quantitative restrictions against imports of sensitive agricultural products (maize, soybeans, cotton) to fend off price volatility .

Colombia and Peru have a shared vision of openness and free trade agreements. However, some differences in specific policies can be pointed out.

- First, Colombia was inclined to protect agriculture through subsidies and credit support. Peru has moved in the opposite direction as part of the implementation agenda of the FTA with the USA – ie. it eliminated variable levies and withdrew product specific protection.
- In the industrial sector, Peru and Colombia have some similar sensitive products, but the Colombia applied greater defence mechanisms and promoted some non-traditional exports (see the table below).

Measure	Peru	Colombia
Exchange rate measure	✔ (drawback)	✔ (TRC)
Foreign Currency Liquidity	✔	✔
Export Credits	✔	✔
Export Subsidies	–	✔
Agriculture Subsidies	–	✔
Support for exchange risk	–	✔
Technical Standards	–	✔
Government purchases	–	✔
Quotas	–	✔
Reduction of tariffs on capital goods and raw materials	–	✔
Increase of Tariff Measures	–	✔
Safeguards	–	✔
Antidumping duties	✔	✔
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures	✔	✔
Export assistance	✔	✔

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6 Crisis-Era Trade Policy Responses in a Dollarized Economy: The Case of Ecuador

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Introduction

The global crisis had particular repercussions in the case of Ecuador given the restraints of its dollarised economy and associated political preferences. In 2000 Ecuador adopted the dollar as its currency in order to anchor its economy and put a stop to the succession of institutional and economic crises that the country had faced in the preceding years. Hence when the global crisis hit, the government had no recourse to monetary policy. Krugman has drawn attention to the Ecuadorian case, noting that, since the country does not have an exchange rate policy (and hence a monetary policy), it was deprived of a variety of policy instruments to face the crisis. With tied hands it resorted to the expedient of restricting imports.[2] During the last quarter of 2008 when the effects of the global crisis hit hard, the government adopted a host of financial and trade measures in order to avoid further hardships. These responded to the political preferences of the time, as articulated by the government of President Rafael Correa.

In this article, I offer a short review of the impact of the global crisis in Ecuador, the measures adopted to face it and, in particular, an analysis of the trade policy measures undertaken in a context of dollarisation. The trade measures were so obstructive that they led to reactions and demands from Ecuador´s closest partners in the Andean Community. The evolution of these trade measures is included in the database of Global Trade Alert with the necessary details to understand the full nature and coverage of these measures.

1 Comments from Pedro da Motta Veiga and Diana Tussie are graciously acknowledged
2 *http://www.globaltradealert.org/news/fixed-rates-and-protectionism-2009-edition-paul-Krugman-blogs-quito-ecuador*

Effects of the world crisis on Ecuador

Ecuador lacks a diversified export base. The external sector suffers from a strong concentration on the inflows provided by crude oil (Table 1) and remittances. Under these structural constraints compounded by the dollarisation straightjacket, Ecuador was very vulnerable to the global crisis, which not only affected external accounts, but also employment in the real sector.

Table 1 Ecuador: Structure of Exports (Petrol and non-petrol) 2003-2010

Period	Exports FOB (millions of US dollars)			Export shares	
	Total a=b+c	Petrol b	Non- petrol c	Petrol	Non-petrol
2004	7,752.89	4,233.99	3,518.90	54.61	45.39
2005	10,100.03	5,869.85	4,230.18	58.12	41.88
2006	12,728.24	7,544.51	5,183.73	59.27	40.73
2007	14,321.32	8,328.57	5,992.75	58.16	41.84
2008	18,510.60	11,672.84	6,837.76	63.06	36.94
2009	13,799.01	6,964.59	6,834.41	50.47	49.53
2010 (Jan-April)	5,607,38	3,160.89	2,446.49	56.37	43.63

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. Monthly Statistical Report No. 1899, May 2010. (Table 3.1.2.)

While the price of oil soared to US$ 100 per barrel during the first semester of 2008 it subsequently collapsed to below US $30 at the beginning of 2009. Oil export earnings suffered a severe drop (Table 1) which jeopardised the balance of trade as well as fiscal revenues. Given the depreciation of regional currencies imports from Ecuador's neighbours slowed down only slightly so the monthly trade balance showed a worrisome trend.

After oil, remittances are the second most significant export earning in Ecuador. These inflows come especially from the United States, Spain, and Italy. The labour conditions of unskilled migrants are known to be very hard. Even though some of them have managed to become employed in formal activities, most of them are in temporary or informal jobs. They also face the tightening of labour markets and migratory laws in host countries. As a consequence remittances decreased as from the second quarter of 2008. This further aggravated the balance of payments problem, as well as the situation of households that are heavily dependent on the receipt of these remittances.

At the same time as the fall in foreign investment and external lending, revenues from tourism shrank. . To complete the external picture, it is necessary to point out that freely available international reserves (those over the amount required to sustain the domestic circulation of dollars) showed a worrying trend, decreasing sharply as from September 2008 up to May 2009.[3] Altogether these factors showed a quick deterioration in the balance of payments. The overall balance of payments situation was the strongest argument justifying the trade restrictions to face the global crisis.

The crisis has had a severe impact on employment. From the second half of 2008 and up to the third quarter 2009, the rate of unemployment increased to 9.1%[4]. Because growth is intimately tied to oil revenues and remittances in 2009 it was a negligible 0.36% (while, in 2008 it had reached 7.24%). The reform agenda which had resorted to pumping up social spending, employment, and public investment to sustain effective demand was thus severely jeopardised in 2009. While the fiscal deficit worsened, cut ties with the IMF and the World Bank ruled out easy access to foreign loans. Although regional financial institutions were able to lend a welcome helping hand, the tight financial situation in turn aggravated the tension with the private banks. This was due to their reluctance to repatriate their holdings, the shrinking of deposits and loans, as well as their discontent over the terms of liquidity management.

Economic measures to face the crisis

The scenario described above illustrates the serious threat facing the continued survival of the dollar as a domestic currency. Certainly, President Rafael Correa is not happy with the inherited policy anchoring the rate of exchange, but his team also fear the institutional destabilisation that may ensue if the country moves out of the dollar, as was exemplified by the duress of the Argentine withdrawal from convertibility in 2001 and is now seen in full steam in the harsh options confronting Greece. The three pronged strategy so far has been:

1. to strengthen the financial system threatened by shrinking deposits;
2. to shore up the external sector, and
3. to provide support for domestic agriculture and industry.

These decisions were taken over time. In November 2008 fiscal measures were undertaken, such as the drawback of custom taxes to exporters and reductions and exonerations on income tax for those sectors most affected by the crisis. In December of the same year a tax law was passed which aimed to increase the overall costs of retaining dollars abroad. It considered reductions on income tax for companies that could re-invest their profits at home. The law also raised the tax on currency outflows (including the payment of imports, remittance of profits to foreign subsidiaries, capital and interest payments over external credits) from 0.5% to 1%. Finally, the law established a monthly tax on private financial entities over funds and investments kept overseas. As part these financial measures the Central Bank issued a decision, establishing an internal liquidity

3 Reserves picked up after May 2009 but did not reach the levels of 2008. Monthly Statistic Report No.1894, December 2009, Central Bank of Ecuador. Available at *http://www.bce.fin.ec/*

4 Evolution of labor markets in Ecuador. Quarterly Summary, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos. Available at *http://www.inec.gov.ec/*

coefficient, which forces private financial entities to hold a share of their funds and investments in the country.

By the end of 2008, a financial security law was passed which created a reserve fund in order to offer liquidity to private financial institutions. This reinstated some of the functions of the Central Bank as a lender of last resort, a function that it had previously given up with the adoption of dollarisation. The recovered role also included the right to enforce regulations to protect deposits in the banking system and limits to banking service charges. Additionally the Central Bank ordered in May 2009 an increase on the interest rates applied to finance the purchase of goods with the intention of reducing the consumption of imports.[5]

The second cluster of measures to face the global crisis was adopted in the realm of trade in order to slow down imports, sustain the trade balance and ultimately stop the drain of reserves. In January 2009, a safeguard was applied on a most favoured nation basis (MFN) introducing quotas and higher tariffs. The safeguard affected 630 tariff lines with the application of ad valorem surcharges, specific duties and quotas for goods deemed to be mainly luxury items that competed with domestic production, such as footwear, ceramics, electric equipment, vehicles, perfumes, and liquors.[6] The safeguard was negotiated in the WTO on an MFN basis. This was a savvy move: being on a most favoured nation basis, the measures did not exclude imports from countries with which Ecuador has long established preferential agreements, a violation that ultimately became highly controversial in the country. It must be pointed out that these countries have traditionally held a surplus in trade in manufactures with Ecuador, so their reaction was far from unpredictable.

The safeguard was justified under the Article XVIII, Section B of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, on restrictive measures that limited the value or volume of imports to face balance of payment problems.[7] This temporary safeguard generated uproar from affected sectors both domestic and abroad. As a result it was softened over time.[8] After negotiations in the Balance of Payment Committee of the WTO, the temporary safeguard was accepted on June 4th 2009, with a commitment to phase out the restrictions so long as the economy showed signs of improvement.

The inclusion of preferential partners in the MFN measure, particularly Peru and Colombia raised a controversy insofar as it nullified their rights under regional agreements. It led to a series of protracted negotiations to re-establish their preferential rights. Ecuador was initially quite averse to maintain access but the gradual recovery of oil prices in the second half of 2009 finally offered some relief to the balance of payment which, in turn, softened attitudes and allowed the government to comply with its regional commitments.

Since all contenders are members of the Andean Community of Nations (ACN), the organisation was called to adjudicate on the dispute regarding the compatibility of the MFN safeguard with regional commitments. The safeguard

5 *http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/ecuador*: The Central Bank increases the interest rate to lower consumption.

6 Resolution 466, Council for Trade and Investment (COMEXI). *http://www.comexi.gov.ec/reso_docs/*

7 GATT, 1947. *http://www.jurisint.org/pub/06/sp/doc/05.html* # 05.018.

8 *http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/ecuador-import-restrictions-630-tariff-lines*.

was authorised by the end of March 2009, insofar as the preferential margin was respected. The Ecuadorian government appealed the resolution while it also announced the possibility of altogether withdrawing from the ACN. The Community ratified its decision, and finally the Ecuadorian authorities caved in. Moreover, the quotas were replaced with tariff surcharges.

Shortly after, in July of the same year, with an eye on the rapid and steep devaluation of the Colombian peso which added pressure to the bilateral balance of trade, an exchange rate safeguard (under the ACN) was adopted vis-à-vis Colombia. The applied tariff on 1,346 products (equivalent to more than one third of Ecuadorian imports from Colombia in 2008) was raised to the MFN level thus again nullifying preferential treatment under the Andean Community.[9] The measure once again led to further disputes with Colombia. The safeguard was subsequently phased out on a periodic basis and following the gradual recovery of the bilateral exchange rate, in such a way that the measure was finally adjusted to respect trade rights and affect a fewer number of items.[10]

Concluding remarks and prospects for the future

Dollarisation has been in place for a decade. The polemic about the convenience of this monetary anchor persists, now been fanned by events in Europe. For many the anchor has meant macroeconomic stability, reduced economic uncertainty, and higher purchasing power, while for others the country has given up its monetary sovereignty and the right to exchange rate management. Moreover the revaluation of the dollar had led to a loss of competitiveness, and imposes high social costs on the majority of the population. The global crisis showed the costs of this straightjacket: the Ecuadorian government could not apply exchange and monetary measures and it only had recourse to fiscal measures (increasing taxes to currency outflows in order to reduce imports) and trade measures (safeguards), in order to discourage imports and to face the balance of payment disequilibria.

The bulk of the policy package relied on trade measures. These were posited as transitory and short term, with the aim of sticking to the use of US dollar while at the same time intervening in such a way as to favour local production and consumption to the extent possible. In effect, government policy has given priority to the domestic market and has backpedalled on new North- South Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Such backpedalling has been opposed by exporters and has created serious rifts inside the Andean Community with the two staunch supporters of FTAs, Colombia and Peru.

The implementation of safeguards affected the relationship with the country´s principal trade partners, most notably with Colombia and Peru, the two biggest markets in the Andean Community of Nations. Both gave ominous warning signals of the dire consequences of hurting their traditionally positive

9 Resolution # 494 , Council for Trade and Investment (COMEXI), 06th July 2009, at *http://www.comexi.gov.ec/reso-docs/*

10 *http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/ecuador-safeguard-applied-colombian-products*

trade balances with Ecuador. This situation generated tensions with Ecuador threatening to drop out from the Community following in Venezuela´s footsteps.

Discontent with the measures of Ecuador revealed the policy divergences in the Andean sub-region and the increased polarisation between two groups of countries: on one side Colombia and Peru[11] supporters of an open policy framework, and on the other Bolivia and Ecuador inclined to stronger regulation. Bolivia, for example, gave a strong blessing to the safeguards adopted by Ecuador.[12] To counter the growing discord in the Andean Community and build new trade alliances Ecuador has been very active in the WTO. The long-standing banana dispute was a learning experience that has been put to use; since then the country has a high powered cadre of public officials that have been trained in the ins and outs of WTO law and negotiations. Beyond the move described above, of going to the WTO to obtain a waiver for a safeguard that was going to mostly reduce trade flows with its neighbours, Ecuador has also been very active in the General Council in relation to the discussions on the effects of the crisis on trade flows[13]. In the financial services committee the country has tabled a proposal together with Argentina, South Africa, and India in order to analyse the impact of the financial rescue packages on trade in financial services.

Thanks partly to the expedience of the twin safeguards, but most importantly to the recovery of oil prices which by the end of 2009 reached US$70.45 per barrel, the trade deficit was successfully kept under control[14]. Consequently the balance of payments improvement generated some breathing space and international liquidity was also improved. However, the structure of trade remains untouched, closely tied to the prospects of a limited number of export items. Such concentration, hand-in-hand with dollarisation, reduces the room for an export driven policy response to external crises. President Correa and his team believe in regenerating the domestic market propping up demand and supply, so the possibility of protectionist responses to external shocks in today´s Ecuador remains. Correa was re-elected in 2009 and was inaugurated for a new presidential period of four years on an electoral platform that pledges to sustain inward oriented growth. The open question in such circumstances is whether the Ecuadorian economy will be able to face any future external shock while at the same time retain the US dollar as its national currency.

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11 See essay on Peru and Colombia in this Report.

12 “Bolivia supports Ecuador on safeguards”, 31 July, 2009, *www.americaeconomia.com*. In addition Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Cuba have made strides to establish a regional payments system known as SUCRE in 2010.

13 General Council, WT/GC/W/617, 14 December 2009.

14 For the period January – March 2009 the trade deficit was US$ 759,54 billion, while for the period January – November 2009, the trade deficit was halved US$ 347,94 billion. Monthly Statistical Report # 1894. *op.cit.* Figure 3.2.2. Trade Balance.

7 Brazilian Trade Policy: New Motivations and Trends

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1. Introduction

Until the beginning of 2010 Brazilian trade policy concentrated on the mitigation of the negative effects of the crisis on exports. The main initiatives sought to increase the supply and reduce costs of financing for exports. Yet from mid 2010 the focus has shifted to supporting competitiveness to offset the appreciation of the currency. The effect of the national currency appreciation on the trade flows has rekindled the debate about the relations between trade and exchange rate policies. This shift is reflected in the competitiveness package announced on 5 May 2010. However, two months passed between the announcement and their effective implementation. The process of trade policy formulation has revealed the existence of different views within the government and some tensions as well. These differences manifested themselves in turf wars, as were clearly on show in regards to the initiatives to reduce the tax burdens on exports.

This article presents Brazil's main trade policy measures in the post-crisis (from the last quarter of 2008 to July 2010) and analyses the trends and moves of trade policy during this period. The next sections make extensive use of measures reported in the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database.

2. Post-crisis trade policy

The authorities' first task was to tackle the main transmission mechanisms of the crisis on trade: the increase in costs, the contraction of trade finance, and the intensification of the competition in third markets.

2.1 Export support measures

The measures were largely aimed at improving access to credit, increasing the span of official financing programmes (in terms of numbers of benefited companies and sectors), and significantly propping up credit lines. The main measures in this area were the following:

- Extension of the Exports Financing Programme (PROEX) to exporting companies with a gross turnover of up to R$ 600m (CAMEX[1] Resolution, nº 10, de 17 February 2009);
- Increase of the maximum annual expenses with equalisation of interest rates in export credit, from US$ 10m to US$20m for intercompany operations. The limits on spending in these operations are set for the Bank of Brazil by the Committee of Financing and Guarantees.
- Implementation of PROEX lines for small and medium companies, incorporating pre-shipment and allowing the linking of these to PROEX financing. Since then PROEX had only been acting in the post-shipment modality (CAMEX Resolution nº 45, 2009)[2]
- Creation of more favourable conditions for the financing of exports of capital goods by the National Economic and Social Development Bank (known as BNDES for its acronym in Portuguese), a measure announced on 9 July 2009. Costs of pre-shipment lines were reduced from 12.05% per year, on average, to 4.5%. Post-shipment lines were equated to the LIBOR "or another remuneration due to the law". This programme, initially intended to remain in effect until 31 December 2009, was extended until the end of 2010. For the pre-shipment financing hired from 1 July 2010, the interest rates will go from 4.5% to 5.5% per year (Central Bank of Brazil Resolutions no 3759, 9 July 2009, and no 3851, 29 April 2010).[3]

Figure 1. BNDES support for exports - monthly cost (in thousands US dollars)



Source: BNDES

1 CAMEX is the agency which links all the agencies with responsibilities over foreign trade
2 *http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/brazil-public-financing-production-goods-exports-small-and-medium-companies-pre-shipment-pha*
3 *http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/brazil-new-credit-line-exports-consumer-goods*

As shown in the above chart, the expenditures of the BNDES for financing exports released in the last quarter of 2008 were substantially higher than those registered for the same period in the previous year. Yet in the beginning of 2009 there was a significant reduction in these disbursements. With the aim of stimulating regional trade (the main destination of manufactures), the government has made available trade financing in local currency. The implementation of the payments system in local currency between Brazil and Argentina, in October 2008, and the supply of credit lines to neighbours in the form of swaps – in the same pattern as those offered by the US to Brazil during the height of the crisis – are along this line. The first initiative is in operation but the second has not yet been implemented.

There were also measures aimed at removing the tax burdens from exports operations (enlargement of the drawback system and other specific measures) and for the facilitation of trade.

- Exemption of income tax on resources sent abroad for the payment of expenditures referring to adaptation of products to technical and sanitary norms of importing countries (fundamentally pre-requisites of the European Reach system for products in the chemical value chain);
- Regulation of the integrated drawback regime[4] unifying the existing rules on imports and drawback;
- Reduction of the social contribution for the exports of information technology services[5].

Yet despite the accumulation of credits by companies referring to the payment of indirect state or federal taxes, the main tax problem faced by exporters remains unresolved.

2.2. Trade facilitation

Since 2008 Camex has promoted a programme to facilitate trade (Resolution nº16, 20 March 2008). The programme includes measures to reduce duplication of procedures; to extend the use of electronic documents; to harmonise the measures carried out by different government agencies in ports and borders, among others. The experience shows that such endeavours tend to be slow due to the political turf wars and opposing views on the costs and benefits.

2.3. Investment measures

In October 2009 Brazil imposed a 2% tax on financial inflows entering the country for investments in stocks and fixed income. The measure does not affect direct investment in Brazil and aims to restrain speculative flow of incoming capital, identified as one of the responsible factors for the appreciation of the Real (Decree n° 6.983, 20 October 2009).[6]

4 *http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/extension-brazilian-drawback-system*
5 *http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/brazil-reduction-payroll-taxes-exporters-it-services*
6 *http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/brazil-2-tax-foreign-capital-inflows-investment-equities-and-fixed-income-instruments*

Figure 2. AD Initiated Investigations



Source: Decom/Secex and WTO.

2.4. Import protection measures

Immediately after the onset of the international crisis, the authorities made an unsuccessful attempt to introduce automatic import licensing for a wide range of products. The government announced the decision in January 2009, when it became evident that the country would face its first monthly deficit in the balance of trade in years. According to official sources the objective of these measures was not an across the board restriction of imports, but precise information on flows. The government was committed to comply with the WTO norms, which determined that automatic licenses must be released in up to ten days. But due to several criticisms from entrepreneurs and public opinion, the measure was revoked just three days after coming into effect.

There was also an increase in the import tariffs for iron products, which had zero percent tax in the list of exemptions to the Common External Tariff (CET) in Mercosur and were raised to the CET original levels – between 12 and 14%. Other measures and specific tariff alterations have been frequent, but in many cases they lower protection, especially in capital goods in order to stimulate investments.

There was also a hike in trade defence measures. The statistics show that the majority of cases took place in 2008, before the start of the crisis and were strongly related to the pressures arising from currency appreciation. Moreover, the substantive devaluation of the Real by the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 seemed to have slowed down the demand for antidumping. Yet things took a turn in the second quarter of 2009. While in the first semester of 2009 only 3 antidumping investigations were initiated (of a total of 9 throughout the year), in the same semester in 2010 the number jumped to 10. The number of positive findings also increased. In 2009 there were positive findings in 16 cases as opposed to 11 in 2008. While positive findings declined in the period between

January and July 2010 this was because of the fewer investigations initiated the year before.[7]

From the 121 investigations initiated between 2000 and July 2010, 62 were initiated during 2004 and 2008, and 23 of these in 2008 only. In total, 35.07% of the petitions targeted China. Until 2008 Brazil had the tenth most antidumping measures considering petitions since 1995, dating back to the creation of the WTO. Between 2008 and 2009 during the height of the financial crisis, Brazil was the sixth country in terms of initiating new investigations.

Actually, if we take into consideration that investigations end on average one year after initiation, the ratio of application of measures seems to be reaching fairly high levels since 2007, surpassing the global average according to data provided to the WTO by member states. More recently, the ratio of positive findings reached 84%, as opposed to 58% between 2000 and 2007, while the same index registered a small reduction in the case of WTO members (except for Brazil) going from 70% between 2000 and 2007 to 65% in 2008/9 (Table 2).

In 2010, the actions initiated by Brazil continue to affect a wide range of origins; only one in ten investigations initiated has targeted China. Referring to product coverage, among the ten investigations initiated from January to July 2010 there is a concentration on the chemical and paper industries, followed by glass and food industries. These sectors coincide with those observed in investigations begun by other WTO member states, as is shown below.

Table 1 Application of antidumping measures

	Initiation of Investigations	Applications
2007	13	9
2008	23	11
2009	9	16
Jan-July 2008	9	5
Jan-July 2009	3	8
Jan-July 2010	10	3

Source: *www.desenvolvimento.gov.br*, accessed August 10, 2010

Table 2 Index – Application of measures

	2000-2007	2008-2009
WTO Members		
Brazil	58%	84%
All members	69%	67%
All except Brazil	70%	65%

Source: WTO, *www.wto.org*, accessed August 10, 2010

7 Investigations take one year to be concluded. Application refers to the period after the initiation.

Table 3 Antidumping measures affected sectors, January – July 2010

Sector	Brazil*
Chemical Products	40%
Glass	20%
Paper	30%
Food	10%
Total	*100%*

Source: www.desenvolvimento.gov.br, accessed August 10, 2010

3. A competitiveness package: May 2010

On 5 May 2010 the government announced a package of measures in the foreign trade area. These measures mainly reflect the concerns of the authorities in relation to the deterioration of trade balance. Initiatives in the exports, imports, and government procurement areas were made public.

Three tax measures applicable to exports were announced:

i. the reimbursement of 50% of the credits of indirect federal taxes accumulated by companies in their exports (which were not compensated in other operations) up to 30 days after their request;
ii. the implementation of the drawback exemption for the domestic market; and
iii. the exclusion of the exports revenue for the framing of companies in the SIMPLES regime (tax regime applicable to micro and small businesses).

Among the three measures, only the first shows some potential to have significant impact on the profitability of companies. The exemption is the least used among the drawback modalities and framing in the SIMPLES have limited reach. However, in the first instance, the conditions that companies must fulfil cumulatively in order to have access to the benefit significantly restrict the reach of the measure.

The area of financing and export guarantees was also contemplated in the package but it is still difficult to evaluate the impact given the gaps in the published information. Also announced were the creation of a bank exclusively dedicated to the financing of foreign trade, as a BNDES wholly-owned subsidiary, and the creation of a Foreign Trade Guarantee Fund, to cover risks not covered by the market. The Fund's risk management will be carried out by the BNDES and can be transferred to the soon to be created Brazilian Insurance Company. The government also announced the extension of the interest rates equalisation mechanisms (until then restricted to capital goods) to consumer goods in the financing of production for exporting.

As for imports, the package stipulates the elimination of the 40% reduction applicable to the tariff on auto parts, applied to imports by the assembly line factories installed in the country.

Regarding procurement policies, the authorities also granted a preference margin of up to 25% to domestic bidders. The products and services should have a minimum national content to qualify for this benefit, whose margins will be fixed by products or activities according to criteria related to the impact of government procurement on employment, revenue, tax collection, and technological development.

Most of the measures announced in early May came into action from the second half of July onwards. The lengthy elaboration over the package and the difficulties in implementation have shun a spotlight on the lack of consensus in the government in relation to initiatives that can generate positive and non-marginal impact on export costs without "ruining" fiscal accounts. This seems to be particularly true in the case of measures announced in the area of export tax reductions which, although limited, still find much resistance among government agencies, especially the department responsible for tax administration. It is worth noting that the majority of exporters consider the reduction in the tax burden on exports as the main priority in the trade agenda.

Some of the aspects of the package deserve to be highlighted because they show trends that seem to be gaining momentum in the post-crisis trade policy environment:

- **The extension of subsidies to consumer goods for the financing of exports through BNDES.** There is an enlargement of the sectoral reach of the explicit subsidy component in the public financing of exports, until now restricted to capital goods.
- **The concern with the deficit in auto parts appears to be driving the decision to raise tariffs in this sector.** The tariff increase comes over and above the increase in the use of the antidumping, signalling a new protectionist trend fed by the currency appreciation.
- **The use of the instrument of government procurement to favour domestic producers.** In the recently adopted package, the preference given to domestic production is added to the requirement of a national content and "positive externalities", generating a double discrimination between domestic and foreign producers, even though it does not contravene commitments to the WTO.

4. Conclusions

The May 2010 package signals a more protectionist trade policy for Brazil and one that uses a wider variety of instruments, as opposed to the immediate post-crisis policy, centred on financing exports (Table 4). But beyond these features the package expresses the concerns with the impact of the currency appreciation on export performance and more generally, with the deterioration of external accounts.

Table 4 Trade policy since the crisis: main instruments

Policy instruments	2008 / 2009	2010
Export finance	Extension of the Export Financing Programme (PROEX). More favourable (subsidised) conditions for the financing of exports of capital goods by (BNDES)	Extension to consumer goods of subsidised financing on conditions afforded to capital goods (BNDES).
Tax exemptions on exports		Partial reimbursement of the credits of indirect federal taxes accumulated by companies in their exports. Implementation of the drawback regime - exemption modality in the domestic market
Protection policies	Specific tariff changes, in many cases reducing protection, especially in the sector of capital goods to stimulate investments. No increase in ADD	Specific tariff changes, in some cases related to risks of product shortage. Increasing use of AD: ratio between the application of measures and the opening of investigations has grown. Concern with the deficit in auto parts leads to tariff increase.
Public procurement		Changes in the rules of government procurement: increased preferences to domestic suppliers (minimum content required) of goods and services.

Source: GTA database

The concerns with this process of deterioration tend to dominate the scenario in which the trade policy is formulated from now on. These concerns supporting exports and the administration of protection policies will heavily influence the government agenda in the near future.

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SECTION 3

Country-by-Country Reports

Argentina

Table 8.1. Foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	179	169
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Argentina's commercial interests [1]	40	37
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Argentina's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Argentina's interests [2]	50	46
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Argentina's interests [3]	89	86
Total number of implemented measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	156	147
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Argentina's commercial interests	23	22
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Argentina's foreign commercial interests	22	21
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Argentina's commercial interests	56	55

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Argentina" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.2. Argentina's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Argentina's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	87	34
Total number of Argentina's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	7	6
Total number of Argentina's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	31	6
Total number of Argentina's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	49	22
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests	393	383
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests.	26	26
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests	174	174

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Argentina" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.3. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	18
France	8
India	7
Indonesia	7
Spain	6
Brazil	5
Netherlands	5
Belgium	4
Finland	4
Germany	4
Italy	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
Ukraine	3
Belarus	2
Bolivia	2
China	2
Kazakhstan	2
Morocco	2
Nigeria	2
Pakistan	2
Paraguay	2
South Africa	2
Switzerland	2
United States of America	2
Venezuela	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Viet Nam	2
Algeria	1
Australia	1
Chile	1
Ecuador	1
Ghana	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Republic of Korea	1
Thailand	1

Table 8.4. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Argentina's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	39
Brazil	21
Germany	18
India	18
France	17
Italy	17
Japan	17
Spain	17
United States of America	17
Belgium	15
Chile	15
Indonesia	15
Thailand	15
Netherlands	14
Singapore	14
Sweden	14
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	14
Uruguay	14
Canada	13
Israel	13
Malaysia	13
Republic of Korea	13
South Africa	13
Paraguay	12
Viet Nam	12
Colombia	11
Czech Republic	11
Mexico	11
Peru	11
Russian Federation	11

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Turkey	11
Ecuador	10
Finland	10
Hong Kong	10
Poland	10
Portugal	10
Switzerland	10
Austria	9
Egypt	9
Norway	9
Philippines	9
Romania	9
Venezuela	9
Australia	8
Bolivia	8
Dominican Republic	8
Greece	8
Saudi Arabia	8
Trinidad and Tobago	8
Ukraine	8
United Arab Emirates	8
Algeria	7
Bangladesh	7
Croatia	7
Cuba	7
Denmark	7
Ireland	7
Pakistan	7
Bulgaria	6
Ghana	6
Hungary	6
Jordan	6
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	6
Nigeria	6
Sri Lanka	6
Tunisia	6
Angola	5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5
Cameroon	5
Chinese Taipei	5
Congo	5
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	5
Jamaica	5
Lebanon	5
Lithuania	5
Luxembourg	5
Morocco	5

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
New Zealand	5
Panama	5
Serbia	5
Slovenia	5
Sudan	5
Albania	4
Costa Rica	4
El Salvador	4
Honduras	4
Iran	4
Kazakhstan	4
Kuwait	4
Macedonia	4
Mali	4
Malta	4
Netherlands Antilles	4
Niger	4
Senegal	4
Slovakia	4
Afghanistan	3
Aruba	3
Burkina Faso	3
Cape Verde	3
Cyprus	3
Côte d'Ivoire	3
Equatorial Guinea	3
Estonia	3
Gambia	3
Guatemala	3
Haiti	3
Iceland	3
Mauritania	3
Mauritius	3
Montenegro	3
Nicaragua	3
Palestinian	3
Yemen	3
Azerbaijan	2
Barbados	2
Benin	2
Cambodia	2
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2
Ethiopia	2
Guyana	2
Kenya	2
Liberia	2
Mozambique	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Myanmar	2
Qatar	2
Saint Lucia	2
Syrian Arab Republic	2
Uganda	2
United Republic of Tanzania	2
Zimbabwe	2
Andorra	1
Armenia	1
Bahamas	1
Bahrain	1
Belarus	1
Belize	1
Botswana	1
Brunei Darussalam	1
Burundi	1
Central African Republic	1
Chad	1
Comoros	1
Djibouti	1
Dominica	1
Eritrea	1
Gabon	1
Georgia	1
Grenada	1
Guinea	1
Guinea-Bissau	1
Iraq	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Latvia	1
Lesotho	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Namibia	1
Oman	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Rwanda	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Sao Tome and Principe	1
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Somalia	1
Suriname	1
Swaziland	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
Zambia	1

Table 8.5 Implemented measures that harm Argentina's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	30	20.7%
Bail out / state aid measure	29	20.0%
Export subsidy	15	10.3%
Export taxes or restriction	9	6.2%
Public procurement	9	6.2%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	8	5.5%
Local content requirement	6	4.1%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	4.1%
Trade finance	6	4.1%
Competitive devaluation	4	2.8%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	4	2.8%
Import ban	3	2.1%
Consumption subsidy	2	1.4%
Investment measure	2	1.4%
Migration measure	2	1.4%
Other service sector measure	2	1.4%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	2	1.4%
State-controlled company	2	1.4%
Technical Barrier to Trade	2	1.4%
Import subsidy	1	0.7%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.7%
State trading enterprise	0	0.0%
Sub-national government measure	0	0.0%
Total	145	100.0%

Table 8.6 Argentina's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	33	55.9%
Bail out / state aid measure	9	15.3%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	6	10.2%
Export taxes or restriction	5	8.5%
Tariff measure	2	3.4%
Export subsidy	1	1.7%
Import ban	1	1.7%
Local content requirement	1	1.7%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.7%
Total	59	100.0%

Belize

Table 8.7. Foreign state measures affecting Belize's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Belize's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Belize's commercial interests	22	21
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Belize's commercial interests [1]	4	3
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Belize's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Belize's interests [2]	7	7
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Belize's interests [3]	11	11
Total number of implemented measures affecting Belize's commercial interests	18	17
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Belize's commercial interests	4	4
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Belize's foreign commercial interests	3	3
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Belize's commercial interests	35	35

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Belize" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.8. Belize's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Belize's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Belize's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	0	0
Total number of Belize's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of Belize's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Belize's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Belize that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Belize that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Belize that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Belize" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.9. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Belize's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Nigeria	3
Belgium	2
Argentina	1
Austria	1
Bulgaria	1
China	1
Costa Rica	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Ethiopia	1
European Communities	1
Finland	1
France	1
Germany	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Japan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Netherlands	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Spain	1
Sweden	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.10. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Belize's state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.11 Implemented measures that harm Belize's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Competitive devaluation	3	16.7%
Tariff measure	3	16.7%
Export subsidy	2	11.1%
Export taxes or restriction	2	11.1%
Migration measure	2	11.1%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	11.1%
Bail out / state aid measure	1	5.6%
Import subsidy	1	5.6%
Local content requirement	1	5.6%
Trade finance	1	5.6%
Total	18	100.0%

Table 8.12 Belize's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Bolivia

Table 8.13. Foreign state measures affecting Bolivia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Bolivia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Bolivia's commercial interests	48	47
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Bolivia's commercial interests [1]	7	6
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Bolivia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Bolivia's interests [2]	15	15
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Bolivia's interests [3]	26	26
Total number of implemented measures affecting Bolivia's commercial interests	41	40
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Bolivia's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Bolivia's foreign commercial interests	7	7
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Bolivia's commercial interests	37	37

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Bolivia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.14. Bolivia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Bolivia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Bolivia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	3	3
Total number of Bolivia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of Bolivia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Bolivia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	3	3
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Bolivia that harm foreign commercial interests	21	21
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Bolivia that harm foreign commercial interests	5	5
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Bolivia that harm foreign commercial interests	16	16

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Bolivia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.15. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Bolivia's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	8
Belgium	4
Germany	4
Netherlands	4
Spain	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Finland	3
France	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Italy	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
Brazil	2
Paraguay	2
China	1
Indonesia	1
Japan	1
Russian Federation	1
United States of America	1
Venezuela	1

Table 8.16. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Bolivia's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Argentina	2
Brazil	2
China	2
Germany	2
Mexico	2
United States of America	2
Canada	1
France	1
Italy	1
Japan	1
Peru	1
Spain	1
Sweden	1
Thailand	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Venezuela	1

Table 8.17 Implemented measures that harm Bolivia's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	10	24.4%
Export taxes or restriction	7	17.1%
Export subsidy	6	14.6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified	5	12.2%
Trade finance	4	9.8%
Local content requirement	2	4.9%
Public procurement	2	4.9%
Competitive devaluation	1	2.4%
Import ban	1	2.4%
Investment measure	1	2.4%
Tariff measure	1	2.4%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	2.4%
Total	41	100.0%

Table 8.18 Bolivia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Import ban	1	33.3%
Investment measure	1	33.3%
Tariff measure	1	33.3%
Total	3	100.0%

Brazil

Table 8.19. Foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	267	239
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Brazil's commercial interests [1]	50	45
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Brazil's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Brazil's interests [2]	73	59
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Brazil's interests [3]	144	135
Total number of implemented measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	222	204
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Brazil's commercial interests	45	35
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Brazil's foreign commercial interests	42	32
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Brazil's commercial interests	60	60

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Brazil" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.20. Brazil's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Brazil's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	79	57
Total number of Brazil's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	33	32
Total number of Brazil's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	17	4
Total number of Brazil's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	29	21
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests	239	232
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests	27	26
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests	130	130

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Brazil" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.21. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	24
Argentina	21
Indonesia	11
India	10
France	7
Germany	6
Portugal	6
Spain	6
Italy	5
Kazakhstan	5
Netherlands	5
Nigeria	5
Poland	5
Ukraine	5
Belarus	4
Belgium	4
Finland	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
China	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Japan	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Paraguay	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
United States of America	3
Australia	2
Bolivia	2
Canada	2
Morocco	2
Republic of Korea	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
South Africa	2
Switzerland	2
Venezuela	2
Armenia	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Iran	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Pakistan	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Thailand	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.22. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Brazil's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	20
Germany	13
United States of America	12
France	10
Japan	8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	8
Belgium	7
Canada	7
Hong Kong	7
India	7
Italy	7
Netherlands	7
Spain	7
Indonesia	6
Malaysia	6
Mexico	6
Sweden	6
Turkey	6
Argentina	5
Austria	5
Chile	5
Finland	5
Republic of Korea	5
South Africa	5
Viet Nam	5
Bangladesh	4

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Denmark	4
Paraguay	4
Russian Federation	4
Singapore	4
Switzerland	4
Australia	3
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	3
Egypt	3
Israel	3
Pakistan	3
Peru	3
Philippines	3
Portugal	3
Thailand	3
Ukraine	3
Bolivia	2
Côte d'Ivoire	2
Ireland	2
Luxembourg	2
New Zealand	2
Norway	2
Poland	2
Romania	2
Slovenia	2
Sri Lanka	2
Uruguay	2
Algeria	1
Angola	1
Antigua and Barbuda	1
Armenia	1
Aruba	1
Bahamas	1
Bahrain	1
Barbados	1
Belarus	1
Benin	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
Cambodia	1
Cameroon	1
Cape Verde	1
Cayman Islands	1
Chad	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Colombia	1
Costa Rica	1
Croatia	1
Cuba	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Djibouti	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
El Salvador	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Estonia	1
Gabon	1
Gambia	1
Georgia	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Guatemala	1
Guinea	1
Guyana	1
Haiti	1
Honduras	1
Hungary	1
Iceland	1
Iran	1
Iraq	1
Jamaica	1
Jordan	1
Kenya	1
Kuwait	1
Latvia	1
Lebanon	1
Liberia	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Madagascar	1
Malta	1
Mauritania	1
Mauritius	1
Morocco	1
Mozambique	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Nicaragua	1
Nigeria	1
Oman	1
Panama	1
Qatar	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Senegal	1
Slovakia	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Sudan	1
Suriname	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
Tunisia	1
Turks and Caicos Islands	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Venezuela	1

Table 8.23. Implemented measures that harm Brazil's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	44	21.0%
Tariff measure	36	17.1%
Export subsidy	17	8.1%
Export taxes or restriction	16	7.6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	16	7.6%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	13	6.2%
Local content requirement	10	4.8%
Public procurement	10	4.8%
Import ban	6	2.9%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	6	2.9%
Competitive devaluation	5	2.4%
Consumption subsidy	5	2.4%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	2.4%
Trade finance	5	2.4%
Migration measure	4	1.9%
Investment measure	3	1.4%
Import subsidy	2	1.0%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	2	1.0%
State-controlled company	2	1.0%
Intellectual property protection	1	0.5%
Other service sector measure	1	0.5%
Sub-national government measure	1	0.5%
Total	210	100.0%

Table 8.24. Brazil's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	18	40.9%
Tariff measure	15	34.1%
Export subsidy	3	6.8%
Trade finance	3	6.8%
Public procurement	2	4.5%
Export taxes or restriction	1	2.3%
Investment measure	1	2.3%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	2.3%
Total	44	100.0%

Chile

Table 8.25. Foreign state measures affecting Chile's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Chile's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Chile's commercial interests	134	130
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Chile's commercial interests [1]	24	23
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Chile's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Chile's interests [2]	41	40
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Chile's interests [3]	69	67
Total number of implemented measures affecting Chile's commercial interests	111	108
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Chile's commercial interests	23	22
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Chile's foreign commercial interests	22	21
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Chile's commercial interests	50	50

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Chile" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.26. Chile's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Chile's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Chile's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	3	0
Total number of Chile's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	1	0
Total number of Chile's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	1	0
Total number of Chile's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	1	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Chile that harm foreign commercial interests	1	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Chile that harm foreign commercial interests	1	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Chile that harm foreign commercial interests	1	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Chile" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.27. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Chile's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	15
India	6
Indonesia	6
Russian Federation	6
Brazil	5
France	4
Netherlands	4
Spain	4
Belgium	3
Finland	3
Germany	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Austria	2
Belarus	2
Bulgaria	2
China	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
European Communities	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Italy	2
Japan	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Poland	2
Portugal	2
Republic of Korea	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
South Africa	2
Sweden	2
Ukraine	2
United States of America	2
Venezuela	2
Australia	1
Ecuador	1
Kazakhstan	1
Malaysia	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Nigeria	1
Paraguay	1
Sri Lanka	1
Thailand	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.28. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Chile's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Argentina	1

Table 8.29. Implemented measures that harm Chile's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	23	22.5%
Tariff measure	16	15.7%
Export subsidy	12	11.8%
Export taxes or restriction	9	8.8%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	8	7.8%
Trade finance	6	5.9%
Public procurement	5	4.9%
Competitive devaluation	3	2.9%
Investment measure	3	2.9%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	3	2.9%
Import ban	2	2.0%
Import subsidy	2	2.0%
Local content requirement	2	2.0%
State-controlled company	2	2.0%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	2	2.0%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.0%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.0%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	1	1.0%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.0%
Total	102	100.0%

Table 8.30. Chile's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	2	100.0%
Total	2	100.0%

Colombia

Table 8.31. Foreign state measures affecting Colombia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Colombia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Colombia's commercial interests	125	122
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Colombia's commercial interests [1]	27	25
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Colombia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Colombia's interests [2]	37	36
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Colombia's interests [3]	61	61
Total number of implemented measures affecting Colombia's commercial interests	107	104
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Colombia's commercial interests	18	18
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Colombia's foreign commercial interests	17	17
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Colombia's commercial interests	51	51

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Colombia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.32. Colombia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Colombia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Colombia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	7	2
Total number of Colombia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	2	1
Total number of Colombia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	4	1
Total number of Colombia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	1	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Colombia that harm foreign commercial interests	1	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Colombia that harm foreign commercial interests	1	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Colombia that harm foreign commercial interests	1	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Colombia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.33. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Colombia's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	11
France	7
Russian Federation	6
India	5
Belgium	4
Finland	4
Germany	4
Italy	4
Netherlands	4
Spain	4
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Indonesia	3
Ireland	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	3
Venezuela	3
Canada	2
Kazakhstan	2
Switzerland	2
Ukraine	2
Belarus	1
Brazil	1
China	1
Ecuador	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Nigeria	1
Pakistan	1
Paraguay	1
South Africa	1
Thailand	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.34. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Colombia's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	1

Table 8.35. Implemented measures that harm Colombia's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	19	19.6%
Export subsidy	15	15.5%
Export taxes or restriction	11	11.3%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	8	8.2%
Tariff measure	6	6.2%
Trade finance	6	6.2%
Public procurement	5	5.2%
Competitive devaluation	4	4.1%
Migration measure	4	4.1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	4	4.1%
Investment measure	3	3.1%
Consumption subsidy	2	2.1%
Import ban	2	2.1%
Local content requirement	2	2.1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	2	2.1%
Import subsidy	1	1.0%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.0%
State-controlled company	1	1.0%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	1.0%
Total	97	100.0%

Table 8.36. Colombia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	3	100.0%
Total	3	100.0%

Costa Rica

Table 8.37. Foreign state measures affecting Costa Rica's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Costa Rica's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Costa Rica's commercial interests	77	72
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Costa Rica's commercial interests [1]	18	15
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Costa Rica's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Costa Rica's interests [2]	24	23
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Costa Rica's interests [3]	35	34
Total number of implemented measures affecting Costa Rica's commercial interests	64	59
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Costa Rica's commercial interests	13	13
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Costa Rica's foreign commercial interests	12	12
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Costa Rica's commercial interests	45	44

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Costa Rica" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.38. Costa Rica's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Costa Rica's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Costa Rica's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	3	2
Total number of Costa Rica's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	1	1
Total number of Costa Rica's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	1	0
Total number of Costa Rica's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	1	1
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Costa Rica that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Costa Rica that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Costa Rica that harm foreign commercial interests	6	6

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Costa Rica" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.39. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Costa Rica's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
France	5
Argentina	4
Belgium	4
China	4
Finland	4
Netherlands	4
Spain	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Germany	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Indonesia	3
Ireland	3
Italy	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
Russian Federation	2
United States of America	2
Brazil	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
India	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Republic of Korea	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1
Venezuela	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.40. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Costa Rica's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Belize	1
El Salvador	1
Guatemala	1
Honduras	1
Nicaragua	1
Panama	1

Table 8.41 Implemented measures that harm Costa Rica's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	13	24.5%
Export subsidy	8	15.1%
Export taxes or restriction	6	11.3%
Tariff measure	5	9.4%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	4	7.5%
Local content requirement	3	5.7%
Trade finance	3	5.7%
Competitive devaluation	2	3.8%
Consumption subsidy	2	3.8%
Intellectual property protection	2	3.8%
Public procurement	2	3.8%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	2	3.8%
Import ban	1	1.9%
Total	53	100.0%

Table 8.42 Costa Rica's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Migration measure	1	100.0%
Total	1	100.0%

Ecuador

Table 8.43. Foreign state measures affecting Ecuador's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Ecuador's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Ecuador's commercial interests	64	63
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Ecuador's commercial interests [1]	9	8
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Ecuador's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Ecuador's interests [2]	20	20
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Ecuador's interests [3]	35	35
Total number of implemented measures affecting Ecuador's commercial interests	56	55
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Ecuador's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Ecuador's foreign commercial interests	8	8
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Ecuador's commercial interests	43	43

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Ecuador" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.44. Ecuador's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Ecuador's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Ecuador's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	12	12
Total number of Ecuador's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	8	8
Total number of Ecuador's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	3	3
Total number of Ecuador's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	1	1
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Ecuador that harm foreign commercial interests	4	4
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Ecuador that harm foreign commercial interests	1	1
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Ecuador that harm foreign commercial interests	33	33

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Ecuador" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.45. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Ecuador's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	10
India	4
Indonesia	3
Belgium	2
Finland	2
France	2
Germany	2
Netherlands	2
Russian Federation	2
Venezuela	2
Austria	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	1
China	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
Ethiopia	1
European Communities	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Japan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malaysia	1
Malta	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Spain	1
Sweden	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United States of America	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.46. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Ecuador's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Argentina	1
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Brazil	1
Canada	1
Chile	1
Colombia	1
Costa Rica	1
Denmark	1
Dominican Republic	1
France	1
Germany	1
India	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Japan	1
Mexico	1
Netherlands	1
Panama	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Portugal	1
Republic of Korea	1
Singapore	1
Spain	1
Sweden	1
Switzerland	1
Turkey	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United States of America	1
Uruguay	1
Venezuela	1

Table 8.47. Implemented measures that harm Ecuador's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	11	19.6%
Export subsidy	9	16.1%
Export taxes or restriction	7	12.5%
Trade finance	6	10.7%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	5	8.9%
Competitive devaluation	4	7.1%
Tariff measure	4	7.1%
Import ban	2	3.6%
Public procurement	2	3.6%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	3.6%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.8%
Import subsidy	1	1.8%
Investment measure	1	1.8%
Local content requirement	1	1.8%
Total	56	100.0%

Table 8.48. Ecuador's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Intellectual property protection	1	50.0%
Tariff measure	1	50.0%
Total	2	100.0%

El Salvador

Table 8.49. Foreign state measures affecting El Salvador commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting El Salvador's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting El Salvador's commercial interests	51	47
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of El Salvador's commercial interests [1]	9	7
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm El Salvador's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against El Salvador's interests [2]	16	14
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against El Salvador's interests [3]	26	26
Total number of implemented measures affecting El Salvador's commercial interests	45	42
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect El Salvador's commercial interests	6	5
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm El Salvador's foreign commercial interests	6	5
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm El Salvador's commercial interests	41	41

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "El Salvador" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.50. El Salvador state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting El Salvador's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of El Salvador's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	0	0
Total number of El Salvador's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of El Salvador's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of El Salvador's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by El Salvador that harm foreign commercial interests.	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by El Salvador that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by El Salvador that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "El Salvador" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.51. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting El Salvador commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	4
Belgium	4
Finland	4
Germany	4
Netherlands	4
Spain	4
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
France	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Italy	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
China	2
Indonesia	2
Russian Federation	2
United States of America	2
Brazil	1
Costa Rica	1
Kazakhstan	1
Malaysia	1
Nigeria	1
Thailand	1
Venezuela	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.52. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by El Salvador state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.53 Implemented measures that harm El Salvador commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	10	25.6%
Export subsidy	6	15.4%
Export taxes or restriction	5	12.8%
Competitive devaluation	4	10.3%
Public procurement	3	7.7%
Trade finance	3	7.7%
Local content requirement	2	5.1%
Tariff measure	2	5.1%
Import ban	1	2.6%
Migration measure	1	2.6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	2.6%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	2.6%
Total	39	100.0%

Table 8.54 El Salvador implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Falkland Islands

Table 8.55. Foreign state measures affecting Falkland Islands' commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Falkland Islands' commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Falkland Islands' commercial interests	2	2
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Falkland Islands' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Falkland Islands' commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Falkland Islands' interests [2]	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Falkland Islands' interests [3]	1	1
Total number of implemented measures affecting Falkland Islands' commercial interests	1	1
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Falkland Islands' commercial interests	1	1
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Falkland Islands' foreign commercial interests	1	1
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Falkland Islands' commercial interests	1	1

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Falkland Islands" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.56. Falkland Islands' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Falkland Islands' commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Falkland Islands' measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	0	0
Total number of Falkland Islands' measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of Falkland Islands' measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Falkland Islands' measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Falkland Islands that harm foreign commercial interests.	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Falkland Islands that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Falkland Islands that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Falkland Islands" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.57. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Falkland Islands' commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	1

Table 8.58. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Falkland Islands' state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.59. Implemented measures that harm Falkland Islands' commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	100.0%
Total	1	100.0%

Table 8.60. Falkland Islands' implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

French Guiana

Table 8.61. Foreign state measures affecting French Guiana's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting French Guiana's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting French Guiana's commercial interests	2	2
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of French Guiana's commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm French Guiana's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against French Guiana's interests [2]	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against French Guiana's interests [3]	0	0
Total number of implemented measures affecting French Guiana's commercial interests	0	0
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect French Guiana's commercial interests	2	2
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm French Guiana's foreign commercial interests	2	2
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm French Guiana's commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "French Guiana" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.62. French Guiana's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting French Guiana's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of French Guiana's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	0	0
Total number of French Guiana's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of French Guiana's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of French Guiana's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by French Guiana that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by French Guiana that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by French Guiana that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "French Guiana" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.63. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting French Guiana's commercial interests

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.64. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by French Guiana's state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.65 Implemented measures that harm French Guiana's commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.66 French Guiana's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Guatemala

Table 8.67. Foreign state measures affecting Guatemala's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Guatemala's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Guatemala's commercial interests	73	69
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Guatemala's commercial interests [1]	13	10
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Guatemala's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Guatemala's interests [2]	25	25
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Guatemala's interests [3]	35	34
Total number of implemented measures affecting Guatemala's commercial interests	59	56
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Guatemala's commercial interests	14	13
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Guatemala's foreign commercial interests	13	13
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Guatemala's commercial interests	44	43

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Guatemala" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.68. Guatemala's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Guatemala's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Guatemala's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	0	0
Total number of Guatemala's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of Guatemala's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Guatemala's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Guatemala that harm foreign commercial interests.	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Guatemala that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Guatemala that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Guatemala" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.69. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Guatemala's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
India	5
Belgium	4
Finland	4
France	4
Germany	4
Netherlands	4
Russian Federation	4
Spain	4
Argentina	3
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Indonesia	3
Ireland	3
Italy	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	2
Brazil	1
China	1
Costa Rica	1
Dominican Republic	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Pakistan	1
Thailand	1
Venezuela	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.70. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Guatemala's state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.71. Implemented measures that harm Guatemala's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	13	23.6%
Export subsidy	11	20.0%
Export taxes or restriction	6	10.9%
Tariff measure	5	9.1%
Trade finance	5	9.1%
Public procurement	4	7.3%
Competitive devaluation	2	3.6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	3.6%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	3.6%
Import ban	1	1.8%
Import subsidy	1	1.8%
Local content requirement	1	1.8%
Migration measure	1	1.8%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	1.8%
Total	55	100.0%

Table 8.72. Guatemala's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Guyana

Table 8.73. Foreign state measures affecting Guyana's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Guyana's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Guyana's commercial interests	31	30
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Guyana's commercial interests [1]	7	6
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Guyana's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Guyana's interests [2]	14	14
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Guyana's interests [3]	10	10
Total number of implemented measures affecting Guyana's commercial interests	24	23
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Guyana's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Guyana's foreign commercial interests	6	6
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Guyana's commercial interests	34	34

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Guyana" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.74. Guyana's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Guyana's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Guyana's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	0	0
Total number of Guyana's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of Guyana's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Guyana's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Guyana that harm foreign commercial interests.	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Guyana that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Guyana that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Guyana" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

COUNTRY

Table 8.75. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Guyana's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	2
Belgium	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
Austria	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	1
China	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
European Communities	1
Finland	1
France	1
Germany	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Netherlands	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Spain	1
Sweden	1
United States of America	1
Venezuela	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.76. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Guyana's state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.77. Implemented measures that harm Guyana's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	4	20.0%
Export taxes or restriction	4	20.0%
Export subsidy	3	15.0%
Trade finance	3	15.0%
Competitive devaluation	2	10.0%
Local content requirement	1	5.0%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	5.0%
Public procurement	1	5.0%
Tariff measure	1	5.0%
Total	20	100.0%

Table 8.78. Guyana's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Honduras

Table 8.79. Foreign state measures affecting Honduras' commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Honduras' commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Honduras' commercial interests	51	49
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Honduras's commercial interests [1]	9	7
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Honduras's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Honduras's interests [2]	17	17
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Honduras's interests [3]	25	25
Total number of implemented measures affecting Honduras's commercial interests	42	41
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Honduras's commercial interests	9	8
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Honduras's foreign commercial interests	8	8
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Honduras's commercial interests	39	39

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Honduras" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.80. Honduras state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Honduras's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Honduras's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	0	0
Total number of Honduras's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of Honduras's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Honduras's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Honduras that harm foreign commercial interests.	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Honduras that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Honduras that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Honduras" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.81. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Honduras commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
India	5
Argentina	4
Belgium	2
Finland	2
France	2
Netherlands	2
Spain	2
United States of America	2
Austria	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	1
China	1
Costa Rica	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Estonia	1
European Communities	1
Germany	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Ireland	1
Italy	1
Japan	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Pakistan	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Russian Federation	1
Slovakia	1
Slovenia	1
Sweden	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Venezuela	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.82. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Honduras state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.83. Implemented measures that harm Honduras commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	9	23.1%
Export subsidy	9	23.1%
Export taxes or restriction	4	10.3%
Trade finance	4	10.3%
Tariff measure	3	7.7%
Competitive devaluation	2	5.1%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	5.1%
Public procurement	2	5.1%
Import ban	1	2.6%
Import subsidy	1	2.6%
Local content requirement	1	2.6%
Migration measure	1	2.6%
Total	39	100.0%

Table 8.84. Honduras implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Mexico

Table 8.85. Foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	243	230
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Mexico's commercial interests [1]	59	54
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Mexico's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mexico's interests [2]	59	54
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mexico's interests [3]	125	122
Total number of implemented measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	208	198
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Mexico's commercial interests	35	32
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Mexico's foreign commercial interests	29	27
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Mexico's commercial interests	56	56

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Mexico" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.86. Mexico's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Mexico's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	19	9
Total number of Mexico's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	7	4
Total number of Mexico's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	4	1
Total number of Mexico's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	8	4
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests.	79	75
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests	27	24
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests	32	31

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Mexico" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.87. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	30
Argentina	11
India	8
France	7
Indonesia	7
United States of America	7
Brazil	6
Netherlands	5
Canada	4
China	4
Italy	4
Spain	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
Belgium	3
Finland	3
Germany	3
Poland	3
Slovakia	3
Sweden	3
Venezuela	3
Austria	2
Belarus	2
Bolivia	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
European Communities	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Japan	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Nigeria	2
Portugal	2
Republic of Korea	2
Romania	2
Slovenia	2
South Africa	2
Switzerland	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Ukraine	2
Australia	1
Ecuador	1
Ethiopia	1
Iran	1
Kazakhstan	1
Malaysia	1
Pakistan	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Thailand	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.88. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Mexico's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	5
United States of America	4
Indonesia	2
Malaysia	2
Philippines	2
Thailand	2
Viet Nam	2
Argentina	1
Australia	1
Austria	1
Brazil	1
Canada	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Colombia	1
Cuba	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Dominican Republic	1
France	1
Germany	1
Guatemala	1
Hungary	1
India	1
Israel	1
Italy	1
Japan	1
Pakistan	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Slovenia	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
South Africa	1
Spain	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1

Table 8.89. Implemented measures that harm Mexico's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	50	27.0%
Tariff measure	29	15.7%
Export subsidy	17	9.2%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	10	5.4%
Export taxes or restriction	9	4.9%
Local content requirement	8	4.3%
Public procurement	8	4.3%
Migration measure	7	3.8%
Consumption subsidy	6	3.2%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	3.2%
Trade finance	6	3.2%
Competitive devaluation	5	2.7%
Import ban	4	2.2%
Other service sector measure	3	1.6%
State-controlled company	3	1.6%
Import subsidy	2	1.1%
Intellectual property protection	2	1.1%
Investment measure	2	1.1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	1.1%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	2	1.1%
State trading enterprise	2	1.1%
Sub-national government measure	1	0.5%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	0.5%
Total	185	100.0%

Table 8.90. Mexico's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	60.0%
Tariff measure	2	20.0%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	10.0%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	1	10.0%
Total	10	100.0%

Nicaragua

Table 8.91. Foreign state measures affecting Nicaragua's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Nicaragua's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Nicaragua's commercial interests	45	44
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Nicaragua's commercial interests [1]	7	6
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Nicaragua's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Nicaragua's interests [2]	18	18
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Nicaragua's interests [3]	20	20
Total number of implemented measures Nicaragua's	38	37
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Nicaragua's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Nicaragua's foreign commercial interests	7	7
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Nicaragua's commercial interests	39	39

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Nicaragua" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.92. Nicaragua's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Nicaragua's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Nicaragua's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	0	0
Total number of Nicaragua's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of Nicaragua's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Nicaragua's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Nicaragua that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Nicaragua that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Nicaragua that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Nicaragua" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.93. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Nicaragua's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Finland	4
France	4
Spain	4
Argentina	3
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Germany	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Italy	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Netherlands	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	2
Brazil	1
China	1
Costa Rica	1
India	1
Japan	1
Russian Federation	1
South Africa	1
Venezuela	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.94. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Nicaragua's state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.95 Implemented measures that harm Nicaragua's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	9	25.0%
Export subsidy	8	22.2%
Trade finance	4	11.1%
Export taxes or restriction	3	8.3%
Tariff measure	3	8.3%
Competitive devaluation	2	5.6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	5.6%
Import ban	1	2.8%
Import subsidy	1	2.8%
Local content requirement	1	2.8%
Migration measure	1	2.8%
Public procurement	1	2.8%
Total	36	100.0%

Table 8.96 Nicaragua's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Panama

Table 8.97. Foreign state measures affecting Panama's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Panama's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Panama's commercial interests	79	78
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Panama's commercial interests [1]	18	17
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Panama's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Panama's interests [2]	27	27
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Panama's interests [3]	34	34
Total number of implemented measures affecting Panama's commercial interests	67	66
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Panama's commercial interests	12	12
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Panama's foreign commercial interests	12	12
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Panama's commercial interests	46	46

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Panama" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.98. Panama's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Panama's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Panama's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	0	0
Total number of Panama's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of Panama's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Panama's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Panama that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Panama that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Panama that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Panama" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.99. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Panama's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	5
India	4
Belgium	3
Finland	3
Germany	3
Indonesia	3
Russian Federation	3
Spain	3
Austria	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
European Communities	2
France	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Italy	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Netherlands	2
Poland	2
Portugal	2
Republic of Korea	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Sweden	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
Venezuela	2
Belarus	1
Brazil	1
China	1
Costa Rica	1
Ecuador	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
South Africa	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
United States of America	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.100. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Panama's state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.101. Implemented measures that harm Panama's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	14	23.7%
Export subsidy	12	20.3%
Export taxes or restriction	6	10.2%
Tariff measure	6	10.2%
Trade finance	6	10.2%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	3	5.1%
Competitive devaluation	2	3.4%
Import ban	2	3.4%
Import subsidy	2	3.4%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.7%
Investment measure	1	1.7%
Migration measure	1	1.7%
Other service sector measure	1	1.7%
Public procurement	1	1.7%
State trading enterprise	1	1.7%
Total	59	100.0%

Table 8.102. Panama's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction.

Paraguay

Table 8.103. Foreign state measures affecting Paraguay's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Paraguay's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Paraguay's commercial interests	57	55
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Paraguay's commercial interests [1]	6	5
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Paraguay's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Paraguay's interests [2]	18	18
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Paraguay's interests [3]	33	32
Total number of implemented measures affecting Paraguay's commercial interests	51	49
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Paraguay's commercial interests	6	6
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Paraguay's foreign commercial interests	6	6
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Paraguay's commercial interests	39	39

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Paraguay" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.104. Paraguay's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Paraguay's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Paraguay's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	4	4
Total number of Paraguay's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	1	1
Total number of Paraguay's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Paraguay's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	3	3
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Paraguay that harm foreign commercial interests	67	67
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Paraguay that harm foreign commercial interests	10	10
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Paraguay that harm foreign commercial interests	15	15

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Paraguay" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.105. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Paraguay's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	12
Spain	5
Belgium	4
Brazil	4
France	4
Germany	4
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Finland	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Italy	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Netherlands	3
Poland	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Russian Federation	2
China	1
Ecuador	1
India	1
Japan	1
Nigeria	1
South Africa	1
Venezuela	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.106. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Paraguay's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Brazil	3
China	3
Argentina	2
Bolivia	2
Uruguay	2
Chile	1
Colombia	1
France	1
Germany	1
India	1
Indonesia	1
Israel	1
Spain	1
Switzerland	1
United States of America	1

Table 8.107. Implemented measures that harm Paraguay's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	11	21.2%
Export subsidy	9	17.3%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	6	11.5%
Export taxes or restriction	5	9.6%
Trade finance	5	9.6%
Tariff measure	4	7.7%
Competitive devaluation	3	5.8%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	3.8%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.9%
Import ban	1	1.9%
Import subsidy	1	1.9%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.9%
Investment measure	1	1.9%
Public procurement	1	1.9%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	1.9%
Total	52	100.0%

Table 8.108. Paraguay's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	40.0%
Local content requirement	1	20.0%
Public procurement	1	20.0%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	20.0%
Total	5	100.0%

Peru

Table 8.109. Foreign state measures affecting Peru's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Peru's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Peru's commercial interests	93	90
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Peru's commercial interests [1]	11	9
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Peru's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Peru's interests [2]	25	25
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Peru's interests [3]	57	56
Total number of implemented measures affecting Peru's commercial interests	83	80
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Peru's commercial interests	10	10
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Peru's foreign commercial interests	10	10
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Peru's commercial interests	49	49

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Peru" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.110. Peru's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Peru's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Peru's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	7	0
Total number of Peru's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	1	0
Total number of Peru's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	4	0
Total number of Peru's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	2	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Peru that harm foreign commercial interests.	2	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Peru that harm foreign commercial interests	2	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Peru that harm foreign commercial interests	2	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Peru" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.111. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Peru's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	11
France	6
Russian Federation	6
India	5
Spain	5
Netherlands	4
Belgium	3
Brazil	3
Finland	3
Germany	3
Indonesia	3
Austria	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
European Communities	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Italy	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Poland	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Sweden	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
United States of America	2
Venezuela	2
Bolivia	1
Canada	1
China	1
Ecuador	1
Japan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Malaysia	1
Nigeria	1
Pakistan	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Republic of Korea	1
South Africa	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.112. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Peru's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
India	1
United States of America	1

Table 8.113. Implemented measures that harm Peru's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	17	20.2%
Export subsidy	13	15.5%
Export taxes or restriction	10	11.9%
Tariff measure	9	10.7%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	6	7.1%
Public procurement	6	7.1%
Trade finance	6	7.1%
Competitive devaluation	4	4.8%
Import ban	2	2.4%
Investment measure	2	2.4%
Local content requirement	2	2.4%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	2.4%
Consumption subsidy	1	1.2%
Import subsidy	1	1.2%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.2%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure	1	1.2%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	1.2%
Total	84	100.0%

Table 8.114. Peru's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	3	100.0%
Total	3	100.0%

Suriname

Table 8.115. Foreign state measures affecting Suriname's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Suriname's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Suriname's commercial interests	17	16
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Suriname's commercial interests [1]	3	2
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Suriname's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Suriname's interests [2]	7	7
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Suriname's interests [3]	7	7
Total number of implemented measures affecting Suriname's commercial interests	15	14
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Suriname's commercial interests	2	2
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Suriname's foreign commercial interests	2	2
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Suriname's commercial interests	7	7

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Suriname" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.116. Suriname's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Suriname's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Suriname's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	0	0
Total number of Suriname's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of Suriname's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Suriname's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Suriname that harm foreign commercial interests.	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Suriname that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Suriname that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Suriname" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.117. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Suriname's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	1
Belgium	1
Brazil	1
China	1
France	1
Netherlands	1
Nigeria	1

Table 8.118. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Suriname's state measures

No measures reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.119. Implemented measures that harm Suriname's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	4	33.3%
Trade finance	3	25.0%
Export subsidy	2	16.7%
Competitive devaluation	1	8.3%
Export taxes or restriction	1	8.3%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	8.3%
Total	12	100.0%

Table 8.120. Suriname's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures reported for this jurisdiction.

Uruguay

Table 8.121. Foreign state measures affecting Uruguay's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Uruguay's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Uruguay's commercial interests	111	108
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Uruguay's commercial interests [1]	19	17
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Uruguay's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Uruguay's interests [2]	33	33
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Uruguay's interests [3]	59	58
Total number of implemented measures affecting Uruguay's commercial interests	93	90
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Uruguay's commercial interests	18	18
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Uruguay's foreign commercial interests	17	17
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Uruguay's commercial interests	51	51

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Uruguay" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.122. Uruguay's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Uruguay's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Uruguay's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	1	1
Total number of Uruguay's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	1	1
Total number of Uruguay's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	0	0
Total number of Uruguay's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	0	0
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Uruguay that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Uruguay that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Uruguay that harm foreign commercial interests	0	0

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Uruguay" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.123. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Uruguay's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	14
Russian Federation	10
India	4
Belgium	3
Finland	3
France	3
Germany	3
Indonesia	3
Netherlands	3
Austria	2
Belarus	2
Brazil	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
European Communities	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Italy	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malta	2
Morocco	2
Paraguay	2
Poland	2
Portugal	2
Republic of Korea	2
Romania	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2
Spain	2
Sweden	2
Switzerland	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
United States of America	2
China	1
Ecuador	1
Ghana	1
Iran	1
Japan	1
Kazakhstan	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Malaysia	1
Nigeria	1
South Africa	1
Thailand	1
Venezuela	1
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.124. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Uruguay's state measures

No measures reported for this jurisdiction.

Table 8.125. Implemented measures that harm Uruguay's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	17	18.9%
Tariff measure	16	17.8%
Export subsidy	13	14.4%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	11	12.2%
Export taxes or restriction	9	10.0%
Trade finance	6	6.7%
Competitive devaluation	3	3.3%
Local content requirement	3	3.3%
Public procurement	3	3.3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	2.2%
Import ban	1	1.1%
Import subsidy	1	1.1%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.1%
Investment measure	1	1.1%
Other service sector measure	1	1.1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1.1%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	1	1.1%
Total	90	100.0%

Table 8.126. Uruguay's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures reported for this jurisdiction.

Venezuela

Table 8.127. Foreign state measures affecting Venezuela's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Venezuela's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Venezuela's commercial interests	84	83
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Venezuela's commercial interests [1]	15	14
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Venezuela's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Venezuela's interests [2]	26	26
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Venezuela's interests [3]	43	43
Total number of implemented measures affecting Venezuela's commercial interests	71	70
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Venezuela's commercial interests	13	13
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Venezuela's foreign commercial interests	13	13
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Venezuela's commercial interests	22	22

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Venezuela" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.128. Venezuela's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Venezuela's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Venezuela's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	10	10
Total number of Venezuela's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	4	4
Total number of Venezuela's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	2	2
Total number of Venezuela's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	4	4
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Venezuela that harm foreign commercial interests	784	784
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Venezuela that harm foreign commercial interests	38	38
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Venezuela that harm foreign commercial interests	72	72

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting "Venezuela" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

Table 8.129. Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Venezuela's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	9
Belgium	1
Bolivia	1
Brazil	1
China	2
Ecuador	1
Finland	1
France	2
Germany	1
India	5
Indonesia	3
Japan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Malaysia	1
Nigeria	1
Russian Federation	3
South Africa	2
Spain	3
Thailand	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United States of America	3
Viet Nam	1

Table 8.130. Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Venezuela's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Colombia	3
Mexico	3
Argentina	2
Austria	2
Brazil	2
Chile	2
China	2
Ecuador	2
France	2
Italy	2
Japan	2
Panama	2
Peru	2
Republic of Korea	2
Spain	2
Sweden	2
Thailand	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
United States of America	2
Albania	1
Australia	1
Barbados	1
Belgium	1
Bolivia	1
Bulgaria	1
Canada	1
Costa Rica	1
Cuba	1
Czech Republic	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Denmark	1
Dominican Republic	1
Egypt	1
El Salvador	1
Estonia	1
Finland	1
Germany	1
Greece	1
Guatemala	1
Guyana	1
Haiti	1
Honduras	1
Hungary	1
India	1
Indonesia	1
Ireland	1
Israel	1
Jamaica	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malaysia	1
Morocco	1
Netherlands	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
New Zealand	1
Nicaragua	1
Norway	1
Pakistan	1
Paraguay	1
Philippines	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Russian Federation	1
Singapore	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Slovakia	1
South Africa	1
Switzerland	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Turkey	1
Ukraine	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Uruguay	1

Table 8.131. Implemented measures that harm Venezuela's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	13	21.3%
Export subsidy	8	13.1%
Export taxes or restriction	7	11.5%
Public procurement	7	11.5%
Tariff measure	7	11.5%
Trade finance	5	8.2%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	4	6.6%
Competitive devaluation	3	4.9%
Import ban	2	3.3%
Import subsidy	1	1.6%
Intellectual property protection	1	1.6%
Investment measure	1	1.6%
Local content requirement	1	1.6%
Migration measure	1	1.6%
Total	61	100.0%

Table 8.132. Venezuela's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Investment measure	2	25.0%
Competitive devaluation	1	12.5%
Export subsidy	1	12.5%
Import ban	1	12.5%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	12.5%
State-controlled company	1	12.5%
Trade finance	1	12.5%
Total	8	100.0%